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In 1917 the Bolsheviks anticipated, on the basis of the Marxist classics, that the 
proletarian revolution would put an end to bureaucracy. However, soon after the revolution many 
within the Bolshevik Party, including Trotsky, were denouncing Soviet bureaucracy as a 
persistent problem.  In fact, for Trotsky the problem of Soviet bureaucracy became the central 
political and theoretical issue that preoccupied him for the remainder of his life. This study 
examines the development of Leon Trotsky’s views on that subject from the first years after the 
Russian Revolution through the completion of his work The Revolution Betrayed in 1936. In his 
various writings over these years Trotsky expressed three main understandings of the nature of 
the problem: During the civil war and the first years of NEP he denounced inefficiency in the 
distribution of supplies to the Red Army and resources throughout the economy as a whole. By 
1923 he had become concerned about the growing independence of the state and party 
apparatuses from popular control and their increasing responsiveness to alien class pressures. 
Then in later years Trotsky depicted the bureaucracy as a distinct social formation, motivated by 
its own narrow interests, which had attained a high degree of autonomy from all social classes. 
Throughout the course of this evolution, Trotsky’s thinking was influenced by factors that 
included his own major concerns at the time, preexisting images and analyses of bureaucracy, 
and Trotsky’s interpretation of unfolding events. In turn, at each point Trotsky’s understanding 
of the general nature of the problem of Soviet bureaucracy directed and shaped his political 
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activities and his analyses of new developments. The picture of Trotsky that emerges is of an 
individual for whom ideas and theories were extremely important as means of understanding the 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
For most of the last two decades of his life, the central political and theoretical issue that 
occupied Leon Trotsky was the problem of Soviet bureaucracy. Even in the years immediately 
after the Bolshevik Revolution, Trotsky criticized various manifestations of bureaucratic 
inefficiency in the military and economic organs of the Soviet Union. By late 1923 he had begun 
to detect the corrosive presence of bureaucratism—involving authoritarianism, excessive 
centralism, and conservatism—in the Soviet state and the Bolshevik Party. During the party 
struggle of 1926-1927, Trotsky even more vigorously denounced bureaucratism in the state and 
party apparatuses, which he saw as increasingly repressive and as highly responsive to bourgeois 
pressure. This was a view Trotsky continued to develop and apply until 1933. Finally, in later 
years Trotsky constructed a new theory, most fully articulated in The Revolution Betrayed, to 
explain how a privileged bureaucracy had managed to attain an unprecedented degree of 
autonomy from all social classes of Soviet society.  
An examination of the development of Trotsky’s thinking on this question is important 
for a number of reasons, including its value in explaining the actions of one of the most 
important political figures of the twentieth century. It is the contention of this dissertation that 
much of Trotsky’s political behavior can be understood only in light of his analysis of 
bureaucracy. For example, a familiarity with Trotsky’s views on glavkokratiia in the early 1920s 
is required to comprehend his early preoccupation with central economic planning. A grasp of 
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what Trotsky, as well as Lenin, meant by the term bureaucracy in late 1922 is needed in order to 
appreciate the significance of the famous “bloc” the two leaders forged at that time. An 
understanding of Trotsky’s theory of bureaucracy in 1926-1927 is essential for recognizing the 
close relationship between the political, economic, and international demands he raised in the 
party struggle during those years. Similarly, an acquaintance with Trotsky’s 1926-1927 theory is 
necessary to fathom his refusal to form a broad alliance with the party right in 1928-1929, his 
readiness to accept at face value the accusations in the show trials of the First Five-Year Plan, his 
perpetual anticipation of a sharp turn to the right in economic and Comintern policy in the early 
1930s, his hesitation over a break with the Comintern in mid-1933, and then the speed with 
which he subsequently discarded one after another of his preciously held positions in late 1933. 
Beyond that, a study of Trotsky’s views on bureaucracy is important from the perspective 
of the history of ideas. Martin Krygier has noted the impact of Trotsky’s post-1923 writings on 
both Marxist and non-Marxist students of bureaucracy, observing that Trotsky’s writings “had a 
considerable influence on the reception of the concept of bureaucracy by later Marxists and by 
many non- or ex-Marxists.”1 Perhaps even more significantly, a number of scholars have 
commented upon the influence of Trotsky’s writings—especially his later work—on serious and 
scholarly work dealing with the phenomenon of Stalinism. Thus, in 1958 John Plamenatz 
asserted, “As an indictment of Stalinism, Trotsky’s account of Soviet Russia is formidable. So 
much so, indeed, that some version or other of it has been adopted by nearly all of Stalin’s more 
plausible critics.”2 More recently, Duncan Hallas has observed that whatever criticisms can be 
made of Trotsky’s analysis of Stalinism, “it has been the starting point for all serious analysis 
from a Marxist point of view”; and Henry Reichman has asserted that “it is Leon Trotsky’s 
critique that continues to shape key elements of what many scholars—including some otherwise 
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hostile to Marxism—regard as Stalinism.”3 Thus, a study of Trotsky’s views on both 
bureaucracy and Stalinism is important for understanding the origins of more recent analyses of 
those phenomena. 
Finally, a clarification of Trotsky’s developed views on bureaucracy is essential for 
anyone who would attempt to apply his theory to a study of Soviet history, or to the 
contemporary process of capitalist restoration in Russia and Eastern Europe. Various scholars 
have commented upon, not only the past influence, but also the current significance of Trotsky’s 
analysis of Stalinism. Thus, in 1979 Baruch Knei-Paz asserted that no one had done more than 
Trotsky “to show the social and historical roots of Stalinism,” and that “it was, and in many ways 
still is, one of the most perceptive theoretical accounts of it.”4 And in 1983 Perry Anderson 
depicted Trotsky’s general interpretation of Stalinism as being “to this day the most coherent and 
developed theorization of the phenomenon within the Marxist tradition.”5 Furthermore, a number 
of writers have insisted upon the continuing value of Trotsky’s later theory of bureaucracy for 
understanding the process of capitalist restoration in Russia and Eastern Europe. For example, in 
1995 M. I. Voyeikov, professor of economics at the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted that “in 
The Revolution Betrayed in the mid 1930s” Trotsky “described with remarkable accuracy that 
which took place in our country in the early 1990s.”6 In 2001 the British Trotskyist Alan Woods 
observed that Trotsky’s analysis of Stalinism, “with a delay of 60 years,” had been “completely 
vindicated by history.”7 Similarly, in recent years Western social scientists such as Stephen 
White and Allen C. Lynch have turned to Trotsky’s 1936 observations to illuminate the 
dynamics of capitalist restoration.8 However, to apply Trotsky’s later theory presupposes an 
intimate familiarity with it; and that in turn requires an understanding of how Trotsky’s views 
evolved over time. As Trotsky asserted in a 1933 preface to a Greek edition of his 1923 writings 
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on bureaucracy, “It is impossible to understand correctly either scientific or political ideas 
without knowing the history of their development.”9  
Although a number of other works have dealt in one way or another with this topic, in 
each case the focus, the scope, or the depth of the study has differed from that of the present 
dissertation. Some have had broader or significantly different concerns; others have concentrated 
upon a single aspect of Trotsky’s theory or upon an examination of one work; while still others 
have attempted only a brief sketch of the development of Trotsky’s views on bureaucracy or 
Stalinism. 
Studies that have contained discussions of Trotsky’s analysis of bureaucracy but that 
have a broader or different focus have included biographies, general examinations of Trotsky’s 
political thought, works that have compared Trotsky’s views with those of another theorist, and 
studies of other aspects of Trotsky’s thinking that overlap with his analysis of the problem of 
bureaucracy. To date, perhaps the most extensive examination of the evolution of Trotsky’s 
theory of bureaucracy is contained in Isaac Deutscher’s classic three-volume biography—
especially in the second and third volumes, The Prophet Unarmed and The Prophet Outcast.10 
Other biographical works that are noteworthy in this regard include Robert Wistrich’s Trotsky: 
Fate of a Revolutionary and the fourth and fifth volumes of Tony Cliff’s Trotsky.11 General 
studies of Trotsky’s political thought that present outlines of his main, and especially later, ideas 
on bureaucracy are Duncan Hallas’s Trotsky’s Marxism, Baruch Knei-Paz’s The Social and 
Political Thought of Leon Trotsky, Ernest Mandel’s Trotsky as Alternative and Trotsky: A Study 
in the Dynamic of His Thought, and John Molyneux’s Leon Trotsky’s Theory of Revolution.12 
Books of a comparative nature that include discussions of Trotsky’s views on this topic are 
Michael M. Lustig’s Trotsky and Djilas: Critics of Communist Bureaucracy and Emanuele 
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Saccarelli’s Gramsci and Trotsky in the Shadow of Stalinism.13 Works focusing upon other 
aspects of Trotsky’s thought, but that also contain significant examinations of his analysis of the 
problem of bureaucracy, include three unpublished doctoral dissertations: Eileen Braun’s “The 
Prophet Reconsidered: Trotsky on the Soviet Failure to Achieve Socialism,” Thomas Egan’s 
“Leon Trotsky: His Political Philosophy in Opposition,” and David Law’s “Trotsky in 
Opposition: 1923-1940.” Published monographs in the same category are The Evolution of 
Trotsky’s Theory of Revolution by Curtis Stokes and Trotsky, Trotskyism and the Transition to 
Socialism by Peter Beilharz.14  
Yet other studies have concentrated more narrowly on one or another aspect of Trotsky’s 
theory of Soviet bureaucracy, or exclusively upon Trotsky’s most important work on the subject, 
The Revolution Betrayed. Among the former are works on the class nature of the Soviet Union 
that include discussions of Trotsky’s “workers’ state” position, such as The Bureaucratic 
Revolution by Max Shachtman, State Capitalism in Russia by Tony Cliff, Marxism and the 
U.S.S.R. by Paul Bellis, Trotskyism and the Dilemma of Socialism by Christopher Z. Hobson and 
Ronald D. Tabor, and Western Marxism and the Soviet Union by Marcel van der Linden.15 
Additionally, Jay Bergman, David Law, and Robert Warth all have published articles dealing 
with Trotsky’s use of the Thermidor analogy, while Robert McNeal has written on Trotsky’s 
perception of Stalin.16 Since 1936 a large number of authors have also written essays, reviews, 
articles, chapters, and pamphlets explaining, interpreting, extolling, criticizing, or testing the 
arguments of Trotsky’s most complete statement on the problem of Soviet bureaucracy, The 
Revolution Betrayed. These include works by C. A. Arthur, John P. Burkett, Richard B. Day, 
Theodore Edwards, H. C. Foxcroft, C. L. R. James, David H. Katz, Leszek Kolakowski, Loizos 
Michail, Deborah Duff Milenkovitch, and John Plamenatz.17 
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A fairly small number of studies have focused directly upon the topic of this dissertation: 
the evolution of Trotsky’s theory of Soviet bureaucracy. The most significant of these include 
Perry Anderson’s “Trotsky’s Interpretation of Stalinism,” Siegfried Bahne’s “Trotsky on Stalin’s 
Russia,” Martin Krygier’s “The Revolution Betrayed? From Trotsky to the New Class,” David 
W. Lovell’s Trotsky’s Analysis of Soviet Bureaucratization, Robert McNeal’s “Trotskyist 
Interpretations of Stalinism,” Hillel Ticktin’s “Leon Trotsky and the Social Forces Leading to 
Bureaucracy,” and Hillel Ticktin’s, “Leon Trotsky’s Political Economic Analysis of the USSR, 
1929-40.”18 All of these, including David W. Lovell’s monograph, are relatively brief essays. 
Many of the publications cited here have included important insights that will be 
incorporated in this dissertation. However, none has systematically and comprehensively 
examined the history of the evolution of Trotsky’s theory of the Soviet bureaucracy. The broader 
or differing focus of a number of these works has diverted their attention from that particular 
story. In other cases the narrower concentration upon one aspect of Trotsky’s theory or upon just 
one of his works has limited their contribution to the larger picture that will be examined in this 
dissertation. Finally, the sheer brevity of all previous works directly devoted to a discussion of 
the development of Trotsky’s views on bureaucracy and/or Stalinism has meant that important 
aspects of that development have been missed, important writings have been overlooked, and 
sometimes the significance of Trotsky’s other writings has been misjudged. 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of the development of 
Trotsky’s thinking on the problem of Soviet bureaucracy from shortly after the Bolshevik 
Revolution in 1917 through the writing of The Revolution Betrayed in 1936. As already 
suggested, Trotsky did not always use the word bureaucracy (biurokratiia) when dealing with 
this problem. Sometimes he employed other terms such as bureaucratism (biurokratizm or 
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kantseliarshchina), officialdom (chinovnichestvo), or red tape (volokita). Throughout this study 
there is an attempt to note the Russian word Trotsky employed at each point, as well as its 
closest English equivalent. However, the term bureaucracy is also used here in a generic sense—
for example, when discussing the Trotsky’s understanding of the “problem of bureaucracy” or 
“Trotsky’s theory of bureaucracy.” The dissertation begins with 1917 rather than 1923 as other 
works on this topic commonly do, in order to show the important ways Trotsky’s views on 
bureaucracy shaped his political positions and behavior from the time of the revolution through 
1922, and also to shed new light on the origins of his struggle against “bureaucratism” in the 
New Course controversy of 1923. It culminates with The Revolution Betrayed because this was 
Trotsky’s most complete and integrated statement on the problem of Soviet bureaucracy. 
However, that chapter also includes a brief summary of the additional developments in Trotsky’s 
theory up to his death in 1940. 
This study examines Trotsky’s theoretical understanding of the problem of bureaucracy 
at each point in its development while attempting to identify both the sources of Trotsky’s views 
and their implications for his perceptions of events and his actions. Special attention is paid to 
how the political and economic context, and especially Trotsky’s perception of that context, 
influenced his thinking on the problem of bureaucracy. Throughout, the influence upon Trotsky 
of other thinkers—such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Khristian Rakovskii, Victor Serge, and 
Trotsky’s son Leon Sedov—are examined. At the same time, the dissertation looks at how 
Trotsky’s understanding of the problem of bureaucracy in turn shaped his perceptions and 
evaluations of Soviet political developments as well as his own political behavior. At times, this 
study notes contradictions in Trotsky’s analysis or suggests errors or inadequacies in his 
interpretation of events in order to highlight some aspect of the development of his views. 
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However, no attempt is made to evaluate Trotsky’s final views from either an empirical or a 
normative perspective, or to compare Trotsky’s ultimate conclusions with those of contemporary 
scholars.  
For a systematic comparison of Trotsky’s views across time, a standard set of analytical 
categories is required. However, Trotsky’s views on the problem of bureaucracy changed so 
dramatically over the years that it is impossible to apply any one highly specific set of categories 
to all periods. Consequently, for each period the following five general categories of analysis, 
with occasional variation of terminology for stylistic reasons, are applied: Trotsky’s conception 
of the problem of bureaucracy, his understanding of the major characteristics of bureaucracy, his 
explanation of the causes of the problem, his beliefs regarding the consequences of bureaucracy, 
and his conclusions regarding the cure for the problem.  
In each period the conception of bureaucracy employed by Trotsky was his general 
understanding of the problem. Thus, in the first years after the revolution Trotsky consistently 
associated bureaucracy with inefficiency, most commonly describing it as “glavkokratiia”—a 
flawed system of organizing Soviet industry. By late 1923 he had begun to view the phenomenon 
of bureaucratism as a variety of political alienation involving excessive centralization of 
authority in the apparatuses of the state and the party, but also the susceptibility those 
apparatuses to alien class pressures. This conception received an even sharper expression in 
1926-1927 when Trotsky denounced the problem of bureaucratism, or of the Soviet bureaucracy, 
in terms of the growing centralism, authoritarianism, and repression in all Soviet political 
institutions, and also in terms of the responsiveness of the party leadership to an increasingly 
powerful bourgeois layer. In the early 1930s, although he began to describe the bureaucracy as a 
social formation that had usurped power, Trotsky continued to view it as highly receptive to 
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bourgeois pressures. However, by the mid 1930s he had concluded that the bureaucracy was a 
highly autonomous and self-sufficient “caste.” This was an image he would retain for the 
remainder of his life. 
The characteristics category involves the most salient features of bureaucracy for 
Trotsky at any given time. For example, characteristics of glavkokratiia in the early years of the 
revolution included the centralist domination by the industrial glavki of regional and local 
economic organs and enterprises, combined with the inadequate coordination of the activities of 
the different glavki with each other. In later years Trotsky frequently discussed such features as 
the bureaucracy’s size, its privileges, its attitudes, its political composition and patterns of 
recruitment, its internal divisions, and its policies.  
The causes category involves all of Trotsky’s different explanations for the origins of the 
problem of bureaucracy. Thus, in the early years Trotsky attributed the phenomenon of 
glavkokratiia to mistakes made in constructing socialist economic institutions with no historical 
precedent. By 1926-1927 he viewed the fundamental source of bureaucratism to be a shift in the 
balance of class forces that had pushed state and party apparatuses to the right, thereby 
necessitating restrictions on workers’ democracy. In the mid-1930s Trotsky explained the 
usurpation of power by the bureaucracy by reference to the various factors contributing to the 
demoralization of the proletariat, as well as to the function of the bureaucracy in mediating social 
conflict. Finally, in The Revolution Betrayed, while continuing to discuss factors that had 
weakened the Soviet working class after the revolution, Trotsky began to define the essential 
function of the Soviet bureaucracy in terms of the distribution of scarce resources in a backward, 
transitional society. 
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 The consequences category includes Trotsky’s understanding of both the immediate and 
the longer term effects of bureaucratization. In his earlier writings Trotsky concentrated upon the 
relatively short term effects of glavkokratiia and other forms of bureaucratic inefficiency in 
disrupting industrial production and military supply. Beginning with 1923 Trotsky became more 
concerned with the larger and longer-term prospect that bureaucratism might result in capitalist 
restoration. This remained a major concern of Trotsky’s until his death. However, throughout 
those years his position varied regarding both the immediacy of the danger and the path that such 
a restoration might take.  
 Most broadly, Trotsky’s views regarding the cure for the problem of bureaucracy fall into 
three approaches. From 1917-1922 Trotsky focused especially upon the structural reorganization 
of the Soviet economy. Roughly from 1923-1933 he advocated political reform of Soviet 
institutions, beginning with the party. Finally, during the years 1933-1940 he called for force or 
revolution to overturn bureaucratic rule. Furthermore, throughout the years 1923-1940 Trotsky’s 
thinking shifted and evolved regarding such issues as alliances, tactical demands, and the role of 
the international oppositional movement. 
Without exception, the primary sources used for this study were materials that have been 
published at one time or another. At an early stage of work on this dissertation, a number of 
previously unpublished documents from the Trotsky Archives at Harvard University were 
examined. However, Pathfinder Press subsequently published translations of those documents, 
including translations of several letters done by this author, and since then the original Russian 
texts also have appeared on the Web. Materials employed include books, pamphlets, resolutions, 
and articles written for public consumption, but also “circular letters,” private letters, and a diary 
published since Trotsky’s death. In light of the fact that most of Trotsky’s theoretical writings 
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were written for publication and the fact that so much additional material has appeared in print 
and on the Web in recent decades, this does not appear to represent a serious limitation.  
The English translations of Trotsky’s writings used in this dissertation were primarily 
those produced by political publishers—Pathfinder and Monad in the U.S., and New Park in the 
U.K.—plus a few other titles issued by various academic and commercial presses. These works 
include the following titles listed in roughly chronological order: The Trotsky Papers, 1917-1922 
(in English and Russian); the five-volume series How the Revolution Armed; the two-volume 
collection The First 5 Years of the Communist International; Terrorism and Communism; 
Lenin’s Fight against Stalinism (by Lenin and Trotsky); Problems of Everyday Life; the three-
volume series, The Challenge of the Left Opposition (1923-1929); Portraits: Political and 
Personal; the three-volume series Trotsky’s Writings on Britain; Leon Trotsky on Britain; Leon 
Trotsky on China; The Stalin School of Falsification; The Third International After Lenin; My 
Life: An Attempt at an Autobiography; the fourteen-volume series, The Writings of Leon Trotsky; 
the three-volume work, The History of the Russian Revolution; The Struggle Against Fascism in 
Germany; Leon Trotsky on France; Trotsky’s Notebooks, 1933-1935 (in English and Russian); 
Trotsky’s Diary in Exile, 1935; The Serge-Trotsky Papers; The Revolution Betrayed; The 
Spanish Revolution, 1931-39; The Transitional Program; In Defense of Marxism; and the 
biography Stalin.19  
To check the translations listed above, and for additional contributions by Trotsky on the 
problem of bureaucracy that have not yet been translated, a number of Russian-language sources 
were also utilized. These include two series originally published in the Soviet Union: Trotsky’s 
Kak vooruzhalas revoliutsiia: na voennoi rabote and his Sochineniia (twelve volumes published 
in fifteen parts). In this latter series, volume 15, Khoziaistvennoe stroitel’stvo Sovetskoi 
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respubliki, and volume 21, Kul’tura perekhodnogo perioda are especially important sources for 
Trotsky’s early views on bureaucracy.20 Additional Russian language sources consulted include 
the four-volume collection Kommunisticheskaia oppozitsiia v SSSR, 1923-1927; the collection 
(two volumes to date) Archiv Trotskogo: iz archivov revoliutsii, 1927-1928; Trotsky’s 
Stalinskaia shkola falsifikatsii; his autobiography, Moia zhizn: opyt avtobiografii; a facsimile 
edition in four volumes of his journal Biulleten’ oppozitsii; the full text of Trotsky’s Biulleten’ 
on the “Iskra Research” website; a collection of diary entries and letters entitled Dnevniki i 
pis’ma; Trotsky’s Chto takoe S.S.S.R. i kuda on idët?; his Stalin, and the full text of various 
letters, documents, and publications on the “Lib.Ru: Lev Trotskii” website.21 Additional primary 
sources used include Lenin’s Collected Works in English and Russian, Stalin’s Works in English 
and in Russian, the stenographic reports of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, stenographic 
reports of party congresses, and collections of important party resolutions in English and 
Russian.  
Various memoirs and numerous secondary sources were also employed, especially for 
preparing the historical background sections in each chapter. These secondary sources include 
general surveys of Soviet political and economic history and the history of Soviet foreign policy 
and of the Comintern, more specialized monographs and articles on various aspects of Soviet and 
Comintern history; biographies of Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin, and Bukharin, and all of the works 
cited above that deal directly or indirectly with Trotsky’s analysis of bureaucracy. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized chronologically in nine additional 
chapters: 
Chapter 2 discusses of the meaning of the term bureaucracy in popular usage and within 
the Marxist movement before the Bolshevik Revolution. In its original eighteenth century French 
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usage, bureaucracy meant the “rule of the bureaus” or “the bureaus that rule.” By the mid-
nineteenth century the term had migrated throughout Europe, and had acquired a host of 
secondary meanings and connotations including excessive formalism, apathy, ignorance, and 
inefficiency on the part of officials. All of these negative meanings and connotations were in 
popular use in Russia by the early twentieth century where they shaped the thinking of 
revolutionary socialists such as Lenin and Trotsky.  
However, another tradition that contributed even more directly to the understanding of 
Russian socialists was the classical Marxist analysis of bureaucracy. Marx and Engels, taking 
their understanding from the primary, popular meaning of the term, viewed bureaucracy in terms 
of the phenomenon of political alienation. That is, the state apparatus or bureaucracy was seen as 
an institution that had separated itself from the control of, and that had established its own rule 
over, society as a whole. In their mature works both writers argued that in normal periods there 
was a direct relationship between this development and the subordination of the state to the 
control of the dominant economic class.22 Furthermore, they predicted that the coming socialist 
revolution would begin to put an end to political alienation and the problem of bureaucracy by 
transforming the state into a tool of the proletariat and by instituting the radically democratic 
measures undertaken by the Paris Commune. Ultimately, they envisioned that the state and its 
bureaucracy would wither away with the abolition of classes and scarcity. Prior to the Bolshevik 
Revolution, first Trotsky and then Lenin reaffirmed these basic ideas, equating Russian soviets 
with the Paris Commune as interpreted by Marx and Engels. Lenin presented this view most 
sharply in The State and Revolution where he emphasized that the coming revolution would 
smash the old state bureaucracy by instituting fuller democracy, and then would begin to 
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construct a less bureaucratic machine that would make possible the gradual abolition of all 
bureaucracy. 
Chapter 3 discusses various understandings of the problem of bureaucracy that were held 
within the Bolshevik Party during the first years after the revolution. At that time there was a 
broad consensus within the party that the revolution had failed to resolve the problem of 
bureaucracy. However, there was little agreement about exactly what this meant. A series of 
opposition groupings within the party continued to define the problem in terms of political 
alienation as the growing centralization of power and exclusion of the masses from participation, 
and to link this directly to the recruitment of bourgeois specialists to serve as administrators in 
Soviet political, economic, and military institutions. Lenin, while advocating the use of 
bourgeois experts, shared some of the concerns of the oppositionists about the bureaucratizing 
influence of the specialists and about the failure to draw workers and peasants into the 
administration of the state. Along with the oppositionists, he also occasionally denounced 
manifestations of hyper-centralism and authoritarianism—especially in Trotsky’s behavior and 
proposals at the time of the trade union controversy of 1920, and in Stalin’s behavior and 
proposals regarding the Georgian affair of 1922. At the same time, Lenin frequently condemned 
“bureaucracy,” understood very differently as inefficiency in the functioning of Soviet 
institutions.  
In contrast to both the oppositionists and Lenin, during this period Trotsky rejected any 
association of the bureaucracy with either bourgeois specialists or with excessive political 
centralism. Rather, drawing upon various popular secondary associations of the term 
“bureaucracy,” Trotsky described the problem almost exclusively as related to inefficiency. 
Thus, he condemned as “bureaucratic” various oppositions’ resistance to the use of specialists; 
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and he denounced as “bureaucratic,” and “red-tapist” the inefficient work habits of Soviet 
officials. However, Trotsky’s most frequent and most developed analysis of bureaucracy during 
this period was devoted to “glavkokratiia”—inefficiency that he perceived in the very structure 
of Soviet economic institutions, involving the excessive centralism of the glavki and an 
insufficient degree of coordination between them. Against this, Trotsky proposed granting 
greater autonomy to local institutions and enterprises and the introduction of centralized 
economic planning. At the same time, Trotsky’s analysis led him to reject Lenin’s 
recommendations for combating bureaucracy through the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate 
and through the creation of a post for Deputy Chairmen of the Sovnarkom. However, in 
December 1922, in reaction to “bureaucratic” resistance to his repeated proposals for centralized 
planning and to maneuvering against Trotsky by other party leaders, Trotsky agreed to join 
Lenin in a “bloc against bureaucracy.” 
Chapter 4 discusses the dramatic transformation that occurred in Trotsky’s thinking on 
the problem of Soviet bureaucracy during the years 1923-1925. From an almost exclusive 
preoccupation with efficiency, Trotsky shifted the focus of his analysis to the problem of 
political alienation. At the same time, he increasingly directed his attention from bureaucracy in 
the state to the phenomenon of bureaucracy in the party. This transformation seems to have been 
prompted by a number of factors, including the leadership majority’s continued resistance to 
centralized planning. Early in 1923 Trotsky denounced the tendency toward “bureaucratism,” 
“departmentalism,” and departmental degeneration” within the party that arose because of the 
failure to unite specialized jobs through the adoption of real economic and political planning. 
When the leadership subsequently disregarded the decisions of the Twelfth Party Congress to 
implement planning and then increasingly resorted to the practices of secretarial appointment and 
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transfer of dissidents, during the New Course controversy of 1923-1924 Trotsky condemned the 
leadership’s preoccupation with details, but also the “tendency of the apparatus to think and 
decide for the whole” party.23 The ultimate danger for Trotsky was that this might result in the 
complete “opportunist degeneration” of the leadership. Following the defeat of the opposition, 
Trotsky temporarily retreated both politically and theoretically. However, a number of the anti-
bureaucratic themes from Trotsky’s New Course writings can be discerned in his speeches and 
writings from 1924-1925. 
Chapter 5 discusses the views on Soviet bureaucracy articulated by Trotsky in the 
political struggle of 1926-1927. In those years Trotsky returned to the offensive, joining with his 
former opponents Zinoviev and Kamenev in a United Opposition that sharply challenged the 
policies of the party leadership concerning the Soviet economy, international affairs, and the 
party regime. At the same time, building upon his insights from the New Course Controversy, 
Trotsky developed for the first time a complex yet remarkably elegant and coherent theory of 
Soviet bureaucracy based entirely upon the classical Marxist analysis of the phenomenon of 
political alienation.  
Specifically, Trotsky now argued that the disease of “bureaucratism” that now affected 
all Soviet political institutions had two essential aspects. On one hand, it included a further 
centralization of decision making, mounting authoritarianism, and political repression. At the 
same time, it included the growing responsiveness of the party leadership to the appeals and 
pressures of the kulaks and NEPmen, most clearly manifested in a steady drift to the right in 
economic and international policy. In Trotsky’s analysis, the ultimate source of both phenomena 
was a shift in the relative strength of social classes within the Soviet Union with the weakening 
of the proletariat due to demoralization and disillusionment, and a strengthening of the self-
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confidence and political activity of bourgeois elements. This shift had pushed the apparatus to 
the right, and at the same time had necessitated ever-greater deviations from workers’ 
democracy. Ultimately, both developments further weakened the proletariat. Trotsky’s greatest 
concern was that this process would culminate in capitalist restoration—most likely through the 
“Thermidorian” path of gradual, apparently minor, shifts in policy and in the party leadership. 
However, Trotsky believed that, until such a restoration of capitalism, the Opposition could still 
hope to reform the state and party by mobilizing the proletarian members of the party to press for 
an improvement in the party regime and political line. 
The years 1928-1929, discussed in Chapter 6, represented the beginning of a crisis in 
Trotsky’s theoretical understanding of Soviet bureaucracy as events increasingly contradicted his 
predictions.24 Although Trotsky had predicted that the crushing of the Opposition would result in 
the disintegration of the centrist current and further shifts of policy to the right leading to a 
restoration of capitalism. Instead, following the defeat of the United Opposition the Stalinist 
center actually consolidated power while initiating a dramatic shift of economic and Comintern 
policy to the left. In the face of this widening gulf between theory and reality, many 
Oppositionists abandoned the theory and capitulated. 
 In contrast, Trotsky continued to insist upon the validity of his theory, attempting to 
reconcile it with reality by a series of highly strained interpretations of events and a number of ad 
hoc theoretical modifications. Consistent with his theory, Trotsky endorsed the party leadership’s 
assertions regarding a “kulak strike” in late 1927 and early 1928, and its claims that the technical 
specialists in the Shakhty trial of 1928 had engaged in conspiracy to commit sabotage. Beyond 
that, on the basis of theoretical considerations Trotsky minimized the significance of the left turn, 
measuring its seriousness in terms of the leadership’s failure to reform the party regime. To the 
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extent that Trotsky recognized a turn had taken place in both Comintern and domestic policy, 
Trotsky dubiously attributed it to the pressure exerted by the working class and/or the 
Opposition.  
At the same time, the defeat of the party right by Stalin impelled Trotsky to modify his 
theory by increasingly emphasizing the relative autonomy of the apparatus. Specifically, he now 
asserted that in certain periods the “logic of the apparatus” had a greater impact upon events than 
the balance of class forces. In line with this, Trotsky began to suggest that a Stalinist victory 
could prepare the way for a directly “Bonapartist,” restoration of capitalism. In turn, this 
suggested to Trotsky the possibility of a “common effort” with the party right around democratic 
demands. At the same time, manifestations of autonomy by the apparatus reinforced Trotsky’s 
tendency to redefine the problem in terms of a “bureaucracy” that had usurped power, rather than 
one of “bureaucratism.” Nevertheless, to a large degree Trotsky largely retained the theory he 
had developed in previous years, and on that basis repeatedly continued to predict an imminent 
policy shift to the right.  
During Trotsky’s Turkish exile of 1929-1933, discussed in Chapter 7, the contradictions 
between his theory and developments in Soviet policy continued to widen. Despite Trotsky’s 
repeated predictions that a deep turn to the right was imminent, the leadership veered ever more 
sharply to the left in both its economic and Comintern polices, in the process adopting policy 
orientations so far to the left that they fell entirely outside of the framework assumed by 
Trotsky’s theory. Furthermore, Trotsky’s theory had depicted the worsening of the state and 
party regimes as directly related to the leadership’s rightist orientation. Yet, even while 
implementing its left course, the leadership continued to institute policies that, in Trotsky’s view, 
deviated more and more from the norms of workers’ democracy. 
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As in 1928-1929, Trotsky attempted to reconcile his theory with reality by a combination 
of methods, including forcing the situation into the Procrustean bed of his traditional theory, and 
introducing ad hoc theoretical modifications that suggested the bureaucracy was more 
autonomous than he previously imagined. The result was an analysis that was increasingly 
incoherent. Thus, on different occasions Trotsky found himself explaining the leftist economic 
orientation of the leadership as inspired by proletarian pressure, bourgeois influence, or the 
emotional states of an autonomous bureaucracy. At times he asserted the turn had been made 
against the wishes of the bureaucracy; while at other times he insisted it had been made by the 
bureaucracy. Sometimes he argued that the left turn had increased the danger of capitalist 
restoration, and other times that it had decreased the danger. Trotsky repeatedly defined as 
“centrist” a grouping that stood to the left of the Left Opposition while criticizing as “rightist” a 
party current which held views virtually indistinguishable from those of the left. Finally, he 
continued to denounce the “conservatism” of a leadership which was transforming the Soviet 
economy dramatically while implementing a radical leftist course internationally. 
Chapter 8 discusses the revolution that occurred in Trotsky’s thinking on the problem of 
Soviet bureaucracy during the period 1933-1936. The disastrous failure of Comintern policy in 
Germany in 1933 presented a new challenge to Trotsky’s traditional theory, compelling him to 
make one theoretical change after another that finally liberated his thinking from the theory he 
had developed in 1926-1927. Immediately, Trotsky gave up on his attempt to reform the 
Communist Party of Germany (KPD). That break initiated a chain reaction that overturned or 
modified a whole series of other political and theoretical positions—including Trotsky’s reform 
perspective for the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [AUCP(b)] and Soviet state, his 
definition of a workers’ state, his views on the relevance of the Thermidor and Bonapartism 
19 
analogies, and his explanation for the origins of the bureaucracy’s power. All of these changes 
reinforced his growing perception of the bureaucracy as a highly autonomous entity.  
Subsequently, Trotsky applied these insights in explaining the new right shifts on Soviet 
economic and international policy. Then, on the basis of these interpretations of recent policy 
developments, Trotsky initiated further theoretical modifications—including a complete revision 
of his views on Thermidor and Bonapartism, a dropping of the term centrism, and a call for a 
new political revolution— that supplemented and reinforced his new appreciation for the 
bureaucracy’s autonomy.  
Chapter 9 explains how the revolution of 1933-1936 in Trotsky’s theory culminated in 
his major theoretical work, The Revolution Betrayed. Much of that book restated for a general 
audience ideas that Trotsky had expressed in the international Trotskyist press since 1933. 
However, beyond that, The Revolution Betrayed contained a number of new ideas and emphases. 
More clearly than ever before Trotsky defined and stressed the socio-economic context of Soviet 
bureaucratization. This provided a framework for redefining the functional origins of 
bureaucratic power, for evaluating Soviet policy in all areas, and for starkly identifying the 
alternative futures confronting the USSR. Although in subsequent years Trotsky continued to 
write on Soviet political developments, in all his work after August 1936 he based his analysis 
on the theory of Soviet bureaucracy outlined in The Revolution Betrayed. 
Chapter 10 concludes this work with a summary of the development of Trotsky’s views 
on Soviet bureaucracy and with a brief indication of what that story means for our understanding 
of the theorist. The history of the evolution of Trotsky’s thinking on the problem of Soviet 
bureaucracy was a complex one. At each stage, his theorizing was influenced by his concerns 
about the principal problems and tasks confronting the Soviet Union and the world revolution, by 
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preexisting images and analyses of the problem of bureaucracy, and by his perceptions and 
analyses of current developments. In turn, his political activity and his analyses of events were, 
to a large degree, directed and shaped by his theoretical analysis of the problem of bureaucracy. 
The picture of Trotsky suggested by this account is of a man who greatly valued ideas and 
theories, both as a means of understanding the world and as a guide to changing it. 
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2.0  BUREAUCRACY BEFORE OCTOBER 
When Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, first began to address the issue of Soviet bureaucracy soon 
after the October Revolution of 1917, they derived their understanding of that problem from 
various sources. One of these was popular usage of the word bureaucracy in both Russia and 
Western Europe. In popular usage in the early twentieth century, the primary understanding of 
bureaucracy remained close to its original meanings. The word was first coined in eighteenth 
century France to refer to the rule of officials. Shortly after that, it was used to refer to a body of 
officials who ruled. Secondary definitions and connotations that emerged in the nineteenth 
century and that persisted into the twentieth included an excessive degree of formalism and 
paperwork, and the apathy, ignorance, and inefficiency of state officials.  
Consistent with the primary popular meaning, Marx and Engels viewed bureaucracy as 
related to the problem of political alienation. That is, they identified bureaucracy with a state 
apparatus that had established its independence from the control of society as a whole, and that 
ruled over society. They believed that in normal periods this alienation was directly related to the 
domination of the state by an exploitative class. Furthermore, they predicted that the problem of 
bureaucracy would be greatly reduced by the coming revolution, and that eventually it would 
wither away altogether. In the years and months preceding the October Revolution both Trotsky 
and Lenin reaffirmed this traditional Marxist analysis of bureaucracy. 
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Despite the expectations derived from Marxist theory, shortly after the revolution a wide 
range of Bolsheviks concluded that the problem of bureaucracy had not been eliminated. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, some Bolsheviks would define and attempt to understand the 
problem in terms of traditional Marxist analysis. On the other hand, Trotsky initially would draw 
upon popular secondary meanings of bureaucracy to define the central problem as one of 
inefficiency.  
2.1 ORIGINAL MEANINGS OF BUREAUCRACY  
Scholars have identified a variety of meanings of the term bureaucracy in current Western 
usage. Martin Albrow has counted seven and Fred Riggs has identified eleven contemporary uses 
of the word.1 Although it had not yet acquired quite that many meanings in either Western 
European or Russian discourse at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, it already had 
accumulated a wide range of denotations and connotations. Still, the most common popular 
understanding of bureaucracy remained close to its original meaning. 
By most accounts, the term bureaucratie, or bureaucracy, was first coined in 1745 by the 
Vincent de Gournay, the French Physiocrat who was also responsible for creating the expression 
laissez faire.2 De Gournay created it by combining the French bureau, which referred to offices 
where officials worked, with the Greek word kratein, meaning “to rule.” His intent was to 
identify a form of rule comparable to systems such as democracy and aristocracy. From the 
beginning the word was used as a pejorative to indicate the excessive power of state officials, 
while suggesting their tendency to meddle in areas beyond the bounds of their proper concern. 
De Gournay’s friend the Baron de Grimm observed in a letter to Diderot in 1764: 
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We [in France] are obsessed by the idea of regulation, and our 
Masters of Requests refuse to understand that there is an infinity of 
things in a great state with which a government should not concern 
itself. The late M. de Gournay . . . sometimes used to say: We have 
an illness in France which bids fair to play havoc with us; this 
illness is called “bureaumania”. Sometimes he used to invent a 
third or fourth or fifth form of government under the heading of 
bureaucracy.3 
 
Along the same lines, the following year Grimm remarked, “The real spirit of the laws of France 
is that bureaucracy of which the late M. de Gournay . . . used to complain so greatly; here the 
offices, clerks, secretaries, inspectors, and intendants are not appointed to benefit the public 
interest, indeed the public interest appears to have been established so that offices might exist.”4 
The term bureaucratie soon began to appear in French literary and popular discourse. Thus, in 
1789 the dramatist and writer Louis Sébastien Mercier explained in his Le Tableau de Paris that 
bureaucracy was a “word recently coined to indicate, in a clear and concise manner, the 
overgrown power possessed by simple clerks who, in the various offices of the administration, 
make up and push forward all sorts of projects, which they find most often in dusty drawers in 
the offices, and which they favor for reasons of their own, good and bad.”5 Somewhat more 
neutrally the 1798 supplement to the Dictionary of the French Academy defined bureaucracy 
simply as “Power, influence of the heads and staff of governmental bureau.”6 
In the following years, the word, together with its original meaning, began to find its way 
into other Western European languages. One of the earliest German uses of the term was the 
observation by Kant’s colleague Christian Klaus in 1799 that the Prussian state, “far from being 
an unlimited monarchy . . . is but a thinly veiled aristocracy . . . which blatantly rules the country 
as a bureaucracy.”7 Consistent with this usage, an 1813 edition of a German dictionary of foreign 
expressions defined bureaucracy as: “the Authority or power which various government 
departments and their branches arrogate to themselves and their fellow citizens.”8 The earliest 
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uses of the term in English also corresponded with this understanding of the term. Thus, in 1818 
the English writer Lady Morgan referred in Florence McCarthy to “the bureaucratie or office 
tyranny by which Ireland had been so long governed.”9 Similarly, articulating a theme that would 
become a common one in English writing on the subject, the writer Thomas Carlyle in 1850 
condemned bureaucracy as a “Continental nuisance” and observed that there was no “risk or 
possibility” that bureaucracy would arise in England, since “Democracy is hot enough here.”10  
As the term traveled geographically, its meaning began to evolve. One early important 
development involved the extension of the term’s referent beyond the rule by officials to include 
also the body of officials that ruled. For example, in his 1821 book Europe and the Revolution 
the German writer Johann Joseph von Görres described the bureaucracy as a civil institution 
comparable to the standing army.11 Likewise, in his 1848 work Principles of Political Economy 
the English philosopher John Stuart Mill opposed the concentration of all management skill and 
power of organized action “in a dominant bureaucracy.”12  
Meanwhile, a host of secondary characteristics related in various ways to the image of a 
ruling body of officials also came to be identified closely with the term. Bureaucracies 
increasingly were seen as concerned primarily with their own group interests. This was the case, 
for example, in the description in 1821 by Prussian statesman Freiherr vom Stein of the 
Bureaulisten as “a class for themselves—the clerical caste.”13 The internal hierarchy of state 
apparatuses was noted and viewed as related to the domination they exerted externally. Thus, an 
anonymous Hamburg pamphlet of 1844 compared the hierarchy of the Prussian bureaucracy to 
that of the military, asserting that in both, hierarchy was designed to maintain the “divine right of 
despotism” through “blind devotion and the eternally unchangeable acknowledgement of its 
infallibility.”14 Furthermore, bureaucracies increasingly were viewed as unproductive and 
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parasitical upon society. The same anonymous Hamburg pamphlet asserted that bureaucracy was 
“a powerful cancer [which] feasts voraciously, insatiably, and lives off the marrow and blood of 
the people.”15 
At the same time bureaucracy also began to be identified with other characteristics less 
clearly related to the original meaning, but associated in the public consciousness with the 
internal operations of state apparatuses or the personal characteristics of state officials. Robert 
von Mohl, professor of political science at Heidelberg, recorded a number of these in 1846, 
noting that these connotations varied depending upon the social group making the complaint. He 
observed, for example, that nobles condemned the inconsiderateness of officials, industrialists 
bemoaned their “indolence and apathy,” scholars derided bureaucratic ignorance, and artisans 
deplored unnecessary paperwork.16 A trait mentioned in von Mohl’s own definition that also 
came to be recognized as one of the hallmarks of bureaucracy was the tendency of officials to be 
“satisfied with purely formal conduct.”17 Another popularly perceived feature of bureaucracy 
was its inefficiency. Thus, an article published in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine in 1836 
complained of the bureaucratic organization of the French education system that it was not only 
despotic but also inefficient.18 Similarly, in 1867 British essayist Walter Bagehot unfavorably 
contrasted the inefficiency of bureaucracy with the normal efficiency of the business world and 
with public administration controlled by a democracy.19  
At times there was also a tendency to identify bureaucracy with a particular form of 
administration. After 1806, the Prussian system in which a collegium of officials took collective 
responsibility for a government function, was replaced by the bureau system in which 
responsibility at each level was placed in an individual. Since the bureau system resulted in faster 
decisions and greater unity and decisiveness of action, it was widely perceived that it also 
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enhanced the power of officials. Thus, the 1819 edition of the Brockhaus encyclopedia observed, 
“This bureaucracy becomes increasingly dangerous as the previous custom of conducting 
business through collegia falls into disuse.”20 It was not long before bureaucracy began to be 
identified, especially in Germany, with the bureau system. For example, in 1845 the socialist 
Karl Heinzen defined bureaucracy as “an administrative structure where a single official controls 
the administration, as opposed to a collegial structure.”21 At least for some, this in fact suggested 
that bureaucracy was characterized by a high degree of efficiency, not inefficiency.22  
A final development worth mentioning was the application of bureaucracy to bodies of 
functionaries outside of the state. This innovation is sometimes associated with the 1911 work 
Political Parties in which the German sociologist Robert Michels diagnosed the “oligarchical 
tendencies” within the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).23 However, by the first decade of 
the twentieth century the left wing of the socialist movement was already referring to the 
phenomena of bureaucracy and bureaucratism within the labor and socialist movements.24 
2.2 BUREAUCRACY IN RUSSIA 
The term bureaucracy [biurokratiia] seems to have arrived in Russia somewhat later than 
in Germany or Britain, but it was in use there at least by the mid-nineteenth century. References 
to bureaucrats [biurokraty] appeared in 1856 in “Russkie voprosy,” Nikolai Ogarev’s series of 
articles on the peasantry, and in 1857 in Nikolai Dobroliubov’s review article of Mikhail 
Saltykov’s Gubernskie ocherki.25 By the end of the nineteenth century bureaucracy and related 
words were commonly employed in Russia. From the beginning, the connotations of the term 
there were at least as pejorative as in the West, and perhaps even more so. Various contemporary 
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writers have noted that in Russia today the meaning of bureaucracy is always negative, never 
neutral or positive as it sometimes is in the West.26 The same was true in the decades preceding 
the Russian Revolution.  
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the primary meaning attached to 
bureaucracy in Russian remained closely tethered to de Gournay’s original understanding of the 
term. For example, in 1891 the Brockhaus and Efron Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ explained the 
first meaning of biurokratiia as “the direction which state administration assumes in the 
countries where all matters are concentrated in the hands of the organs of a central governmental 
power, acting on orders (of authorities) and through orders (by subordinates).”27 The first 
definition offered by the Slovar’ russkago iazyka, published by the Imperial Academy of Science 
in 1895, included “command by officials” [chinonachalie].28 Along the same lines, the 1912 
Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivogo velikorusskago iazyka defined bureaucracy as “administration where 
official command [chinonachalie] rules.29 Finally, about the same time the Granat 
Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ explained that biurokratiia meant “an administrative structure which 
is characterized by its complete alienation from life and by the despotic attachment to society of 
principles of government alien to its real interests.”30  
Beyond that, the connotations and secondary definitions of biurokratiia provided by these 
reference works also corresponded closely to the associations and meanings that had evolved in 
Western Europe. The 1891 Brokhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary provided an extensive 
discussion of these. It asserted that under bureaucracy “officialdom [chinovnichestvo] assumes a 
special, exceptional position—it feels itself the leading center of all social life and it forms a 
special caste outside of the people.” In fact, this dictionary identified “the alienation of 
officialdom from the rest of the population, . . . its caste exclusiveness” as one of the distinctive 
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features of bureaucracy. Among the disadvantages of bureaucracy the same work included the 
fact that matters requiring state intervention were usually conducted badly; that bureaucracy 
involved the unnecessary intervention of authorities; and that contact with bureaucratic organs of 
authority often occurred at the expense of the dignity of the average person. Also, Brokhaus and 
Efron asserted that, in contrast with “healthy administration” which subordinates form to 
essence, “bureaucracy observes form for the sake of itself and sacrifices the essence of the matter 
to it.”31 This latter tendency was closely related to the “paper-pushing” [bumazhnoe 
mnogopisanie] which Vladimir Dal’ in his 1912 Tolkovyi slovar’ included as a defining 
characteristic of bureaucracy.32 Another common association with biurokratiia was the notion of 
internal hierarchy suggested by the frequently offered synonym chinovnichestvo, often translated 
into English as “officialdom.”33 As Alan Kimball has explained, within the nineteenth century 
tsarist state,  
The word chinovnichestvo referred to the formal system of 
comprehensive national administration by state servitors holding 
rank—chin—up and down the “Table of Ranks”. The Table of 
Ranks established appropriate, hierarchical rungs for civilian, 
military, church, and royal court servitors.34  
  
Again, this emphasis upon hierarchy was noted explicitly in the 1912 Tolkovyi slovar’ by 
Vladimir Dal’, which defined biurokratiia in part as “graded subordination; the dependence of 
every official person on the next higher.”35 Furthermore, the association of biurokratiia with the 
German bureau system was evident in Pavlenkov’s 1918 dictionary of foreign words, which 
defined bureaucracy as a “system of administration by which the main head executes all orders 
under his own responsibility; it is contrasted with a collegial system.”36 
Reference works included many of these same associations in their definitions of the 
related term bureaucratism [biurokratizm]. For example, Pavlenkov’s 1913 Entsiklopedicheskii 
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slovar’ defined bureaucratism as “a system of conducting business by administration by office 
means, on the basis of the reports of subordinates in accordance with the instructions of higher 
superiors, not taking into consideration the wishes of the population or its representatives, with 
the observance of official secrecy.”37 Additionally, Pavlenkov’s 1918 dictionary of foreign 
words noted that “bureaucratism . . . signifies a completely formal, clerical carrying out of 
business, the subordination of truth and fact to form; the useless multiplication of files and 
business correspondence, and the abuse of power by a superior.”38 
Both in Russia and in exile, leaders of the Russian socialist movement such as Trotsky 
and Lenin absorbed and utilized all of these denotations and connotations of bureaucracy and 
bureaucratism current in Russia and in Western Europe. This wide range of meanings can be 
seen reflected in an article by Lenin written in April 1905. There, he responded to Menshevik 
accusations that the Bolsheviks advocated “bureaucratic centralism” in the party and the 
implementation of a “formal bureaucratic principle.” First, Lenin based his argument upon 
various secondary meanings of bureaucracy current in both Russia and Western Europe: 
Bureaucratism [biurokratizm], taken in general, may denote 
officialism [kantseliarshchina], red tape [volokita], formalism 
[bumazhnost’], paper answers [otpiski]. This sort of bureaucratism 
is evil . . . . It is clear to every reader who is at all conscientious 
that this is the kind of bureaucratism meant by the Bureau of 
Committees of the majority, so that to accuse Vperyod [Lenin’s 
paper] of contradicting itself is utter childishness.  
 
Continuing, Lenin again employed an understanding of bureaucracy more closely related to the 
primary meaning of rule by officials or officials: 
Bureaucratism [biurokratizm] may [also] mean infringement of the 
legitimate and, if we may say so, of the “natural” rights of every 
opposition, a fight waged against a minority by unfair means. Such 
bureaucratism is possible . . . but there is no principle involved in 
it. It must be combated by the establishment of constitutional 
guarantees of the rights of minorities.39 
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However, in the years before the October Revolution the thinking of Trotsky and Lenin about the 
question of bureaucracy was not just shaped by popular understanding of that issue. To a large 
extent it was also influenced by the writings of Marx and Engels on that subject. 
2.3 MARX AND ENGELS ON BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL ALIENATION 
Comments on bureaucracy can be found scattered throughout the writings of Marx and 
Engels on the state. Although they never explicitly defined the term, their understanding of the 
problem coincided closely with the popular usage which defined bureaucracy primarily in terms 
of a ruling body of state officials. Consistently, they used it as a pejorative for a state apparatus 
that had come to stand over and dominate society as a whole. That is, for both Marx and Engels, 
bureaucracy was viewed as an embodiment of political alienation.40 Although they perceived this 
problem to be especially pronounced in certain abnormal state forms, in their mature writings 
Marx and Engels described it as characteristic of all class states. They believed it would only 
begin to disappear in the proletarian state of the future. Many of these themes first appeared in 
embryonic form in Marx’s 1843 polemics against Hegelian political philosophy, The Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and On the Jewish Question.  
In his The Philosophy of Right Hegel had contrasted two spheres of Prussian society—
civil society and the state. In civil society, according to Hegel, men pursued their individual 
needs and self-interests. Although Hegel viewed the egoism of civil society as beneficial in some 
respects, he argued that it had engendered an eternal war of each against all that threatened to 
tear society apart. Fortunately, however, in Prussian society the conflicting private interests of 
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civil society were reconciled by the second sphere, the state, which promoted the collective, 
universal interests of society. Hegel believed that three Prussian political institutions participated 
in this mediation: the monarch, the legislature, and most importantly, the civil service. As 
opposed to all other classes of civil society, the civil service was a “universal class,” seeking 
only the common good.41 
The young Marx contemptuously rejected Hegel’s claim that the Prussian state was 
motivated by universal interests. In his Critique, Marx argued that the central institution of the 
modern state, the “bureaucracy,” was just one more self-seeking corporation, “a particular, self-
contained society within the state.”42 Rather than representing the true interests of society, the 
bureaucracy simply redefined the common good to correspond with its own particular interests. 
As Marx put it, “The bureaucracy appears to itself as the ultimate purpose of the state. . . . The 
bureaucracy holds the state, the spiritual essence of society, in thrall, as its private property.”43 
The bureaucracy hid this reality from the outside world by the veil of secrecy with which it 
surrounded all its operations. Internally, it disguised the truth from the bureaucracy’s own 
members by a “hierarchy of knowledge” in which “the apex entrusts insight into particulars to 
the lower echelons while the lower echelons credit the apex with insight into the universal, and 
so each deceives the other.”44 In the pursuit of its particular interests the bureaucracy attempted 
to control all aspects of society:  
Its crass spiritualism is revealed in its wish to do everything. That 
is to say, it makes will the prime cause because it is nothing but 
active existence and receives its content from outside itself, and 
can therefore only prove its own existence by moulding and 
limiting that content. For the bureaucrat the world is no more than 
an object on which he acts.45 
 
Against Hegel’s claim that the state resolved the conflicts of civil society, in his book On 
the Jewish Question Marx asserted that the state, rising out of these conflicts, depended upon 
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their continued existence for its legitimacy: “Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the 
state presupposes them in order to exist . . . . It is only in this way, above the particular elements, 
that the state constitutes itself as a universality.”46 In fact, according to Marx the state only 
emerged as an institution fully distinct from society in the modern era. Only in modern society 
with the abolition of all ties between individuals was it possible for the state to appear as the sole 
repository of the general interest. Having arisen out of the conflicts between particular interests, 
the state continually sought to perpetuate them. Thus, although the state initially attacked the 
corporations in the pursuit of its own aims, it ultimately was compelled to ensure their survival 
by force.47 
In his early writings Marx was still somewhat vague about how the political alienation 
characteristic of modern society was to be overcome. However, two conclusions already stood 
out: First, in his On the Jewish Question Marx argued that the separation of the state and its 
bureaucracy from civil society would have to be abolished through the elimination of the 
contradictions that divided civil society.48 Second, in the “Introduction” to his Critique this could 
only be achieved by a true universal class whose interests coincided with those of society as a 
whole. By late 1843 Marx had discovered this class in the proletariat.49  
Although Marx and Engels periodically referred to the problem of bureaucracy in later 
years, they never again dealt as extensively with this term as Marx had in 1843. Nevertheless, 
from their scattered references it is clear that they continued to associate it with the problem of 
political alienation. Furthermore, in some respects they continued to describe and explain this 
alienation in terms quite similar to Marx’s 1843 analysis. 
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2.4 THE CLASS STATE AND POLITICAL ALIENATION 
Not long after Marx explained the conception of the state as a manifestation of political 
alienation he, together with Frederick Engels, began to develop another conception of the state: 
as an instrument used by the dominant economic class to defend and extend its own interests. 
This view of the state appeared in the writings of Engels as early as 1844.50 Marx accepted the 
class state conception by the following year when he and Engels collaborated on their first joint 
work, The German Ideology. At that time they wrote that the state is “nothing more than the 
form of organisation which the bourgeois are compelled to adopt, both for internal and external 
purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests.”51 Perhaps the best-known 
expression of this view can be found in the Communist Manifesto (1848) where Marx and Engels 
asserted, “The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common 
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”52 More generally, Engels later described the state as being “as 
a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium 
of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires the means of holding 
down and exploiting the oppressed class.”53  
  
Two contemporary commentators, Richard Hunt and Robert C. Tucker, have noted the 
contradiction between the conception of the state expressed in these passages and that contained 
in Marx’s 1843 writings. Furthermore, they argue that Marx and Engels resolved this 
contradiction by analyzing the state in normal periods in terms of their class conception, while 
reserving Marx’s 1843 analysis for “abnormal” state forms such as Bonapartism.54 It is true that 
Marx and Engels discarded aspects of Marx’s 1843 analysis when they first developed their class 
conception of the state. However, Hunt’s and Tucker’s argument obscures the fact that, 
throughout the remainder of their lives, Marx and Engels retained Marx’s 1843 view that all state 
bureaucracies manifested political alienation.  
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Of course, the adoption of the class conception of the state clearly entailed a modification 
of Marx’s earlier position. Most importantly, Marx and Engels abandoned the view that the state 
apparatus or bureaucracy was driven primarily by self-interest in normal periods. For example, in 
1849 Marx explained that in modern bourgeois society, “It inheres . . . that bureaucracy and 
army, instead of being masters of commerce and industry, be reduced to their tools, and be made 
into mere organs of bourgeois business relations.”55 Similarly, in 1852 Marx explained that in the 
period between the two Bonapartes the French state bureaucracy “was an instrument of the ruling 
class, however much it strove for power in its own right.”56  
At the same time, however, Marx and Engels continued to view the state and its 
bureaucracy, as Marx had in 1843, in terms of the problem of political alienation. They still 
described the state as an institution that had established its independence from society and that 
ruled over it, falsely claiming to represent the general interest. For example, in The German 
Ideology, even while noting the role of the state in enforcing the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
Marx and Engels characterized the state as “a separate entity, alongside and outside civil society” 
and explained that this “illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, 
always took on an independent existence in relation to them.”57 In The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte (1852) Marx described the French “bureaucratic and military organization” as it 
had developed from the period of absolute monarchy up to the time of Napoleon III as a 
“frightful parasitic body which surrounds the body of French society like a caul and stops up all 
its pores.” Under this state machinery, “every common interest was immediately detached from 
society, opposed to it as a higher general interest, torn away from the self-activity of the 
individual members of society and made a subject for governmental activity.”58 Years later, in 
his Anti-Dühring (1878) Engels spoke of the “political authority [which] has made itself 
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independent in relation to society, and has transformed itself from society’s servant into its 
master.”59 And in an “Introduction” (1891) to Marx’s The Civil War in France Engels contended 
that “the transformation of the state from servants into masters of society” had been “an 
inevitable transformation in all previous states.”60  
These passages clearly indicate that the mature Marx and Engels saw all states as 
manifesting political alienation comparable in some respects to that observed by Marx in Prussia 
in 1843. Marx and Engels never explicitly explained how they reconciled the notion that the state 
stands above and dominates the whole of society with the idea that the state is subordinate to a 
party of society. However, it is likely they would have asserted that, in serving a privileged 
minority, the class state dominates a “society,” understood as the vast majority of that society’s 
members. Besides that, they might have argued that the class state stands above and dominates 
even members of the dominant economic class viewed as individual citizens. An examination of 
the account by Engels of the origins of the state further demonstrates that he, at least, saw the 
original alienation of the state from society and its subordination to dominant class rule as 
simultaneous and interdependent processes. 
2.5 ENGELS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE STATE 
According to Engels the first public authority, the ancestor of the modern state, was 
created by pre-class society to carry out certain essential functions on behalf of society as a 
whole. In his Anti-Dühring Engels explained that these functions included irrigation, defense 
against external enemies, the “adjudication of disputes,” the “repression of encroachments by 
individuals on the rights of others,” and religious functions.61 He noted in The Origin of the 
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Family, Private Property and the State (1884) that this authority could not yet properly be called 
a “state” for it had no coercive power except public opinion and it remained under the control of 
the entire community.62 Over time this authority, as a distinct institution, developed its own 
particular interests and was able to elevate itself above the control of the rest of society. In a 
letter to Joseph Bloch in 1890 Engels explained, 
The persons appointed for this purpose form a new branch of the 
division of labour within society. This gives them particular 
interests, distinct, too, from the interests of those who empowered 
them; they make themselves independent of the latter and—the 
state is in being.63 
  
However, the primitive public authority was not able to effect this transformation simply 
by an act of will. Rather, it was only made possible by the simultaneous expansion in the 
functional significance of its power. In particular, the authority became increasingly 
indispensable as a mediator of the conflicts that arose between communities with the expansion 
of productive forces and the division of labor.64 With the emergence of social classes, the 
mediating function of the authority became even more necessary in order to prevent class 
struggle from tearing society apart. In The Origin Engels explained that the state 
is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the 
admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble 
contradiction within itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable 
antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these 
antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not 
consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power 
seemingly standing above society became necessary for the 
purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds 
of "order"; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself 
above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state.65 
 
Up to this point, the account by Engels of the emergence of the state closely paralleled 
Marx’s 1843 analysis of the origin of the modern state. The state arose in the context of a society 
rent by conflicting particular interests as a body claiming to represent the general interest; but in 
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reality, it was nothing but one more particular institution, “placing itself above” society and 
“increasingly alienating itself from it.” However, even as the state raised itself above the control 
of society as a whole, Engels argued, it became the instrument of the dominant economic class. 
In fact, Engels saw a direct causal relationship between these processes. He indicated this in his 
article “Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy” (1888): 
Society creates for itself an organ for the safeguarding of its 
general interests against internal and external attacks. This organ is 
the state power. Hardly come into being, this organ makes itself 
independent in regard to society; and indeed, the more so, the more 
it becomes the organ of a particular class, the more it directly 
enforces the supremacy of that class.66 
 
Engels suggested two different ways in which this had occurred. In his Anti-Dühring he 
described a tendency for the rulers of the emergent state to establish themselves as the dominant 
economic class.67 But even where the state remained distinct from the dominant class, Engels 
asserted in The Origin, it was transformed increasingly into the servant of that class: 
As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms 
in check, but as it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the 
conflict of these classes, it is, as a rule, the state of the most 
powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the 
medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, 
and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the 
oppressed class.68 
By this Engels may have simply meant that the function of ensuring social harmony most 
directly advanced the interests of the class that most benefitted from the existing economic 
order. However, it also seems to suggest that, as the early state freed itself from the control of 
the whole society, it became more vulnerable to conquest by the most powerful of the 
contending classes. 
Conversely, for Engels the transformation of the state into the servant of the dominant 
class tended to exacerbate the alienation of the state from society. As the emergent state began 
to represent the interests of the dominant class, its activities on behalf of that class increasingly 
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precluded communal participation and control. In The Origin Engels described this tendency in 
ancient Greece: 
 
This special power is necessary, because a self-acting armed 
organization of the population has became impossible since the 
cleavage into classes. . . . The people’s army of the Athenian 
democracy was an aristocratic public power against the slaves, 
whom it kept in check; however, a gendarmerie also became 
necessary to keep the citizens in check.69 
In the account of Engels, then, the transformation of the original public authority into an 
institution standing above and dominating society was directly related to its conversion into a 
tool of class domination. The fundamental cleavages between particular interests gave rise to 
the state as an institution alienated from society as a whole. This process was facilitated by, and 
simultaneously encouraged, the subordination of the state to the interests of the dominant class. 
However, Marx and Engels also believed that in certain exceptional periods the state 
was able to achieve not only an extreme degree of independence from society, but also a large 
measure of autonomy from class control.70 For Marx and Engels such exceptional state forms 
included Oriental Despotism, Caesarism, Absolute Monarchy, Tsarist Autocracy, and 
Bonapartism.71 Of these state forms, the two thinkers devoted the greatest attention to 
Bonapartism.  
2.6 BONAPARTISM 
Although Marx and Engels spoke of the “Bonapartism” of Napoleon Bonaparte and of 
Bismarck, their most extensive analyses of that phenomenon dealt with the regime of Louis 
Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon III.72 Following his election as President of France in 
December 1848, Louis Bonaparte proceeded to extend his control over the state apparatus and 
army at the expense of the Legislative assembly. Then, in December 1851 he staged a successful 
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coup against the Second Republic and the following year had himself proclaimed emperor of 
France. Beginning with Marx’s 1852 work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx 
and Engels repeatedly attempted to define Louis Bonaparte’s regime and explain its origins. 
As we have seen, consistent with other writings by Marx and Engels on the normal state, 
Marx described the French state bureaucracy prior to Bonaparte’s coup as both an organ of class 
rule and as a manifestation of political alienation. On one hand the bureaucracy had, since its 
inception under the absolute monarchy, tended to advance the interests of the bourgeoisie; and in 
the period between the two Napoleons it had become the mere instrument of the capitalist class.73 
On the other hand Marx characterized the pre-Bonapartist bureaucracy as a “parasite” that had 
risen above society and extended its control into all areas of social concern while legitimizing its 
power in terms of the general interest.74 
However, according to Marx, Louis Bonaparte’s coup inaugurated two important changes 
in the character of the French state. First, the state became even more independent from society 
as a whole: 
 
The state parasite received only its last development during the 
second Empire. The governmental power with its standing army, 
its all directing bureaucracy, its stultifying clergy and its servile 
tribunal hierarchy had grown so independent of society itself, that 
a grotesquely mediocre adventurer with a band of hungry 
desperadoes behind him sufficed to wield it.75 
 
At the same time, through Bonaparte’s coup the state was able to attain such an unprecedented 
degree of autonomy from the bourgeoisie that it appeared “that all classes fall on their knees, 
equally mute and equally impotent, before the rifle butt.”76 Marx described Bonaparte as being 
“only where he is because he has broken the political power of this middle class, and breaks it 
again daily.”77 Thus, in the Bonapartist state Marx and Engels saw an exception to the pattern, 
observed in the normal state, of a direct relationship between the state’s degree of independence 
from society and its degree of subordination to the dominant economic class. 
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Marx and Engels offered varying explanations of how the Bonapartist state had attained 
such a high degree of autonomy from class control and an extreme degree of independence from 
society. At one point Marx represented this as an unintended consequence of conscious 
bourgeois policy. According to this interpretation, the bourgeoisie had strengthened the state as a 
sword against the proletariat. However, with Bonaparte’s coup the bourgeoisie discovered that 
the sword was two-edged; the state had become autonomous enough to turn against its master.78 
In a second explanation Marx contended that the capitalist class purposefully had established a 
state independent of its direct control in order to defuse the political struggle of the proletariat. 
The French bourgeoisie had “realized instinctively that although the republic made their political 
rule complete it simultaneously undermined its social foundation, since they had now to confront 
the subjugated classes and contend with them without mediation, without being concealed by the 
Crown, without the possibility of diverting the national attention by their secondary conflicts 
amongst themselves and with the monarchy.” Consequently, they had come “to yearn for the 
return of the previous forms of this rule, which were less complete, less developed, and precisely 
for that reason, less dangerous.”79 
It was Engels, however, who in The Origin provided the best-known explanation, not 
only for the autonomy of the state under Louis Bonaparte, but also under Napoleon I and the 
previous absolute monarchs. In each case the state had been able to utilize the “balance” 
achieved in the class struggle to enlarge its own power and independence:  
By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring 
classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as 
ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of 
independence of both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held the balance 
between the nobility and the class of burghers; such was the 
Bonapartism of the First, and still more of the Second French 
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Empire, which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie 
and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.80 
 
This balance made it impossible for either class to establish its own direct control over the state. 
Consistent with this explanation, Marx in The Civil War in France (1871) described the 
Bonapartism of the Second Empire as “the only form of government possible at a time when the 
bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the 
nation.”81 
Beyond offering these general interpretations of the origins of Bonapartism, Marx and 
Engels attempted to identify the various social groups that Louis Bonaparte relied upon in 
establishing and consolidating his rule. First, and most important in this regard, was the French 
peasantry. At one point Marx even asserted that Bonaparte “represents the most numerous class 
of French society, the small peasant proprietors.”82 However, as a number of commentators have 
noted, Marx seems to have meant by this that Bonaparte portrayed himself as the champion of 
the peasants and relied upon their electoral and military support.83 Second, Marx explained that 
the lumpenproletariat organized in the Society of December 10 provided Bonaparte with the 
shock troops necessary for his conquest of power, staging demonstrations on his behalf and 
beating up his republican opponents.84 Third, according to Marx Bonaparte solidified his rule 
with the support of the state bureaucracy. Although it was already bloated and powerful when 
Louis Bonaparte assumed the Presidency, he granted it further privileges to ensure its allegiance: 
 
An enormous bureaucracy, with gold braid and a fat belly, is the 
‘Napoleonic idea’ which is most congenial of all to the second 
Bonaparte. It could not be otherwise, for he has been forced to 
create, alongside the real classes of society, an artificial caste for 
which the maintenance of his regime is a question of self-
preservation. One of his first financial operations was therefore to 
raise officials’ salaries to their old level and to create new 
sinecures.85  
Finally, Marx and Engels described how Bonaparte relied upon the passivity of the French 
workers in his struggle with their class enemy, and how he even attempted to win their support by 
granting universal suffrage and promising “socialist” social programs.86 
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Although Marx and Engels saw Bonaparte as courting and obtaining the support of all 
sectors of French society, and although they argued that he was the servant of no class, in their 
view there was no doubt about which class benefitted most from his rule. Even while breaking the 
political rule of the capitalist class, he continued to preserve and strengthen its “social power.”87 
In the pursuit of his own self-interests and those of his state, Bonaparte found himself compelled 
to promote the coincident interests of the capitalist class. In 1852 Marx explained, 
 
Bonaparte is the executive authority which has attained 
power in its own right, and as such he feels it to be his mission to 
safeguard ‘bourgeois order’. But the strength of this bourgeois 
order lies in the middle class. He therefore sees himself as the 
representative of the middle class and he issues decrees in this 
sense.88  
In 1871 Marx summarized the benefits that the bourgeoisie had derived from the Second Empire: 
 
Under its sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, 
attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and 
commerce expanded to colossal dimensions; financial swindling 
celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set 
off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious and debased 
luxury.89 
2.7 THE PROLETARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND THE END OF BUREAUCRACY 
In their mature works, as in Marx’s 1843 writings, Marx and Engels clearly believed that 
the coming socialist revolution would eliminate the problem of bureaucracy, understood in terms 
of political alienation. They anticipated that the proletarian state that would emerge from the 
revolution would immediately abolish the worst aspects of the problem, and that ultimately even 
the relatively “de-alienated” proletarian state would disappear along with class domination. 
Between the revolution and the withering of the state, the proletariat would need to retain its own 
state—a “dictatorship of the proletariat”—to enforce its own immediate interests and to lay the 
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basis for a classless society.90 As Hal Draper has demonstrated, the term dictatorship as used by 
Marx and Engels meant “a domination, a social rule,” and was not opposed to democracy.91 In 
fact, throughout their writings Marx and Engels stressed the necessarily democratic character of 
the workers’ state. The draft of the Communist Manifesto by Engels predicted that the revolution 
would establish “a democratic constitution implying directly or indirectly the political rule of the 
proletariat.”92 Similarly, the Communist Manifesto proclaimed that “the first step in the revolution 
by the working class, is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of 
democracy.”93 
However, it was the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871— the first “dictatorship of 
the proletariat”94—that dramatically reinforced their conviction that the proletarian state would, of 
necessity, be radically democratic. Marx and Engels fully approved of the Commune’s attempts to 
institutionalize democracy. In Marx’s The Civil War in France, and in the introduction to that 
work by Engels, the two commended the steps taken by the Commune to fill all posts by election 
on the basis of universal suffrage, and to provide for the immediate recall of all officials. They 
supported the Commune’s limitation of the salaries of state officials to the level of “workmen’s 
wages,” and the election of a majority of “naturally working men, or acknowledged 
representatives of the working class” to the Commune. They applauded the “suppression of the 
standing army and the substitution for it of the armed people,” and acclaimed the elimination of 
“the whole sham of state-mysteries and statepretensions [sic]” through the Commune’s 
publication “of all its doings and sayings.” Finally, they endorsed the democratization of the state 
through the abolition of the distinction between the executive and legislative branches.95  
On the basis of this experience Marx and Engels concluded in 1872 that “the working 
class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own 
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purposes.”96 Rather, the capitalist state bureaucracy would have to be smashed and a more 
democratic one substituted in its place. According to Engels, the democratic measures taken by 
the Commune had brought about both the “shattering of the former state power and its 
replacement by a new and truly democratic one.”97 For Marx the Commune was the “political 
form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour.”98 
In part, the endorsement of radical democracy by Marx and Engels was derived from class 
considerations. Thus, they viewed the democratic measures of the Commune as a means of 
restricting bourgeois political power while subordinating the state to the interests of the 
proletariat. As Engels explained in 1891, “In order not to lose again its only just conquered 
supremacy, this working class must, on the one hand, do away with all the old repressive 
machinery previously used against it itself, and, on the other, safeguard itself against its own 
deputies and officials.”99 The concern of Engels here seems to have been that, without such 
democratic norms as those established by the Commune, the state apparatus might break away 
from working class control. Such a situation could result in the reassertion of control of the state 
by the capitalist class. 
At the same time, Marx and Engels viewed the democratic measures of the Commune as a 
way to reduce the independence of the state from society, to begin to overcome the ancient 
problem of political alienation. Engels described the election and recall of officials and the 
payment of “workmen’s wages” as steps taken “against this transformation of the state from 
servants of society into masters of society.”100 In The Civil War in France Marx described these 
steps as the beginning of “the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment 
of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic 
excrescence.”101 
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Similarly, the functions of the post-capitalist state as conceived by Marx and Engels 
simultaneously would advance the class interests of the proletariat and reduce the level of 
political alienation in society. Initially, the dictatorship of the proletariat would attempt to satisfy 
the immediate interests of the working class by abolishing class exploitation and defending the 
conquests of the workers.102 At the same time, through its nationalization of the means of 
production, the state would be transformed from an institution standing above society into “the 
representative of society as a whole.” By the appropriation of bourgeois property, Engels wrote in 
Anti-Dühring, the proletariat 
puts an end to itself as the proletariat, it puts an end to all class 
antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the state. . . . The 
first act in which the state really comes forward as the 
representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the 
means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its 
last independent act as a state.103 
 
Eventually, even this “state,” which was not quite a state, was expected to vanish as class 
domination dissolved and scarcity was abolished. In a famous passage from his Anti-Dühring 
Engels described this process:  
As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in 
subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the 
struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of 
production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also 
been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would 
make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. . . . The 
interference of the state power in social relations becomes 
superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. . . 
. The state is not “abolished,” it withers away.104  
  
 This did not mean that under socialism there would be no authoritative coordinating 
bodies. As Hal Draper has pointed out, the withering of the state for Marx and Engels meant the 
disappearance of official coercion, not of public authority itself.105 In an 1872 essay Engels 
predicted that after the coming social revolution, “public functions will lose their political 
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character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true 
interests of society.”106 Political, that is, repressive, functions would disappear, but 
“administrative functions” and, presumably, an administrative authority, would persist. 
Similarly, in The Civil War in France Marx spoke of the “legitimate functions” which the Paris 
Commune would have “wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and 
restored to the responsible agents of society” had the Commune survived.107 Furthermore, in his 
(1874-75) “conspectus” on Bakunin’s Statism and Anarchy Marx seems to have assumed that 
elections of a non-coercive public authority would continue to occur under socialism: “As soon 
as the functions [of public authority] have ceased to be political, there exists (1) no governmental 
function; (2) the distribution of general functions has become a businesslike matter entailing no 
rule; (3) the election has none of its present political character.”108 
In the absence of class conflict, however, there was little danger that such an authority 
would elevate itself above societal control. Furthermore, lacking the means of repression, it 
would never again be able to dominate society. Thus, socialist society would finally eliminate the 
problem of bureaucracy. 
2.8 AFTER MARX AND ENGELS 
The leaders of the socialist movement who came later continued to accept the conclusion 
of Marx and Engels that bureaucracy would cease to be a problem after the socialist revolution. 
At the same time, however, the leadership of the Second International consistently blunted the 
anti-bureaucratic, anti-statist thrust of Marx’s and Engels doctrine, particularly regarding the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Although some figures in the left wing of the International, 
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including Trotsky, challenged this “orthodox” view prior to 1917, it was Lenin who in that year 
most clearly and sharply reaffirmed the expectations of Marx and Engels regarding the anti-
bureaucratic and radically democratic character of the revolutionary state. 
The continuing tendency within the socialist movement to minimize the threat of post-
capitalist bureaucracy is illustrated by the writings of Karl Kautsky, the best known leader and 
foremost theoretician of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Second 
International. In his 1908 work The Foundations of Christianity Kautsky briefly considered the 
potential for the bureaucratization of the socialist movement and for the emergence of a 
bureaucratic class after the revolution. Neither, he concluded, was a serious danger: “We may 
maintain not only that Socialism will not develop any internal contradictions in the period 
preceding this victory [of the proletariat], that will be comparable with those attending the last 
phases of Christianity, but also that no such contradictions will materialize in the period in which 
the predictable consequences of their victory are developed.”109 Kautsky based the latter 
conclusion on the premise that class differences traditionally have been generated by private 
ownership of the means of production, and by military and scientific needs. The first of these 
factors, private property, would be abolished soon after the revolution. At the same time he 
argued that the economic preconditions already existed for overcoming the tendency of the 
military and science to give rise to class differentiation. The development of productive forces 
had eliminated the necessity of confining military training to a small “aristocracy of warriors,” 
while the growing economic integration of nations had already made war “a piece of ruthless 
folly.” Capitalism also had created a greater demand for intellectuals, along with the potential for 
mass education, and had thus reduced the need for a scientific elite.110 
Even while sustaining the traditional Marxist optimism regarding the withering away of 
state and bureaucracy, however, the leaders of the Second International ignored or rejected major 
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aspects of the views of Marx and Engels on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Most importantly, 
they minimized the depth of the radical democracy envisioned by Marx and Engels and the 
distance that separated this democracy from even the most democratic bourgeois republic. As 
early as the 1890s and consistently thereafter, Kautsky, the central defender of Marxist 
“orthodoxy,” endorsed existing parliamentarism, both as a means by which the proletariat could 
come to power and the specific form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.111 He repeated the call 
by Marx and Engels for the “conquest of political power,” but made no reference to their views 
on the need to smash the bourgeois state.112 Furthermore, he rejected the idea of a “government 
of the people and through the people in the sense that public affairs should be administered not 
by functionaries but by popular masses working without pay during their spare time.” This, he 
said, was “a utopia, even a reactionary and anti-democratic utopia.”113 Although Marx and 
Engels had assumed the existence of paid functionaries, their emphasis had been precisely upon 
the “utopian” idea of “government of the people and through the people.” 
Kautsky’s response in 1912 to criticisms by the Dutch left-socialist Anton Pannekoek 
reveals even more sharply the contrast between his views on the revolutionary state and those of 
Marx and Engels. Pannekoek had rejected the SPD’s and Kautsky’s parliamentary orientation 
and had revived the call by Marx and Engels for the destruction of the bourgeois state machine. 
In reply, Kautsky conflated the two issues, dismissing Pannekoek’s views as semi-anarchist 
while reaffirming the SPD’s perspective: “The goal of our political struggle remains the same as 
it has been up to now: the conquest of state power through winning a majority in parliament and 
raising parliament to be the master of government. Not, however, the destruction of state 
power.”114 None of the existing ministries of bourgeois governments, Kautsky argued, could be 
eliminated by a revolution. Rather than calling for the destruction of the state, the SPD strove for 
its subordination to the working class through the election of high officials.115 
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At this point nearly all Russian socialists, including Lenin, accepted Kautsky’s position 
as authoritative. However, there was little reason for them even to consider the question for most 
were unified in the view that the coming revolution in Russia would be bourgeois-democratic, 
not socialist, in nature. Only after the completion of the democratic revolution, Lenin argued in 
the summer of 1905, would it be appropriate to address the question of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat.116 Furthermore, Lenin explicitly rejected the slogans of the Paris Commune as 
inapplicable to the Russian situation.117  
However, anticipating his later views on the revolutionary state, during the turbulent year 
1905 Lenin suggested that a revolutionary government in Russia could be based upon “soviets.” 
The soviets or workers’ councils that appeared in cities throughout Russia during the revolution 
of 1905 were institutions composed of delegates elected by the workers to direct the 
revolutionary struggle. In the course of their development they approached the status of 
alternative governments. Lenin first commented on the soviets in November 1905 while still in 
exile. Already at that point he had concluded that the St. Petersburg Soviet “should be regarded 
as the embryo of a provisional revolutionary government.”118 Assessing the role of the soviets in 
early 1906, Lenin characterized them as “embryonic forms of a new revolutionary authority” and 
“embryos of a new, people’s, . . . revolutionary government.”119 
Meanwhile, one of the few Russian Social Democrats who already held a position to the 
left of Lenin’s was Leon Trotsky. In the summer of 1905 Trotsky arrived at the conclusion that 
would become central to his famous theory of permanent revolution that a successful 
revolutionary struggle in Russia would bring to power a dictatorship of the proletariat which, in 
the process of completing the democratic revolution, would be compelled to undertake socialist 
measures.120 Thus, as early as July 1905 Trotsky predicted that the future revolutionary 
government in Russia would not be a “dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry” as Lenin 
held, but rather a “dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the peasantry.”121 
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The imminent prospect of a Russian dictatorship of the proletariat suggested to Trotsky 
the relevance of the experience of the first dictatorship of the proletariat, the Paris Commune. In 
December 1905 he wrote, 
 
If a few years ago we were apparently further than any European 
nation from the traditions of the Paris Commune, then now, in 
passing through the first phase of our own revolution, which the 
struggle of the proletariat has made a revolution in Permanenz, an 
uninterrupted revolution, we are confronted by the heritage of the 
Commune of 1871 more directly than any European nation. 
For us, the history of the Commune is now not just a great 
dramatic moment in the international struggle for liberation, not a 
mere illustration of some sort of tactical situation; it is a direct and 
immediate lesson.122 
 
Trotsky’s study of writings of Marx and Engels on the Commune led him in turn to a 
vision of the dictatorship of the proletariat that was far more anti-bureaucratic and anti-statist 
than Kautsky’s. Trotsky proclaimed that the first tasks of the proletariat in power would be “to 
consolidate its position, arm the revolution, disarm reaction, widen the base of the revolution, 
reconstruct the state.”123 All of these, and particularly the last, required the same radically 
democratic measures that had been enacted by the Commune: “The abolition of the standing 
army and the police, the arming of the people, the dispersion of the mandarin bureaucracy, the 
establishment of the principle of election of all functionaries, the equalization of their salaries, 
the separation of church and state—these are the measures which, from the example of the 
Commune, it is necessary to carry through at the very beginning.”124 
Like Lenin, Trotsky also believed that the 1905 soviets had the potential to become 
institutions of a revolutionary state. In 1905 he characterized the soviets as “indisputably future 
focal points of support for a provisional government.”125 Four years later he asserted that the St. 
Petersburg Soviet had been “a workers’ government in embryo” and “the first embryonic organ 
of revolutionary power.”126 However, Trotsky went beyond Lenin in observing direct parallels 
between the democratic and anti-bureaucratic character of the soviets and that of the Paris 
Commune. He described the St. Petersburg Soviet of 1905 as “the organized power of the mass 
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itself over its separate parts. It constitutes authentic democracy, without a lower and an upper 
chamber, without a professional bureaucracy [biurokratiia], but with the voters’ right to recall 
their deputies at any moment.”127  
 
Beyond that, Trotsky predicted that future soviets would dismantle the tsarist state and 
abolish absolutism, destroying its “material structure” by reform and by “dissolution of the army, 
annihilation of the police and bureaucracy.” Furthermore, the soviets would transform public 
authorities into “agents of municipal self-government.”128 Years later, on the eve of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin would arrive at similar conclusions. 
2.9 THE STATE AND REVOLUTION 
In the summer of 1916 the young left-wing Bolshevik, Nikolai Bukharin, submitted an 
essay for inclusion in a collection of programmatic articles edited by Lenin. In that essay 
Bukharin repeated the anti-statist heresies of left-Marxists such as Pannekoek that the Marxist 
goal was the “revolutionary destruction” of the bourgeois state, and that “the difference between 
Marxists and anarchists is not at all that the Marxists are statists and the anarchists are anti-
statists, as many assert” but only that socialists support economic centralization. Lenin at first 
dismissed Bukharin’s views as “semi-anarchism” and accused him of ignoring the need for a 
post-revolutionary state.129 However, Bukharin had prompted Lenin to reconsider the theory of 
the state.  
By February 1917 Lenin’s rereading of Marx and Engels led him to the conclusion that, 
despite “small errors,” Bukharin was “closer to the truth than Kautsky.”130 Lenin now agreed that 
the task of the proletarian revolution was to smash the old bourgeois state machine and to replace 
it with a new one. At the same time he went beyond Bukharin in accepting a conclusion Trotsky 
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had reached years earlier—that the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat had manifested 
itself not only in the Paris Commune, but also in the soviets of 1905. In his notes on the state in 
early 1917 Lenin wrote, 
 
Marx’s fundamental idea: the conquest of political power by the 
proletariat does not mean the taking over of a “ready-made” state 
machinery, but . . . its “smashing” and destruction, and its 
replacement by a new one . . . . One could, probably, . . . express 
the whole matter thus: replacement of the old (“ready-made”) state 
machine and parliaments by Soviets of Workers’ Deputies and 
their trustees.131 
 
Not long after Lenin wrote these lines he had the opportunity to apply them to living 
soviets. In one of his first statements after the February Revolution Lenin noted the dual power 
which had emerged in Petrograd between the Provisional Government and the Soviet of 
Workers’ Deputies. As in 1905 Lenin described the Petrograd Soviet as “an organization of the 
workers, the embryo of a workers’ government, the representative of the entire mass of the poor 
sector of the population.” Now, however, he went beyond his old slogan of the “democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry” calling for the preparation of the second stage of the 
revolution. By implication, this was to involve the establishment of a dictatorship of the 
proletariat exercised through the soviets.132 During the following months Lenin repeatedly 
explained that the characteristics of soviet power would be those that Marx had admired in the 
Paris Commune.133 
Lenin developed these themes most fully in his pamphlet The State and Revolution 
written in August-September 1917 and published the following January. In that work Lenin 
again explained that for a certain transitional period after the seizure of power the proletariat 
would need a state “both to crush the resistance of the exploiters and to lead the enormous mass 
of the population—the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the semi-proletarians—in the work of 
organising a socialist economy.”134 However, the type of state that was needed by the proletariat 
was not the same as that created by the bourgeoisie. The old state was unsuitable because it had 
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been created for a different purpose, “to maintain exploitation, i.e., in the selfish interests of an 
insignificant minority against the vast majority of the people.”135 Furthermore, the main 
institutions of the old state machine, the bureaucracy [chinovnichestvo] and the standing army, 
were connected “by thousands of threads” with the bourgeoisie.136 Consequently, Lenin 
described as the most fundamental point of the Marxist theory of the state that “all previous 
revolutions perfected the state machine, whereas it must be broken, smashed.”137 In its place the 
proletariat would substitute a state designed “to completely abolish all exploitation, i.e., in the 
interests of the vast majority of the people, and against the insignificant minority.”138 
The smashing of the old state was to be accomplished “‘only’ by fuller democracy.” 
However, Lenin noted that this meant, in fact, the replacement of the old institutions by 
fundamentally different ones.139 Lenin asserted that the directly repressive functions of the state 
could be carried out directly by the armed people “with a very simple ‘machine’, almost without 
a ‘machine’.” Thus, the standing army could be abolished.140 Regarding the other post-
revolutionary function of the state—the construction of a socialist economy—Lenin believed that 
this would temporarily require the continued existence of some form of bureaucracy: 
 
Abolishing the bureaucracy [chinovnichestvo] at once, 
everywhere and completely, is out of the question. It is a utopia. 
But to smash the old bureaucratic [chinovnichnii] machine at once 
and to begin immediately to construct a new one that will make 
possible the gradual abolition of all bureaucracy 
[chinovnichestvo]—this is not a utopia, it is the experience of the 
Commune, the direct and immediate task of the revolutionary 
proletariat.141  
 
However, this new bureaucracy would be radically different from that of the bourgeoisie. At the 
outset the “specific ‘bossing’ of state officials” would be replaced “by the simple functions of 
‘foremen and accountants.’” These functions, Lenin argued, had been so simplified by capitalist 
culture that they were “already fully within the ability of the average town dweller.”142 Thus, it 
was “quite possible, after the overthrow of the capitalists and the bureaucrats [chinovniki], to 
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proceed immediately, overnight” to replace them with the control and supervision “by the armed 
workers, by the whole of the armed population.”143 Thus, “all may become 
‘bureaucrats’[biurokraty] for a time and . . . therefore, nobody may be able to become a 
‘bureaucrat’[biurokrat].”144 
To the extent that a distinct body of state officials was needed, it would be kept 
subordinate to the society as a whole through the measures that had been implemented by the 
Paris Commune. All officials were to be elected and subject to recall at any time, and their 
salaries were to be “reduced to the level of ordinary ‘workmen’s wages’.” Furthermore, 
democratic control over executive functions would be maintained by turning these over to 
representative institutions—in the process transforming such institutions “from talking shops into 
‘working’ bodies.”145 To the extent this occurred, functionaries would “cease to be ‘bureaucrats’ 
[biurokraty], to be ‘officials’ [chinovniki].”146 Lenin also foresaw that the proletarian state would 
continue to need a “scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists, and so on.” However, in 
Lenin’s view the use of these experts posed no threat to popular control over the state: “These 
gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists, and will work even 
better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers.”147 
Again, for Lenin the dictatorship of the proletariat was only to survive during the 
transition from capitalism to communism. Ultimately, he believed, the state would cease to exist 
altogether. In the final analysis the state was only a tool for the suppression of one class by 
another. When classes ceased to exist a “systematic struggle against a definite section of the 
population” would no longer be necessary. Although Lenin saw the withering of the state as a 
lengthy process, he believed it would begin with the abolition of the bourgeois state and its 
replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat. Lenin recalled that even the short-lived Paris 
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Commune was already ceasing to be a state because it had replaced repression of the majority by 
the minority with repression of the minority by the majority.148  
However, in one passage Lenin indicated that some sort of state would continue to exist 
for a period even after the threat of a capitalist restoration had finally disappeared. This would be 
during the lower stage of communism when goods were to be distributed according to work 
performed. Following Marx, Lenin pointed out that such a system of distribution involved the 
application of an equal measure of compensation to individuals who had unequal needs. As such, 
the principle of “equal right” was “a violation of equality and an injustice” and was, in fact, a 
form of “bourgeois right.” Until the economic prerequisites were created for distribution 
according to need, a state would be necessary for the regulation of labor and the distribution of 
goods.149 
Lenin believed that the state would finally wither away completely when the higher stage 
of communism was reached. At that point production and distribution would be organized 
according to the principle: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.” 
Then, when both class rule and bourgeois norms of distribution had ceased to exist, the state with 
its bureaucracy would no longer be necessary.150 
2.10 CONCLUSION 
In the years immediately after the revolution, Bolshevik views on bureaucracy were 
shaped by various influences, including popular usage of the term and classical Marxist writings 
on that issue. From popular Russian and European discourse, the Bolsheviks derived an 
understanding of bureaucracy understood primarily as rule by officials, or as a body of officials 
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that ruled, and secondarily as a variety of other negative phenomena that included excessive 
formalism, paperwork, and inefficiency. From Marx and Engels they inherited an analysis that 
associated the problem of bureaucracy with political alienation—a phenomenon that was viewed 
as directly related to bourgeois control of the state, that would be curtailed significantly by the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and that would ultimately disappear in the socialist society of the 
future. 
Despite expectations derived from the Marxist classics, shortly after the revolution many 
within the Bolshevik party detected the resurgence of various phenomena that they described as 
manifestations of bureaucracy or bureaucratism. Some Bolsheviks, such as the various 
opposition groupings that flourished within the party from 1918 to 1922, continued to define and 
analyze the problem in traditional Marxist terms. At times, Lenin also characterized the problem 
of Soviet bureaucracy this way—although on other occasions, drawing heavily upon the 
secondary meanings and associations of bureaucracy in popular usage, he defined the problem 
quite differently in terms of inefficiency. During those years Trotsky viewed the problem of 
Soviet bureaucracy almost exclusively as one of inefficiency. However, in later years Trotsky, 
too, would come to perceive the relevance of the classical Marxist analysis of bureaucracy for 
the Soviet situation. 
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 3.0  REVOLUTION AND THE PROBLEMS OF BUREAUCRACY 
Not long after the October Revolution, many Bolsheviks, including opposition groupings, Lenin, 
and Trotsky, began to realize that the problem of bureaucracy had not died with the old regime. 
Although there was a general consensus that bureaucracy was a growing problem, there was little 
agreement on exactly what that problem was, and how to account for its reappearance. A series 
of leftist opposition groups within the party employed the primary meaning and the classical 
Marxist analysis of bureaucracy and defined the problem in terms of the rule of state officials, 
that is, in terms of the growth of political alienation in the Soviet Union. These Bolsheviks saw 
bureaucracy in the elevation of Soviet political, economic, and military institutions above the 
control of the working class. Furthermore, consistent with the traditional Marxist analysis, they 
argued that this problem was directly related to the degree of political power or influence 
retained by the exploiting classes. At times, Lenin spoke similarly, warning of the 
bureaucratizing influence of the bourgeois specialists, and denouncing the “bureaucratic” 
centralism and authoritarianism of some of his comrades. At other times, however, Lenin used 
the term bureaucracy in a wholly different sense to characterize the enormous inefficiency of the 
Soviet state and party apparatuses. Trotsky, of course, would in later years come to define the 
problem of Soviet bureaucracy in terms of extreme political alienation. However, during the first 
period of Soviet power from the revolution until 1922, Trotsky’s understanding of the problem 
was distinctive in that he rejected the view that Soviet bureaucracy involved the rule of officials 
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 or political alienation, as well as the notion that it was related to the use of bourgeois specialists. 
Instead, in this period Trotsky viewed the problem of Soviet bureaucracy as related exclusively 
to the problem of inefficiency in Soviet military and economic organs. 
3.1 THE DREAM DEFERRED 
On the eve of the Bolshevik insurrection Lenin confidently predicted that the coming 
revolution would resolve the age-old problems of political alienation and bureaucracy. In The 
State and Revolution he argued that the socialist revolution would establish a dictatorship of the 
proletariat modeled after the Paris Commune. Through the soviets the masses of workers and, 
following them, the peasants would take power into their own hands. Popular control over the 
state would be assured by the dissolution of the standing army, the elimination of the distinction 
between the state’s executive and legislative branches, the introduction of election and recall of 
all officials, and the limitation of officials’ salaries to the level of “workmen’s wages.” In time, 
as the need for a distinct, repressive apparatus faded, even this radically democratic proletarian 
state would wither away. 
During the first six months of Soviet power the Bolshevik leaders had good reason to 
believe that their utopian dreams were about to become a living reality. The insurrection itself, 
though planned and directed by the party leadership, enjoyed the ardent support of the 
overwhelming majority of the industrial workers. The day after the insurrection the Bolsheviks 
handed power over to the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, composed in the majority of 
Bolshevik delegates. In the following weeks and months workers and peasants throughout Russia 
continued to establish soviets as organs of local government. At all levels soviet deputies were 
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 elected and received only minimal wages; and the soviets concentrated in their hands both 
executive and legislative power.1 
Outside of the soviets as well, new regime was characterized by a high degree of popular 
participation. Before and after the seizure of power soldiers at the front responded to Bolshevik 
appeals and elected committees to arrange a cease-fire with enemy units. In the early months of 
Soviet power the factory committees established during 1917 first introduced workers’ control 
over the factories, then began to nationalize them outright; workers in Petrograd organized their 
own tribunals to dispense revolutionary justice; and throughout Russia peasants spontaneously 
seized the property of the large landowners.2  
On the crest of this revolutionary wave the Bolsheviks continued to proclaim the dream 
of a radically democratic, participatory, and anti-bureaucratic state. In this regard no one was 
more optimistic than Lenin. Immediately after the insurrection he repeated to the Petrograd 
Soviet the central refrain of The State and Revolution: “The oppressed masses will themselves 
create a power. The old state apparatus will be smashed to its foundations and a new 
administrative apparatus set up in the form of the Soviet organisations.”3 At the Seventh Party 
Congress in March 1918 he amplified upon this theme: “Soviet power is a new type of state 
without a bureaucracy, without police, without a regular army, a state in which bourgeois 
democracy has been replaced by a new democracy, a democracy that brings to the fore the 
vanguard of working people, gives them legislative and executive authority, makes them 
responsible for military defence and creates state machinery that can re-educate the masses.”4 In 
the same period Lenin further argued that, besides the soviets, other mass institutions such as the 
trade unions, factory committees, militia groupings, and peoples’ courts could facilitate popular 
participation in the affairs of state.5 Finally, he continued to predict that under socialism the state 
67 
 would disappear altogether.6 At the Seventh Party Congress he noted that, in some respects, the 
withering of the state had already begun, though he added more cautiously, “We shall have 
managed to convene more than two congresses before the time comes to say: see how our state is 
withering away.”7 
During this period Trotsky also emphasized many of these same anti-bureaucratic and 
democratic themes. Early in 1918 Trotsky observed, “Yesterday the mass-man was nobody, a 
slave to the Tsar, the nobles and the bureaucracy [biurokratiia].”8 However, the revolution had 
been a “revolt of the peasants against the landlords, of the workers against the capitalists, of the 
whole people against old tsarist bureaucratism [biurokratizm] and against the Tsar himself.”9 In 
the revolution the “former [military] apparatus was smashed along with all the other apparatuses 
of the bureaucracy [biuroktratiia].”10 Along these same lines, on the day of the insurrection 
Trotsky expressed his confidence that the new state would serve only working people: 
We, today, we, the Soviet of Soldiers’, Workers’, and 
Peasants’ Deputies, are going to undertake an experiment unique in 
history, the establishment of a government that will have no other 
aim than the satisfaction of the needs of the soldiers, workers and 
peasants. 
The state must become the instrument of the masses in the 
struggle for their liberation from all slavery.11 
 
A few months later he again explained that the representation of the interests of working people 
by the state was guaranteed by the right to elect and recall all officials of the soviets. Because of 
this, in comparison with the old dumas and zemstvos, there were “in the Soviet incomparably 
more serious, more profound guarantees of the direct and immediate relation between the deputy 
and the electors.”12  
However, by early 1918 the dream of immediately realizing the commune state already 
had begun to fade. Increasingly, the policies adopted by the party leadership and the emergent 
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 structures of power diverged from the democratic aspirations of The State and Revolution. 
During the civil war that raged from the spring of 1918 until late 1920, highly paid “bourgeois 
specialists” continued to occupy positions of authority throughout Soviet political, economic and 
military institutions; working class initiative gave way to centralism in all spheres; the state 
apparatus, instead of contracting, expanded enormously; the Soviet leadership found itself 
resorting to coercion, not only against its White Guard enemies, but also against the classes it 
claimed to represent; and opposition parties were harassed into impotence. Finally, the power of 
the soviets indeed “withered,” but in its place grew the power of a hierarchically organized party. 
During these years the goal of a commune state did not entirely disappear from the 
pronouncements of the party leaders, but it receded further and further into the distance.13  
It is of course debatable whether the Marxist vision of the commune state could have 
been realized under the best of circumstances. However, the Bolsheviks never had the 
opportunity to find out. From the beginning they were beset by difficulties that had not been 
anticipated in the classics, and that Lenin had not considered in The State and Revolution. Marx 
and Engels had expected that the proletariat would first come to power in the most economically 
advanced countries. Instead, the revolution had triumphed in the most backward country of 
Europe. Not only did Russia lack the social surplus necessary to begin socialist construction, it 
also lacked the degree of literacy required for sustained mass political participation, and even a 
proletariat large enough to constitute a stable base for the revolutionary regime. Furthermore, 
Marx and Engels assumed the revolution would be international in scope.14 In the early years of 
Soviet power the Bolsheviks continued to count upon the prospect of world revolution to rescue 
them from the effects of backwardness and imperialist intervention.15 Yet, despite the 
revolutionary wave that swept over Europe in the aftermath of the world war, Russia remained 
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 an isolated outpost of socialism surrounded by hostile capitalist powers. Finally, there had been 
no anticipation before 1917 of the transformative effects of a brutal civil war that would 
necessitate the militarization of all aspects of public life, inflict devastation upon the proletariat, 
and bring the economy of the revolutionary state to the brink of collapse. 
At the same time, subjective factors also certainly contributed to the erosion of the 
Marxist vision of the commune state. In the heat of polemics and the desperation of the moment, 
the Bolshevik leaders frequently painted up harsh policies dictated by necessity as manifestations 
of revolutionary virtue, while justifying policies which were merely expedient in terms of dire 
necessity.16 In doing so, they accelerated and intensified the drift toward authoritarianism, and 
helped to perpetuate it even after the worst military and economic dangers had receded. 
The first deviation from the Marxist vision involved the recruitment of large numbers of 
bourgeois specialists to serve in the political, economic, and military institutions of the Soviet 
state. Although in The State and Revolution and, even more, in contemporaneous pamphlet Can 
the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?, Lenin had recognized that the dictatorship of the proletariat 
would need to utilize the administrative, economic, and scientific experts from the old regime, he 
had not anticipated that the Soviet state would be compelled to pay these “spetsy” more than 
“workmen’s wages” or to entrust them with major decision-making powers.17 However, by the 
spring of 1918 the deteriorating economic situation convinced Lenin that “without the guidance 
of experts in the various fields of knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation to 
socialism will be impossible.” Though admitting it was a departure from the principles of the 
Paris Commune, he now proposed the payment of very large salaries to attract the services of the 
spetsy.18 This inducement was an immediate success. By August over half the officials in the 
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 commissariats—the ministries of the new government—and nearly 90 percent of the upper-level 
officials had held some sort of administrative post before the revolution.19  
The influx of bourgeois specialists into industrial administration and the military was 
comparable. In December 1918, 57 percent of the membership of the most important “chief 
committees” (glavki) of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) in charge of 
Soviet industry consisted of former employers and employers’ representatives, technicians, and 
officials from various departments, while 43 percent were workers or representatives of workers’ 
organizations. By 1921, at least 80 per cent of the “most responsible posts” in VSNKh and 74 
per cent of the members of the administrative collegia of the industrial glavki consisted of 
specialists and ex-officials.20 At the factory level, too, the managers appointed by the glavki 
during the civil war were, for the most part, bourgeois specialists.21 Meanwhile, Trotsky, the new 
Commissar of War, insisted that the Soviet armed forces be commanded by the most competent 
“military specialists” available—the former tsarist officers. By the end of 1918 these constituted 
76 percent of the command and administration of the Red Army.22  
The civil war years also witnessed a growing centralization of all political, military, and 
economic institutions. One form this centralization took in the soviets was the widespread 
delegation of powers to executive committees. In the center it soon became clear that the All-
Russian Congress of Soviets, consisting of a thousand-odd deputies, was too large a body to 
direct policy effectively or even to convene regularly in the context of a civil war. In its place the 
fifteen member government—the Council of Peoples’ Commissars (Sovnarkom)—quickly 
emerged as the dominant state institution. At lower levels, too, soviet executive committees 
increasingly assumed the powers of the local soviets.23 Describing the situation in the local 
soviets at the end of 1919, L. B. Kamenev reported, 
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 We know that because of the war the best workers were withdrawn 
in large numbers from the cities, and that therefore at times it 
becomes difficult in one or another provincial or district capital to 
form a soviet and make it function. . . . The soviet plenary sessions 
as political organizations often waste away, the people busy 
themselves with purely mechanical chores. . . . General soviet 
sessions are seldom called, and when the deputies meet, it is only 
to accept a report, listen to a speech, and the like.24  
 
Meanwhile, the local soviets and their organs came to be dominated more and more by 
those of the center. In the early months of power the autonomy of the regional soviets often 
assumed extreme and disruptive forms.25 This regionalism was partly overcome with the 
adoption of the 1918 constitution which clearly placed soviets and their executive committees at 
each territorial level under the control of the corresponding institutions at the next higher level.26 
In the following years the need for a unified direction of resources for the war effort further 
promoted the drift toward centralism. During the civil war local soviets were subordinated not 
only to higher soviets, but also to the local arms of such central institutions as VSNKh, the 
Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (Cheka), and the 
Military Revolutionary Committee.27 
The most centralized institution to emerge in the civil war was the Red Army. In the first 
months after the revolution the military forces at the disposal of the Soviet government consisted 
mostly of militia and partisan detachments composed of worker volunteers and commanded by 
elected officers. Upon assuming the post of Commissar of War in April 1918, Trotsky 
immediately set about reconstructing a standing army along more traditional lines, insisting that 
this was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war.28 He reinstituted conscription and 
the appointment of officers, defending this last measure on the grounds that the principle of 
election of officers had been introduced by the Bolsheviks simply as a means “to break the class 
resistance of the commanding personnel.” Since political power was now in the hands of the 
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 working class, election of officers had become “politically purposeless and technically 
inexpedient.” Furthermore, with the establishment of Soviet power, Trotsky claimed, “there can 
be no antagonism between the government and the masses of the workers . . . and, therefore, 
there cannot be any grounds for fearing the appointment of members of the commanding staff by 
the organs of the Soviet power.”29 
At the same time, a similar process of centralization was proceeding in the economy. In 
an effort to reverse the progressive disintegration of the economy, in late 1917 and early 1918 
the powers of the factory committees and councils of workers’ control were transferred to the 
more centralized trade unions and to VSNKh.30 By late 1918 the intensification of the war led to 
the establishment of the system that later became known as “War Communism”—a rigidly 
centralist command economy entirely subordinated to the needs of war. With the diminishing 
supply of consumer goods, trade relations between the cities and the countryside broke down. In 
order to feed the Red Army and the starving cities, the Bolsheviks sent armed detachments from 
the urban centers to confiscate the peasants’ grain. Private trade was outlawed and price controls 
and rationing were instituted. At the same time nearly all industry was nationalized and placed 
under the direction of VSNKh and its organs—the glavki (chief committees) and tsentry 
(centers).31  
Centralization also proceeded in the management of individual factories. Against the 
resistance of the trade unions, Lenin waged a successful campaign to replace collegial boards 
with individual factory managers. As Lenin saw it, “large scale machine industry—which is . . . 
the foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict unity of will,” and this could only be 
achieved by “thousands subordinating their will to the will of one.”32 Both Lenin and Trotsky 
brushed aside objections that “one-man management” subverted proletarian direction of the 
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 economy, arguing that working class rule was assured through the abolition of private ownership 
and through the power of the soviets, not by the form of industrial management.33 
The attempt under War Communism to centralize all aspects of economic and social life 
was undoubtedly one of the reasons for the enormous growth of the state apparatus during these 
years. From the first half of 1918 until the first half of 1919 the membership roles for the trade 
union of Soviet officials quadrupled, expanding from 114,539 to 529,841.34 Within Moscow, in 
May 1919 approximately 16 percent of the population and 31 percent of those employed were 
office workers. Despite decreases in the total number of office workers in Moscow, by 1920 they 
still comprised nearly a third of the working population.35 One factor besides centralization that 
contributed to the growth of the state apparatus was the pressure on the state to provide jobs in 
order to reduce the level of unemployment. As Zinoviev commented in December 1920, “We 
can make as many resolutions as possible but if, at the same time . . . tens of thousands of people 
press upon us in many cities, seeking to find some kind of work for themselves, we cannot by 
any means fight against the swelling of bureaucracy in our apparatus.”36 
Also related to the centralization of the economy was the escalation in state coercion, not 
only against the class enemy and the peasants, but also against the working class. At Lenin’s 
insistence, piece work and the hated Taylor system of industrial administration were 
reintroduced in the factories. Furthermore, labor courts were established to punish violators of 
labor discipline. Lenin explained that “those who violate labour discipline at any factory, in any 
undertaking, in any matter, . . . are responsible for the sufferings caused by the famine and 
unemployment.” We “must know how to find the guilty ones,” he insisted, “to bring them to trial 
and ruthlessly punish them.”37 During the civil war the trade unions were induced to adopt a 
productionist orientation and to play an active role in enforcing labor discipline. As Trotsky 
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 asserted in 1920, “The further we go, the more do the unions recognize that they are organs of 
production of the Soviet state, and assume responsibility for its fortunes—not opposing 
themselves to it, but identifying themselves with it.” Thus, they were becoming “organizers of 
labor discipline” and “the apparatus of revolutionary repression against undisciplined, anarchical, 
parasitical elements in the working class.”38 
Under Trotsky’s inspiration economic authoritarianism reached its peak in 1920. By then 
most of the White Armies were in flight, but the civil war and the inefficiency of War 
Communism had brought the Soviet economy to a state of ruin. In order to resuscitate industry, 
Trotsky proposed a scheme for the “militarization of labor” whereby workers would be drafted 
into labor armies and assigned wherever they were needed. As an initial step in the 
implementation of this plan, the Third Army of the Urals was transformed into a labor army. 
According to Trotsky, such methods were not simply necessitated by difficult circumstances; 
rather, they were “the inevitable method of organization and disciplining of labour-power during 
the period of transition from capitalism to Socialism.”39 For this reason—and not simply because 
of bourgeois resistance—the state could be expected to intensify its repressive powers for a 
period of time after the proletarian revolution: “Just as a lamp, before going out, shoots up in a 
brilliant flame, so the State, before disappearing, assumes the form of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, i.e., the most ruthless form of State, which embraces the life of the citizens 
authoritatively in every direction.”40 
In early 1920 Trotsky was assigned the task of reviving the transport system. He created a 
Chief Political Administration for the Lines of Communication (Glavpolitput’) with the powers 
to draft party workers and assign them throughout the country. In August he established the 
Central Transport Commission (Tsektran), which placed all transport workers under his control, 
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 and dismissed railroad union leaders who had criticized his policies. Further, he threatened to 
“shake up” all the trade unions as he had the transport unions. Finally, at the end of the year 
Trotsky elaborated a plan for the “statization” of the trade unions that would have subordinated 
them completely to the authority of the state.41 
Meanwhile, the ideal of soviet democracy also was steadily undermined by the escalating 
repression of all opposition parties, including those of the left: the Socialist Revolutionaries 
(S.R.s), the Left S.R.s, the Mensheviks, and the anarchists. The State and Revolution had not 
explicitly discussed the question, but the radically democratic system projected in that work 
seems most consistent with the toleration of competing parties. Furthermore, there is evidence to 
suggest that the Bolsheviks initially anticipated some degree of political pluralism in the soviets. 
For example, in January 1918 Lenin commented that “if the working people are dissatisfied with 
their party they can elect other delegates, hand power to another party and change the 
government without any revolution at all.”42 However, in late 1917 Bolshevik efforts to establish 
a multi-party coalition government of the left foundered on what Marcel Liebman has 
characterized as the “hostility, contempt and refusal to compromise” of the Mensheviks and the 
S.R.s.43 Then, in 1918, one after the other of the opposition parties, or sections of them, rose in 
armed revolt against the Bolsheviks. Each in turn was repressed, its leaders arrested, and its 
newspapers banned. When sections of these parties drew closer to the Soviet government during 
the civil war, the Bolsheviks permitted them a degree of freedom. Still, they remained under 
suspicion, and for their semi-loyalty enjoyed at best only semi-legality.44  
In 1920 Trotsky offered a defense of one-party rule in terms far more sweeping than the 
necessities of the moment. It was, he claimed, the only means by which the interests and desires 
of a heterogeneous proletariat could be unified: 
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 The exclusive role of the Communist Party under the 
conditions of a victorious proletarian revolution is quite 
comprehensible. The question is of the dictatorship of a class. In 
the composition of that class there enter various elements, 
heterogeneous moods, different levels of development. Yet the 
dictatorship pre-supposes unity of will, unity of direction, unity of 
action. By what other path can it be attained? The revolutionary 
supremacy of the proletariat pre-supposes within itself the political 
supremacy of a party, with a class programme of action and a 
faultless internal discipline.45 
 
Furthermore, Trotsky argued that the historically progressive character of the repression of 
opposition parties was demonstrated by its effect: “Noske [the rightist German social democrat 
and minister of military affairs] crushes the Communists, but they grow. We have suppressed the 
Mensheviks and the S.R.s—and they have disappeared. This criterion is sufficient for us.”46 
During these years perhaps the most important deviation from the vision of direct, soviet 
democracy proclaimed in Lenin’s The State and Revolution was the usurpation of the powers of 
the soviets by the Communist Party. Several factors were responsible for this. First, it proved to 
be far more difficult than Lenin had anticipated to get the masses involved in the administration 
of the state. By March 1919 Lenin was forced to admit that “the soviets, which by virtue of their 
programme organs of government by working people, are in fact organs of government for the 
working people by the advanced sector of the proletariat.”47 In effect, this meant the soviets were 
organs of government by the party, for that was where the “advanced sector of the proletariat” 
was concentrated. Second, in the context of the civil war the Bolshevik leadership actively 
sought political hegemony in the soviets and other mass institutions as a means of ensuring their 
political reliability. In 1919 the presence of non-party and non-Bolshevik deputies in the local 
soviets and other organizations prompted the Eighth Party Congress to declare: 
The Communist Party makes it its task to win decisive 
influence and complete leadership in all organizations of the 
workers . . . . The Communist Party strives especially to establish 
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 its programme and its complete leadership in the contemporary 
state organizations, which are the Soviets.48 
 
In line with this, party domination of these organizations at the lower levels was quickly assured 
by the formation of disciplined party “fractions” within each of them, and by the appointment of 
party members to important non-party posts.49 Third, the difficulties of the war combined with 
the requirements of efficiency to strengthen the role of the party. As local soviets atrophied 
during the war, party committees were forced to step in to assume their coordinating functions.50 
At the summit of power the Central Committee of the party filled the need for a central arbiter 
and final court of appeal for disputed questions in the soviets and other mass organizations.51 As 
Trotsky explained, “This affords extreme economy of time and energy, and in the most difficult 
and complicated circumstances gives a guarantee for the necessary unity of action.”52 Finally, 
with the progressive expansion of the size of Sovnarkom meetings, the most pressing matters 
were frequently resolved by the Politburo.53 
One consequence of these developments was that the party leaders increasingly tended to 
equate proletarian rule with party rule. In 1919 Lenin made a virtual slogan of the phrase 
“dictatorship of the party”: “Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand upon it and cannot 
depart from this ground, since this is the party which in the course of decades has won for itself 
the position of vanguard of the whole factory and industrial proletariat.”54 
The following year he characterized any attempt to distinguish between the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the party as evidence of “an unbelievable and 
inextricable confusion of thought.”55 Along the same lines in 1920 Trotsky remarked, 
We have more than once been accused of having 
substituted for the dictatorship of the Soviets the dictatorship of 
our party. Yet it can be said with complete justification that the 
dictatorship of the Soviets became possible only by means of the 
dictatorship of the party.56 
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Even as it usurped the powers of the soviets, the party was transformed by the same 
processes of centralization that were occurring in the state. At all levels the party also 
experienced the concentration of power in fewer and fewer hands. Local party committees 
shrank as their members were mobilized for the war, and the authority of these committees was 
assumed by the party chairmen, renamed “secretaries” in 1920.57 At the center, party congresses, 
like meetings of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, soon proved to be too large and too 
infrequent to define policy. The Central Committee, consisting of fifteen full and seven 
candidate members in 1918, quickly assumed this role in the party. But its ascendancy was only 
temporary, for military responsibilities often forced its members to be absent from Moscow. By 
1919 the oppositionist Osinskii was complaining that “even the Central Committee as a 
collegiate body does not, properly speaking, exist,” for “comrades Lenin and Sverdlov decide 
current questions by way of conversation with each other or with individual comrades in charge 
of this or that branch of Soviet work.”58 That same year this concentration of power was codified 
by the creation of three new subcommittees of the Central Committee: a five man Politburo 
responsible for urgent policy decisions; a five man Orgburo entrusted with the overall direction 
of party work; and a Secretariat, consisting of one secretary and five assistants, which was later 
placed in charge of day-to-day organizational tasks.59 
Meanwhile, in the party as in the state, power was gravitating toward the center. This 
tendency grew especially pronounced as the practice of electing local party officials declined. It 
became common for local party committees to co-opt new members to replace those who had 
been lost to the war, and for higher level committees to appoint chairmen of committees at lower 
levels. The Politburo and Orgburo frequently appointed officials in the provincial party 
institutions, and often without consulting these bodies in advance. The powers of the local party 
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 committees were further weakened by the creation, at Trotsky’s insistence, of centrally appointed 
“political departments” in charge of all political work in the Red Army and in various local 
factories and industries.60 
The conclusion of the civil war brought to the surface all the pent-up frustrations that had 
accumulated since 1918. In the face of an outpouring of popular discontent, the party leadership 
was forced to institute economic and political reforms. It scrapped the system of War 
Communism and promised to decentralize the party. Beyond that, it took steps to curb the party’s 
control over state institutions and to revive the soviets. After the detour of the civil war, there 
were at last indications that the Soviet state was about to emerge again on the road charted in The 
State and Revolution.  
One indication of the growing dissatisfaction with War Communism was the response 
within the party to Trotsky’s plan to “statify” the trade unions. Trotsky’s proposal touched off an 
explosion among party union leaders and oppositionists who were fed up with industrial 
authoritarianism. Even Lenin turned against Trotsky’s authoritarian measures at this point. Lenin 
agreed with Trotsky that the unions should encourage labor discipline and productivity, but now 
he placed greater stress on persuasion than coercion. Furthermore, he argued that the unions 
needed to preserve their independence from an increasingly “bureaucratic” state. The trade union 
question was resolved at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 with the adoption of Lenin’s 
perspective.61 
However, the party was confronted with even more serious manifestations of discontent. 
In the early months of 1921 a wave of strikes swept the factories of Petrograd while peasants 
rose in open revolt throughout the country. In March the sailors of the Kronstadt naval garrison 
mutinied in solidarity with the rebelling workers and peasants and demanded an end to Bolshevik 
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 rule.62 The Kronstadt and peasants’ uprisings were quickly crushed, but at the same time the 
party began to institute reforms to undercut the economic sources of discontent. The Tenth Party 
Congress abolished forced requisitioning of grain and replaced it with an agricultural tax in kind. 
In the following months the other features of the New Economic Policy (NEP) began to take 
shape: monetary wages replaced rationing, domestic private trade and small-scale private 
industry were encouraged, and the state began leasing enterprises to their former owners or to 
producers’ cooperatives. Also, the centrally controlled glavki were dismantled and replaced by 
autonomous “trusts” as the basic unit of industrial production.63 
In late 1920 and early 1921 efforts were also made to reverse the process of centralization 
that had transformed the party during the war. This was the thrust of the resolution on party 
construction adopted by the Ninth Party Conference in September 1920. The resolution called for 
the frequent convening of local party meetings to discuss important national and local issues, 
outlined measures to encourage members to criticize local and central party institutions, 
demanded an end to the practice of appointing party functionaries, and urged the abolition of 
political departments. Additionally, it established a hierarchy of control commissions to 
investigate alleged violations of party democracy.64 Similarly, the Tenth Party Congress 
announced the end of the “militarization” of party life, and called for the restoration of “workers’ 
democracy” within the party.65 
Finally, after the civil war attempts were made to revive the soviets as institutions of 
power. A series of laws enacted in 1921-1922 strengthened the soviets and restricted the 
authority of the “extraordinary organs” such as the Cheka that had flourished during the war. 
Sovnarkom ceded much of the power it had accumulated to the Central Executive Committee 
(CEC) of the Congress of Soviets and to its Presidium. And, beginning with the Eleventh Party 
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 Congress in 1922, Lenin increasingly insisted upon the need to extricate the party from its direct 
involvement in state affairs and upon increasing the responsibilities of soviet institutions at all 
levels.66 
However, anyone who believed that the commune state was about to become a reality 
was quickly disillusioned. The genuine revival of soviet democracy presupposed the existence of 
a powerful and self confident proletariat. But the war years had taken a heavy toll upon the 
Russian working class: approximately 60,000 industrial workers had died on the battlefield; 
hundreds of thousands more perished from hunger and disease; others fled in a mass exodus to 
the countryside to escape starvation; and thousands were absorbed into the swelling state 
apparatus. Consequently, by 1922 the size of the industrial working class was less than half what 
it had been in 1917.67 With only a little exaggeration, Lenin observed in October 1921 that “the 
proletariat has disappeared.”68 
Another precondition for the revival of soviet democracy was the easing of restrictions on 
opposition parties. However, from the perspective of the Bolsheviks, this too was impossible. At 
the end of the civil war, dissatisfaction with the regime was so widespread that it was unlikely 
the Communist Party could win a genuinely democratic election. Yet, the Bolsheviks had no 
intention of voluntarily surrendering power to the Mensheviks and S.R.s, for to do so would 
endanger not only their own physical survival, but also the goals for which they had just fought a 
bloody civil war. Thus, at the Tenth Party Congress Trotsky bluntly asserted the “historic 
birthright of the party, which is obliged to defend its dictatorship, in spite of temporary 
vacillation of elements, in spite of temporary vacillation even in the midst of the workers.”69 This 
attitude was reinforced by the prospect of the revival of bourgeois political activity that the 
Bolsheviks feared would accompany the partial restoration of capitalism under NEP. Instead of 
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 loosening their restrictions on opposition parties, the Bolsheviks now banned them altogether. At 
the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Lenin expressed this mood of intolerance in one of the 
more authoritarian statements of his career: 
And when a Menshevik says, “You are now retreating; I have been 
advocating retreat all the time, I agree with you, I am your man, let 
us retreat together,” we say in reply, “For the public manifestations 
of Menshevism our revolutionary courts must pass the death 
sentence, otherwise they are not our courts, but God knows 
what.”70 
 
This escalation in the repression of dissent outside the Bolshevik Party had an immediate 
impact upon democracy within the party as well. Isaac Deutscher has described the dynamic 
involved: 
If the Bolsheviks were now to engage freely in controversy, if their 
leaders were to thrash out their differences in public, and if the 
rank and file were to criticize the leaders and their policy, they 
would set an example to non-Bolsheviks who could not then be 
expected to refrain from argument and criticism. If members of the 
ruling party were to be permitted to form factions and groups in 
order to advance specific views within the party, how could people 
outside the party be forbidden to form their own associations and 
formulate their own political programmes?71 
 
Consequently, the Tenth Party Congress, for the first time in Bolshevik history, imposed a ban 
on party factions. Afterwards, the 1921 purge of “undesirable elements” from the party was used 
to eliminate rank and file oppositionists, while opposition leaders were dispersed by 
reassignment to obscure outposts.72 
 Meanwhile, the flow of power from the state to the party continued unabated. This 
process was accelerated by the steady deterioration of Lenin’s health from mid-1921 until his 
death in 1924. Lenin’s had been the most powerful voice for restricting the prerogatives of the 
party. In Lenin’s absence Sovnarkom referred even greater numbers of disputed questions to the 
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 more prestigious Politburo.73 At the same time, the Orgburo and Secretariat were amassing ever 
greater powers through the appointment of party personnel. Partly this was a continuation 
through inertia of practices initiated during the civil war. Partly, it grew out of the attempt, in the 
aftermath of the war, to reorganize the party to more effectively direct the machinery of state. 
And partly, it was a product of institutional self-aggrandizement by the Orgburo and Secretariat. 
The individual who benefitted most from the growing powers of these bodies was Stalin—the 
leading figure in the Orgburo and, after April 1922, the General Secretary of the party.74 
3.2 THE OPPOSITIONS AND BUREAUCRACY 
During the period 1918-1922, among the most vocal and consistent critics of Soviet 
bureaucracy were a series of opposition groupings within the Russian Communist Party. 
Although they differed on many questions, they were united in the belief that the problem of 
bureaucracy in the Soviet Union was in the departure from the radically democratic and 
proletarian ideals expressed in the writings by Marx and Engels on the Paris Commune and in 
Lenin’s The State and Revolution. Each group denounced the growing authoritarianism and 
centralism of Soviet institutions. Also, echoing the writings of Marx and Engels on bureaucracy 
and political alienation, each linked this problem with the growth of bourgeois power and 
influence. 
The Left Communists came together in early 1918 in opposition to the signing of a peace 
treaty with Germany, and as proponents instead of a policy of revolutionary war. However, even 
after the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in early March, they continued to function as a 
faction, shifting their focus to economic policies.75 At the time, Lenin was attempting to reverse 
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 the progressive deterioration of the economy by halting further nationalization of enterprises, 
curbing the powers of the factory committees, imposing labor discipline on the workers, and 
recruiting bourgeois specialists to serve as industrial managers. For the Left Communists these 
policies represented an impermissible departure from the revolutionary socialist principles that 
Lenin himself had expressed. Nikolai Bukharin, one of the leaders of the Left Communists, 
observed, “It is good . . . that the cook will be taught to govern the state; but what will there be if 
a Commissar is placed over the cook? Then he will never learn to govern the state.”76 
For the Left Communists the danger of Lenin’s policies lay in the restoration of economic 
power to a section of the bourgeoisie combined with the introduction of “bureaucratic centralist” 
methods. By the latter, they seem to have understood any measure that removed direct control of 
production from the workers and that imposed discipline on the proletariat from without. The 
Left Communists believed that these measures, like the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, had 
originated in the willingness of the party leadership to compromise principles for the sake of 
survival. If taken to their logical conclusion, such policies raised the prospect of the degeneration 
of the revolution by undermining the independent initiative of the working class. 
With the policy of administering enterprises on the basis of 
broad participation by capitalists and semibureaucratic 
centralization it is natural to combine a labor policy directed 
toward the institution among the workers of discipline under the 
banner of “self-discipline,” toward the introduction of obligatory 
labor for workers . . . , piecework payment, lengthening of the 
working day, etc. 
The form of government administration will have to 
develop in the direction of bureaucratic centralization, the rule of 
various commissars, the deprivation of local soviets of their 
independence, and in practice the rejection of the type of 
“commune state” administered from below.77 
 
Ultimately, the Left Communists predicted, the result would be the collapse of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and the restoration of some form of capitalism. As Osinskii warned, 
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 The stick, if raised against the workers, will find itself in the hands 
of a social force which is either under the influence of another 
social class or in the hands of the soviet power; then the soviet 
power will be forced to seek support against the proletariat from 
another class (e.g. the peasantry), and by this it will destroy itself 
as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism and socialist 
organization must be set up by the proletariat itself, or they will not 
be set up at all; something else will be set up—state capitalism.78 
 
The only way out of the danger, according to the Left Communists, was through radical 
economic measures that continued the offensive against capital while expanding workers’ 
democracy. Thus, they advocated the nationalization of all large scale industrial and financial 
enterprises and the extension of the principle of workers’ control. Each enterprise was to be 
managed by a board, two-thirds of which would be composed of elected workers’ 
representatives. The factory boards, in turn, were to be subordinate to a network of elected 
economic councils. Production norms were to be set and enforced exclusively by workers’ 
organizations. Although the Left Communists did not entirely reject the use of bourgeois 
specialists, they insisted that these were to be nominated only by the worker-dominated factory 
boards and subject to removal from below.79 
The Left Communists were decisively defeated in May at the Congress of Councils of the 
National Economy, and by June they had collapsed as an organized opposition. However, soon 
afterwards they saw part of their program implemented in a Sovnarkom decree that nationalized 
all large-scale industry.80 In the following years many of the leaders of the Left Communists 
continued to be active in other opposition groupings—particularly the Military Opposition and 
the Democratic Centralists—that fought to limit the power of the bourgeois specialists. 
From the moment when Trotsky first announced his plans for the construction of a Red 
Army, his policies encountered resistance within the party. By the Eighth Party Congress in 
March 1919 this discontent had crystallized into what later became known as the Military 
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 Opposition. The Military Opposition was a heterogeneous grouping that included, in addition to 
former Left Communists, leaders of the partisan detachments that had formed in late 1917 and 
early 1918. Among these, the local military leaders of Tsaritsyn such as Voroshilov, supported 
by Stalin, played a prominent role. Like the Left Communists, the Military Opposition resisted 
the use of bourgeois specialists—in this case, the former tsarist officers. Also, it opposed 
Trotsky’s efforts to introduce a high degree of centralism in the Red Army, his rejection of the 
principle of election of officers, and his introduction of political departments under the direct 
supervision of the Central Committee to organize all party work in the army.81 The Military 
Opposition did not develop a general analysis of the problem of bureaucracy, but their views on 
this question seem to have been consistent with those of the Left Communists. At the Eighth 
Party Congress the former Left Communist V. M. Smirnov decried Trotsky’s centralization of all 
political work in the army “according to a completely bureaucratic model.”82 Although the 
Military Opposition’s views were rejected by the Eighth Congress, a number of its leaders were 
already espousing a broader platform in a new opposition grouping—the Democratic Centralists. 
The Democratic Centralists appeared as an opposition faction early in 1919, and reached 
the high point of their influence and activity in 1920-21. They were composed largely of 
intellectuals who were alarmed by the decline of democracy and the growth of centralism and 
authoritarianism in the economic, state, and party institutions. These were tendencies that, 
according to V. V. Osinskii, one of the leaders of the Democratic Centralists, stifled “the creative 
initiative of the conscious workers.”83 Like the Left Communists, the Democratic Centralists saw 
these as manifestations of “bureaucratism” or “bureaucratic centralism.” For example, at the 
Ninth Party Congress in 1920, V. N. Maksimovskii declared, 
We are defending that democratic centralism which is inscribed in 
the statutes of the party adopted at the December conference. We 
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 are defending democratic centralism in the construction of the 
organs of Soviet power. . . . The Central Committee is guilty of 
bureaucratic centralism. . . . It is said that a fish begins to rot from 
its head. At the top the party is beginning to fall under the 
influence of this bureaucratic centralism.84 
 
Even more sharply, T. V. Sapronov denounced the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
party leaders as the “dictatorship of the party bureaucracy.”85 Although the Democratic 
Centralists did not clearly define the origins of bureaucratism, at different times they implied it 
had arisen out of bourgeois influence and the expansion of “military culture” at the expense of 
civilian culture.86 
The solution to the problem for the Democratic Centralists was through the 
implementation of a broad program of proletarian democracy and decentralization. They 
advocated greater restrictions on the use of bourgeois specialists, vigorously defended collegial 
management of enterprises, and resisted Trotsky’s efforts in 1920 to militarize the economy. As 
far as the state was concerned, they attempted to revive the power of the soviets, proposing 
measures to change the composition of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets to make it more representative, and a plan to restore to the CEC the 
legislative powers that had been assumed by Sovnarkom. At the same time they demanded the 
return of a large measure of power from the central state institutions to the local soviets.  
The Democratic Centralists advocated similar measures to combat bureaucratism in the 
party. They urged that the Central Committee be expanded and proletarianized, and they 
advocated the “collective principle” for decision making at all levels of the party. Against the 
flow of power from the local party organizations to the center, they demanded an end to the 
Secretariat’s practice of appointing local party officials and issuing directives to provincial party 
organizations, and urged the abolition of the special political departments. The Democratic 
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 Centralists argued that the entire party should have the opportunity to consider all important 
matters before a decision was reached, and they defended the right of opposition groups to air 
their differences freely in the party press and at party assemblies.87 
Meanwhile, yet another dissident group, the Workers’ Opposition, appeared as an 
organized party faction in late 1920. As its name suggests, this group was composed almost 
entirely of industrial workers. Like the Democratic Centralists, the Workers’ Opposition attacked 
the use of bourgeois specialists, the introduction of individual management in industrial 
enterprises, and Trotsky’s practice of appointing trade union leaders. The most distinctive 
contribution of the Workers’ Opposition was its advocacy of the rapid transfer of the 
management of industry to the trade unions. Nationally, this was to be exercised by a central 
organ elected by the unions grouped according to branches of production. Locally, enterprises 
were to be controlled by elected workers’ committees.88 
The Workers’ Opposition’s views on bureaucracy were most clearly articulated by 
Alexandra Kollontai in a pamphlet published in early 1921. According to Kollontai, bureaucracy 
was a pervasive phenomenon in both state and party institutions. In both cases the problem was 
the excessive centralization of decision making: 
The harm in bureaucracy does not only lie in the red tape . . 
. . The harm lies in the solution of all problems, not by means of an 
open exchange of opinions or by the immediate efforts of all 
concerned, but by means of formal decisions handed down from 
the central institutions. These decisions are arrived at either by one 
person or by an extremely limited collective, wherein the interested 
people are quite often entirely absent. Some third person decides 
your fate: this is the whole essence of bureaucracy.89 
 
For Kollontai, this hyper-centralism was one example of the “vacillation, inconsistencies, and 
outright deviations of our Soviet policy from the early expressed class-consistent principles of 
89 
 the communist programme.”90 She singled out Trotsky as one of the most blatant of the 
“defenders and knights of bureaucracy” among the party leaders.91 
Kollontai attributed the growth of bureaucracy to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois 
influence in the state and party. This influence was exerted in two ways. First, the state and party 
had been forced to attempt to reconcile the often antagonistic interests of the heterogeneous 
classes within the Soviet Union: the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty owners, and the 
bourgeoisie. In doing so, the Soviet leaders had adapted their policies to classes hostile to the 
working class, and consequently had begun to distance themselves from the proletariat: 
Distrust of the workers by the leaders is steadily growing. 
The more sober these leaders get, the more clever statesmen they 
become with their policy of sliding over the blade of a sharp knife 
between communism and compromise with the bourgeois past, the 
deeper becomes the abyss between the “ups” and the “downs”, the 
less understanding there is, and the more painful and inevitable 
becomes the crisis within the party itself.92 
 
Second, there had been a direct influx of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements into the state 
and party: “These are the elements that bring decay into our Soviet institutions, breeding there an 
atmosphere altogether repugnant to the working class.”93 
According to Kollontai, the elimination of the problem of bureaucracy had to begin in the 
party. “As soon as the party . . . recognises the self-activity of the masses as the basis of our 
state,” she predicted, “the Soviet institutions will again automatically become living institutions, 
destined to carry out the communist project.”94 To reform the party, she and the Workers’ 
Opposition demanded the expulsion from the party of all non-proletarians who had joined after 
1919, the elimination of all non-working class elements from party administrative positions, the 
reinstitution of the elective principle for all posts, and the submission of all major questions of 
policy to the rank and file for discussion.95 
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 The Democratic Centralists and the Workers’ Opposition participated in the winning of 
some significant reforms such as the reversal of the growing militarization of labor and the 
measures adopted by the Ninth Party Conference and Tenth Party Congress for the 
democratization of the party. However, like the Left Communists, they failed in their efforts to 
realize the traditional Marxist vision of a commune state. While both groups continued to be 
active into the mid-1920s, after the Tenth Party Congress they quickly declined in influence 
under the repression of the party leadership.96 
 Although the opposition groups within the party were quite vocal in their criticisms of 
bureaucracy, they were not alone in raising these concerns. During the years 1918-1922 central 
party leaders such as Lenin and Trotsky also spoke out against the dangers of bureaucracy. Of 
the two, Lenin was in many ways closest to the position of the oppositionists. 
3.3 LENIN ON BUREAUCRACY 
By the spring of 1918 Lenin had concluded that the danger of economic collapse and the 
difficulties of involving the masses in the administration of the state temporarily necessitated 
significant departures from the principles of the commune state. From that point until his death 
Lenin endorsed measures that were widely denounced by the party oppositions as “bureaucratic”: 
the extensive employment of bourgeois specialists, the payment of salaries far exceeding 
“workmen’s wages,” the introduction of strict economic and political centralism, and the use of 
economic and state coercion against the working class to increase labor productivity. Yet, during 
these years Lenin also frequently expressed his concerns about the growth of the problem of 
bureaucracy. As early as April 1918 Lenin noted the “shadow of a possibility” of the 
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 “bureaucratic distortion of the Soviet form of organization.”97 In the following years this shadow 
lengthened and deepened in Lenin’s mind until, by 1922, it had begun to darken his entire 
outlook on the prospects for socialism in the Soviet Union. 
Despite Lenin’s profound differences with the party oppositionists, his concerns about the 
dangers of bureaucracy at times coincided to a considerable degree with theirs. Like the 
oppositionists, Lenin expressed the fear that departures from the proletarian and democratic 
ideals expressed in The State and Revolution ultimately might subvert the Soviet state. Lenin, 
too, saw this problem as related to the steady influx of bourgeois elements into the state 
apparatus. Also, at times Lenin deplored the bureaucratism displayed by other party leaders in 
advocating policies that he viewed as excessively centralist or authoritarian. In all these cases, 
Lenin remained close to the primary popular meaning, and to the traditional Marxist 
understanding, of that phenomenon. However, there were many other occasions when Lenin 
utilized a variety of popular secondary meanings of the term bureaucracy when speaking of 
administrative inefficiency in the state and party apparatuses. 
Often when Lenin spoke of bureaucracy and bureaucratism he had in mind the enormous 
number of old tsarist officials employed by the Soviet state and the attitudes of these officials. In 
early 1919 he warned that the struggle with bureaucracy was far from over, for the old tsarist 
bureaucracy was “trying to regain some of its positions.”98 Shortly after this, at the Eighth Party 
Congress, Lenin further elaborated on this point: 
We dispersed these old bureaucrats, shuffled them and then began 
to place them in new posts. The tsarist bureaucrats began to join 
the Soviet institutions and practise their bureaucratic methods, they 
began to assume the colouring of Communists and, to succeed 
better in their careers, to procure membership cards of the Russian 
Communist Party. And so, they have been thrown out of the door 
but they creep back in through the window.99 
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 The problem with the old tsarist officials was that they were “imbued with bourgeois views” and 
had retained their “thoroughly bourgeois outlook.”100 In part, this meant that they were 
exclusively concerned with their own, narrow self-interests. Thus, on one occasion Lenin 
denounced those “petty officials, petty bureaucrats accustomed to the old and selfish way of 
doing things.”101 Beyond that, out of hostility to the workers and the goals of socialism, the old 
bureaucrats unconsciously subverted Soviet policy or consciously engaged in sabotage. In 
November 1920 Lenin spoke of the “hundreds of thousands of old officials whom we got from 
the tsar and from bourgeois society and who, partly deliberately and partly unwittingly, work 
against us.”102 Most ominous of all was the danger that the enormous mass of bourgeois officials 
would be able to redirect Soviet policy toward a restoration of capitalism. Lenin saw this as a 
distinct possibility during the second year of NEP, observing at the Eleventh Party Congress in 
the spring of 1922, 
If we take Moscow with its 4,700 Communists in responsible 
positions, and if we take that huge bureaucratic machine, that 
gigantic heap, we must ask: who is directing whom? I doubt very 
much whether it can truthfully be said that the Communists are 
directing that heap. To tell the truth, they are not directing, they are 
being directed.103 
  
Lenin further believed that the bureaucratizing effect of the old officials was not confined 
to the state apparatus. In November 1920 he noted the growth of bureaucratic tendencies in the 
party as well, explaining, 
It is natural that the bureaucratism that has reappeared in Soviet 
institutions was bound to have a pernicious effect even on Party 
organisations, since the upper ranks of the Party are at the same 
time the upper ranks of the state apparatus; they are one and the 
same thing. Since the evil is the old bureaucratism which has been 
able to show itself in the Party apparatus, it is obvious and natural 




 Similarly, at the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922 Lenin asked whether the 4,700 Communists in 
Moscow in responsible positions had not “come under the influence of an alien culture.”105 
Evidently, Lenin thought that many Communist state and party officials had begun to adopt the 
attitudes and practices of the tsarist bureaucrats. 
If the officials from the old regime were so unreliable, why had they been employed in 
the first place? According to Lenin this had been necessitated by the lack of effective 
participation by the masses in the administration of the state. In late 1917 and early 1918 Lenin 
blamed the low degree of involvement by the proletariat and poor peasantry on their lack of self-
confidence.106 By 1919 and 1920 he was concentrating on another factor—the absence of culture 
(kulturnost’) among the masses of workers and peasants.107 By this, of course, Lenin did not 
mean that the masses were insufficiently familiar with the classics of literature or the opera. 
Lenin, and following him the other Bolshevik leaders, used the term culture to refer to literacy 
and the knowledge of basic organizational and office procedure. The absence of these skills 
prevented many workers and peasants from getting involved in state administration, and lowered 
the effectiveness of those who did. 
Once employed by the Soviet state, the old tsarist bureaucrats had little trouble evading 
the control of their Communist bosses, for the culture of Communists was hardly higher than that 
of the masses. Lenin explained at the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922, 
Their [the old bureaucrats’] culture is miserable, insignificant, but 
it is still at a higher level than ours. Miserable and low as it is, it is 
higher than that of our responsible Communist administrators, for 
the latter lack administrative ability. Communists who are put at 
the head of departments—and sometimes artful saboteurs 
deliberately put them in these positions to use them as a shield—
are often fooled.108 
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 However, in spite of the dangers involved in employing the old tsarist officials, Lenin 
could not agree with the opposition groupings that the use of specialists should be severely 
curtailed. With all their defects, the specialists were an inherited resource that the Soviet 
government could not afford to waste. “We cannot live without this apparatus,” Lenin confessed 
at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919; “every branch of government creates a demand for 
such an apparatus.”109 Instead, for the time being it was necessary to carefully supervise and 
control their activity. Just as the army had installed commissars to keep an eye on the old tsarist 
generals, so the state needed to attach “worker commissars” to these bourgeois experts. In time, 
it could even be hoped that the experts could be “conquered morally” once they saw how the 
proletariat was enlisting broader circles of working people in progressive campaigns.110 
Ultimately, however, Lenin’s solution to the problem was to draw the masses of workers 
and peasants into the work of running the state in order to replace the bourgeois specialists. 
Again, at the Eighth party Congress Lenin contended, “We can fight bureaucracy to the bitter 
end, to a complete victory, only when the whole population participates in the work of 
government.”111 Although Lenin finally concluded that it would take years for the masses of 
workers and peasants to acquire the skills necessary to participate in the administration of the 
state, he believed they could begin immediately to learn these skills by watching the work of the 
bourgeois specialists.112 In January 1919 he argued, “We must appoint more workers of average 
qualifications to the government offices, who would learn their jobs from the specialists and be 
able to replace them eventually and do the practical work independently.”113 Similarly, in 
February 1920 Lenin insisted on the need to “attach groups of workers to these bourgeois 
experts, to look on, to learn and to take this work into their own hands.”114 Thus, while Lenin 
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 saw the specialists as part of the bureaucratic problem, he believed that they could contribute to 
its solution. 
From 1920 onward, Lenin believed that the masses could best be drawn into the 
administration of the state by participating in the work of the Commissiariat of Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Inspection (Rabkrin). Rabkrin was formed in 1920 through the reorganization of the 
Commissariat of State Control, and was specifically entrusted with the task of fighting 
bureaucracy in the state apparatus.115 Soon, Rabkrin had replaced the soviets in Lenin’s thinking 
as the institution most conducive to mass political participation. In January 1920 Lenin advised 
Stalin, the head of Rabkrin, that “all working people, both men and particularly women, should 
serve in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection.”116 He proclaimed the goal that “hundreds of 
thousands and millions of working people should pass through the school of the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Inspection and learn to administer the state (which was something nobody had taught 
us), so that they might replace hundreds of thousands of bourgeois bureaucrats.”117 Other 
institutions through which Lenin hoped that workers and peasants would learn administrative 
skills were the trade unions, and the producers’ and consumers’ cooperatives. Also, he expressed 
the hope that the general elevation of culture through an expansion of the school system, would 
create “a large body of young people capable of thoroughly overhauling our state apparatus.”118  
Meanwhile, Lenin proposed that bourgeois elements who had managed to worm their 
way into the party, and other Communists infected with bourgeois attitudes, should be purged 
from the party. In 1919 he suggested an indirect “purging” of the party by making “steadily 
increasing demands” upon its members. One of these demands included “subbotniks,” or unpaid 
days of work. Faced with such demands, Communists who were not seriously committed 
revolutionaries would leave the party of their own accord.119 In 1921, Lenin recommended a 
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 more direct method of purging the party—the expulsion of “those who have lost touch with the 
masses,” and “those who have ‘attached’ themselves to us for selfish motives, . . . those who 
have become ‘puffed-up commissars’ and ‘bureaucrats’.”120  
Although Lenin accepted the oppositionist view that the problem of bureaucracy was 
related to the use of the bourgeois specialists, he did not frequently agree with the oppositionist 
definition of the problem as one of excessive centralism or authoritarianism. However, on at least 
two occasions Lenin used the term bureaucracy in precisely this sense. In each case, the relevant 
policies had already provoked, or were threatening to provoke, popular discontent. Also, in each 
case Lenin concluded that centralism and authoritarianism had outlived its usefulness or had 
gone too far. 
This was the meaning behind Lenin’s denunciation in late 1920 and early 1921 of 
Trotsky’s trade union policies as “bureaucratic.” Lenin had fully endorsed Trotsky’s “shake up” 
of the rail union leadership earlier in the year as a necessary measure to revive transport. But 
with the growth of oppositionist and trade-union discontent, Lenin drew back from these 
authoritarian measures while Trotsky pressed ahead.121 Even then Lenin did not entirely reject 
the measures that Trotsky had employed as head of Tsektran. The problem, Lenin argued, was 
not that Tsektran had brought pressures to bear, but that it had indulged in pressures to excess. 
And it had failed to switch to normal trade-union methods at the proper time.122 
Trotsky’s persistence in the use of coercion now drew heavy fire from Lenin. Lenin 
denounced Trotsky’s policy of “shaking up” the trade unions as “irregularities and bureaucratic 
excesses”; he characterized Trotsky’s further proposals to reorganize the unions by “selecting 
functionaries” as a “real bureaucratic approach”; he predicted that workers would view Trotsky’s 
scheme for replacing “workers’ democracy” with “industrial democracy” as a “bureaucratic set-
97 
 up”; and he derided Trotsky’s pamphlet containing his trade union proposals as nothing but 
“bureaucratic projecteering.”123 Lenin believed that Trotsky’s authoritarian tendencies were a 
result of his approaching economic problems from a military perspective. Thus, he denounced 
the “‘degeneration of centralism and militarised forms of work into bureaucratic practices, petty 
tyranny, red-tape’.”124 Furthermore, he explained that there were two aspects of military 
experience: a “positive side” consisting of “heroism, zeal, etc.,” and a “negative side of the 
experience of the worst military types” which included “red-tape and arrogance.” Trotsky’s 
theses, according to Lenin, played up to the worst in military experience.125 Because of 
“excesses” such as those committed by Tsektran, Lenin rejected Trotsky’s characterization of the 
Soviet Union as simply a “workers’ state.” More precisely, it was “a workers’ state with a 
bureaucratic twist to it.” In light of this bureaucratic distortion Lenin observed, “We now have a 
state under which it is the business of the massively organised proletariat to defend itself.” For 
this reason the working class needed trade unions with a high degree of autonomy from the 
Soviet state.126 
Although the dispute was resolved by the Tenth Party Congress, which adopted Lenin’s 
own position on the trade union question, this episode continued to color Lenin’s perception of 
Trotsky. It was at least partly for this reason that Lenin spoke, in his “Testament” written at the 
end of December 1922, of Trotsky’s “excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative 
side of the work.”127 By that time, however, Lenin had begun to perceive Stalin, not Trotsky, as 
the most “bureaucratic” of the Soviet leaders. 
The issue that evoked this characterization was Stalin’s handling of a dispute with the 
Georgian party leadership in late 1922. In September Lenin clashed with Stalin over a proposal 
for the new Soviet constitution to be adopted the following year. Stalin had pressed for the direct 
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 incorporation of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia into the Russian 
Republic as “autonomous republics.” More concerned about the sensibilities of the traditionally 
oppressed nationalities, Lenin argued for the creation of a new, federalist structure. Although 
Lenin easily won this dispute, Stalin proceeded with other plans to incorporate Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan into a Transcaucasian Federation. This was particularly offensive to the 
leaders of the Georgian party. Near the end of November Lenin grew alarmed over reports of 
repression directed by Stalin and executed by Ordzhonikidze against the Georgian Central 
Committee. By the end of the year Lenin had come to fully endorse the Georgian position.128 
At that point Lenin described the behavior of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii—
who headed an investigating commission that whitewashed the situation—as typically 
bureaucratic. Their centralist and authoritarian actions, according to Lenin, were characteristic of 
“that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as 
the typical Russian bureaucrat is.”129 Lenin seems to have viewed this as a particular problem in 
Stalin’s case, given his enormous power as General Secretary of the party. In his “Testament” 
written at the end of December 1922, Lenin remarked that he was “not sure whether he [Stalin] 
will always be able to use that authority with sufficient caution.”130 A few days later, in his notes 
on the Georgian situation, Lenin denounced “Stalin’s haste and his infatuation with pure 
administration, together with his spite against the notorious ‘nationalist-socialism’,” and 
characterized Stalin as a “Great-Russian bully.”131 
Aside from supporting constitutional guarantees of the rights of the national republics, 
Lenin attempted to combat this bureaucratic authoritarianism through the demotion and 
exemplary punishment of those responsible for the repression of the Georgians. In an addendum 
to his “Testament” Lenin urged that Stalin be replaced as General Secretary by someone “more 
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 tolerant, more loyal, more polite, and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc.”132 
Furthermore, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii were to be publicly condemned for their 
handling of the Georgian affair; and Ordzhonikidze was to be expelled from the party for at least 
two years.133 
Like the opposition groups in the party, then, when Lenin expressed concerns about 
bureaucracy he was often referring to the problem of political alienation—either in the 
excessively centralist and authoritarian policies of his comrades, or in the political power of a 
state apparatus stocked with officials from alien classes. However, the growing alienation of 
Soviet institutions from the masses and the potential for the political degeneration of the regime 
were not Lenin’s only concerns. As head of state, he was inevitably more preoccupied than the 
oppositionists with the possibility that, out of simple inefficiency and incompetence, the Soviet 
state would prove unable to cope with its vital military, economic, and political tasks. This fear 
was reflected in many of Lenin’s comments on the problem of bureaucracy. Thus, consistent 
with popular secondary understandings of bureaucracy, Lenin frequently employed that term, 
together with red tape, to refer to inefficiency, waste, delay, and excessive size in the state 
apparatus.  
Lenin first attacked the inefficiency of the state apparatus as early as December 1918 at 
the Second Congress of Economic Councils. There, he angrily announced that he had received 
reports of warehouses filled with goods kept under lock and key while peasants clamored for 
commodities. In an apparent swipe at party oppositionists, he explained that the origin of this 
“red tape” was to be found in collegial management, and the consequent decline of individual 
responsibility.134 A few months later he described the Soviet Union as “ground down by red 
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 tape.” Explicitly rejecting the accusations of oppositionists that this was caused by excessive 
centralism, Lenin argued instead that it was “because we have not got strict centralisation.”135 
During the following years, Lenin waged a successful campaign to replace collegial 
administration with individual management. However, the waste and inefficiency continued and 
even increased. At the beginning on March 1922 Lenin painted a bleak picture of the 
bureaucratic wasteland of the government apparatus: 
We have huge quantities of material, bulky works, that would 
cause the heart of the most methodical German scientist to rejoice; 
we have mountains of paper, and it would take Istpart 
[Commission for Collecting and Studying Materials on the History 
of the October Revolution and the History of the Russian 
Communist Party] fifty times fifty years to go through it all; but if 
you tried to find anything practical in a state trust, you would fail; 
and you would never know who was responsible for what. The 
practical fulfillment of decrees—of which we have more than 
enough . . . is never checked. Are the orders of the responsible 
Communist officials carried out? Can they get this done? No.136 
 
Later in the month, at the Eleventh Party Congress, Lenin continued his assault on 
bureaucratic inefficiency. There, he informed the delegates of a recent case in which a French 
capitalist wanted to sell the Soviet government a large supply of badly needed canned meat. 
Because of the red tape of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, the transaction was not completed 
for several weeks—and then only because of Lenin’s initiative. Lenin summed it up as “simply 
the usual inefficiency of the Russian intellectuals to get things done—inefficiency and 
slovenliness.”137  
In the same report Lenin also noted the excessive size of the state apparatus, “that huge 
bureaucratic machine, that gigantic heap.”138 Part of this problem was reflected in the number of 
state commissions: there were one hundred and twenty of these when, in Lenin’s view, only 
sixteen were needed.139 By November of 1922 Lenin was complaining that since 1918 the 
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 number of state officials just in Moscow had grown from 231,000 to 243,000, even after 
reductions. And he asserted the state apparatus was inflated to more than twice the needed 
size.140 
Lenin explained the growth of bureaucratic inefficiency primarily as a consequence of the 
incompetence of former underground revolutionaries as state administrators.141 Again, what 
Communists lacked was “culture.” This was, for example, the problem with the officials in the 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade who were incapable of purchasing canned meat from the French 
capitalist. 142 Lacking culture, Lenin asserted, Communist officials were constantly drawing up 
schemes, but were incapable of practical work.143 He complained that many Communists were of 
no use in combating red tape, and some were even a hindrance in this respect.144 One 
consequence of this incompetence was that officials were afraid of taking responsibility for their 
work. This in turn resulted in a proliferation of commissions behind which bureaucrats could 
take shelter; and it constantly led state bodies to refer petty administrative questions to the 
highest party institutions.145 
Over the years, Lenin suggested a number of measures to improve the efficiency of the 
state apparatus. First, he advocated raising the level of individual and departmental 
responsibility—for example, through the use of individual instead of collegial management. The 
same principle was emphasized by Lenin in a recommendation of April 1922 concerning the 
duties of the newly created positions of Deputy Chairmen of Sovnarkom. The Deputy Premiers 
were to “demand more self-reliance and more responsibility from every Peoples’ Commissar and 
every government department,” and to see that the responsibilities of Soviet officials were 
precisely defined.146 
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 Second, state administration was to be improved through the appointment of competent 
Communists to responsible posts. In April 1922 Lenin proposed that the Deputy Chairmen 
supervise the placement of Communists in Soviet offices. They were to become acquainted with 
Soviet officials “so as to test and choose men, and also to really improve the machinery of Soviet 
government.”147 Furthermore, Lenin recommended that the Deputy Chairmen supervise the 
distribution of Communists to guarantee that they occupied posts in which they could “combat 
bureaucracy and red tape” and improve the lot of citizens who had to deal with “our utterly 
inefficient Soviet machinery of administration.”148  
Third, Lenin proposed to punish those who were guilty of inefficiency. For example, 
Lenin threatened jail for the officials involved in the canned meat affair, and he recommended 
the same treatment for other officials responsible for red tape.149 He also urged the Deputy 
Chairmen to impose penalties for “bureaucratic methods, red tape, inefficiency, neglect, etc.” 
These were to include dismissal and legal prosecution in widely publicized trials.150  
Fourth, Lenin believed that efficiency could be improved through proper supervision over 
the methods used in the state institutions. Again, the most important tool in this regard was the 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. Rabkrin’s duties included studying the methods of “a given 
office, factory, department, and so forth” and introducing practical changes.151 Another form of 
guidance in administrative methods was the reorganization of one or a few departments that 
could serve as models for the rest. In 1922 Lenin charged the Deputy Chairmen with this task.152 
Similarly, in 1923 he suggested Rabkrin do the same, beginning with the most poorly organized 
state institution—Rabkrin itself.153 
One final method of improving the state apparatus was to cut severely the number of 
government commissions, reduce the staffs of departments, and eliminate “unproductive 
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 expenditure.” The sole exception to this last measure was to be the Commissariat of 
Education.154 This must have been at least partly due to the role that education played for Lenin 
in fighting bureaucracy.  
3.4 TROTSKY AND BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY 
Although Trotsky’s later writings on the problem of bureaucracy have received a great 
deal of attention by historians and political activists, very little has been written about his views 
on this question during the period 1917-1922.155 Nevertheless, during these years Trotsky, like 
others within the Bolshevik Party, frequently voiced his alarm about the growth of bureaucracy 
in the Soviet state apparatus. However, in contrast with party oppositionists and Lenin, in this 
period Trotsky did not utilize a Marxist analysis of political alienation. That is, he did not 
denounce political centralism, or the tendency of a political apparatus to stand over and dominate 
society, nor did he describe the problem of Soviet bureaucracy as related to the surviving 
influence of exploitative classes upon the Soviet state. Rather, Trotsky viewed the problem of 
bureaucracy almost exclusively as related to the inefficiency of Soviet military and economic 
institutions. During the party controversies of these years, these semantic differences 
occasionally generated confusion when Trotsky, under attack for his “bureaucratic”-authoritarian 
methods, responded by hurling the charge of “bureaucracy” back at his critics. In fact, the wide 
differences within the party over the real meaning of bureaucracy were a reflection of the vastly 
differing concerns of those who used the term. No doubt, Trotsky’s almost exclusive 
preoccupation with efficiency during this period was shaped by his responsibilities as head of the 
largest of department of the Soviet apparatus, the War Commissariat. 
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 Although, broadly speaking, Trotsky used the term bureaucracy to refer to sources of 
inefficiency in the Soviet state apparatus, more specifically he employed it in reference to three 
distinct, though overlapping, problems. First, he denounced as “bureaucrats” (biurokraty) those 
who, out of self-interest, opposed the implementation of military or economic policies that he 
viewed as most efficient. Second, he employed the terms bureaucratism (biurokratizm, 
kantseliarshchina) or red tape (volokita) as synonyms to characterize work habits of state 
officials that he viewed as inefficient, or even obstructionist. Third, and most importantly, 
Trotsky criticized the inefficient organization of entire areas of work such as military supply 
during the civil war, or industrial production under War Communism and the early years of NEP 
as a form of bureaucracy (biurokratiia).  
In his first comments on the problem of bureaucracy after the revolution, Trotsky used 
the term to refer to a group of conservative, petty-bourgeois officials who acted in their own self-
interest and contrary to the interests of the revolution. We have seen how Lenin and the 
opposition groupings in the party frequently attacked the bourgeois specialists as “bureaucrats” 
in this sense. Trotsky, however, the most enthusiastic proponent of the use of these specialists, 
consistently viewed this accusation as misdirected. In fact, in late 1918 and early 1919 he even 
leveled the charge of bureaucratism against those who opposed the use of bourgeois military 
experts. 
In late 1918 and early 1919 Trotsky reacted sharply to the Military Opposition’s 
campaign against the use of the former tsarist officers in the Red Army. As Trotsky saw it, this 
hostility to the military specialists was irrational from a military point of view, and could only be 
explained as a product of ignorance or concern for personal privilege. Thus, in August 1918 he 
described one part of the Military Opposition as “people infected with panic or those who are 
105 
 remote from the entire work of the military apparatus.”156 The following March he characterized 
this group as composed of “prominent workers” who were “pretty persistent and independent but 
inclined to oversimplify every question.”157 However, for Trotsky the most important part of the 
Military Opposition consisted of “bureaucrats” (biurokraty)—party members assigned to 
military work who were mainly preoccupied with their own status and privileges. Here, it is 
evident that Trotsky was referring to the military leadership in Tsaritsyn, supported at the time 
by Stalin. Trotsky’s sharpest denunciation of this group appeared in his “Letter to a Friend” of 
January 10, 1919: 
Only a wretched Soviet bureaucrat [biurokrat], jealous for his new 
job, and cherishing this job because of the personal privileges it 
confers and not because of the interests of the workers’ revolution, 
can have an attitude of baseless distrust towards any great expert, 
outstanding organiser, technician, specialist, or scientist—having 
already decided on his own account that ‘me and my mates will get 
by somehow’.158 
 
Beyond attacking the members of this group as bureaucrats, Trotsky enumerated their 
other characteristic shortcomings. Raging against those who, he believed, would ruin the war 
effort, Trotsky denounced them as ignorant, incompetent, lazy, and conservative. In August 1918 
he ridiculed certain “Party military figures” who, he asserted, “are incapable of keeping an eye 
on anything, behave like satraps, spend their time doing nothing, and, when they meet with 
failure, shuffle off the blame on to the General Staff officers.”159 In January the War Commissar 
expanded upon these accusations: 
There are also in the leading Soviet organs not a few half-equipped 
people who imagine themselves to be know-it-alls. Complacency, 
resting content with small successes—this is the worst feature of 
philistinism, which is radically inimical to the historic tasks of the 
proletariat. . . . Our own bureaucracy [biurokratiia], . . . is real 
historical ballast—already conservative, sluggish, complacent, 
unwilling to learn and even expressing enmity to anyone who 
reminds it of the need to learn. . . . [This trend] is nourished by the 
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 moods of limited, envious, complacent (and yet at the same time 
unsure of itself) philistine-bureaucratic [biurokraticheskii] 
conservatism.160 
 
Because they threatened to disrupt the war effort with their opposition, these bureaucrats 
indirectly threatened the very survival of the Soviet Republic. Pioneering a theme later used by 
Stalin against the Trotskyists, Trotsky accused his opponents of being “worse than any 
saboteur,” as a “genuine menace to the cause of communist revolution,” and as “genuine 
accomplices of counter-revolution.”161 
Although he rejected the opposition’s argument that that the bourgeois specialists were 
responsible for bureaucratism, Trotsky also attempted to explain the source of the problem of 
bureaucracy in class terms. In part, he attributed it to unspecified “petty-bourgeois traditions and 
influences,” combined with the demoralizing pressures of revolution. Additionally, the allegedly 
petty-bourgeois origins of a large number of his opponents had contributed to the problem: 
The heritage of the past, petty-bourgeois traditions and influences, 
and finally, just the demand of strained nerves for a rest, all do 
their work. In addition, there are fairly numerous representatives of 
the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia who have sincerely rallied 
to the cause of the working class but internally have not yet fused 
with it, and have retained many qualities and ways of thought 
which are characteristic of the petty-bourgeois milieu. These, the 
worst elements of the new regime, are striving to become 
crystallised as a Soviet bureaucracy [biurokratiia].162 
 
During the party controversies of 1920 Trotsky again used the term bureaucracy to refer 
to groups of officials who resisted efficient policies out of narrow self-interest. As we have seen, 
during that year Trotsky was frequently attacked for his “bureaucratic” authoritarian tendencies 
in advocating one-man management of enterprises, the militarization of labor, and the “shake 
up” of the trade unions. In each case, Trotsky dismissed the accusation and countercharged or 
strongly implied that it was his opponents who were the real bureaucrats. 
107 
 Early in the year leftist oppositionists and Bolshevik trade unionists joined the 
Mensheviks in denouncing the attempt to replace collegial with individual management of 
enterprises. Individual management, the critics claimed, was inherently bureaucratic in that it 
restricted the self-activity of the proletariat. In reply, Trotsky rejected the notion that the 
supremacy of the proletariat was in any way related to the form of industrial management; and he 
forcefully argued on behalf of the greater efficiency of individual authority.163 Finally, he 
observed that a large part of the opposition to individual management originated in the Soviet 
trade-union bureaucracy: 
But the question of “threes” and “fives” [that is, the collegial 
boards] interests, not the laboring masses, but the more backward, 
weaker, less fitted for independent work, section of the Soviet 
labor bureaucracy [rabochaia biurokratiia]. The foremost, 
intelligent, and determined administrator naturally strives to take 
the factory into his hands as a whole, and to show both to himself 
and to others that he can carry out his work. While if that 
administrator is a weakling, who does not stand very steadily on 
his feet, he attempts to associate another with himself, for in the 
company of another his own weakness will be unnoticed.164 
 
Again, the conception of bureaucracy employed by Trotsky was of a group of officials who 
opposed the implementation of efficient policies out of self interest. No doubt, Trotsky’s 
reference to the “labor bureaucracy” was intended to conjure up associations with the 
conservative and self-seeking trade union and socialist bureaucracies of the advanced capitalist 
countries. Trotsky may have also had this analogy in mind in his response to the critics of his 
militarization of labor in early 1920. Then, Communist oppositionists joined Mensheviks in 
denouncing Trotsky as “the new Arakcheev” and his policies as “Arakcheevshchina” after the 
authoritarian Minister of War who had set up military farming colonies under Alexander I and 
Nicholas I.165 Trotsky in turn described this as evidence of his critics’ “petty-bourgeois 
intelligentsia and trade-unionist prejudices.”166 
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 Finally, during the trade-union controversy at the end of the year, Trotsky again defended 
himself against charges of bureaucratism for his authoritarian methods in running Tsektran and 
his threat to impose similar measures in other unions. While admitting there was bureaucratism 
in Tsektran, Trotsky suggested it was less than in those unions which had not completed their 
economic tasks and, “losing ground under their feet become bureaucratized 
[biurokratiruiutsia].”167 Trotsky’s meaning here is obscure, but he seems to have been saying 
that in such unions the leadership simply gave up on attempting to fulfill its responsibilities for 
production and concentrated instead on defending its own narrow interests. 
However, when Trotsky spoke of bureaucracy during the years 1919-1922 he more 
frequently had in mind a different understanding of that problem—one that involved the work 
habits and attitudes of Soviet officials. Understood in this sense, bureaucracy involved a number 
of the secondary characteristics that were popularly associated with the term, such as an 
excessive preoccupation with formalities and paperwork, an attitude of apathy and indolence, 
and ignorance. Trotsky’s remarks in this regard were not always consistent or clear. Thus, at 
times he spoke as if these were defining characteristics of bureaucracy or bureaucratism, and at 
times as if they were sources of that problem. Also, at times he described bureaucracy 
exclusively in terms of these negative traits, and at times he contrasted these features with the 
“good sides” of bureaucracy. However, in each case Trotsky associated these attributes with the 
problem of bureaucracy, and in each case he blamed them for inefficiency in the functioning of 
Soviet state institutions.  
On a number of occasions, Trotsky spoke of the bureaucratic formalism and apathy that 
permeated the Soviet state apparatus. Thus, in April 1919 during the White offensive led by 
Kolchak, Trotsky complained that reinforcements for the Red Army were too slow in coming to 
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 the front, and in general “the necessary effort is not observable in the tempo of work of Soviet 
institutions.”168 Decisions, urgent measures, and the transmission of orders from one institution 
to another were frequently delayed, and the responsible local workers often failed to check on the 
fulfillment of decisions. Trotsky blamed part of the problem on excessive formalism—the 
“routine” and “red tape” (volokita) that had “accumulated already in our Soviet mechanism.”169 
At the same time he accused local Soviet officials of slothfulness comparable to that of Oblomov 
in Goncharov’s novel by that title—a “new Soviet Oblomovism.” What was needed in Trotsky’s 
estimation was greater effort on the part of provincial and uezd (county) soviet executive 
committees and party committees. Furthermore, Trotsky insisted that workers in the provinces 
who had “become overgrown with the cobwebs of bureaucratism [kantseliarshchina] must be 
removed from their posts.”170 
In June 1919 Trotsky observed an even more blatant example of this formalism and 
passivity among local state institutions. At Liski on the Southern Front, Trotsky came across a 
trainload of wounded and sick Red Army soldiers who had not been fed during the entire twelve 
hours the train had been sitting in the station. Trotsky blamed the medical apparatus of the 
Southern Front that had failed to notify the station in advance about the train and to instruct it to 
take the necessary measures to supply the sick. Even more appalling to Trotsky was the failure of 
the local authorities to respond to the situation: “Can anyone conceive any worse example of 
obtuse heartlessness and shameless bureaucratism [kantseliarshchina] even in the foulest times 
of foul Tsardom!” Trotsky promised a thorough reorganization of the army medical and 
communication apparatuses and a “vigorous shake-up of local Soviet institutions that shut their 
eyes when, under their very noses, soldiers of the Red Army are suffering and dying.” This 
“shake-up” was to be achieved through the exemplary punishment of apathetic local officials: 
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 “We must show in practice to idlers and saboteurs that an indifferent attitude to wounded and 
sick Red Army men will be punished by the Soviet Republic in the same way as treason to the 
socialist fatherland.”171 
In February 1920 Trotsky’s own economic work was disrupted by the apathy of local 
officials. En route to the Urals to direct the organization of the First Labor Army, Trotsky’s train 
buried itself in the snow and was partially derailed. For nineteen hours Trotsky fumed while the 
train lay helpless. Although he raged against the specter of “sabotage and kulak-type self-
seeking,” it seems the real problem was a pattern of criminal negligence.172 Local soviets had 
sent an inadequate number of men to clear the tracks after a major snow storm at the end of 
January. On the night of the accident the local railway administration in charge of that section of 
the tracks had failed to warn Trotsky’s train about the drifts. After the accident, it took ten hours 
for a work team to arrive and more than fifteen hours for a representative from the next station to 
show up; and some local railway officials declined to put in an appearance at all. Then the head 
of the Transport Cheka at Sasova, attempting to cover for the local soviet officials, did nothing 
but summon the head of the sector and the senior track foreman to “present a report on the 
snowdrifts.”173 Trotsky denounced both the negligence of the local officials and the formalist 
response of the Cheka as examples of bureaucratism. In the end, “the bureaucrat [biurokrat] from 
the Cheka took the transport bureaucrats away from their work in order to submit a useless 
bureaucratic [biurokraticheskii] report.” In this case Trotsky’s solution was to place fifty-five 
versts of the rail line under martial law and to threaten those responsible with the “maximum 
punishment” at the hands of a Revolutionary Military Tribunal.174 
However, in late 1920 and early 1921 Trotsky began to focus upon yet another issue 
related to the work habits of Soviet officials—their widespread ignorance of the most efficient 
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 methods of organizing work. At first, in late 1920, Trotsky characterized this ignorance as an 
example of their failure to master the “good sides” of bureaucracy. But by early 1921 Trotsky 
was describing ignorance of organizational technique as a source of Soviet red tape. 
Trotsky first raised this theme in late 1920 at the height of the trade union controversy. At 
that point he was confronted with widespread accusations of bureaucratism for his attempt to 
“shake up” the trade unions and fuse them with state institutions. Trotsky evaded the accusation 
by redefining bureaucracy, this time filling it with a positive content. To the extent he had been 
responsible for the bureaucratization of the trade unions, he responded in an article in December, 
this was not a reproach. In almost Weberian terms Trotsky now defined bureaucracy 
(biurokratiia) as an efficient system of administration that included such positive features as “a 
more special acquaintance with particular branches of administration and the economy, a precise 
hierarchy of interrelationships, definite methods of work elaborated by long practice, etc.”175 In a 
speech delivered in December to the expanded plenum of Tsektran Trotsky’s list of the “good 
sides” of bureaucracy included the methods of work that had been developed by “German and 
American bureaucracy [biurokratiia],” such as “rationalization, Taylorism, distribution, forms of 
responsibility, supply, plan, bookkeeping, etc.”176 Bureaucratism (biurokratizm), so understood, 
was not an invention of tsarism, but rather “an epoch in the growth of humanity, when humanity 
passes from the medieval mist to the bourgeois order and creates certain skills and methods of 
administration, creates good and more precise offices with good typewriters . . . along with 
correct bookkeeping and management.” These were skills it was necessary for the Soviet state to 
acquire, Trotsky warned, if it did not want “‘to become lice ridden’” and “retire from the 
scene.”177 
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 Trotsky never again spoke in such glowing terms about bureaucracy. Perhaps he found 
this rhetorical device to be too risky given the fact that so many within the party were already 
uneasy about his “bureaucratic” proclivities. Nevertheless, he continued to berate the 
organizational incompetence of Soviet officials as a source of bureaucratism. In a speech 
delivered in January 1921 Trotsky argued that the red tape which remained in the Soviet 
apparatus was at least three-fourths a product of low culture and poverty. This, he asserted, 
“cannot be eliminated by organizational measures. Clumsiness and red tape [volokitnost’] can be 
overcome only by raising the quality of work, the accumulation of material wealth, and the 
raising of culture.”178 Further, he called for a “struggle against bureaucratism [biurokratizm], 
which now means struggle against laxity, ignorance, and slackness in all spheres of our life.”179 
In the fall of 1921 Trotsky launched a campaign to raise the level of Soviet culture in the 
Red Army. There, the task was to instill discipline in the ranks of the fresh recruits who had 
replaced the demobilized veterans of the civil war. Trotsky repeatedly attempted to inspire his 
troops in the mundane tasks of greasing their boots and cleaning their rifles, while chastising 
them for spitting and dropping cigarette butts in the barracks.180 Almost immediately Trotsky’s 
campaign encountered resistance. In September Trotsky noted that certain unnamed party 
members had begun to grumble about his constant “nagging” over “trifles” and to suggest that 
this was new evidence of his “bureaucratism.”181 Predictably, Trotsky’s response was to direct 
the charge back at his critics, implying that they were guilty of a bureaucratism that combined 
formalism, laziness, and ignorance. “The slovens and sluggards,” he complained bitterly, “love 
to hide themselves behind the struggle against bureaucratism.” However, they failed to 
understand the true meaning of the term: 
Bureaucratism [biurokratizm] means attention to empty form at the 
expense of content, of the matter actually at hand. Bureaucratism 
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 wallows in formalities, in nonsensicalities, but does not concern 
itself at all with businesslike details. On the contrary, 
bureaucratism usually sidesteps the practical details of which the 
matter itself is composed, being concerned merely to ensure that 
everything adds up on paper.182 
 
Trotsky explained that such red tape had been characteristic of the Russian state since Peter the 
Great. Peter, too, had struggled against “laziness, immobility and negligence,” but in the process 
he had achieved only “superficial, formal, bureaucratic [biurokraticheskii] precision.” In Peter’s 
time, as in Trotsky’s, such precision “served merely as a cover for the red tape [volokita] . . . 
inherited from the accursed past, together with poverty and illiteracy.”183 
3.5 TROTSKY AND GLAVKOKRATIIA 
Although Trotsky denounced bureaucrats who opposed efficient policies out of self 
interest as well as bureaucratic inefficiency in the work habits of state officials, the most 
important notion of bureaucracy for Trotsky during these years involved the inefficiency that he 
perceived in the very structure of Soviet political, military and, especially, economic institutions. 
In particular, he criticized the excessive centralism of these institutions and the inadequate 
coordination between them. From late 1919 until the end of 1922 Trotsky wrote more 
extensively and more coherently about this form of bureaucracy than any other. 
Trotsky first began to denounce the bureaucratism inherent in the inadequate 
coordination of local soviet institutions in the spring of 1919. In April, during the Kolchak 
offensive, he complained that reinforcements were slow in arriving at the front because of delays 
in the supply of uniforms at the local level. The problem was not that there were no uniforms 
available; rather, 
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 local Soviet institutions work, as often as not, in isolation from 
each other. Uniforms held by the National Economic Council or 
the supply committees [of the local soviets] are not available when 
required by the military commissariat of the province or the 
uyezd.184  
 
Trotsky urged that it was “necessary to finish decisively with red tape [volokita] and disparity 
between departments, in every uyezd and provincial town.”185 At the time, he offered no specific 
proposals for reorganization. 
Problems of military supply continued to plague the Red Army in the following months. 
In July Trotsky asserted that deficiencies in supply had been largely responsible for recent 
military setbacks. “We must eliminate, at all costs, the criminal red tape [volokita] of the army 
supply organs and the barren bureaucratism [kantseliarshchina] which has succeeded the chaos 
which previously prevailed, not replacing but merely supplementing it,” Trotsky urged. His 
concern was that the supply service was too centralized, given the slowness of Soviet rail 
transport and the mobile character of the war. By the time requisition orders reached the supply 
organs of the front and the requested supplies had been dispatched, the units that had requested 
them had been dissolved or transferred. “As a result,” Trotsky observed, “the boot never reaches 
the soldier’s foot.” To eliminate the problem Trotsky proposed to decentralize the distribution of 
supplies, shifting the responsibility from organs of an entire front to those of individual armies 
and further, to the supply chiefs who would accompany each supply train.186 
By the end of the year, Trotsky’s responsibilities as War Commissar had led him into an 
examination of the problems of inefficiency in war-related production. There he again 
discovered a pattern of excessive centralism and inadequate local coordination. At the Seventh 
Congress of Soviets in December and again and at meeting of the Moscow party committee in 
January he reported that frequently in a province one institution would have cloth; a second, 
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 thread and buttons; and a third, spare sewing shop workers. Yet in the same province there were 
soldiers who were inadequately clothed. The problem was that the transfer of materials had to be 
approved by the center, and orders from the center did not always correspond to the local 
situation. For example, to have overcoats sewn the center sometimes would instruct that cloth 
was to be taken from one province that had buttons and shipped to another that had none.187 All 
in all, Trotsky reported in a speech to the Moscow committee of the party in January 1920, in the 
previous year he had “sent hundreds of telegrams with protests against superfluous centralism” 
to VSNKh.188 
By this time Trotsky had begun to shift his attention from specifically military concerns 
to broader economic questions. As he did so, he immediately perceived the same problems in all 
branches of the economy. At a meeting of the party fraction of the Central Council of Trade 
Unions in January Trotsky related the findings of the Moscow provincial economic council. In 
Moscow, for example, one local factory was inactive for over two months while it waited for the 
replacement of a driving belt; another had to shut down several times because it had run out of 
canvas; and a third could not begin to produce silicate brick because it had failed to receive an 
armature for its steam engine. In each case the necessary parts and materials were available 
locally, but the existing regulations did not permit their transfer to the factory in need.189 
The following month Trotsky witnessed related problems in the distribution of grain in 
the Urals. There he saw workers in some areas eating oats or starving, while in other areas the 
horses were eating wheat or supplies were rotting. The problem was that the provincial supply 
committees did not have the authority to transfer wheat from one province to another, but were 
required to send all grain west of the Urals from which it was centrally redistributed. Yet rail 
transport had broken down to such an extent that the grain could not be shipped. “One cannot 
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 imagine greater idiocy passing under the name of centralism,” Trotsky complained. “A stop must 
be put to this monstrous bureaucratism [biurokratizm].”190  
In addressing this problem before the Ninth Party Congress at the end of March 1920, 
Trotsky argued that “the question of red tape [volokita] and bureaucratism [biurokratizm] in the 
sphere of our economy is not at all reducible to a struggle with isolated bureaucrats [biurokraty], 
with the bureaucratic [biurokraticheskii] practices of some specialists, etc.” Though this notion 
was “fairly widely held,” it was “extremely superficial.” Rather, bureaucratism and red tape were 
based “in the very structure of our economic institutions.”191 At the time, fifty-odd glavki and 
tsentry under VSNKh dominated all industrial production and distribution.192 Each glavk 
controlled a separate branch of industry down to the level of the enterprise. The problem, as 
Trotsky saw it, was the rigid central control exercised by the glavki over the various industrial 
trusts and local enterprises, combined with an inadequate degree of coordination between 
separate glavki, trusts, and enterprises. Since 1918 the Democratic Centralists had been 
complaining about the excessively centralist control of local industry by the glavki, calling the 
system “glavkism.” Now, Trotsky renamed it “glavkokratiia,” which he defined as “the rule of 
separate, vertically centralized glavki, which are not linked organizationally and which are badly 
coordinated in their work.”193  
For Trotsky the lack of coordination was evident from the foundations of industry all the 
way to the summit. At the Ninth Party Congress Trotsky described the situation at the local level 
as one in which that there were “no cross-sectional connections, no canals which would combine 
the trusts or the enterprises of the various trusts with one another.”194 As far as the summit was 
concerned, in an article in December 1920 he noted that although VSNKh had been established 
to direct the economy in accordance with a single plan, this goal had never been realized. 
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 Instead, VSNKh had become, in effect, just one more commissariat—the “Peoples’ 
Commissariat of Industry”—among many, and had even failed to establish coordination between 
the glavki under its direction: “Even within the Supreme Council of the National Economy, . . . 
the separate branches of the economy (fuel, metal, textile production, etc.) developed into 
independent, centralized glavki, the coordination of whose work is still, to a significant degree, a 
task of the future.”195  
According to Trotsky this system had created a host of difficulties, particularly for local 
institutions. In December 1920 he argued that whenever a local organ wanted to get any practical 
results out of a decree, it had to “climb up to the summit of a glavk, descend, climb again to the 
summit of another glavk, and so on without end.” Thus, the local institution was confronted with 
a choice: it could either wander through the maze of red tape in an attempt to fulfill decrees, or it 
could “break the front of red tape [volokita]” by the “violation or circumvention of decrees.”196 
The ultimate outcome was the disruption of industrial production, especially that which was 
locally based. In a speech at an all-city party conference in Moscow at end of March, 1920, 
Trotsky observed that glavkokratiia had “trampled under itself all areas of industry.” He 
asserted, “At the present time glavkokratiia prevents economic growth in the local areas: the 
programs of the center are fulfilled poorly, in dimensions of three or five percent.”197  
In various statements, Trotsky indicated that numerous factors had contributed to the 
formation of the system of glavkokratiia. Originally, it had arisen as a necessary and healthy 
reaction against the extreme decentralization of the first period of Soviet power. However, 
mistakes had been made because there had been no historical precedent to serve as a guide. Also, 
the vastness of the country, the ruined state of the economy inherited form the old regime, and 
the devastation of the civil war had greatly complicated the task of planning.198 Thus, Trotsky 
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 concluded in December 1920, glavkokratiia had been “a transitional moment in the construction 
of a socialist economy.” However, now it was “a transitional form which it is necessary to get 
over.”199 
Trotsky’s analyses of bureaucracy differed substantially from Lenin’s, both in his 
exclusive preoccupation with the problem of inefficiency and in his focus on the structural 
inadequacies of the Soviet economy. Given these differences, it is not surprising that Trotsky 
also rejected Lenin’s panacea for bureaucracy—the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. In part, 
Rabkrin had been set up to institute workers’ and peasants’ control over the tsarist experts. To 
the extent that this was Rabkrin’s purpose, Trotsky argued in December 1920, it was irrelevant to 
the struggle against bureaucracy: 
If the problem were conscious criminality or vices brought in from 
the outside, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate could, 
probably, fulfill its designated task. But the methods of the 
Inspectorate have turned out to be invalid precisely because the 
problem is not at all one of exposing and abolishing, but of 
establishing a correct and coordinated economic organization on 
new bases.200 
 
For Trotsky the real struggle involved introducing greater efficiency into Soviet economic 
organs. To the extent that this was the goal of Rabkrin, it was at least on the right track. But in 
this case, its methods were faulty: 
In regard to the basic task which interests us—the control and the 
establishment of expedient work of the various departments—one 
can say now with certainty that Rabkrin is not equal to this task. It 
is impossible to create a separate department which would 
combine in itself, so to speak, all the state wisdom and would 
actually be able to check on the work of the other departments, not 
only from the point of view of the honesty and efficiency of their 
work, but also from the point of view of the expediency and 
correctness of the organization of the work as a whole.201 
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 In fact, Trotsky claimed, the departments saw Rabkrin as less than useless, for Rabkrin itself was 
a source of red tape (volokita) and arbitrariness. Trotsky pointed to Rabkrin’s financial control 
function as an example. Without a real index of costs—and discounting the ruble that had 
“ceased to measure anything”— the departments or enterprises were incapable of actually 
measuring expenditures, etc. In such a situation, the state controller could either approve every 
estimate and appropriation, or “combining red tape with arbitrariness,” he could “occupy himself 
with pressures, demand precise estimates which are impossible to give, and impose prohibitions 
in cases when he cannot understand the matter.” The more cautious controllers would try to steer 
a course between red tape and arbitrariness.202 
Trotsky’s own proposed solution to the problem was to begin to restructure the entire 
Soviet economy from the level of the enterprises to the summit. What was needed first of all was 
a degree of economic decentralization. Thus, at the Seventh Congress of Soviets in December 
1919, and again at the Eighth in December 1920, Trotsky supported the slogan of “powers in the 
local areas.”203 Specifically, Trotsky advocated granting greater autonomy to individual 
enterprises and local economic organs with regard to the exchange of local resources and 
products. Though it was necessary to preserve and develop vertical centralism in the glavki, he 
asserted in March 1920, this had to be combined with “the horizontal coordination of enterprises 
along the lines of the economic raiony [districts], where the enterprises of the various 
departments of industry and of diverse economic significance are compelled to live on the same 
sources of local raw materials, means of transport, labor power, etc.”204 In line with this, in 
January 1920 he supported a proposal that would allow nationalized enterprises to supply 
requests from other institutions in the same locality when these were approved by a 
gubsovnarkhoz (provincial council of the national economy).205  
120 
 Simultaneously, Trotsky fought for the creation of new institutions to coordinate regional 
resources. In his original plan for the militarization of labor in December 1919, Trotsky proposed 
the organization of labor armies along the lines of “territorial and production districts.” He 
envisioned that these labor armies would be able to assist the revival of local economic centers 
by helping to coordinate the local exchange of resources.206 By the following March he was able 
to report to the party congress that, wherever labor armies had been established, regional 
economic centers had crystallized around them. Each of these, he argued, could unite 
representatives of local economic institutions with those of the center and take upon itself the 
tasks of transferring raw materials, labor power, etc. within a region.207 
Finally, Trotsky urged greater coordination of the glavki and economic commissariats 
from the top. He anticipated that ultimately this would occur through a single economic plan that 
would replace glavkokratiia with “authentic socialist centralism.”208 At the Eighth Congress of 
Soviets in December 1920 he suggested that the recent creation of various interdepartmental 
economic organs had been a step in this direction.209 The next step, he argued, would be to hand 
over the task of coordinating the work of all the economic departments to one institution. 
VSNKh had proven incapable of playing this role. Now it was necessary to try again, this time 
entrusting the job to the Council of Labor and Defense, a body originally set up to coordinate 
resources for the war effort.210 
In early 1921 Trotsky had cause to celebrate his successes in the struggle against 
glavkokratiia.211 The Eighth Congress of Soviets had just endorsed his call for both greater local 
economic autonomy and a single economic plan, and had assigned the task of working out such a 
plan as well as the coordination of the work of the economic commissariats to the Council of 
Labor and Defense.212 In February, Sovnarkom decided to create a “state general planning 
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 commission” (Gosplan) attached to the Council of Labor and Defense—a decision that was 
fulfilled on April 1.213 However, Trotsky soon discovered that, to the extent his war against 
glavkokratiia had been a battle for central economic planning, the struggle was far from over. 
Although Trotsky had won significant reforms within the context of the system of War 
Communism, in the following months this system itself was scrapped with the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy.  
Trotsky watched the unfolding of NEP with mixed emotions. On one hand, he welcomed 
the fact that NEP had dealt a serious blow to the hyper-centralism of War Communism. A series 
of measures adopted during 1921 released industry completely from the grip of the glavki: the 
growth of small and medium-scale private and cooperative enterprises was permitted; industrial 
enterprises administered by the state were grouped into new “unions” or “trusts” with the right to 
buy and sell on the open market without interference from the center; and the glavki themselves 
were abolished.214 Thus, in an address to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in November 
1922 Trotsky praised the NEPist reversal of the “policy of a centralized bureaucratic 
[biurokraticheskii] management of industry.”215 On the other hand, Trotsky increasingly was 
concerned about the retreat from comprehensive economic planning that accompanied NEP.216 
Although in his speech to the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern he argued that NEP was 
one of the “transitional stages” between capitalism and “complete socialism, with its socially 
planned economy,” he had already begun to criticize the slow pace of that transition. 217  
Trotsky no longer used the term glavkokratiia, but he continued and intensified his 
struggle against the bureaucratic inefficiency that he saw as arising from the lack of planning and 
central coordination. As early as May 3, 1921, just one month after the establishment of Gosplan, 
Trotsky complained to Lenin, “Unfortunately, our work is being done as hitherto without any 
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 plan and without any understanding of the need for one, and the planning commission is more or 
less a planned negation of the need for a practical business-like economic plan for the near 
future.”218 He returned to this theme in a letter to the Central Committee on August 7, 1921 in 
which he pointed out that NEP had already evoked “practical muddle and ideological confusion” 
because of the unsystematic way it was being introduced. Again, the problem was that there was 
no center that could direct the economy. He reminded the Central Committee that under War 
Communism, “The constant clashes between economic, trade union, and Party organs, especially 
over the matter of individual appointments and transfers, were capable of ruining the most 
thriving industry.” Now under NEP, the problem was compounded by the fact that three-fourths 
of the business of administrating the economy consisted of selecting and teaming officials—a 
task that required some “community of purpose” in administration. Furthermore, Trotsky 
anticipated new conflicts would emerge under NEP between state enterprises, enterprises under 
contractual obligation to the state, and enterprises leased to private capital. He predicted that, 
without an authoritative economic center, the relationship between these enterprises and state 
institutions (especially Rabkrin) would “inevitably become a new source of red tape [volokita], 
carping and abuse.”219  
Although he continued to recommend “a degree of decentralization, transferring the 
initiative and the responsibility to the institution on the spot,” this was already a lesser concern. 
With greater emphasis Trotsky argued again for the intervention of a single economic center “to 
ensure that the central economic apparatus does function in such a way as to ensure the genuine 
and uninterrupted regulation of economic life by actively eliminating bureaucratic 
[biurokraticheskii] hindrances and assisting in the establishment of straightforward relationships 
between interdependent organs and establishments.” Trotsky now believed that, given its 
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 planning responsibilities, the newly created Gosplan was the most likely institution to play this 
role. However, for it to do so Gosplan would have to be totally reorganized in its composition, 
redirected from theoretical to practical methods of work, and guided by the needs of large-scale 
industry.220 Trotsky would continue to insist on these points during 1922. 
3.6 TROTSKY AND BUREAUCRACY, LATE 1921-1922 
In late December 1921 Trotsky raised several new observations that suggest an 
association of bureaucracy with the phenomenon of political alienation. However, this 
development was primarily significant as an anticipation of themes that would later become 
prominent in Trotsky’s analysis. For the time being, the focus of Trotsky’s thinking regarding 
bureaucracy remained concentrated upon the problem of “glavkokratic” bureaucratic 
inefficiency. In fact, it was this concern that was largely responsible for bringing Trotsky 
together with Lenin in an alliance against bureaucracy at the end of 1922. 
On December 19, 1921, Lenin sent a letter to members of the Politburo and to CC 
members Zalutskii and Solts soliciting their reactions to a proposal to restrict new admissions to 
the party. Following the recent purge of “unsuitable elements” from the party, Lenin supported a 
draft resolution under consideration by the Eleventh Party Conference to institute a probationary 
period of one and a half years for workers and three years for everyone else.221 Trotsky replied in 
a letter of December 21. There is no indication of precisely what Trotsky had observed that 
prompted his response, but in his letter he vigorously questioned the proposal:  
V.I.! I have very big hesitations concerning your prohibitive and 
restrictive proposals in regard to the admission into the party. Now 
we probably have 400,000 members, and it will remain almost like 
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 this for 1 ½ years. While keeping the inevitable tendency to charge 
party members with any important and semi-important posts, we 
will get a closed party of administrators. For workers, who actually 
work at factories, we must make joining the party as easy as 
possible, reducing a period of alternative membership up to ½ year 
maximum. 
It is better to clean a building from time to time, than to 
cork up all windows and cracks. A party of administrators means a 
party of those who enjoy privileges. Some people do it cautiously 
and “tactfully”, others—less cautiously . . . I surely underline only 
one side of the matter, but it is fraught with big complications.222 
 
Immediately, Lenin acceded to Trotsky’s recommendations.223 
The Russian historian Alexander Pantsov, who discovered Trotsky’s letter, has noted the 
significance of Trotsky’s remarks in light of his later analysis of Soviet bureaucracy.224 In fact, 
these brief paragraphs contain the seeds of four ideas that would later become prominent in 
Trotsky’s thinking: that party as well as the state was developing negative “administrative” 
characteristics; that these characteristics were transmitted into the party from the state as a result 
of the party’s control of the state; that administrative authority in the Soviet Union had become 
associated with privilege; and that the best way to combat this problem was by enhancing the 
proletarian composition of the party. Still, these remarks were only a brief anticipation of 
Trotsky’s later analysis of a layer of privileged administrators, increasingly alienated from the 
needs, aspirations, and control of the working class. In his letter to Lenin Trotsky did not 
associate these issues with the term bureaucracy. More significantly, it seems he did not return 
to these concerns for more than a year. Rather, when he addressed the problem of Soviet 
bureaucracy in 1922, Trotsky referred almost exclusively to the inefficiency he associated with 
the “glavkokratic” organization of the economy. 
Trotsky publicly returned to the problem of bureaucracy in the discussion of Lenin’s 
political report at the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922. In that report Lenin attacked the 
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 tendency of high state officials to drag even minor problems before the Politburo or the Central 
Committee of the party.225 This was a theme Trotsky could readily endorse, for he had raised it 
himself in a letter to the Politburo earlier in the month.226 Trotsky now elaborated upon Lenin’s 
point, noting that the practice occurred at the local level as well. The problem, Trotsky argued, 
was that it was commonly believed that any complex state question quite suddenly became 
simple when it was introduced into a party committee: 
It is believed that the same economist who could not cope with his 
economic work when he was in charge of a provincial economic 
council is anointed with grace when he is appointed gubkom 
secretary. Precisely by force of such “anointment” he decides, 
without hesitation, all economic, military, administrative, and all 
other questions.227 
 
For the most part these were not questions of principle but such practical questions as how much 
oil to transfer to one location and how much firewood to another. One consequence of the 
referral of such questions to party committees, Trotsky continued, was that state institutions lost 
all sense of responsibility. More important was the effect it had upon the party apparatus: “That 
which is the worst in bureaucratism [biurokratizm], that is, a relationship to matters without 
knowledge of the essence of things, but an approach only from the point of view of the forms of 
things, inevitably infiltrates into the party apparatus.”228 The problem of bureaucratism Trotsky 
was pointing to here was the old one of excessive formalism. However, now for the first time he 
saw this as a concern in the party as well as the state. In 1923 Trotsky would openly warn that 
the party, through its preoccupation with details, was in danger of losing its revolutionary 
perspective. At the Eleventh Party Congress he only hinted at this possibility: 
The summary resolution of all things—it is this which 
constitutes the worst harm of bureaucratism [biurokratizm]: 
bureaucratism does not deal with the essence of things, but with its 
passing forms. I repeat that, given such a summary resolution of all 
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 questions, not principled, but routine and practical, bureaucratism 
inevitably takes over party apparatuses.229 
 
Jerry Hough has suggested that in this contribution Trotsky was raising, for the first time 
and in a muted form, the question of party democracy.230 However, this reads too much of 
Trotsky’s later position into his comments. Rather, the fundamental question to which he was 
alluding was, once again, the need for a central body to coordinate the economy. In the absence 
of economic leadership by an authoritative state body, economic questions were increasingly 
resolved on an ad hoc basis by party committees.231 Here was the growing organizational 
“muddle” Trotsky had anticipated in his letter of August 7, 1921 to the Central Committee. 
Having been rebuffed by the Central Committee at that time in his effort to grant Gosplan 
coordinating powers, he evidently felt constrained to confine his remarks at the party congress to 
mere allusions to this problem. Soon afterwards, however, Trotsky again explicitly returned to 
the question in his correspondence with the CC. 
A few weeks after the party congress, Lenin circulated to the Politburo his proposal to 
create two Deputy Chairmen of Sovnarkom to combat state bureaucratism. Trotsky’s response 
was quite critical. First, Trotsky predicted that the selection of two Deputy Chairmen would only 
generate new difficulties. Beyond that, Lenin’s plan did nothing to address the inefficiency that 
was rooted in the structure of the Soviet economy, and in some ways it compounded the 
problem. “The main thing,” Trotsky complained, “is that I still cannot envision the sort of organ, 
which will in practice be able to control economic work on a day-to-day basis.” Again, he argued 
that, although Gosplan outwardly approximated such an organ, in practice it had become simply 
an “academic institution.” Meanwhile, in the absence of such an organ, the controversies that 
continually erupted between state economic departments were referred to the Council of Labor 
and Defense or the Politburo, and were “resolved by rule of thumb . . . when the water is 
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 reaching our throats.” 232 One of the tasks envisioned for the Deputy Chairmen in Lenin’s 
proposal was the “reduction of the establishment of Soviet institutions.” However, as Trotsky 
saw it, the tendency to create new bodies was a result of the lack of a real planning and 
coordinating organ. In the absence of a “forward-looking, controlling economic organ” the 
Central Committee had been forced to set up “an economic commission, a budgetary 
commission, a gold commission, and so on and so forth.”233 (In a letter several months later, after 
a third Deputy had been added, Trotsky included the “troika” of Deputies as one more 
extraneous commission.)234 
Trotsky was equally critical of the role Lenin’s plan envisioned for Rabkrin. Lenin had 
proposed that the Deputy Chairmen would utilize Rabkrin to combat inefficiency in the work 
habits of state officials. Repeating his own 1920 critique of Rabkrin, Trotsky contended that the 
attempt to introduce better methods by means of a separate department was deeply misguided:  
This work cannot in any event be done at second hand through the 
medium of a special department which peeps in from time to time 
and takes note of everything that is needed. This is Utopia. There 
never has been such a department anywhere on earth, and in the 
logic of things there cannot be one.235 
 
Officially, Trotsky asserted, instructions to the departments were being carried out, but they 
failed to produce results because of material shortages and “ignorance, incapacity and so forth.” 
The way to rectify this problem was not by a “swoop from without” on the part of Rabkrin, but 
through the long and difficult process of raising the level of Soviet education and the 
organizational competence of officials through a system of schools and training courses for the 
young, for non-party workers and peasants, and for existing office workers. Furthermore, 
Trotsky judged Rabkrin to be an unsuitable instrument because it had proven itself to be unfit for 
serious work of any type. In what may be an indication of his awareness of Stalin’s maneuvering, 
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 Trotsky noted “the extraordinary growth of intrigue in the organs of the People’s Commissariat 
of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, which has become proverbial throughout the country.”236  
It is not surprising then that, when Lenin’s proposal was approved over Trotsky’s 
objections, Trotsky repeatedly declined Lenin’s request that he accept the post of Deputy 
Chairman. It may be, as Isaac Deutscher has suggested, that Trotsky’s pride was hurt “by an 
arrangement which would have placed him formally on the same footing as the other vice-
Premiers who were only Lenin’s inferior assistants.”237 The weight of evidence, however, 
provides more support for Deutscher’s other explanation: “He could not, without contradicting 
himself, accept a post in which he would have had to give effect to an economic policy which in 
his view lacked focus, and to guide an administrative machinery which he held to be faultily 
constructed.”238 This, in fact, was Trotsky’s own explanation.239  
Lenin’s last attempt to convince Trotsky to take on the job occurred in a discussion 
between the two leaders in December.240 In the course of the conversation, Lenin “spoke of the 
terrible growth of bureaucratism [biurokratism]” in the state apparatus and once more urged 
Trotsky to become a Deputy Chairman, as a means of getting at the problem.241 In reply, Trotsky 
reviewed his initial objections to the creation of the position, again suggesting that bureaucratism 
was related directly to the lack of planning. He pointed out that over the previous two years the 
Orgburo, the Secretariat, and the Politburo repeatedly had made decisions “without reference to 
the interested department and even behind its back.” These included “piecemeal reductions in the 
army, instead of planned reductions . . . ; similar phenomena as regards budgetary expenditure 
and analogous occurrences in the domain of individual appointments.” In Trotsky’s view, this 
had “utterly destroyed the possibility of proper work, selection and training of officials and of 
any sort of correct assessment or any sort of anticipation of a planned economy.”242  
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 At this point in the discussion Trotsky’s comments went beyond the issue of 
organizational efficiency. Evidently Trotsky had noticed the efforts of Stalin, Zinoviev, and 
Kamenev to promote their own people and block his succession to the leadership. Noting that 
bureaucratism (biurokratizm) was a problem in party as well as state institutions, he reported that 
in the provinces, the districts, the party locals and the Central Committee, he had observed “a 
special selection of functionaries and specialists, party and non-party, around certain party 
personalities and groups.” Among these officials, a “mutual shielding” was taking place: 
“Attacking a functionary you run into the party leader.”243 Once again, the problem was that 
inefficient policies were defended by bureaucrats pursuing their own, narrow self-interests. 
After a moment’s reflection Lenin responded, “That is, I propose a struggle with Soviet 
bureaucratism [biurokratizm] and you are proposing to include the bureaucratism of the 
Organization Bureau of the Party?” “I suppose that’s it,” replied Trotsky. Lenin then invited 
Trotsky to join him in a “bloc” against “bureaucratism [biurokratizm]” in general, and against 
the Organizational Bureau in particular.244 Trotsky agreed. Specifically, the bloc was to fight for 
the creation of a special committee attached to the Central Committee that would “look into the 
question of the more correct selection, training, and promotion of officials and of more correct 
organizational relationships.” Just before the meeting concluded, Lenin promised to give further 
thought to the organizational details.245 
 It is probable that the agreement was viewed somewhat differently by Lenin and Trotsky, 
but it marked the beginning of the convergence of their views on bureaucracy. No doubt Lenin 
partly saw it as a way to begin to address, through “more correct selection, training, and 
promotion,” the inefficiency in the state apparatus that was a product of the lack of culture of 
Communists. Also, he must have hoped to use the committee to curb the “bureaucratic” 
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 authoritarian exercise of power by Stalin, the head of the Orgburo. Trotsky, on the other hand, 
hoped to use the committee primarily to promote centralized planning and coordination, and to 
neutralize his opponents, such as Stalin, who obstructed the implementation of planning for 
selfish political reasons. The bloc never fully materialized due to the rapid deterioration of 
Lenin’s health. But on his sick bed in the following months, the dying leader came to accept two 
of Trotsky’s earlier conclusions: that Rabkrin, as it was constituted at the time, was a virtually 
useless institution; and that it made sense to grant greater powers to Gosplan.246 At the same 
time, as we shall see in the next chapter, in early 1923 Trotsky began to embrace many of 
Lenin’s views regarding bureaucracy. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
During the years 1917-1922 there was broad agreement within the Bolshevik Party that 
bureaucracy had not been laid to rest by the proletarian revolution as the Marxist classics had 
anticipated, but had continued to flourish under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, there 
was little agreement on precisely how to define the problem. At one extreme the various leftist 
opposition groups described bureaucracy in terms closely related to the traditional Marxist 
analysis. They warned of the growing political alienation of the masses from excessively 
centralist and authoritarian economic, military, and political institutions; and they related this 
problem to the growing influence of hostile class elements. At the other extreme stood Trotsky—
the ultimate incarnation of bureaucracy in the eyes of the oppositionists. Trotsky consistently 
rejected the analyses of the opposition groupings, and defined the problem instead as one of 
inefficiency. Between the two extremes Lenin articulated elements of both views. 
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In late 1921 Trotsky raised concerns about restrictions on party admission that suggested 
he was beginning to perceive the problem of bureaucracy in terms of political alienation. 
However, Trotsky’s remarks in this regard represented only a brief anticipation of his later 
analysis of party bureaucratism. In fact, at the end of 1922 Trotsky’s explicit conception of the 
problem of bureaucracy was not significantly different from the understanding he had articulated 
during the preceding years. Yet, Trotsky’s struggle against bureaucratic inefficiency had brought 
him into conflict with the majority of the party leadership. In the following year this conflict 
would intensify, and Trotsky would begin to redefine the struggle as one between bureaucracy 
and workers’ democracy. 
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 4.0  FROM INEFFICIENCY TO POLITICAL ALIENATION 
The year 1923 represented a watershed in the evolution of Trotsky’s thinking on the question of 
Soviet bureaucracy. When Trotsky addressed the issue of bureaucracy in the first years after the 
revolution, he consistently defined the problem in terms of factors promoting inefficiency, 
particularly in state military and economic organs. In 1923 Trotsky began to comment upon 
manifestations of political alienation in Soviet political institutions, and to associate these 
features with the problem of bureaucracy. Although in subsequent years Trotsky’s views on 
Soviet bureaucracy would continue to develop and change, his understanding that the 
fundamental problem was one of political alienation would remain constant. 
This shift in Trotsky’s focus brought him into line with the dominant tradition in Marxist 
analyses of bureaucracy. From the earliest political works of Marx and Engels, through the post-
revolutionary writings of the various Bolshevik opposition groups, and of Lenin, the term 
bureaucracy was most commonly associated with what we have described as political alienation. 
Marxists writing within this tradition generally described two fundamental aspects to the 
problem: the tendency within class societies for political institutions to rise above the control of 
the masses, and the related tendency for political institutions to fall under the sway of powerful 
exploitative classes and to begin to represent those class interests. In 1923 Trotsky began to 
perceive both tendencies in the Soviet state and in the Communist Party.  
 A number of factors contributed to Trotsky’s shift of analysis. These include Trotsky’s 
own deepening political isolation, the influence of Lenin’s views upon Trotsky’s thinking, the 
treatment of the Georgian party leadership by Stalin and his supporters, and changes in the party 
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 regime. However, a factor that was especially significant for Trotsky was the leadership 
majority’s continued opposition to economic planning—that is, its resistance to measures that 
Trotsky saw as necessary to abolish the “glavkokratic” character of the Soviet economy. From 
this, Trotsky concluded that the bureaucratic inefficiency of the Soviet economic was deeply 
rooted in the alienation of the political leadership from the needs of Soviet workers and the goals 
of socialism.  
The development of Trotsky’s thinking on these questions in the period 1923-1925 
occurred in three stages. In the first half of 1923 Trotsky first began to raise the issue of political 
alienation in both the state and party. During the New Course controversy in the fall and winter 
of 1923, he denounced political alienation in the party even more sharply. Finally, after the 
defeat of the 1923 Opposition, Trotsky continued to express some of the same themes while 
temporarily confining his remarks to the less controversial topics of inefficiency and 
bureaucratism in the state. 
4.1 CONFLICTS WITHIN THE PARTY LEADERSHIP 
The winter and spring of 1922-1923 were marked by widening differences within the 
party leadership around three main questions: economic policy, policy regarding the minority 
nationalities, and organizational reform of the central party institutions. While these issues 
brought Trotsky and Lenin closer together, they also contributed to the mounting tensions 
between Trotsky and the leadership majority, headed by the triumvirate of Zinoviev, Kamenev, 
and Stalin. 
One major cleavage that appeared within the party leadership in this period involved 
broad differences in economic orientation. The New Economic Policy had been adopted in 1921 
to achieve a number of goals. The Bolsheviks hoped first, that the partial restoration of free 
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 enterprise would promote short-run economic revival; second, that elimination of forced 
requisitioning of grain would overcome the disaffection of the peasantry; and third, that the 
growing success of agriculture would subsidize the gradual expansion of industry and lay the 
basis for a socialist economy. By the winter of 1922-23, the first two of these goals were being 
met. The harvest of 1922 yielded as much as three-fourths of a normal pre-war crop, and the 
peasants seemed to be generally satisfied. However, industry lagged far behind agriculture, 
turning out only one-fourth of its pre-war output, and this industrial production was concentrated 
largely in light industry.1 At this point disagreement arose within the party leadership over 
whether or not economic policies should be altered to accelerate the rate of industrial growth. 
The majority of party leadership opposed any major change in policy that might endanger 
the smychka (link) between the proletariat and the peasantry. Consequently, they resisted all 
efforts to increase the peasant’s tax burden. Furthermore, majority spokesmen such as 
Sokol’nikov, the Commissar of Finance, placed great emphasis upon stabilizing the currency to 
protect the peasants against inflation. To achieve this goal, the majority pursued conservative 
policies of financial orthodoxy: attempting to establish a gold-based ruble, allocating credits to 
industry primarily on the basis of short-run profitability, and encouraging grain exports in order 
to build up Soviet reserves of foreign currency. At the same time, majority leaders resisted an 
increase in state economic planning, for this sounded too suspiciously like a call for a return to 
the system of War Communism.2 
However, within the upper ranks of the party leadership a minority, which included 
Trotsky, Iu. Piatakov (the vice president of VSNKh), and the economist E. A. Preobrazhenskii, 
began to express alarm about the slow tempo of industrial recovery.3 The minority insisted that a 
more rapid tempo of industrialization was necessary for balanced, short-run economic 
development, for strengthening the proletarian base of the Soviet regime, and for the ultimate 
attainment of socialism. In line with this, in late 1922 and early 1923 Trotsky began to call for a 
program of “primitive socialist accumulation,” analogous to the early stages of capital 
accumulation described by Marx.4 Although Trotsky shared the view of the majority that it was 
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 necessary to take steps to stabilize the currency, he saw this concern as subordinate to the need 
for more rapid industrialization. Thus, he proposed an increase in state subsidies to industry, and 
argued that these be granted, not on the basis of short-run profitability, but in view of long-term 
economic need.5  
Trotsky suggested a number of different methods for obtaining the funds necessary for 
his industrialization program. In this regard he stressed the need for greater sacrifices on the part 
of the working class. At the Twelfth Party Congress he even went so far as to tell the Soviet 
proletariat that “there may be times when the state does not pay wages in full or only pays them 
by half, and you, the worker, will credit the state at the expense of your wages.”6 At the same 
time, Trotsky suggested using the proceeds from grain exports to purchase foreign industrial 
machinery. Finally, he asserted that large sums could be saved for reinvestment by reducing 
overhead expenses in existing industry and by concentrating industrial production in a smaller 
number of more efficient enterprises. In Trotsky’s view, the key to the implementation of all 
these recommendations was, once again, a greater emphasis on economic planning.7 
Between the fall of 1922 and the spring of 1923, these differences provoked a number of 
clashes between Trotsky and the majority of the Politburo. The first conflict erupted in late 1922 
around the question of the state monopoly of foreign trade. In an attempt to promote foreign 
trade, the October plenum of the Central Committee voted to free the import and export of 
various commodities from state control. Lenin and Trotsky had been absent from this meeting, 
but upon hearing of the decision, both vigorously protested this weakening of the state 
monopoly. Trotsky, viewing this problem as related to the question of central economic 
planning, used this opportunity to raise that issue again, arguing that Gosplan should be granted 
powers to regulate foreign trade. Although at this point Lenin still rejected Trotsky’s idea of 
strengthening Gosplan, he proposed that Trotsky assume the defense of their common position 
on the trade monopoly at the December plenum. By December 13, Lenin was able to 
congratulate Trotsky on their victory in overturning the October decision “without a single shot.” 
Soon afterwards—probably after his discussion with Trotsky about the bloc against 
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 bureaucracy—Lenin came to accept, in part, Trotsky’s position on Gosplan, recommending that 
the party congress “on certain conditions invest the decisions of the State Planning Commission 
with legislative force.”8 
While Trotsky’s and Lenin’s economic views were converging, in early 1923 Trotsky’s 
differences with the majority of the party leadership continued to widen. In January Stalin 
suggested the creation of a new supreme economic authority that would have included the 
Finance Committee, while excluding both VSNKh and Gosplan—the two institutions most likely 
to articulate the needs of industry. Trotsky succeeded in blocking this proposal, complaining in 
the discussion about this further confirmation of the “financial dictatorship,” and reasserting the 
need to strengthen industry and the powers of Gosplan.9 The following month Trotsky, as the 
head of a new committee on industrial policy, came up with a plan for extending credits to the 
industrial trusts. However, the committee majority—which ultimately included Stalin, Rykov, 
Sokol’nikov, Kamenev, and Dzerzhinskii—rejected Trotsky’s proposal. The final draft of the 
committee’s theses represented an uneasy compromise between the views of Trotsky and the 
majority.10  
Despite his disagreements with the majority, Trotsky was permitted to deliver the report 
on industry to the Twelfth Party Congress in April. Again, Trotsky’s theme was the urgent need 
to devote greater resources to industry and greater attention to economic planning. The most 
noteworthy aspect of the address was Trotsky’s contention that more rapid industrialization was 
necessary in order to maintain the smychka with the peasantry. Trotsky explained that the slow 
development of industry, combined with the rapid revival of agriculture, had resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the prices of industrial goods and a decline in the prices of agricultural 
commodities. He illustrated the situation with a diagram in which the lines representing 
agricultural and industrial prices crossed in September 1922 and then steadily widened like a pair 
of scissors. Trotsky’s conclusion was that the “scissors crisis” threatened to deprive the peasants 
of the benefits of their surpluses. Unable to purchase the goods they needed from the state, the 
peasants would turn more and more to local village industry, and away from the cities.11   
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 The informed observer easily could have discerned major differences between Trotsky’s 
perspective and that of the leadership majority. Zinoviev, Sokol’nikov, and Kamenev strongly 
insisted upon the priority of peasant agriculture under NEP, attacked the notion of “the 
dictatorship of industry,” and poked fun at comrades who had been obsessed with planning under 
War Communism.12 Nevertheless, majority spokesmen did not directly challenge Trotsky’s 
conclusions, and the congress adopted the theses on industry.  
The second issue that divided the party leadership in early 1923 was the nationalities 
question. By early 1923 Lenin had come to believe that the integration of the national republics 
into the Soviet Union had to be slowed down and perhaps reversed out of consideration for the 
sensibilities of those nations which had been systematically repressed under the tsars. At the 
same time, Lenin also concluded that the Great Russian chauvinism evident in the actions of 
Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii reflected the attitudes of the “truly Russian bureaucrat.” 
In a letter to the party congress Lenin singled out these individuals in particular for punishment.13 
On March 5, 1923, with his health failing rapidly, Lenin turned to Trotsky with the 
request that he take upon himself the defense of the Georgian case “now under ‘persecution’ by 
Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.”14 At the February plenum of the Central Committee Trotsky had 
expressed serious reservations about Stalin’s handling of the Georgian conflict. Now however, 
citing reasons of ill health, Trotsky declined to take on responsibility for defense of the 
Georgians. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that this was the first of a series of mysterious 
illnesses that continued to afflict Trotsky for the remainder of his life. Whatever the source of 
these illnesses, they seemed to incapacitate him at the most crucial turning points in his political 
activity. As Trotsky later noted in his autobiography, “My high temperature paralyzed me at the 
most critical moments, and acted as my opponents’ most steadfast ally.”15 
Nevertheless, Trotsky asked to review the relevant documents, and promised to look into 
the question if his health permitted.16 Soon afterwards, according to his later account, Trotsky 
presented Kamenev with a series of demands for Stalin. Trotsky did not support Lenin’s proposal 
for the exemplary punishment of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzerzhinskii. However, he insisted 
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 upon “a radical change in the policy on the national question” and “a discontinuance of 
persecutions of the Georgian opponents of Stalin,” as well as a “discontinuance of the 
administrative oppression of the party, a firmer policy in matters of industrialization, and an 
honest cooperation in the highest centres.” He further demanded the right to make amendments 
to Stalin’s report on the national question to the party congress. Finally, Trotsky required that 
Kamenev, who was on his way to Georgia, “arrange a complete reversal of the policy toward 
Lenin’s Georgian supporters on the national question.”17  
Fearing an open confrontation with Lenin and Trotsky, Stalin accepted Trotsky’s terms. 
Meanwhile, however, Lenin’s health continued to deteriorate and a few days after his 
communication with Trotsky, Lenin suffered another stroke that ended his political career. With 
Lenin out of the way, Stalin’s confidence returned. At the Georgian party conference in mid-
March, the Georgian nationalists were pushed further back by Stalin’s supporters.18  
In the following weeks Trotsky continued to press for a change in policy regarding the 
national question. On March 19 he wrote an article for Pravda denouncing Great Russian 
chauvinism; in the Central Committee session of March 22 he demanded the recall of 
Ordzhonikidze from Georgia, attacked the idea of a Transcaucasian Federation, and endorsed the 
position of the Georgian Central Committee; and, in a speech delivered in Kharkov on April 5, 
he again took up the defense of the oppressed nationalities.19 Still, Trotsky did not make public 
Lenin’s last article on the Georgian situation. The day before the congress convened, Kamenev, 
learning of Lenin’s article, urged the Central Committee to publish it. Trotsky attempted to 
justify his silence about the article on the grounds that he did not know what Lenin intended to 
do with it, and he left the question of publication up to the Central Committee. Subsequently, the 
presidium of the Twelfth Party Congress passed a motion to withhold the article.20 
At the Twelfth Party Congress Stalin delivered the report on the national question 
amended in accordance with Trotsky’s demands. However, Stalin also defended his own policies 
in Georgia, and claimed that Georgian nationalism against other oppressed nationalities was on 
the offensive. The debate on this report was long and heated, but Trotsky did not participate.21 
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 Meanwhile, in the early months of 1923 the leadership also was involved in disputes over 
proposals made by Lenin to reform the central institutions of the state and the party. In a series of 
notes and articles dictated from his sick bed between late December 1922 and early March 1923, 
Lenin outlined two sets of recommendations for combating state and party bureaucratism. Both 
plans contained provisions designed to improve the efficiency of state and party bodies, increase 
proletarian and peasant representation in the central party institutions, and reduce the power of 
Stalin. 
Lenin advanced his first set of proposals in a letter to the forthcoming party congress, 
written between late December 1922 and early January 1923. One section of this letter, later 
called Lenin’s “Testament,” is best known for its characterizations of a number of leading 
Bolsheviks. There, Lenin praised Trotsky as “perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C.,” 
while criticizing him for his “excessive self-assurance” and “excessive preoccupation with the 
purely administrative side of the work.” Regarding Stalin, Lenin noted his “unlimited authority” 
as General Secretary of the party, and questioned “whether he will always be capable of using 
that authority with sufficient caution.” Later, in a post-script evidently inspired by Stalin’s 
handling of the Georgian affair, Lenin described Stalin as “too rude” and recommended that he 
be removed as General Secretary and replaced by someone “more tolerant, more loyal, more 
polite and considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc.”22 
The same letter also contained a proposal to increase the size of the Central Committee 
from 27 full members and 19 candidates to between 50 and 100 members. The new members of 
the Central Committee were to be “mainly workers of a lower stratum than those promoted in the 
last five years to work in Soviet bodies.” For a number of years they were to go through a course 
in state management under the guidance of the most qualified members of the Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Inspectorate. Rabkrin itself was to be demoted to “an ‘appendage’ or, in certain 
conditions, . . . an assistant to these members of the C.C.” Lenin argued that the implementation 
of this plan would have three beneficial effects. First, it would raise the prestige of the Central 
Committee—apparently in relation to the three central leadership bodies of the party: the 
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 Politburo, the Organizational Bureau, and the Secretariat. Second, it would contribute to the 
stability of the party threatened by potential antagonism between the proletariat and the 
peasantry and by “conflicts between small sections of the C.C.” Third, the reform of the Central 
Committee would “help the workers improve the machinery of the state.”23  
Subsequently, Lenin continued to develop his proposals for institutional reorganization in 
two articles: “How We Should Reorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection,” and “Better 
Fewer, But Better,” written in late January and early March, respectively. The ideas contained in 
these articles were clearly based upon the plan Lenin had discussed with Trotsky in December to 
form a special commission attached to the Central Committee that would attempt to improve the 
selection, training, and promotion of officials, and encourage more correct organizational 
relationships in general. As Lenin envisioned it, this commission was to be composed of two 
reorganized institutions: the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin. The five-member CCC, 
which had been set up to combat bureaucracy in the party, was to be vastly expanded by the 
addition of between 75 and 100 workers and peasants. It was to meet with the Central Committee 
once every two months in a supreme party conference—partly in order to bring the question of 
bureaucratism into all important party decisions. Specific activities of the new Central Control 
Commission were to include attending all Politburo meetings and examining all papers and 
documents pertaining to its work, theoretical study of scientific methods of organizing labor, and 
taking part in supervising and improving the state machinery.24 
This new Central Control Commission was to be “amalgamated” to a refurbished 
Rabkrin, the organ established to fight bureaucracy in the state. In what appears at least partially 
to have been a swipe at Stalin, the Peoples’ Commissar of the Workers’ and Peasants’ 
Inspectorate from 1919-1922, Lenin berated the extreme disorganization of Rabkrin: 
 
Let us state frankly that the Peoples’ Commissariat of the Workers’ 
and Peasants’ Inspection does not at present enjoy the slightest 
authority. Everybody knows that no other institutions are worse 
organised than those of our Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, and 
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 that under present conditions nothing can be expected from this 
Peoples’ Commissariat.25  
Lenin recommended cutting the staff of Rabkrin from over twelve thousand members to between 
300 and 400 officials who would be screened for reliability and tested for their knowledge of the 
Soviet state apparatus and organizational methods. The tasks of Rabkrin were to include 
combining and coordinating a number of higher institutions for the organization of labor and 
rebuilding one model commissariat. The Peoples’ Commissar and the collegium of Rabkrin were 
to continue to direct the staff of Rabkrin, but would also assume the leadership of the new 
CCC.26 One important new idea in these proposals was the amalgamation of a state institution 
with a party organ. As in the case of Lenin’s proposal to expand the Central Committee, this 
innovation appears to have arisen from Lenin’s recognition of the need to involve higher party 
circles in any effort to reform the state apparatus.  
These recommendations met with mixed reactions within the Politburo. Although Lenin’s 
evaluations of his leading comrades and his proposal to demote Stalin were not disclosed to the 
party leaders immediately, a section of Lenin’s notes on the need to expand and proletarianize 
the Central Committee was forwarded to Stalin on the day it was written.27 Stalin, perhaps seeing 
the potential for strengthening his base in an enlarged CC, immediately backed the idea of the 
expansion. On January 29, his Secretariat delivered to the Central Committee a series of 
proposed amendments to the party statutes that would increase the size of that committee to 50 
full members. However, the “workers” to be added to the Central Committee were to consist of 
“directors, leaders of oblast organizations, the most authoritative members of the national 
Communist parties, etc.” The power of the Central Committee was to be enhanced by requiring 
that the Politburo refer to it “especially important political questions.”28 Trotsky rejected Lenin’s 
proposal for the Central Committee as interpreted by Stalin, arguing that it would disrupt 
efficient decision making by the CC and that it would in fact do little to proletarianize that body. 
At a meeting of the Central Committee on February 22 he explained, 
 
The Central Committee must retain its strict form and 
capacity for quick decisions. Therefore, its further broadening 
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 makes no sense. It would introduce into the Central Committee 
only a certain additional number of people of the center (primarily 
“general-governors”), thus it would do very little to improve the 
connection with the masses. Meanwhile, the broadening of the 
composition of the Central Committee and the establishment of 
new, more complicated relations between the Politburo and the 
plenum threaten to cause great damage to the accuracy and 
correctness of the work of the Central Committee.29 
At the same time, Trotsky and Stalin also disagreed over Lenin’s suggestion to enlarge 
the Central Control Commission and amalgamate it with a reformed Rabkrin. However, on this 
question their positions were reversed. Stalin initially opposed the idea. No doubt he felt 
seriously compromised by Lenin’s attacks on Rabkrin, and resisted the dismantling of that 
massive organization that he had constructed between 1919 and 1922. The majority of the 
Politburo, including Stalin, attempted to prevent the publication of “Better Fewer, But Better” in 
which the plan was discussed; and Stalin’s supporter V. V. Kuibyshev even suggested printing a 
dummy copy of Pravda to deceive Lenin.30 Trotsky, on the other hand, fully endorsed Lenin’s 
suggestions, the broad outlines of which he had agreed upon in December.31 
Ultimately, the Twelfth Party Congress adopted modified versions of both sets of Lenin’s 
organizational proposals. However, the new members of both the expanded Central Committee 
and the Central Control Commission were chosen, contrary to Lenin’s intent, from the ranks of 
the party officialdom, not from the proletariat and peasantry. Furthermore, Lenin’s idea to 
transform the combined CC and CCC into a supreme party conference that would oversee the 
work of the central party organs was dropped. The most important consequence of the 
organizational reforms was to strengthen Stalin, for most of the new members of both the Central 
Committee and the Central Control Commission were his supporters. Ironically, V. V. 
Kuibyshev who had proposed printing the dummy copy of Pravda, was chosen to chair the 
Central Control Commission.32 
During this period discussions about bureaucratism were not confined to the leading 
circles of the party. In particular, two small opposition groups on the periphery of the party were 
especially vocal in raising this issue. The first was an offshoot of the Workers’ Opposition called 
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 the “Workers’ Group of the Russian Communist Party,” which was founded by the worker 
Gabriel Miasnikov. After the Tenth Party Congress Miasnikov began to agitate for “freedom of 
the press for monarchists to anarchists inclusive,” and for this was expelled from the party in 
1922. In the following months he continued his political activities underground, forming the 
Workers’ Group. In early 1923 the Workers’ Group, like the Workers’ Opposition before it, 
demanded an end to the use of specialists and to managerial authority, the implementation of 
democratic administration of industry through the unions, and the abandonment of NEP—which 
it claimed stood for the “New Exploitation of the Proletariat.” It argued that the revolution had 
degenerated into rule “by a bunch of intellectuals” and called for a new movement of workers 
against bureaucratic party rule.33  
The second group was known as the “Workers’ Truth.” Founded in the fall of 1921, the 
Workers’ Truth was largely an organization of intellectuals who drew their ideas from the former 
Bolshevik leader, A. A. Bogdanov. This group argued that the Soviet Republic had become a 
“state capitalist” system dominated by a new bourgeoisie composed of NEPmen (the capitalist 
traders and speculators who flourished under the New Economic Policy), and party, soviet, and 
trade-union bureaucrats. Furthermore, it asserted that the Communist Party itself was now 
nothing more than “the party of the organizer intelligentsia.” The Workers’ Truth advocated the 
formation of a new “Workers’ Party” that would fight for democratic rights and the interests of 
the proletariat.34 
At the Twelfth Party Congress no one admitted supporting either the Workers’ Truth or 
the Workers’ Group, but the criticisms of these groups were echoed in milder terms by several of 
the delegates. The two central issues in this regard were the suppression of free speech within the 
party and the practice of appointing local party secretaries by the Secretariat. Vladimir Kosior 
protested the fact that many party members were excluded from party and state work or were 
transferred to different parts of the country simply because they had disagreed with the Central 
Committee. He further urged the repeal of the 1921 resolution banning party factions. L. A. 
Lutovinov denounced the growing tendency to view the Politburo as an “infallible pope,” and to 
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 treat every practical criticism of the party as a manifestation of Menshevism. According to 
Lutovinov, it was the suppression of free speech that was responsible for the formation of 
oppositions such as the Workers’ Truth and Workers’ Group. Preobrazhenskii complained that 
30 percent of all the secretaries of provincial committees had been “recommended” by the 
Central Committee.35 In his response to the discussion, Stalin insisted that “never in the past six 
years has the Central Committee prepared for a congress so democratically as it prepared for this 
one.” Nevertheless, he noted that freedom of discussion of “all questions of war and peace” was 
necessarily limited by the fact that “we are surrounded by enemies.”36 Despite his growing 
concerns about the erosion of party democracy, Trotsky said nothing during this discussion of 
Stalin’s organizational report.37  
A question that has aroused considerable speculation by scholars of this period is why 
Trotsky failed to attack the leadership majority openly at the Twelfth Party Congress on the 
issues of the national question and party regime. This question is particularly significant in light 
of Trotsky’s own later estimation that, “if I had come forward on the eve of the twelfth congress 
in the spirit of a ‘block of Lenin and Trotsky against the Stalin bureaucracy, I should have been 
victorious even if Lenin had taken no part in the struggle.”38 It is likely that a number of factors 
were involved. Trotsky later explained, quite plausibly, that he had feared independent action on 
his part would be interpreted as a personal bid for power, and that he had still hoped Lenin would 
recover sufficiently to lead the struggle himself.39 Others have attributed Trotsky’s silence to “a 
lapse in political will power,” a lack of “political sense and acumen,” or Trotsky’s belief that he 
was still bound by his agreement with Stalin on the Georgian question.40 Finally, it has also been 
suggested by Isaac Deutscher that Trotsky was intensely preoccupied with economic policy, and 
that he saw this as the “key to all other problems.”41 This last explanation seems to be supported 
by Trotsky’s analysis of bureaucracy during this period; for, to a large degree, this analysis 
continued to revolve around his understanding of the economic challenges confronting the Soviet 
Republic.  
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 4.2 INEFFICIENCY AND POLITICAL ALIENATION 
In the first few years after the revolution Trotsky defined the problem of bureaucracy in 
terms of a variety of factors that contributed to the inefficiency of the Soviet military and 
economic institutions. At times, he characterized as “bureaucrats” those individuals who 
obstructed policies out of concern for their own power and prestige. In other speeches and 
writings he criticized Soviet officials for “bureaucratic” tendencies that included apathy, 
excessive formalism, and organizational incompetence. Finally, and most importantly, he 
attacked the inefficiency that he saw embodied in the very structure of Soviet economic 
institutions.  
Trotsky reiterated a number of these views, and especially his critique of structural 
economic inefficiency, in early 1923. In fact, aspects of Trotsky’s analysis of glavkokratiia were 
scattered throughout his statements on bureaucracy in this period. However, at this point major 
new themes also began to appear in his speeches and writings. To a greater degree than ever 
before Trotsky began to speak of problems of bureaucracy within the party as well as the state. 
At the same time, he began to associate the problem of Soviet bureaucracy with political 
alienation. Specifically, he denounced various attitudes and modes of behavior prevalent within 
the state apparatus that betrayed a bureaucratic indifference to the needs and concerns of the 
masses. Even more significantly, he noted a conservative bias in Soviet policy that reflected and 
encouraged state and party responsiveness to alien class pressures. It is likely that a number of 
factors were responsible for the emergence of these new themes in Trotsky’s statements on 
bureaucracy. However, to a large degree they represented Trotsky’s attempt to account for 
continuing and deepening differences between his views and those of the majority leadership 
over questions of policy. 
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 In early 1923 Trotsky continued to address problems of structural economic inefficiency 
in the Soviet economy closely related to the phenomenon of glavkokratiia under War 
Communism. For Trotsky, the system of glavkokratiia had involved the excessive centralism of 
the glavki in relation to local economic institutions and enterprises, and the inadequate degree of 
coordination between the separate glavki. During the first two years of the New Economic Policy 
Trotsky discovered related problems in the structure and operation of the state trusts. Just before 
and again at the Twelfth Party Congress, Trotsky returned to the theme of the “glavkokratic” 
character of the state-controlled sector of the economy under NEP. At the Twelfth Party 
Congress he explained that there were two basic flaws in the organization of the state trusts: they 
dominated the individual enterprises so completely that they crushed all independence and 
initiative; and each operated too independently in relation to the state in general and VSNKh in 
particular.42 In Trotsky’s view, the trusts inevitably had assumed a “bureaucratic 
[biurokraticheskii]” and “red-tapist [kantseliarskii]” character, for they had been “created by the 
methods of War Communism, that is, by methods of central glavkokratic prediction and 
direction from above.”43 
Once again, Trotsky proposed a reorganization of the trusts along the lines of his earlier 
proposals for reforming the glavki. The task, he asserted, consisted “in establishing the necessary 
balance between the state, the trust and the factory.”44 In part, this involved a degree of 
decentralization of economic authority, granting greater autonomy to the economic oblasts and 
national republics and to individual enterprises. Trotsky argued that “a factory has to be able to 
point out to the trust that it is advantageous to it to act just so and not otherwise or we will have 
in the trust the old glavkokratiia, only made up to correspond to the conditions of the New 
Economic Policy.”45 The other aspect of Trotsky’s solution was to begin to coordinate the entire 
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 economy by means of a central economic plan. In his Kharkov speech of April 5 Trotsky 
asserted, “The policy of ‘from one case to the next,’ the practice of improvisation, economic 
guerilla tactics, amateurism, must more and more, under the staunch leadership of the party, 
yield place to planning methods and the principle of planning.”46 Most importantly, he again 
explained at the Twelfth Party Congress, this involved enhancing the powers of Gosplan.47 In 
Trotsky’s view a stronger Gosplan would not only improve the efficient coordination of the 
trusts; it would also help in combating the tendency to create “all sorts of temporary and 
accidental commissions: investigating, directing, verifying, preparatory, etc.”48 He explicitly 
rejected the notion that an ideal plan could be created overnight, for such a course could only 
lead back to the economic crises of War Communism and the “comprehensive economic 
constipation” of glavkokratiia. Rather, the extension of planning was to be achieved gradually, 
and only on the basis of accumulated experience.49 
However, while Trotsky continued to view the problem of bureaucracy at least partially 
as one of economic inefficiency, in early 1923 he began for the first time to describe the problem 
of Soviet bureaucracy in terms of political alienation. A number of factors seem to have 
contributed to this change. Perhaps one of these was Trotsky’s own deepening sense of isolation 
from the majority of the party leadership. Throughout his career, Trotsky consistently identified 
his personal fate with that of the revolution. Now, as he became increasingly alienated from the 
centers of power, Trotsky became more and more aware of manifestations of political alienation 
he previously had been inclined to overlook. Also, it is clear that Lenin’s last writings had a 
major impact upon Trotsky’s perception of the problem of bureaucracy in the Soviet state. The 
previous December Trotsky had accepted Lenin’s offer to form a bloc against bureaucracy, and it 
appears that the formation of this alliance inspired Trotsky to reconsider and to embrace many of 
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 Lenin’s views. However, perhaps even more important to the evolution of Trotsky’s thinking 
were policy developments that suggested to Trotsky the growth of political alienation in the state 
and party. One of these was the arrogant treatment of the Georgian Central Committee by Stalin 
and his supporters. Even more significant was the continuing resistance of the majority 
leadership to the economic planning that Trotsky saw as vital for industrial development. From 
this, Trotsky concluded that the problem of bureaucracy was far deeper than inefficiency in the 
organization of the economy; it involved the factors that were responsible for this fundamentally 
mistaken economic orientation.  
Trotsky’s most important comments on state bureaucratism during this period appeared 
in an article written for Pravda on April 3 and a speech delivered at a party conference in 
Kharkov on April 5. In both, Trotsky based his remarks upon Lenin’s recently published 
statements on bureaucracy. In Kharkov Trotsky defined the problem as one in which the party, 
during the first five years of the revolution, had constructed “a state machine which begins with a 
young, selflessly devoted but quite inexperienced Communist, goes on through an indifferent 
office clerk, and ends with a gray-haired expert who sometimes, under irreproachable forms, 
engages in sabotage.” That is, the party had “created this clumsy, creaking machine which to a 
considerable degree is not ‘ours.’”50 In these passages, essentially two different notions of 
bureaucracy were implied.  
One problem, once again, was the general inefficiency of the Soviet state apparatus. 
Thus, in his Kharkov speech Trotsky characterized the state machine as “wretchedly bad,” and 
denounced its low “quality.”51 Similarly, in his Pravda article Trotsky complained, 
If we could take an impression on a sensitive plate of the manners, 
replies, explanations, orders and signatures of all the cells of the 
bureaucratic organism, be it only in Moscow for a single day, the 
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 result obtained would be one of extraordinary confusion. And it is 
worse in the provinces.52 
 
However, in both his Kharkov speech and his Pravda article Trotsky also was referring to 
another concern: the problem of political alienation, involving the growing separation of the state 
from needs of the masses and the goals of socialism.53 As Trotsky described it, this alienation 
had taken a variety of forms, ranging from a lack of interest on the part of bureaucrats in serving 
working people, to manifestations of rudeness and Great Russian chauvinism by state officials, 
to acts of conscious sabotage by specialists, to conservative distortions of economic policy. 
At its most basic level the problem was that the state officials often demonstrated a 
“complete indifference to the living human being and his living work” and a “heartless 
formality.”54 When Trotsky previously had criticized state officials for their apathy and 
excessive formalism, these had been presented as isolated cases of the failure of state officials to 
fulfill their assigned tasks. Now, he portrayed bureaucratic indifference and formalism as 
widespread phenomena. He observed that “a Soviet official ought to behave attentively and 
respectfully to an old, illiterate peasant woman who has come into a big, high-ceilinged hall and 
gazes around her and doesn’t know before which inkstand to beat her forehead on the ground.” 
Often, however, this was not what happened: “There sits our red-tapist, directing her with the tip 
of his finger to number so-and-so, and she hesitates, turning this way and that, in front of number 
so-and-so, utterly helpless, and leaves her office without achieving anything.” Trotsky 
acknowledged that this was not a completely balanced description of the behavior of state 
officials, but he asserted that even if “it is only one-third true to life then there is a frightful abyss 
between the state machine and the working masses.” 55 
Closely related to this indifference was the “rudeness” of the average Soviet official. 
Trotsky noted that, even in the “civilized” capitalist democracies of the West, the state 
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 bureaucracy raises “itself above the people as a closely united professional caste” and “treats the 
workman and peasant arrogantly.” However, in the Soviet Union the problem was even more 
blatant, for “with us, civility, as a general rule, does not exist.”56 It is possible that in his attack 
upon the rudeness of the state apparatus, Trotsky had in mind Lenin’s recent criticisms of 
“Orjonikidze’s rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky” in the Georgian affair.57 
In another article written at the end of April, Trotsky described the state apparatus as deeply 
infected with great power chauvinism: “In the Soviet administrative machine, including also the 
military machine, tendencies of this kind [i.e., “Great Power” attitudes] are powerful to an 
extreme degree—and not only among former generals.”58 
Beyond that, Trotsky noted more extreme symptoms of the alienation of the state from 
the aims of socialism. One was the “conscious sabotage” carried out by “gray-haired experts” 
within the state apparatus.59 Even more worrisome for Trotsky was the distortion of Soviet 
economic policies under the pressure of private capital. Thus, in his April 5 speech in Kharkov 
Trotsky spoke of “the market relations which engender of themselves currents of centrifugal 
force that can distract and rob the state machine in the direction of the interests of private capital, 
wedge the NEP bourgeoisie into it with their interests and ideas, plunder state industry, turning it 
inconspicuously into the channels of private accumulation.”60  
 In his attempts to account for the causes of both state inefficiency and the alienation of 
the Soviet state from the masses, Trotsky borrowed heavily from Lenin. Lenin had suggested 
three sources of bureaucratism in his last writings: the low level of Soviet culture, the difficulties 
of constructing the Soviet state in the midst of revolutionary turbulence, and the fact that a large 
part of the administrative apparatus had been inherited from the tsarist state.61 Trotsky cited all 
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 three of these factors as “principles that maintain and nourish bureaucratism [biurokratizm]” in 
his Pravda article of April 3:  
Foremost among them, of course, is our lack of culture, 
backwardness, and illiteracy. The general muddle resulting from a 
state machinery in continuous process of reconstruction, inevitable 
during a revolutionary epoch, is in itself the cause of much 
superfluous friction, which makes up an important part of 
bureaucratism. It is the heterogeneity of class in the Soviet 
apparatus, and in particular the presence of aristocratic, bourgeois, 
and Counsellor of State [i.e., tsarist state official] practices that is 
responsible for the more repulsive of its forms.62 
 
Two days later, in his Kharkov address, Trotsky offered a similar explanation of the 
growth of state bureaucratism.63 Trotsky did not explicitly attempt to sort out which of these 
factors had produced which particular form of state bureaucratism. However, it seems he viewed 
low culture and the difficulties of state construction as mainly responsible for state inefficiency, 
and he believed that the employment of aristocratic and bourgeois specialists—itself necessitated 
by the low culture of the masses—was the most important source of the alienation of the state 
from the masses. Although in past years Trotsky had defended the bourgeois experts repeatedly 
against charges of bureaucratism, now—perhaps because he feared the spetsy would ally 
themselves with the “NEP bourgeoisie”—Trotsky began to take these charges more seriously. 
He approvingly paraphrased Lenin’s last observations on the excessive power of the bourgeois 
specialists: “Vladimir Ilyich writes about our state machine that it is neither more nor less than 
very similar to the czarist state machine, anointed, as they say, colored in the Soviet style, but if 
you examine it, it is the same old bureaucratic machine.”64  
However, even more significant as corrupting influences were the anonymous “market 
relations” of NEP that were exerting pressures upon the state from without, and the members of 
the “NEP bourgeoisie” who had infiltrated the state machinery. Again, Trotsky’s concern was 
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 that these might divert Soviet policy, distracting and robbing “the state machine in the direction 
of the interests of private capital.”65 Ultimately, this raised the prospect that the Soviet state 
might come to represent bourgeois interests. In early 1923, however, that seemed only a distant 
prospect. At this point Trotsky’s greater concern was that all of these different forms of political 
alienation could disrupt the smychka between the workers’ state and the peasantry, or between 
Russia and the workers and peasants of the non-Russian republics. Trotsky saw the alliance with 
the entire Soviet peasantry as threatened by the formalism and indifference of the typical state 
official, and even more by the mistaken economic policies that were provoking the scissors 
crisis. In the event of such a rupture, the peasantry could “cease to be led by the proletariat and 
fall under the leadership of the bourgeoisie.”66 In the non-Russian republics the threat was even 
greater, for there Great Russian chauvinism could provoke the rise of national opposition 
movements, uniting the “bourgeoisie with the toilers, wholly directed against the revolution.”67 
In either case, Trotsky warned, the outcome of the ensuing civil war “would be doubtful for 
us.”68 
In his proposals to reduce state bureaucratism, Trotsky dissociated himself from the more 
extreme positions of such groups as the Workers’ Truth and the Workers’ Group. Trotsky’s view 
of state bureaucratism at this time was of a state that was defective in many respects but not, as 
these groups thought, totally alien to the goals of socialism. Thus, Trotsky could not accept their 
calls for a new revolution. 69 Nor could he accept the view articulated in an anonymous 
opposition pamphlet circulated on the eve of the party congress that called for the liquidation of 
the party’s leading role in the state. “If there is one question which basically not only does not 
require revision but does not admit the thought of revision,” Trotsky insisted, “it is the question 
of the dictatorship of the party, and its leadership in all spheres of our work.” In Trotsky’s 
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 opinion, any party member who challenged this should be “unanimously dumped by all of us on 
the other side of the barricade [i.e., expelled].”70  
Instead, in a set of proposals that combined Lenin’s recommendations with his own 
earlier ideas, Trotsky called for sweeping reforms of the state apparatus. From Lenin, Trotsky 
took the idea that the principal institution for carrying out this work was a strengthened Central 
Control Commission amalgamated with a reformed Rabkrin: 
Through what agency [should the state be reformed]? 
Through that which erected it, through the party. And for this party 
too we need a fresh, improved organ for sounding this machine, a 
probe which is not only moral but also political and practical—not 
on the plane of formal state inspection, which has already shown 
its complete bankruptcy, but on the plane of party penetration to 
the heart of the matter, to carry out a selection process in the most 
important fields of work. Again, what this organ will look like at 
first, and how this Central Control Commission will work in 
conjunction with the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection, is a 
matter for further experience.71 
 
Evidently, it was the idea of merging the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate with a party 
institution, and thus transforming “formal state inspection” into “party penetration to the heart of 
the matter,” that enabled Trotsky to overcome his previous hostility to Rabkrin.  
At the same time, Trotsky added to Lenin’s proposal his own frequently expressed 
emphasis on planning, calling for the “systematic, planned reconstruction of the state 
machine.”72 He insisted that party leadership of the state had to “assume a more planned 
character” and the state organs had to “learn to work within the framework of a plan and a 
system, to construct a plan which looks to the future, not staggering from one case to the next.”73 
In other words, the combined CCC-Rabkrin was to function in relation to state institutions as he 
hoped Gosplan would function in the economic sphere. 
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 As Trotsky envisioned it, the new party-state institution was to concentrate its efforts on 
evaluating the work of state institutions, and selecting and training state functionaries. He 
anticipated that all of these activities could help in the struggle against both state inefficiency and 
political alienation: the new “central party-and-Soviet organ . . . will be able to sound the state 
machine in a new way both from the angle of its general efficiency and from that of how it 
responds to a simple illiterate old woman.”74 The new body would focus on the “technical 
improvement of the machine, the decrease of staffs, the introduction of greater order, 
thoroughness, and accuracy in the work, and other measures of a similar nature.” At the same 
time, it would also begin to educate “thousands of new workers . . . in the spirit of service, 
simplicity, and humanity.”75 An additional measure that Trotsky probably expected would be 
carried out by the combined CCC and Rabkrin was the exemplary expulsion from the state 
apparatus of a hundred civil servants “who showed a rooted contempt . . . for the working 
masses.”76  
Trotsky also outlined a number of further proposals, besides measures to be carried out 
by the Central Control Commission and Rabkrin, to eliminate both inefficiency and political 
alienation from the state apparatus. One was to increase “the struggle against the low conditions 
of culture, illiteracy, dirt, and poverty.”77 Another was to mobilize public opinion against 
bureaucratic rudeness. In this regard, Trotsky believed the press could play an important role.78 
Finally, to root out bureaucratically inspired Great Russian nationalism, Trotsky called for the 
reeducation of the party on the national question and the stern punishment of chauvinist 
officials.79 
While dealing with the issue of political alienation in the state machine, in the early 
months of 1923 Trotsky also began to address related phenomena in the party. The previous year 
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 he had alluded to the issue of bureaucratism in the party in a speech to the Eleventh Party 
Congress, and he had mentioned it in his last conversation with Lenin in December. On both 
occasions Trotsky’s remarks were somewhat obscure, but they seem to have been directed 
primarily against the inefficiency that he saw as arising from the lack of central economic 
planning. Trotsky returned to the subject in an article for Pravda on March 13, 1923 and again in 
his Kharkov address. Although he continued to see a close connection between party 
bureaucratism and the lack of planning, he now clearly began to describe the problem in the 
party, as in the state, as one of political alienation.  
Trotsky did not yet openly address issues related to the decline in party democracy, 
though it is obvious he was beginning to be concerned about this. Thus, in his February 22 
remarks to the Central Committee on the organizational reform of the leading party institutions, 
he spoke of the importance for the CC of “constant, and not only periodic connections with ‘the 
people at the bottom’ [nizy]” and the need for the Central Committee to have around itself “a 
constant, living, and active party ‘encirclement’.” He argued that “this would add to the C.C. the 
living experience of the localities and of the ‘people at the bottom’” and would “exert a needed 
pressure on the C.C.”80 Also, in his demands to Stalin around the Georgian question, Trotsky 
explicitly called for an improvement in the party regime. However, at this point Trotsky was 
concerned primarily with another aspect of political alienation in the party—the increasing 
conservatism in the policies of the party leadership. While he did not make the connection 
explicit, he again seems to have been responding to the rightward drift of economic policy he 
perceived in the resistance among party leaders to economic planning. 
Trotsky mentioned a number of factors that he saw as responsible for this conservatism, 
or that threatened to exacerbate it. As in his discussion of state bureaucratism, one was the 
163 
 “distortion of human relations by market influences,” that “drags around people, wraps them 
round and corrupts them.”81 Another potential source of conservatism was the infiltration of 
NEPmen into the party. However, in Trotsky’s estimation this was less of a problem in the party 
than in the state, for in the previous year the party had “purged itself of alien elements and added 
to its proletarian element.”82 Instead, in early 1923 Trotsky primarily attributed the growing 
conservatism of the party leadership, not to external pressures, but to dynamics within the party 
itself. The most important source of the problem was the increasing specialization of party 
members involved in the work of state institutions: 
The officers of the party, both central and local, consist with few 
exceptions of comrades who are charged with most responsible 
state service, almost always of a specialized kind. The same 
applies also to a very substantial number of party members who 
are not formally officers of the party but who make up its 
fundamental cadres. The communists now bring their entire 
personalities into their administrative, economic, military, 
diplomatic, and any other sort of work.83 
 
The problem with such specialization, according to Trotsky, was that it could lead to the 
development of a narrowly specialized outlook within individual communists. Trotsky variously 
referred to this as the problem of “bureaucratism,” “departmentalism,” “departmental 
degeneration,” and “the crystallization in the upper strata of the party along the lines of 
profession and department.”84 At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922 he had warned vaguely 
that the party’s preoccupation with routine and practical questions could lead to the growth of 
internal bureaucratism. Now he defined this threat more clearly: “Not a single serious party 
member will claim that in the sphere of party leadership we have attained perfect and 
unchangeable forms, and that as our work inevitably becomes more complicated and subdivided 
the party will not be threatened with the danger of becoming dissolved in this work and losing 
the ability to see the forest for the trees.”85 Trotsky clearly intended to suggest that this already 
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 had occurred to some degree. The specialization of leading party members had narrowed their 
horizons to such an extent that, in dealing with economic questions, they were unable to perceive 
the needs of the entire economic forest.  
If the growth of this conservative specialization continued unchecked, Trotsky feared it 
could lead to extreme forms of political degeneration. In this respect, Trotsky found the 
experience of a number of groups, including the Social Democratic and trade-union leaderships 
of Western Europe, to be instructive. In the course of their development, these groups had 
“retreated further and further into day-to-day, purely reformist, detailed work, in practice 
repudiating revolutionary struggle against capitalism, bowing to the ground before its might.”86 
However, Trotsky did not believe that specialization inevitably resulted in bureaucratism, 
conservatism, and political degeneration. In each case where a socialist organization had 
degenerated, the problem was not simply that the group involved itself with specialized work; 
rather, it was that petty jobs were “openly or tacitly counterposed to a great historic task.” 
Furthermore, he argued that “history knows of no big jobs without petty jobs.” Even 
revolutionary barricade fighting, Trotsky noted, “breaks down into details, assembling logs, 
overturning carts, erecting barriers, and so on.” In that case the individual tasks of the 
insurrectionists were linked together “by the revolutionary high tension of the fighters, in the 
name of a great political aim.” It was this “unity of a great aim” that could elevate the details of 
socialist construction above “petty-bourgeois hairsplitting,” give inspiration to those 
participating in that construction, and save the party from degeneration.87  
Consequently, Trotsky’s solution to the problem of bureaucratism in the party was not to 
reduce the degree of specialization of its members, but—once again—to increase the extent of 
planning, particularly in the economic sphere. Trotsky envisioned that the establishment of a real 
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 economic plan would combat the tendency to departmentalism within the party by unifying the 
work of all its members: 
This historic plan, though as yet imperfect and lacking in 
consistency, must embrace all sections and parts of the work, all its 
nooks and crannies, in the unity of a great creative conception. . . . 
Socialist construction is planned construction on the largest scale. 
And through all the twists and turns of NEP, the party pursues its 
great plan, educates the youth in the spirit of this plan, teaches 
everyone to link his particular function with the common task, 
which today demands sewing on Soviet buttons, and tomorrow 
readiness to die fearlessly under the banner of communism.88 
  
 At the same time Trotsky devoted special attention to the role that the new institution for 
political planning, the merged CCC-Rabkrin, could play in combating party bureaucratism. The 
creation of this new organ, like the strengthening of economic planning, would help to unify the 
experience of party members employed in diverse Soviet offices by establishing greater 
coordination between those institutions. The establishment of the combined CCC-Rabkrin, 
Trotsky asserted, involved “approaching the state machine in a new way, embracing and 
evaluating it as a whole in respect of the most important matters and fundamentally, and along 
these lines subjecting it to regular influence.”89 Also, the selection of seventy-five workers and 
peasants to serve on the CCC would enable the lower levels of the party to exert a “needed 
pressure” and, Trotsky stressed, “in the case of necessity, a ‘unifying’ pressure” on the Central 
Committee.90 Finally, Trotsky saw the new institution as an instrument for identifying and 
dealing with party members who had become politically unreliable. The communist who had 
only begun to degenerate through over-specialization was to be “pulled up with a jerk in good 
time,” that is, warned to correct his behavior. The member who had “become so ‘specialized’” 
that he had “lost his moral link with the party” was to be expelled.91 Similarly, the CCC would 
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 continue to purge bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements that had managed to insert themselves 
into the party.92  
Another method for fighting departmentalism in the party, according to Trotsky, was to 
elevate the consciousness of the membership about the goals and tasks of communism. He 
insisted that “there must be a raising of the political and theoretical level of the party.” One way 
to accomplish this was through “an improvement in the party press, which must give better 
information, become more interesting, more profoundly comprehensive, and in particular must 
get rid of departmental trivia and monotonous proclamations which neither instruct nor arouse 
but put to sleep.”93 
Finally, Trotsky also argued that party bureaucratism could be combated by increasing 
the proletarian composition of its membership.94 In part, he saw this as an effective means of 
insulating the party against the corrupting pressures of the market and the NEPman. Beyond that, 
he believed that a large proletarian membership would serve as an anchor to prevent the 
increasingly specialized leadership from drifting away from its revolutionary perspective and 
pulling the party with it: 
It is necessary first and foremost to increase systematically 
the number of members working at the bench. . . . The more 
abundantly the underground springs of the party are nourished, the 
less the crystallization in the upper strata of the party along the 
lines of profession and department will threaten the party with 
bureaucratic ossification.95 
4.3 THE NEW COURSE CONTROVERSY 
During the summer and early fall of 1923 the party leadership majority took steps to 
consolidate its position through new maneuvers against Trotsky, punitive transfers of its critics, 
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 and increasing the practice of appointing party secretaries at the local level. In the Central 
Committee it was proposed that a number of CC members, including Stalin, should be added to 
Trotsky’s Revolutionary Military Council. Although Trotsky was able to prevent this, he was 
forced to accept Voroshilov and Lashevich, supporters of Stalin and Zinoviev respectively, on 
the council. Kuibyshev explained to Trotsky, “We consider it necessary to wage a struggle 
against you but we cannot declare you an enemy; this is why we must resort to such methods.”96 
In the same period Rakovskii and Osinskii, both of whom had raised sharp criticisms of party 
policy at the Twelfth Congress, found themselves dispatched abroad on diplomatic 
assignments.97 Finally, the appointment of party secretaries reached such unprecedented levels 
that even supporters of the leadership majority were compelled to concede the deterioration of 
party democracy. Dzerzhinskii, for example, complained to the Central Committee that “the 
dying out of our party, the dying out of its internal life, the prevalence of nomination instead of 
election, is becoming a political danger and is paralyzing our party in its political leadership of 
the working class.”98 A few months later Bukharin observed that in Moscow, “Our cell 
secretaries . . . are usually appointed by the district committees.” Further, he asserted that “in the 
majority of cases the elections in our party organizations have in fact been transformed into 
mockery of elections, because the voting takes place not only without preliminary discussion, but 
. . . according to the formula, ‘Is anyone opposed?’”99  
Meanwhile, during the summer of 1923, the Soviet Republic was afflicted with a series of 
economic crises. Following the Twelfth Party Congress, industrial prices continued to rise while 
agricultural prices dropped. The widest opening of the price scissors was reached on October 1 
when industrial retail prices stood at 187 percent of the 1913 level, and retail prices of 
agricultural commodities fell to 58 percent.100 The high prices of manufactured goods in turn 
generated a “sales crisis” in which large quantities of consumer products remained unsold in 
warehouses. Industries were forced to cut back in production, compounding the already serious 
problem of unemployment, and to reduce the level of wages or to pay them irregularly.101 The 
leadership majority viewed the scissors crisis not as a symptom of insufficient industrialization, 
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 but as a result of exorbitant price setting by the trusts. Consequently, the policy pursued was one 
of directly forcing down industrial prices. In August, state credits to industry were restricted to 
compel enterprises to sell existing stocks at lower prices. However, this measure only 
exacerbated the problems of industry, leading to higher unemployment and more wage cuts.102 
In August and September workers in various cities responded to the deterioration in their 
standard of living with a wave of wildcat strikes. Adding to the concern of the Soviet leadership 
was the fact that the strikes were encouraged and assisted by members of the Workers’ Truth and 
Workers’ Group. The leadership reacted with repression against both the strikers and the 
opposition groups.103 
At the end of September the Central Committee established three commissions to come 
up with solutions to the crises: a commission on the scissors crisis, a commission on wages, and 
a commission on the internal party situation. The party minority, including Trotsky, boycotted 
the scissors commission, believing it would fail to address the underlying causes of the crisis.104 
At the same time, the conclusions of Dzerzhinskii’s commission on the situation within the party 
turned out to be just as unsatisfactory to the minority. Instead of addressing the decline in party 
democracy, the most important recommendation of the commission was that all party members 
be required to report to the GPU any information they had about the underground factional 
groups.105 
On October 8 Trotsky wrote a sharp response to the Dzerzhinskii commission proposal. 
He did not directly challenge the recommendation; rather, he asserted instead that informing on 
“hostile elements” within the party was “so elementary a duty” that no special resolution to that 
effect was necessary. However, he further argued that the need for such a resolution was 
symptomatic of a “dramatic worsening of the inner-Party situation and the increased isolation of 
the TsK [CC] from the party.” Then Trotsky proceeded to criticize the mistaken economic 
orientation and the steady erosion of party democracy since the Twelfth Party Congress. He 
concluded by declaring his intention to give his opinion on the current situation in the party “to 
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 every Party member whom I regard as adequately prepared, mature, consistent, and therefore 
able to help the Party emerge from the deadlock without factional convulsions and shocks.”106 
One week later a group of forty-six prominent party members, perhaps encouraged by 
Trotsky, sent their own statement to the Politburo. Some of the signatories, including 
Preobrazhenskii, Piatakov, Antonov-Ovseenko, and I. Smirnov, had supported Trotsky in past 
struggles; others were former members of the Democratic Centralists. The criticisms of 
economic policy and the party regime contained in the “Declaration of the Forty-six” were 
essentially the same as those leveled by Trotsky.107 
The response of a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commission was to condemn Trotsky’s letter as having “objectively acquired the character of a 
factional action,” and to denounce the Forty-six as a “factional group.”108 In early November, 
however, the leadership majority, under pressure from the ranks, shifted their approach from 
condemnation to concession. On the anniversary of the October Revolution Pravda published an 
article by Zinoviev calling for more workers’ democracy within the party. In a report to a district 
committee on December 2 Stalin called for more “open discussion” and the application of the 
“principle of election . . . to all Party bodies and official posts”—barring “insuperable obstacles.” 
However, he noted that under conditions of NEP, surrounded by a growing bourgeoisie, it was 
necessary impose certain limits on democracy, such as requiring that party official have a pre-
October party standing. Also, he observed that it was necessary to set limits to discussion to keep 
the party from degenerating into a “debating society.”109 At the same time Pravda opened its 
pages to a debate on the question of party democracy. This period of concessions culminated on 
December 5 with the adoption by the Politburo and the Presidium of the CCC of a “New Course 
Resolution” co-authored by Stalin, Kamenev, and Trotsky.110 
For the most part, the analysis and the recommendations of the New Course Resolution 
reflected Trotsky’s views. The resolution noted the need for greater coordination of all sectors of 
the economy and “the exceptional importance of Gosplan” and other planning agencies. It also 
described the “objective contradictions” that had arisen from “the prevailing market relations” of 
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 NEP, from the necessity of employing “capitalist forms and methods of work” by the state, and 
from the use of non-proletarian elements in the state apparatus. These consequences included: 
 
striking disparities in the material living standards of party 
members . . . ; the growth of connections with bourgeois elements 
and the ideological influence of the latter; a departmentalized 
narrowing of intellectual horizons among officials . . . ; and as a 
result of this, the weakening of the connections between 
communists working in different sectors; the danger of a loss of 
perspective of socialist construction as a whole and of world 
revolution; the danger . . . of the “NEP degeneration” of a layer of 
functionaries who . . . come most into contact with bourgeois 
elements; the process of bureaucratization that can be observed in 
the party apparatus; and the resulting threat of the party becoming 
separated from the masses.111 
To deal with these problems, the resolution called for more “workers’ democracy,” which 
it defined as “liberty of frank discussion of the most important questions of party life by all 
members, and the election of all leading party functionaries and commissions by those bodies 
immediately under them.”112 It outlined measures to increase free discussion within the party, to 
promote new functionaries from the rank and file, to expand educational work, and to convene 
party conferences twice yearly. The resolution also rejected the idea that the power of superior 
bodies to confirm local party secretaries could be converted into a right of appointment.113 
Although Trotsky cosigned the New Course Resolution and many of its ideas were his 
own, no doubt he viewed certain passages as problematic. Most importantly, the resolution 
upheld the Tenth Party Congress’s ban on factions.114 While Trotsky did not at this time 
advocate factional freedom, he understood that this provision could easily be used to justify 
repression of all dissent within the party. Furthermore, past experience had shown that the right 
of higher authorities to confirm lower level elections was, in practice, often indistinguishable 
from the right of appointment. A few days after the publication of the New Course Resolution, 
an open letter by Trotsky to party meetings appeared in Pravda. Trotsky hailed the “exceptional 
significance” of the resolution, describing it as an “important turning point” in the historical road 
of the party; but he warned that “now the bureaucrats are ready to ‘take note’ of the ‘new 
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 course,’ that is, to nullify it bureaucratically.” He urged rank and file party members to begin to 
implement the resolution by their own initiative.115  
Trotsky’s letter offered fresh encouragement to his sympathizers who had been leading 
the revolt in local party meetings throughout the previous month. Alarmed by these open 
manifestations of oppositional activity, the party leadership majority responded with a concerted 
attack upon Trotsky and the Opposition, developing many of the themes that would characterize 
the anti-Trotsky campaigns of subsequent years. Trotsky was accused of using democratic 
slogans for purely factional purposes; he was charged with seeking to drive a wedge between 
younger and older party generations; he was denounced for having consistently underestimated 
the importance of peasantry; and the philosophy of “Trotskyism” was depicted as inherently anti-
Leninist. To buttress this last accusation, the majority leaders dragged out Trotsky’s Menshevik 
past and reviewed his previous differences with Lenin over the Brest Litovsk Treaty and the 
trade unions.116  
Confined to his apartment by a malarial infection, Trotsky was unable to defend his 
record and his views at public party meetings. Nevertheless, he responded to his antagonists in a 
series of articles that were republished in January 1924 in a pamphlet entitled The New Course. 
In this pamphlet that Trotsky provided an extensive explanation of his new thoughts on party 
bureaucratism.  
4.4 TROTSKY AND THE NEW COURSE 
In his New Course writings on party, Trotsky moved further from his previous 
preoccupation with inefficiency, increasingly associating bureaucracy with the phenomenon of 
political alienation, defined in terms of the growth of centralism and authoritarianism at the 
expense of workers’ democracy. It is possible, of course, to interpret Trotsky’s deepening 
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 concern over political alienation as simply an expression of his own growing sense of alienation 
from the reins of power. Also, it is possible to view Trotsky’s apparently sudden advocacy of 
“workers’ democracy” as a cynical maneuver inspired by self interest. This is exactly how it was 
portrayed by Stalin.117 Perhaps more sincerely, this was also how Shliapnikov, the former leader 
of the Workers’ Opposition, described it, asserting, “In the present controversy the only goal of 
Comrade Trotsky and the Opposition is simply to seize the apparatus.”118 In fact, once again it 
was likely that the maneuvering against Trotsky by the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and 
Kamenev did help sensitize him to manifestations of political alienation within the party. 
However, from the New Course Resolution signed by Stalin and Kamenev as well Trotsky, and 
from the admissions of supporters of the majority, it is clear that the changes in the party regime 
denounced by Trotsky were real enough. Furthermore, it is clear that Trotsky was motivated not 
simply by considerations of personal power, but perhaps even more by longstanding policy 
concerns—namely, the continuing divergence of Soviet economic policy from an emphasis on 
planning and industrialization. While Trotsky explicitly disavowed the advocacy of democracy 
as an “end in itself,”119 there is no reason to doubt that he saw the transformation of the party 
regime as the only way to correct the economic orientation of the leadership.  
Although the Twelfth Party Congress had adopted Trotsky’s recommendations for a 
greater emphasis upon economic planning and industrialization, in the following months little 
was done to implement these proposals. In his October 8 letter to the Central Committee Trotsky 
noted that in violation of the decisions of the Congress,  
 
after the Congress, Gosplan was in fact relegated [to the 
background]. Its work on reaching individual targets is useful and 
necessary, but has nothing in common with the planned regulation 
of the economy as it was passed by the Twelfth Congress. The lack 
of coordination in planning is especially trying in the work of 
central and, in general, major state economic bodies. To an even 
greater extent than before the Twelfth Congress, the most 
important economic issues are being solved in a hurry, without due 
preparation, regardless of their planning connections.120 
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 Trotsky further contended, “There is no management in the economy, the chaos originates at the 
top.121  
In Trotsky’s view, the failure of the majority of the party leadership to implement 
planning had given rise to a host of other incorrect policies and problems. He spoke of the “self-
sufficing, i.e., not subordinate to the general economic plan, character of our financial policy.” 
As a result of this, the concentration of industry was repeatedly interrupted by “‘political’ (i.e., 
local)” interests, thereby exacerbating the scissors crisis. Then, rather than proceeding with a 
planned expansion of industry to strike at the heart of the scissors crisis, the Central Committee 
had set up a commission to bring about a “mechanical reduction of prices” that would benefit 
only middlemen. For Trotsky this was evidence “that a policy which ignores the importance of 
planned flexible regulation, affected by its own inevitable consequences, is returning to the 
attempts of the War Communism command of prices.”122  
At the same time, Trotsky seems to have believed that a planned approach to work in a 
variety of areas was itself disrupted by narrow political considerations. Instead of the “thorough 
personal selection of managerial personnel” mandated by the Twelfth Congress that Trotsky 
thought could be achieved only through a planned approach, decisions about the allocation of 
personnel increasingly were made “from the point of view of their ability to support or oppose 
the inner-Party regime, which is secretly though no less actually established by the Orgburo and 
the Secretariat.”123 A related issue was the growing power of party secretaries. At the Eleventh 
Party Congress in 1922 he had had expressed his concern about the expansion of the economic 
powers of the party secretaries in the vacuum that should have been filled by rational planning. 
In similar terms Trotsky now observed, 
 
In the last year or year and a half a specific secretary’s psychology 
has been formed, its main feature being the conviction that a 
secretary is able to solve any problem without familiarizing 
himself with the gist of the matter. At every step we see how 
comrades who showed no organizational, administrative, or other 
skills while heading Soviet establishments, begin to authoritatively 
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 solve economic, military, and other questions as soon as they 
become secretaries.124 
The leadership’s continuing obstruction of economic planning reaffirmed Trotsky’s 
conclusion that the chaos of Soviet economic policy had deep political roots. First, as Trotsky 
had suggested in early 1923, it indicated the loss of a unifying perspective among the party 
leaders. Second, the continuing marginalization of Gosplan demonstrated an indifference of the 
leadership to the decisions of the party. Third, Trotsky now seems to have perceived that the 
apparent irrationality of many political and economic decisions could be explained in terms of 
the narrow political interests of the central party leaders. All of these conclusions contributed to 
Trotsky’s growing conviction that the problem of bureaucratism involved the political alienation 
of the party leadership from the needs of the working class and of socialism.  
At the same time, Trotsky began to view developments in the party regime with 
increasing alarm. Since the Twelfth Party Congress, the party regime had deteriorated to the 
point that it was “much farther from workers’ democracy than the regime of the toughest periods 
of War Communism.” By worker’s democracy, Trotsky clearly meant the election of party 
functionaries and the free discussion within the party of all important issues. Trotsky asserted “In 
the most severe time of War Communism, [the] practice of appointments was not spread at one-
tenth of its present scale.” Provincial party secretaries were now almost universally appointed; 
and once selected, they proceeded in turn to make all other appointments, dismissals, and other 
important decisions at the provincial level. Whenever anyone opposed the decision of a 
provincial party secretary, that secretary, “with the help of the Center,” simply had the dissident 
transferred. Consequently, party members were afraid to express their views openly. At the 
height of the civil war, Trotsky reminded the CC, the party organizations and the public press 
were centers of lively discussion and debate. Now, there was “no trace of such open exchange of 
opinions on matters of true importance to the Party.”125 Together with developments in the 
economy, the worsening of the party regime indicated to Trotsky that the problem of 
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 bureaucracy essentially involved political alienation. Simultaneously, it brought the question of 
workers’ democracy into the center of Trotsky’s analysis for the first time. 
As a number of writers have emphasized, in late 1923 Trotsky conceptualized the 
problem in terms of the disease of bureaucratism that had infected the party, and not yet of a 
state and party bureaucracy that ruled the Soviet Union.126 It was not until later in the 1920s that 
Trotsky would begin to speak of the bureaucracy. Although at this point he perceived the 
problem of bureaucratism as a disease or tendency, Trotsky rejected as “unworthy of a Marxist” 
the notion that bureaucratism was “only the aggregate of the bad habits of officeholders.” In fact, 
at various times in the past Trotsky had spoken precisely in such terms. At this point, however he 
insisted it was a “social phenomenon,” that is, “a definite system of administration of people and 
things.”127 By this, Trotsky meant to suggest that bureaucratism involved the breakdown of 
collective decision making by the rank and file and its replacement by a hierarchical system of 
authority. Trotsky now asserted that all important party decisions increasingly were made by the 
apparatus that originally was established to be the mere executor of the will of the entire party. 
Thus, he noted “a certain tendency of the [party] apparatus to think and to decide for the whole 
organization,” and he described the party as “living, as it were, on two stories: the upper story, 
where things are decided, and the lower story, where all you do is learn of the decisions.”128 
To a large degree, Trotsky observed, the gravitation of power to the “upper story” of the 
party involved its concentration in the hands of the “Old Guard”—that is, members who had 
joined the party before the October Revolution. Trotsky did not contest the fact that the Old 
Bolsheviks had contributed innumerable services to the revolution; nor did he even deny that 
“they ought to occupy all the leading positions in the party.” Nevertheless, he warned that “the 
growing discontent over this exclusive and self-contained apparatus of secretaries, who identify 
themselves with Old Bolshevism, can in the future have grave consequences for preserving the 
ideological hegemony of the Old Bolsheviks of underground days in the party of contemporary 
times.”129 
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 In passing, Trotsky commented upon a set of characteristic attitudes of the members of 
the party apparatus. Many of these were features he had noted before in his discussions of 
bureaucratic inefficiency. Now, he seems to have believed that these traits had arisen out of the 
impulse of party officials to preserve their own bureaucratic power. 
One of these attitudes was excessive “formalism,” or the rigid application of formal 
principles, described by Trotsky as “the essential attribute of bureaucratism.” He suggested as an 
example the tendency to “consider every criticism a manifestation of factionalism.” Although he 
conceded that factions and “every incorrect deviation” might become an entering wedge for 
alien class interests, Trotsky pointed out that this applied to bureaucratism as well. In fact, those 
who immediately condemned every criticism of the old course as factional were themselves 
guilty of “conservative bureaucratic factionalism.” The lesson was that “concrete Marxist 
verification” had to be applied to all nuances of opinion, “and not the stereotyped phrases which 
are the defense mechanism of bureaucratism.”130 
Closely related to formalism was a preoccupation with tradition that served to legitimize 
the existing party leadership. In his discussion of bureaucratic traditionalism Trotsky again 
invoked a number of precedents from the history of the socialist movement, including the 
example of the tradition-bound Second International. It was true, Trotsky asserted, that “without 
a continuous lineage, and consequently without a tradition, there cannot be stable progress.” 
However, the real revolutionary tradition of Leninism was “a method of historical analysis . . . 
and not a mass of decisions prepared in advance.”131 
Three more bureaucratic attitudes that Trotsky depicted as common within the party 
apparatus were a “complete distain for the mood, the thoughts, and the needs of the party,” 
“bureaucratic smugness,” and “apparatus cliquism.” The first of these was closely related to the 
indifference and hostility to the masses that, earlier in the year, Trotsky had described as 
characteristic of a large part of the state apparatus. “Bureaucratic smugness” involved the 
confidence of party secretaries in their own ability to make important decisions about matters 
with which they had little or no familiarity. Again, Trotsky had noted this tendency as early as 
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 the Eleventh Party Congress. On the other hand, “apparatus cliquism,” or the “corporatist and 
departmental spirit of the separate constituent parts of the party,” was a trait only recently 
diagnosed by Trotsky. This was a particularly menacing phenomenon for it referred to the 
evolving group consciousness of the party secretaries that reinforced their tendency to crystallize 
into a distinct social grouping or “bureaucracy.”132 
Among Trotsky’s concerns about the consequences of bureaucratism was the fear that it 
seriously could undermine the internal vibrancy and unity of the party. “Bureaucratism,” wrote 
Trotsky, “kills initiative and thus prevents the general elevation of the party. That is its cardinal 
defect.”133 Most important in this regard was the effect that it had upon the party youth. Trotsky 
argued that if young people were to develop politically, they needed the opportunity to criticize 
and to think independently. By stifling initiative, the party apparatus was obstructing the 
education of the next generation of Bolshevik leaders.134 At the same time, Trotsky saw 
bureaucratism as a principal source of disruptive factionalism. When communists had no sense 
that they were able to participate actively in making decisions affecting the party, and when their 
questions were ignored or their criticisms repressed, many began “looking for a substitute for 
independent party activity in the form of groupings and factions of all sorts.”135 
Even worse was the potentially distorting effect of bureaucratism on the party’s political 
orientation. In Trotsky’s view the essential advantage of a Leninist party was its ability to utilize 
the diverse experiences of its members in the formulation of policy, the ability “to look at 
industry with the eyes of the communist machinist, the communist specialist, the communist 
director, and the communist merchant, collect the experiences of these mutually complementary 
workers, draw conclusions from them, and thus determine its line for directing the economy in 
general and each enterprise in particular.”136 However, such a collective approach to the work of 
the party required the fullest party democracy, and this had been undermined by bureaucratism.  
Trotsky believed that the weakening of party democracy already had contributed to the 
disorientation of the party leadership. It was the absence of democracy in the party, he now 
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 claimed, and not just the lack of planning, that had led to the development of a narrow 
specialized outlook among the party leaders. Without democracy,  
 
Leadership takes on a purely organizational character and 
frequently degenerates into order-giving and meddling. The party 
apparatus goes more and more into the details of the tasks of the 
Soviet apparatus, lives the life of its day-to-day cares, lets itself be 
increasingly influenced by it, and fails to see the forest for the 
trees.137 
Again, Trotsky was implying that this narrow departmental mentality in turn reinforced the 
mistaken orientation of Soviet economic policy.  
As Trotsky had suggested in the spring, one long-term danger of bureaucratism was that 
it could lead to the complete “opportunist degeneration” of the leadership: 
 
Does bureaucratism bear within it a danger of degeneration, or 
doesn’t it? Anyone who denied it would be blind. In its prolonged 
development, bureaucratization threatens to detach the leaders 
from the masses; to bring them to concentrate their attention solely 
upon questions of administration, of appointments and transfers; to 
narrow their horizon; to weaken their revolutionary spirit; that is, 
to provoke a more or less opportunistic degeneration of the Old 
Guard, or at the very least of a considerable part of it.138 
With greater emphasis than earlier in the year, Trotsky pointed to the specter of capitalist 
restoration. Once more Trotsky asserted that the economic preconditions for this were already 
being prepared by an erroneous economic policy. If the Soviet leadership continued to allow 
private capital to accumulate at the expense of nationalized industry, the peasantry eventually 
would fall under the economic and political influence of the capitalist sector. Most immediately, 
this could happen if the Soviet leadership failed to take steps to close the “scissors” through a 
more rational organization of industry geared to the peasant market.139 At the same time, Trotsky 
also implied that bureaucratism was creating the political prerequisites for capitalist restoration 
by weakening the party, inciting unhealthy factionalism, and promoting the degeneration of the 
party leadership. Thus, the political paths by which Trotsky predicted the counterrevolution 
could occur included “either the direct overthrow of the workers’ party, or its progressive 
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 degeneration, or finally, the conjunction of a partial degeneration, splits, and 
counterrevolutionary upheavals.”140 
Trotsky said relatively little during the New Course controversy about the underlying 
causes of party bureaucratism. He was far more concerned at this point with demonstrating its 
dangers and indicating how these could be combated directly.141 Nevertheless, he stressed that 
party bureaucratism was “not at all a ‘survival’ of the war period.” If it had been a mere 
“survival,” the problem would be diminishing, not growing. Rather, it was “the result of the 
transference to the party of the methods and administrative manners accumulated [in the state] 
during these last years.”142 He further asserted that the state apparatus was “the most important 
source of [party] bureaucratism.”143  
Combining ideas he had expressed earlier in the year with new and undeveloped insights, 
Trotsky explained the origins of state bureaucratism as follows: 
 
Its profound causes lie in the heterogeneity of society, the 
difference between the daily and the fundamental interests of 
various groups of the population. Bureaucratism is complicated by 
the lack of culture among the broad masses. With us, the essential 
source of bureaucratism resides in the necessity of creating and 
sustaining a state apparatus that unites the interests of the 
proletariat and the peasantry in perfect economic harmony, from 
which we are still far removed. The necessity of maintaining a 
permanent army is likewise another important source of 
bureaucratism.144 
He did not elaborate, but it is clear that Trotsky saw each of these factors as contributing 
to the growth of centralized, authoritarian, and hierarchical relationships in the state. In turn, 
these relationships had been transmitted into the party by communists involved in state work and 
by the party apparatus that had been entrusted with the oversight of the state: 
 
On one hand, it [i.e., the state apparatus] absorbs an enormous 
quantity of the most active party elements and teaches them the 
methods of administration of people and things, instead of political 
leadership of the masses. On the other hand, it largely occupies the 
attention of the party apparatus, over which it exerts influence by 
its methods of administration.145 
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 As a result, a large part of the party now consisted of state and party officials who had learned 
the “methods of administration” of the state apparatus. These were the “functionaries” who, 
Trotsky claimed, constituted “one of the fairly stable social groupings” of the Soviet regime.146  
A factor that contributed to the political weight of the functionaries was the relative 
decline in proletarian membership in the party. Trotsky explained that after the seizure of power, 
the first concern of the proletariat had been to create its own state apparatus. This had required 
the transfer of Bolshevik workers from the factories to the “state, cooperative and other 
apparatuses.” In turn, this had “implied a weakening of the factory cells and an increase in the 
functionaries in the party, proletarian in their origin or not.”147 Subsequently, the growth of the 
working class as a whole, which might have provided new proletarian recruits to the party, had 
been retarded by the slow development of industry.148 The result was that now less than one-
sixth of the party membership was composed of proletarians actually working at the bench.149  
Trotsky’s ultimate cure for the disease of party bureaucratism was to strike at its 
foundations by eliminating bureaucratism in the state and by proletarianizing the party. He did 
not even consider relinquishing party control over the state or abolishing one-party rule to stem 
the flow of state administrative methods into the party. No doubt he believed that such measures 
would only weaken the resistance of the Soviet regime to capitalist restoration. However, he 
called for renewed efforts against state bureaucratism, urging specifically “the education of party 
youth, based upon personal initiative” so that the young people would learn to “serve the state 
apparatus in a new manner and to transform it completely.”150 (By this time Trotsky had given 
up on the combined CCC-Rabkrin as an anti-bureaucratic tool. In his view this institution had 
been organized in such a way that it had been “rendered harmless.”151) Also, Trotsky again 
asserted the need to accelerate industrial expansion and to recruit more workers to the party.152 
Nevertheless, Trotsky seemed to recognize that in the short run these measures would not 
be effective in combating party bureaucratism. The struggle against bureaucratism in the state, he 
emphasized, was “an exceptionally important but prolonged task.”153 Furthermore, while he 
judged the proletarianization of the party to be “the best guarantee that it will retain its 
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 proletarian character,” Trotsky cautioned that “the membership of the party can be altered 
seriously (so that, for example, the factory cells make up two-thirds of its ranks) only very 
slowly and only under conditions of noteworthy economic advance.”154 
For the immediate future, then, Trotsky focused less upon the elimination of the ultimate 
sources of bureaucratism, and more upon the need for a direct assault against bureaucratism 
itself. This required the immediate implementation of the democratic reforms embodied in the 
New Course Resolution. In its struggle against bureaucratism, Trotsky insisted, the party could 
not count upon the leadership. Rather, it had to rely upon its own initiative and “subordinate to 
itself its own apparatus without for a moment ceasing to be a centralized organization.”155 
Trotsky called upon the rank and file to begin to take control of party organizations at every level 
and to institute workers’ democracy: 
 
Every unit of the party must return to collective initiative, to the 
right of free and comradely criticism—without fear and without 
turning back—and to the right of organizational self-determination. 
It is necessary to regenerate and renovate the party apparatus and 
to make it feel it is nothing but the executive mechanism of the 
collective will.156 
There were, however, limits to the degree of democracy Trotsky was ready to advocate, 
even within the party. Most importantly, he refrained from asserting the right of party 
oppositionists to organize themselves into factions. In part, this may have been for tactical 
reasons. A challenge by Trotsky of the Tenth Party Congress’s ban on factions would certainly 
have been seized upon by his opponents as fresh evidence of his “anti-Leninism.” However, it is 
also clear that Trotsky accepted the argument of the leadership majority that organized factions 
could become instruments of alien class interests. The task, then, was to find the line that 
separated the “calm” of bureaucratically enforced unity from factionalism.157 
Once the party membership asserted its power, Trotsky predicted, it quickly would find 
allies within the apparatus itself. Of course, there were some “mummified bureaucrats” who 
would have to be removed from their posts, but in Trotsky’s estimation the “vast majority” of the 
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 members of the apparatus were not yet bureaucratized. He anticipated that the New Course 
controversy would “teach a good deal to the majority of the apparatus workers and will get them 
to abandon most of their errors.” Ultimately, when these elements realized the dangers of 
bureaucratism, they would join enthusiastically with the party in implementing the New Course 
Resolution.158 
For Trotsky this was not the end of the struggle. He had been aroused to oppositional 
activity not only by the erosion of democracy within the party, but also by what he perceived to 
be a fundamentally mistaken economic policy. This policy had shifted the Soviet state off the 
tracks that led to socialism, and onto rails that ended in capitalist restoration. Thus, he saw the 
principle of workers’ democracy, as embodied in the New Course Resolution, as only “a means 
and not an end in itself.” The “weight and value” of the new course in the coming period, he 
asserted, “will be determined by the degree to which it helps us solve our principal economic 
task.” That task was the establishment of “centralized, planned management of the economy.”159 
4.5 THE DEFEAT OF THE OPPOSITION 
During the debate that raged through December, the Opposition found a considerable 
degree of support within the party ranks. A stronghold of the Opposition was the Moscow 
province where the assault on the leadership was led by Preobrazhenskii, Sapronov, and 
Piatakov. There, the Opposition frequently dominated party meetings, and perhaps even won a 
majority at the cell level. In the provinces the Opposition was able to capture party organizations 
in Riazan, Penza, Kaluga, Simbirsk, and Cheliabinsk where there were concentrations of 
dissident party officials who had been transferred from the center. Social bases of support for the 
Opposition included Trotsky’s Red Army; the volatile student youth; and, ironically, party 
members employed in that heartland of bureaucratism—the state apparatus (particularly the 
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 economic bodies). This last grouping was, no doubt, drawn to the Opposition for its advocacy of 
rapid industrialization and central planning.160 
Nevertheless, the Opposition was severely hampered by internal weaknesses. Most 
important of these was the inability of the Opposition to differentiate its program clearly from 
that of the leadership majority. Regarding the question of the party regime, the rank and file 
could perceive little difference between the majority and the minority, which both claimed to 
support democratic reforms. Furthermore, the Opposition was unable to present any short-run 
solution to the problems of low wages and unemployment that were troubling industrial workers. 
Besides, some workers still remembered the militarization of labor and trade union “shake-up” 
advocated by Trotsky and his supporters in 1920, and they distrusted the sudden conversion of 
many of the Opposition leaders to workers’ democracy. Another weakness of the Opposition was 
in its leadership. Trotsky’s inability to participate actively in the discussion, together with his 
failure to openly identify himself with the Opposition, left the Opposition without representatives 
who could match the prestige of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Stalin. Also, many of the 
Opposition’s leaders were compromised by their previous association with “anti-Leninist” 
groupings such as the Left Communists and the Democratic Centralists.161  
More important than the internal weaknesses of the Opposition, however, was the 
overwhelming organizational strength of the majority leadership. Through its control of the party 
press, the majority was able to limit the access of the membership to the views of the Opposition 
and to drown criticisms in a flood of counteraccusations. Party members who were inclined to 
sympathize with the views of the Opposition were intimidated from speaking or voting against 
the leadership by the fear of dismissal from their jobs, expulsion from the universities, or transfer 
to other locations. Finally, through the tiered system of election of party conference delegates, 
the leadership was able to reduce the representation of the Opposition substantially. Thus, while 
the Opposition received 36 per cent of the votes at district conferences in the Moscow province, 
they could only claim 18 per cent at the Moscow provincial conference that elected delegates to 
the Thirteenth Party Conference.162  
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 Ultimately, at the Thirteenth Party Conference in mid-January 1924, the Opposition 
received only three out of 128 voting delegates. As far as economic policy was concerned, the 
conference endorsed the deepening orientation to the peasant market, and rejected Opposition 
proposals to increase the degree of central planning and accelerate the tempo of industrialization. 
In its resolution on the recent party discussion, the conference branded the Opposition a “petty 
bourgeois deviation,” insisted upon the need for discipline, and reaffirmed the party’s ban on 
factions.163 
Trotsky’s persistent fever kept him from attending the conference. Even before its 
concluding session, he boarded a train for the Caucasus, seeking rest and recovery. In Tiflis on 
January 21 he received the news of Lenin’s death. The slim possibility that Lenin would recover 
to join Trotsky in an assault on the leadership majority was gone. Misinformed by Stalin about 
the date of Lenin’s funeral, Trotsky did not return to Moscow, but continued on to the resort of 
Sukhum.164 
Meanwhile, the majority leaders found new opportunities to strengthen their own 
positions. At Lenin’s funeral ceremonies they inaugurated a virtual cult based upon the fallen 
leader that was used to legitimate their power.165 In honor of Lenin they opened the doors of the 
party to over 200,000 industrial workers. A number of contemporary historians have concurred 
with Trotsky’s later claim that the effect of this “Lenin Enrollment” was to swamp the party with 
politically unsophisticated and easily manipulated members who would back the leadership 
majority.166 Simultaneously, the Central Control Commission began to oust Oppositionists on 
grounds of “opportunism” and personal defects.167 
Just before the Thirteenth Congress convened in May, the party summit was shaken by 
the sudden revelation of Lenin’s “Testament” by his widow, Krupskaya. The Testament was 
potentially devastating to Stalin, for it called for his removal from the post of General Secretary. 
Zinoviev and Kamenev quickly leapt to Stalin’s defense. According to Trotsky’s account, the 
Council of Elders, leaders of the provincial delegations, voted over the objections of Krupskaya 
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 to read the Testament only to separate delegations to the Congress and to ban discussion of it by 
the Congress as a whole.168  
Not one Oppositionist was elected as a delegate with voting rights to the Thirteenth Party 
Congress; and only a few Oppositionists, including Trotsky, were permitted to speak. The theme 
and tone of the congress were set by Zinoviev, who called for the unity of the party against its 
oppositional disrupters. One after the other, delegates filed to the podium to denounce the 
Opposition’s factional activities and its petty-bourgeois orientation.169  
In his address to the congress, Trotsky adopted a conciliatory tone while reasserting the 
correctness of the views he had expressed in The New Course. He defended his positions on both 
party democracy and economic planning as wholly consistent with the Politburo’s New Course 
Resolution. Although he probably already had serious reservations about the scale and pace of 
the Lenin Enrollment, his own statements on behalf of party proletarianization compelled him to 
endorse it. In response to Zinoviev’s demand that he admit that he had been wrong in his 
evaluation of the situation within the party, Trotsky flatly refused, stating simply, “I cannot say 
so . . . comrades, because I do not think it.” However, he simultaneously reaffirmed his own 
allegiance to the party, declaring that “if it should come to that, I will not be the least soldier on 
the least Bolshevik barricade!”170 
At the Thirteenth Party Congress and in the months that followed, the leadership took 
further steps to consolidate its position and to eradicate the Opposition. Once again, the Central 
Committee was expanded, mostly by the addition of supporters of Stalin. The new Central 
Control Commission, also expanded, was directed to continue the work of weeding the party 
membership, particularly in educational and governmental institutions where Oppositionists were 
concentrated. Meanwhile, the leadership had begun to press the other parties of the Communist 
International into line behind the anti-Trotsky campaign. Since the founding of the Comintern in 
1919, the foreign sections had revered Trotsky as a leader of both the Soviet state and the world 
revolution. Now, at the Fifth Congress of the International in June 1924, the delegates joined in 
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 the chorus of denunciation against Trotsky. At that Congress, Trotsky was replaced on the 
Executive Committee of the International by Stalin.171 
Barred by party discipline from continuing to criticize the policies of the party leadership, 
during the summer of 1924 Trotsky turned to historical analysis to vindicate his own record and 
to cast a shadow on the political biographies of his adversaries. His opponents, depicting 
themselves as faithful disciples of Lenin, had asserted that Trotsky was an unregenerate 
Menshevik who had always been anti-Leninist. Trotsky’s answer appeared in a preface to his 
speeches and writings of 1917. In this preface, entitled “Lessons of October,” he reviewed the 
events of 1917. Trotsky described the internal party situation of that year as a struggle between 
two currents: a left wing led by Lenin (and implicitly, himself) that had pushed consistently for 
the completion of the proletarian revolution and for an insurrection to achieve that goal, and a 
right wing led by Kamenev and Zinoviev that had insisted that the Russian Revolution could not 
go beyond bourgeois-democratic limits and that had opposed the insurrection.172  
Reviewing the disagreements of 1917, Trotsky asserted that “nothing could be more 
paltry than an attempt to turn them now, . . . into weapons of attack against those who were at 
that time mistaken.”173 However, it was precisely as a “weapon of attack” that Trotsky now 
wielded the history of the revolution. As Trotsky saw it, the issue was not merely of historical 
significance. In late 1923 an attempted revolution in Germany had been crushed as a direct 
consequence, Trotsky claimed, of the failure of the German Communist Party to take decisive 
action.174 The obvious implication of “Lessons of October” was that the leaders of the Russian 
Communist Party who had directed preparations for the German insurrection had repeated the 
errors of the right wing of the Bolshevik party in 1917. In particular, the blame for the German 
debacle fell most heavily upon Zinoviev, the President of the Comintern. 
The counterattack by the party leadership was massive. In the numerous books, 
pamphlets, and speeches of the “literary debate” the triumvirs and their supporters denounced 
Trotsky’s interpretation of the events of 1917, in its place supplying their own accounts that 
increasingly diverged from historical accuracy. At the same time, Trotsky’s own political record 
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 was subjected to fresh attacks. The latest allegation, made by Stalin, was that Trotsky 
persistently had opposed his own theory of permanent revolution to “Lenin’s” view that 
socialism could be constructed in one country.175 
In January 1925 Trotsky was forced to resign from his position as Commissar of War. A 
few months later he was reassigned to serve on the Supreme Council of the National Economy 
under Dzerzhinskii. Within VSNKh, he became chairman of three commissions: the Concessions 
Committee, the Board of Electro-technical Development, and the Industrial-Technological 
Commission. In his new assignment Trotsky was able to return to economic issues that had been 
raised by the Opposition. Thus, in August 1925 he wrote a series of articles entitled “Whither 
Russia?” that used recently published Gosplan figures on the performance of the national 
economy to demonstrate the necessity of broadening the scope of economic planning and 
accelerating the rate of industrialization.176 In the meantime, however, after the Thirteenth Party 
Congress Trotsky was forced to retreat from the explosive analysis of party bureaucratism he had 
developed in The New Course. 
4.6 THEORETICAL RETREAT 
The overwhelming defeat of the Opposition in early 1924 left Trotsky politically isolated 
and faced with the prospect of expulsion for further manifestations of “factional” activity. 
Consequently, for the next two years Trotsky refrained from open attacks on the party leadership 
and from public denunciations of party bureaucratism, and he instructed his supporters to do 
likewise. The Belgian-born Oppositionist, Victor Serge later recalled how in 1925 Trotsky sent 
him the following directive: “For the moment we must not act at all: no showing ourselves in 
public but keep our contacts, preserve our cadres of 1923, and wait for Zinoviev to exhaust 
himself.”177 Although Trotsky continued to make occasional remarks on the subject of 
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 bureaucratism in a number of articles and speeches during 1924 and 1925, he now confined 
himself to relatively innocuous comments on the politically safer topic of bureaucratism in the 
state. Nevertheless, behind some of these remarks it is possible to perceive the more pointed 
critique he had developed in The New Course. 
In his analysis of state bureaucratism during this period, Trotsky reiterated a number of 
the themes he had developed in early 1923. The problem, as Trotsky again defined it, was a 
combination of inefficiency and the growing alienation of the Soviet state from the masses. 
Trotsky deplored the red tape [kazënshchina, volokita] in Soviet educational institutions that was 
responsible for the shortage of books, maps, and trained librarians. He also criticized the 
bureaucratism [biurokratizm] of newspapers that were indifferent to the needs of their readers.178 
Further, he argued that the basic question of the socialist reorganization of society was “how to 
avoid bureaucratism [biurokratizm], dead indifference, suffocating formalism.”179  
At the same time, however, Trotsky also defined the “tendency toward bureaucratism 
[biurokratizm]” as “the resolution of problems through state offices, without the workers and 
behind their backs.”180 In this vein Trotsky rebuked the Soviet “chinovnik” who, because he did 
not like “unnecessary discussions,” obstructed the reporting activities of worker-correspondents. 
Such a bureaucrat, Trotsky argued, was “a direct or indirect instrument of the kulak,” for he 
weakened working-class resistance to pro-capitalist forces.181 Trotsky no doubt implicitly 
directed these remarks against bureaucratism in the party as well as the state. Although he was 
unable to say so openly, he continued to believe that the bureaucrats of the majority had 
instituted a regime in the party that was strengthening the position of the kulak.  
Again, as in early 1923, Trotsky asserted that the most important sources of state 
bureaucratism were in the difficulties of socialist construction combined with the backwardness 
and illiteracy of the Soviet masses: “We are too backward, ignorant, illiterate, and habitually 
inert; while the practical problems of economic construction on the other hand are too sharp and 
pressing. This is the spring from which the tendency toward bureaucratism [biurokratizm] 
flows.”182 He described state tyranny over the masses as arising from “cultural weakness, from 
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 illiteracy, from a feeling of defenselessness whose roots lie in the inability to look into things, 
read widely, make complaints, consult the right sources.”183 
Trotsky’s answer to the problem, once again, was to suggest ways to raise the level of 
mass culture and to encourage mass initiative. He devoted special attention to the role that two 
specific groups could play in this regard. The worker correspondents of newspapers, through 
accurate reporting and stylistic clarity, could induce semi-literates to read the paper regularly, 
and thus could help to raise the level of literacy and the political consciousness of the masses.184 
Trotsky also stressed the duty of worker correspondents to report the effects of state policies on 
the masses, and the response of the masses to those policies. In so doing, the correspondents 
could “enlist the newspaper readers to check up on the functioning of the state and gradually 
prepare them for participation in government themselves.”185 Librarians were another group that 
could serve as a conductor of culture to the masses and as a catalyst for popular initiative. 
Trotsky urged librarians to help readers find books they could use, and to hold meetings of local 
peasants to discuss and explain newspaper dispatches.186 To encourage mass initiative, Trotsky 
revived an idea of Lenin’s to establish general complaint bureaus in the libraries. Librarians 
should then take up the complaints of the peasant, “advise him, write to a newspaper, make 
public his grievance, defend him” and generally, help him to overcome his “feeling of 
defenselessness.”187 
Of course, Trotsky had no illusions that he could successfully storm the walls of Soviet 
bureaucratism with an army of newspaper correspondents and librarians. While continuing to 
look for ways to encourage mass initiative, Trotsky was biding his time until a more favorable 
correlation of forces allowed him to return to the theoretical and political offensive. That 
opportunity would finally present itself in 1926. 
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 4.7 CONCLUSION 
In the course of the years 1923-1925, Trotsky’s critique of Soviet bureaucracy underwent 
a dramatic transformation. In late 1922 he was still describing the problem of Soviet bureaucracy 
almost exclusively in terms of “glavkokratic” inefficiency in the Soviet economy. However, the 
continued resistance of the leadership majority to economic planning, along with changes in the 
party regime, his own growing sense of isolation, and the influence of Lenin’s thinking helped 
convince Trotsky that the problem was a deeper one that could be understood best in terms of the 
traditional Marxist analysis of political alienation. Consistent with that analysis, early in 1923 
Trotsky first perceived manifestations of state and party bureaucratism in Soviet economic 
policies that reflected and promoted bourgeois influence. Later, in the New Course controversy, 
he denounced the political alienation embodied in the erosion of workers’ democracy in the 
party. Even in the following two years when political defeat forced him to blunt the edge of his 
remarks, a similar approach can be discerned in Trotsky’s scattered remarks on bureaucracy.  
There were a number of serious theoretical and programmatic weaknesses in the 
perspective developed by Trotsky during these years—particularly as it was expressed in The 
New Course. A first area of weakness, apparent in retrospect, was that it significantly 
underestimated the depth of the problem. At the end of December 1923 Trotsky expressed his 
confidence that the criticisms of the party regime articulated in the New Course controversy 
would be sufficient to convince the overwhelming majority of the party apparatus to return to the 
methods of workers’ democracy—a prediction that proved to be quite unrealistic. In part, this 
was perhaps a rhetorical device to draw hesitant rank and file members into the struggle. At the 
same time, it may have been a product of excessive optimism about the degree of pressure the 
membership would exert in the New Course controversy. Most importantly, however, it appears 
to have been a result of Trotsky’s failure to gauge the depth of resistance to democratization 
within the party leadership majority. The same failure was expressed in the very term 
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 “bureaucratism” that Trotsky chose to identify the issue. The word suggested that the problem 
was merely a disease affecting an otherwise healthy organism.  
A second area of weakness involved Trotsky’s explanation for the origins of the problem 
in both the party and state. An obvious omission from his explanation for the origins of party 
bureaucratism was any reference to the effects of restrictions on party democracy adopted in 
earlier years. In The New Course Trotsky asserted that bureaucratism was not a survival from the 
civil war period, but a relatively new phenomenon. And in fact, it is clear that the party regime of 
1923 really was considerably less democratic than in previous years. However, Trotsky clearly 
understated the degree to which party democracy had been eroded by past measures such as the 
1921 ban on factions and punitive transfer of oppositionists. Similarly, Trotsky made no mention 
of the role of past decisions by the party, such as the ban on opposition parties, as a factor 
undermining workers’ democracy and promoting bureaucratism in the state. In fact, as far as 
restrictions on both party and soviet democracy were concerned, in his October 8 letter to the 
CC, Trotsky explicitly acknowledged the “incompatibility of a complete, highly developed 
workers’ democracy with [proletarian] dictatorship.”188 However, even if Trotsky was correct in 
this assessment, it did not preclude his recognition of the bureaucratizing consequences of earlier 
decisions. Of course, at the time, Trotsky would not have expressed these views even if he had 
agreed with them. To have done so would have handed his opponents the final proof they deeded 
to demonstrate that he remained a Menshevik at heart. It was not until the mid-1930s that 
Trotsky was able to suggest that actions taken by the Bolshevik Party under Lenin had 
contributed to the growth of the problem of bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.  
Additionally, as Isaac Deutscher has suggested, Trotsky’s program for overcoming party 
bureaucratism at this point contained a number of serious inconsistencies. First was the 
contradiction between Trotsky’s call for a return to workers’ democracy in the party and his 
general assessment of the Soviet situation. Trotsky was openly concerned about the growing 
numbers of NEPmen and kulaks in Soviet society. Largely for this reason, he accepted the ban 
on opposition parties, fearing that if opposition parties were permitted, they would offer the 
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 NEPmen and kulaks a means by which to translate their own newfound economic strength into 
political power. Yet, as Trotsky’s own statements in support of a party purge indicate, he also 
recognized the danger that bourgeois elements, blocked from organizing independently, could 
attempt to take control of the Communist Party. Consequently, to the degree that the argument 
for restricting democracy in the soviets was valid, it applied equally to the party. This was, of 
course, the problem to which Stalin alluded when he spoke of the need to retain some restrictions 
on party democracy in the context of NEP and a growing bourgeoisie. To this, Trotsky validly 
responded that the leadership could itself become a transmitter of alien class interests. However, 
with apparently equal validity the leadership could argue that the Old Bolsheviks in the 
leadership were a better guarantee against degeneration than the de-proletarianized party 
described by Trotsky.  
A related weakness was apparent in Trotsky’s proposal to enlarge the sphere of party 
democracy as a means of achieving a more “proletarian” socialist line in economic policy. As 
Trotsky himself indicated, in 1923 only one-sixth of the party membership was made up of 
factory workers. The remainder was composed of factory managers, civil servants, army officers, 
commissars, party officials, etc. The most that party democracy could hope to achieve in the 
immediate future was a somewhat greater degree of working class influence over policy. Trotsky 
saw the long term resolution of this dilemma in the gradual proletarianization of the party. In the 
form this demand actually was implemented in 1924, however, it appears to have reinforced the 
position of the leadership majority through the addition to the party of a mass of politically 
inexperienced and passive workers.189  
Finally, it is questionable whether a democratic, proletarian party would have embraced 
Trotsky’s industrialization program as it was articulated in 1923.190 At this point Trotsky was 
arguing that primitive socialist accumulation required greater sacrifices on the part of the 
proletariat. Although the hardships imposed upon the working class in the summer of 1923 were 
not instituted in the name of a great plan, and although they were perhaps more extreme than the 
measures advocated by Trotsky, the strike wave that resulted suggests that Soviet workers were 
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in no mood to listen to calls for new sacrifices. Nor was there an overwhelmingly positive 
response from the existing working class component of the party to the economic demands of the 
Opposition during the New Course controversy. 
Despite these problems, Trotsky’s shift of focus to political alienation represented an 
enormously important development in his thinking. Although the concept of glavkokratiia had 
been useful for identifying the economic problems of previous years, even then it had been 
irrelevant for understanding some of the important political concerns that Lenin and the party 
opposition groups had been able to address. Viewing bureaucracy in terms of political alienation, 
in 1923 Trotsky was able to paint a convincing, and devastating, portrait of the current state of 
the party regime, to start to explain the emerging dynamics of Soviet politics, and to formulate 
the beginnings of a programmatic alternative. Furthermore, building upon this preliminary work, 
Trotsky was able in subsequent years to construct an elaborate but coherent theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy based entirely upon the traditional Marxist analysis of political alienation.  
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 5.0  A COHERENT THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY 
Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, Trotsky began to speak of the dangers of “bureaucratism” 
in the Soviet Union. However, it was only in 1923 that he began to apply in the Soviet context 
the classical Marxist understanding of bureaucracy as a manifestation of political alienation. In 
the New Course controversy Trotsky warned of the growing powers of the party apparatus, of the 
erosion of workers’ democracy in the party, and of the danger that these could lead to rightward 
shifts in policy and, ultimately, to the restoration of capitalism. After his defeat in that struggle, 
Trotsky temporarily confined his remarks on bureaucracy to the politically safer topic of 
bureaucratism in the state. Nevertheless, he was only biding his time until a change in the 
situation permitted him to return to the political and theoretical offensive. 
Realignments within the party in 1925 and 1926 presented Trotsky with the opportunity 
he had awaited. In 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin and the leadership majority 
over a number of political and economic issues. Implicitly, the arguments of the New Opposition 
confirmed Trotsky’s warnings about the dangers of party bureaucratism and of a resurgent right 
within the country. The following year Trotsky and his supporters joined forces with the 
Zinovievists to form the United Opposition, which sharply challenged the economic, 
international, and political policies of the party leadership throughout 1926 and 1927. In the fire 
of this party struggle, Trotsky forged a coherent theory of Soviet bureaucracy based upon the 
classical Marxist analysis of that problem.  
200 
 5.1 THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED OPPOSITION 
In early 1925 the ruling bloc of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin began to crumble. From 
the outset the alliance had been a shaky one. Even in the summer of 1923, Zinoviev had 
attempted to curb Stalin’s growing organizational powers by proposing the addition of Trotsky 
and either himself, Kamenev, or Bukharin to the party Secretariat. Nothing substantial came of 
the plan, and soon afterwards the outbreak of the New Course controversy and then the debate 
over Trotsky’s “Lessons of October” reunited the triumvirs against their common enemy.1 
However, the tensions latent within the triumvirate inevitably resurfaced as soon as Trotsky had 
been neutralized as a political force. The first issue to divide the party chieftains was the question 
of what was to be done with their defeated opponent. At the meeting of the Central Committee in 
January 1925, Zinoviev and Kamenev, stung by Trotsky’s recent criticisms of their behavior in 
1917, proposed that he be expelled from the party, or at least from the Politburo. The Central 
Committee majority, including Stalin, rejected these recommendations, voting only to accept 
Trotsky’s resignation as Commissar of War. Stalin later explained, “We disagreed with Zinoviev 
and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation, the method of blood-letting . . . 
was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one limb, tomorrow another, the day after 
tomorrow a third—what will we have left in the Party?”2 
Meanwhile, the party leaders resumed their organizational skirmishes against each other. 
In late 1924 or early 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev attempted to enlist N. A. Uglanov, the new 
secretary of the Moscow provincial party committee, in their maneuvers against Stalin. Although 
Uglanov had been appointed at Zinoviev’s and Kamenev’s initiative, he resisted their overtures 
and defected to the Stalinist camp. This was a serious setback for Zinoviev and Kamenev for it 
effectively destroyed the influence that Kamenev, the chairman of the Moscow soviet, wielded in 
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 the Moscow party organization. Consequently, the developing struggle assumed the form of a 
contest between the party organization of Moscow and that of Leningrad, where Zinoviev 
remained the dominant figure.3 In February the Leningrad Komsomol (Communist Youth 
League), encouraged by Zinoviev, attempted to assert its independence from the Komsomol 
Central Committee. Subsequently, Stalin was able to have both the secretary of the Leningrad 
provincial Komsomol committee and the Leningrad party representative on that committee 
removed.4 In the same period, Stalin increasingly began to intervene in the affairs of the German 
Communist Party in an attempt to undercut Zinoviev’s authority as Chairman of the Comintern.5  
During the summer of 1925, the struggle for power evolved into a debate over policy and 
doctrine. The most important issue involved the party’s orientation to the peasants. Since 1923 
the majority leadership had been united in a policy of encouraging the acquisitive inclinations of 
the peasantry. It was Bukharin who most clearly and consistently articulated the rationale for this 
approach. Bukharin described the policy of continued economic concessions to the peasantry as 
essential for the maintenance of political stability. Beyond that, he insisted that a prosperous 
peasantry was the main prerequisite for the continued economic recovery of the Soviet Union. 
The future of Soviet industry, Bukharin insisted, depended upon the increased production of 
industrial crops, and of grain to feed the urban workers and to trade on the world market for 
industrial equipment. At the same time, Bukharin argued that the expansion of agricultural 
production would stimulate industry by fueling the growing rural demand for consumer goods 
and agricultural tools. He anticipated that resources for industrialization could be obtained 
through the progressive taxation of prosperous peasants and through the investment of peasant 
savings held by Soviet banking and credit institutions. Consequently, Bukharin concluded that 
every possible incentive must be utilized to assist production and accumulation in the 
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 countryside. Most immediately, this meant encouraging the most productive sectors of the 
peasantry—the middle and well-to-do peasants.6 Bukharin forcefully expressed this idea in a 
speech delivered in April 1925: 
Our policy in relation to the countryside should develop in 
the direction of removing, and in part abolishing, many restrictions 
which put the brake on the growth of the well-to-do and kulak 
farm. To the peasants, to all the peasants, we must say: Enrich 
yourselves, develop your farms, and do not fear that constraint will 
be put on you.  
However paradoxical it may appear, we must develop the 
well-to-do farm in order to help the poor peasant and the middle 
peasant.7 
This orientation to the well-to-do peasant received its sharpest policy expression in the 
spring of 1925. At that point, fearing the growth of peasant disaffection, the party leadership 
offered new concessions to the peasantry, and especially to its wealthier strata. These were 
codified in decisions of the April plenum of the Central Committee that discouraged the practice 
of periodic land redistribution, reduced restrictions on the leasing of land and the hiring of labor, 
recommended the elimination of price controls on grain, and cut agricultural taxes.8 
Prior to this, Zinoviev and Kamenev had been among the most vocal supporters of the 
party’s agricultural policy. Together, they had taken the lead in denouncing Trotsky for his 
alleged “underestimation of the peasantry,” and during the fall and winter of 1924-1925, 
Zinoviev had been responsible for popularizing the slogan “Face to the countryside.”9 In early 
1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev voted for the Central Committee’s concessions to the kulak, and 
then vigorously defended these decisions in public.10 However, in the spring of 1925 they began 
to back away from the pro-kulak policies they had helped to inspire. To a large degree this 
change in orientation may be explained in terms of factional considerations. As E. H. Carr has 
suggested, once Zinoviev and Kamenev had lost their influence in the Moscow party 
organization, they began to adapt their views to the sentiments of proletarian Leningrad. There, 
the industrial workers resented the growing power of the kulaks who were blamed for bread lines 
and high food prices.11 In early May Zinoviev and Kamenev objected when the majority of the 
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 Politburo decided not to publish an article by Lenin’s widow, Krupskaya, in which she attacked 
Bukharin’s pro-kulak philosophy. A few weeks later Zinoviev delivered a speech in Leningrad in 
which he argued that the slogan “face to the countryside” meant “face to the middle and poor 
peasant,” not “a turning towards the well-to-do strata in the countryside.”12 He continued to press 
the issue in September in an article entitled “The Philosophy of an Epoch” and in a book, 
Leninism. In both works Zinoviev polemicized against the views of the pro-capitalist economist 
N. V. Ustrialov, who had expressed his approval of NEP as a policy that could ultimately lead to 
a phased restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. In the course of his argument, Zinoviev 
warned that the continued growth of the power of the kulak and the NEPman could, in fact, lead 
to the political degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship. At the same time, Zinoviev took up 
two related theoretical issues. He attempted to demonstrate that Lenin always viewed NEP as a 
temporary retreat, and not—as Bukharin alleged—the direct route to socialism. Furthermore, 
Zinoviev embraced Lenin’s definition of NEP as “state capitalism in a proletarian state”—a 
definition that had been disputed by Bukharin. As far as policy was concerned, the implication of 
both arguments was that the further advance to socialism required the renewal of class struggle 
against the kulak.13 
In the same period Kamenev and Zinoviev began to raise objections to the theory of 
“socialism in one country,” first advanced by Stalin in 1924 in the struggle against Trotsky. 
Stalin’s argument, based upon a strained interpretation of a few passages from Lenin, was that 
the Soviet Union possessed all the necessary means for constructing socialism, even if the world 
revolution failed to materialize. Perhaps Zinoviev and Kamenev were genuinely alarmed by 
Stalin’s nationalist revision of Bolshevik doctrine, or perhaps they simply feared it would 
undermine the significance of Zinoviev’s Comintern. At any rate, in September Zinoviev began 
to challenge Stalin’s theoretical innovation. With an abundant use of quotations, Zinoviev 
demonstrated that Lenin consistently viewed the successful construction of socialism in the 
Soviet Union as dependent upon international revolution. Zinoviev argued that the Soviet Union 
could and must begin the process of building a socialist society, but insisted that it could not 
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 hope to complete this task unless it was aided by the victory of the revolution in a number of 
other countries.14 
At the October plenum of the Central Committee Zinoviev, Kamenev, Krupskaya, and 
the Finance Commissar, Sokol’nikov, presented the case for the New Opposition. The two 
central proposals it raised were for an end to the policy of conciliating the kulak and for an open 
party discussion of the disputed issues. Although the Central Committee majority rejected the 
proposal for a party-wide discussion, it was prepared to make concessions regarding agrarian 
policy. Even within the leadership majority there were growing concerns, arising out of 
difficulties in grain procurement, over the orientation to the kulak. Although the harvest had been 
an exceptionally good one, the amount of grain marketed by the peasantry in 1925 was small, 
leading to soaring prices. At least part of the problem was that the wealthier peasants had 
consciously withheld their own crops from the market and had purchased and hoarded the 
harvest of their poorer neighbors in anticipation of rising grain prices. The CC now unanimously 
adopted a resolution on “party work among the village poor” that condemned two deviations 
regarding agricultural policy: the underestimation of the importance of the middle peasant and of 
the smychka between the proletariat and the peasantry, and the underestimation of the kulak 
threat.15  
However, the decisions of the October plenum of the CC marked only a temporary truce 
in the escalating conflict. About the time of the Central Committee session, the Leningrad 
provincial committee was pressured into removing its secretary, P. A. Zalutskii, for his 
allegations that the central party leadership was reestablishing a capitalist state in the name of 
building socialism. After the October plenum, leaders of both sides reaffirmed the statement of 
the CC regarding the two deviations in the party; but the Moscow leadership stressed the dangers 
of ignoring the middle peasantry and the smychka, while the Leningraders increasingly 
emphasized the kulak threat.16 
Meanwhile, Zinoviev and Kamenev attempted to extend the economic debate to the area 
of industrial policy. Between 1923 and 1925 the party leadership had vacillated repeatedly over 
205 
 the question of industrialization. However, in early 1925 the leaders finally agreed that the time 
had come to begin replacing old and worn-out machinery and constructing new, modern 
factories. Thus, the April plenum of the Central Committee voted substantial increases in 
allocations and credit to industry, especially heavy industry. Optimism regarding industrial 
expansion reached its high point in the Gosplan control figures issued in August that projected a 
thirty-three percent increase in industrial production for 1925-1926. At that point many within 
the party leadership began to balk at such an ambitious proposal. In the fall of 1925 Zinoviev and 
Kamenev stepped forward to support a vigorous policy of industrialization, arguing that no 
further growth of industry was possible without new machinery and new factories.17  
Despite this sudden shift on the part of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the debate between the 
minority and the majority did not assume the form of a clear-cut struggle between supporters and 
opponents of industry. One of the foremost leaders of the New Opposition, the Finance 
Commissar Sokol’nikov, continued to resist “excessive enthusiasm” for industrialization out of 
fear that it could lead to a return to uncontrolled inflation. Nor were the majority leaders any 
more united on this question. While Bukharin insisted that socialism—and implicitly, industry—
could only be constructed at a “snail’s pace,” Stalin proclaimed the need to transform the Soviet 
Union “from an agrarian into an industrial country” and “from one that imports equipment into 
one that manufactures this equipment.”18 
The simmering tensions between the party organizations of Leningrad and Moscow 
exploded in December at the provincial party conferences that preceded the Fourteenth Party 
Congress. In Moscow a number of the speakers made particularly insulting remarks about the 
Leningrad leadership, and the conference adopted a resolution that implicitly criticized its sister 
organization. Outraged by these attacks, the Leningraders removed all supporters of the 
leadership majority from their delegation to the party congress and voted unanimously to send a 
letter of protest to the Moscow conference. The Moscow provincial party committee responded 
with an even more sharply worded denunciation of Zinoviev and Kamenev. On the eve of the 
party congress, in an attempt to avert an open rupture between the two organizations, the 
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 leadership majority offered a truce in exchange for major concessions by Leningrad. The 
proposal was rejected by Zinoviev, who described the terms as “a demand for our capitulation 
without any guarantees for the future.”19 
At the Fourteenth Party Congress in December, the leaders of the Leningrad Opposition 
repeated their objections to the majority’s agricultural policies and theoretical positions. 
Furthermore, they sharply denounced the majority leadership for its violations of party 
democracy. Zinoviev complained of the persecution of Leningrad by Moscow and urged the 
Central Committee to offer all the previously defeated minority groupings the opportunity to 
participate in party work. Kamenev also upheld the right of minorities to express their views, but 
his most noteworthy contribution to the discussion was his denunciation of Stalin’s growing 
powers: 
 
We are against creating the theory of a “leader”; we are 
against making a leader. We are against having the secretariat 
combine in practice both politics and organization and place itself 
above the political organ [i.e., the Politburo]. . . . We cannot regard 
it as normal, and we think it harmful to the party, to prolong a 
situation in which the secretariat combines politics and 
organization, and in fact decides policy in advance. . . . I have 
reached the conviction that comrade Stalin cannot perform the 
function of uniting the Bolshevik general staff.20 
In his report to the congress, Stalin reasserted the need to struggle against both the kulak 
deviation and the underestimation of the importance of the alliance with the middle peasant. 
However, since the party was already better prepared to deal with the kulak threat, he urged that 
it “concentrate its fire on the struggle with the second deviation.” Stalin charged that anyone who 
did not accept the doctrine of socialism in one country was a “liquidator who does not believe in 
socialist construction.” Such individuals should “make way for those who have retained their 
courage and staunchness.”21 Other majority speakers depicted the Opposition’s attacks upon 
Stalin as motivated by personal jealousy. In reply to Zinoviev’s complaints of persecution, they 
reminded him of his own campaign against Trotsky. As Mikoian put it, “When Zinoviev is in the 
majority, he is for iron discipline . . . when he is in the minority . . . he is against it.”22 
207 
 Ultimately, the Leningrad Opposition was overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 559 for the 
majority resolution and 65 against.23  
In the following weeks the majority leadership launched a struggle to win control of the 
Leningrad organization. A team of Central Committee members headed by Molotov toured the 
factories of Leningrad to explain the decisions of the party congress. This campaign culminated 
in a special provincial party conference that endorsed the decisions of the party congress and 
condemned the former chiefs of Leningrad. In the same period the leadership majority began to 
remove minority leaders from positions of power. Kamenev was forced to relinquish his 
presidency of the Council of Labor and Defense, chairmanship of the Moscow Soviet, and 
deputy chairmanship of Sovnarkom, and was demoted from full to candidate member of the 
Politburo. Temporarily, he was assigned the post of Commissar for Trade. Sokol’nikov was 
transferred from the position of Finance Commissar to that of deputy chairman of Gosplan, and 
was stripped of his candidate status on the Politburo. Zinoviev forfeited his chairmanship of the 
Leningrad Soviet, but for the time being remained a full member of the Politburo and, officially, 
the head of the Comintern.24 
Throughout the contest between the leadership majority and the New Opposition, Trotsky 
remained silent. As Isaac Deutscher has suggested, part of the reason for this may have been that 
Trotsky, wrapped up in his scientific and literary work, was largely oblivious to the tensions 
within the party leadership.25 Beyond that, to the extent that Trotsky was aware of the developing 
conflict he was inclined to view it as irrelevant to his struggle against bureaucratism. Up to this 
point he had regarded Zinoviev and Kamenev as the most consistent supporters of the party’s 
right wing and the most authoritarian and anti-democratic of the party leaders. Developments in 
the early phases of the struggle between Leningrad and Moscow had done little to change this 
view. Until late 1925 Trotsky seems to have believed that the New Opposition’s concerns 
regarding differentiation in the countryside were exaggerated.26 More importantly, in the early 
phases of the debate there was no clear difference between the New Opposition and the majority 
of the party leadership on the economic question that Trotsky still saw as primary: the need for 
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 planned, accelerated industrialization. Neither Zinoviev nor Kamenev addressed this issue until 
late in the year; and the adherence of Sokol’nikov to the New Opposition tended to confirm 
Trotsky’s suspicions about the conservatism of the Opposition. Furthermore, there was little 
indication that Zinoviev was any more prepared to institute a democratic regime in the Leningrad 
party organization than Stalin was in the central party apparatus.  
By late 1925 Trotsky began to see the struggle in a new light. Just before the Fourteenth 
Party Congress Trotsky described Kamenev’s new position on industrialization as “a step 
forward.”27 At the same time, the difficulties in grain procurement seem to have convinced 
Trotsky that the kulak threat described by the New Opposition was a real one.28 In a series of 
memoranda written during December, Trotsky attempted to clarify for himself the meaning of 
the dispute. Behind all the demagogy of the New Opposition, Trotsky now detected the 
“bureaucratically distorted expression of the political anxiety of the proletariat over the course of 
our economic development as a whole and over the fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”29 
During the party congress Trotsky discerned an “element of truth” in the majority’s accusation 
that the Leningrad Opposition represented a continuation of the Opposition of 1923-24.30  
Still, Trotsky was unwilling to come to the aid of the New Opposition, for he felt that the 
issues were not yet clearly defined. He noted that throughout 1925 all the important economic 
decisions of the Central Committee had been adopted without apparent dissent. To the extent that 
differences had been expressed in public, the debate had been so completely controlled by 
central party leaders that its real social significance had been obscured. For Trotsky, this 
explained how the party organizations of the two most important proletarian centers had come to 
adopt unanimous resolutions attacking each other. This confusion also explained how a 
conservative like Sokol’nikov had emerged as one of the leaders of the New Opposition. 
Furthermore, Trotsky was convinced that the isolation of the struggle from the rank and file had 
imparted an “extremely schematic, doctrinaire, and even scholastic character” to the debate. 
Such was the case in the dispute over “state capitalism” in which, according to Trotsky, the more 
correct position had been taken by Bukharin.31  
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 However, Trotsky’s most important criticism of the New Opposition was that it still did 
not recognize the central importance of industrialization and planning. Although Trotsky felt that 
the minority’s emphasis on industrialization represented a step forward, he criticized the New 
Opposition for continuing to focus on the issue of peasant differentiation without explaining that 
the only solution to this problem was through an expansion in industry. By this, Trotsky 
apparently meant that only industrialization could provide the tools necessary for increasing the 
productivity of the poor and middle peasants and for the gradual transition to “socialist” 
collective farming. Trotsky insisted that the entire party leadership, including Zinoviev and 
Kamenev, had been guilty of underestimating the role of industry “as an element that does not 
passively adapt itself to the conditions of the market, but dynamically shapes and expands the 
market.” Consequently, the party leadership repeatedly had set its long-term projections for 
industrialization too low, and then had revised these upwards only under the pressure of demand. 
Meanwhile, the difficulties in grain collection had arisen because the peasants were disinclined 
to market their harvest when industrial goods were so scarce. In turn, the grain shortages had 
resulted in further reductions in the import of industrial machinery. What was clearly needed—
and what the New Opposition still refused to demand—was an entirely different approach: “State 
industry must become the backbone of economic planning, based on the firm and effective 
coordination of the constituent units of the state-owned and socially owned sectors of the 
economy.”32 
Trotsky anticipated that the continued development of the discussion could lead to a 
broader regrouping of forces within the party and to the further clarification of the issues. For 
this reason, he insisted that the democratization of the internal life of the party organizations of 
both Leningrad and Moscow was a necessary precondition for a successful struggle against the 
“peasant deviation.” Also, he expressed the hope that the removal of the top Leningrad leaders 
who had been responsible for some of the worst abuses of party democracy would contribute to 
this process.33  
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 However, Trotsky did not just passively await the transformation of the internal party 
regime. At the Central Committee session held immediately after the party congress, he, along 
with Piatakov and Rakovskii, objected to the Politburo’s proposal to appoint a majority supporter 
as editor of the Leningrad party newspaper, arguing against the nomination of local editors by 
central party bodies. Instead, they suggested that the central party leadership hold discussions 
with the Leningrad provincial committee to determine how best to implement the resolution of 
the congress that had called for “immediate measures to alter and improve the editorial board of 
Leningradskaia Pravda.”34 Additionally, in January Trotsky appealed to Bukharin for a joint 
effort “to make a transition from the present party regime to a more healthy one” by opening up 
the party to free discussion, and by reinstituting “truly collective work in the Politburo and the 
Central Committee.”35  
Despite Trotsky’s hopes and expectations, no major regrouping of forces within the party 
occurred during the months following the Fourteenth Party Congress. The possibility of a bloc 
with the Zinovievists was discussed among the members of the 1923 Opposition. However, 
many opposed such an alliance, recalling the persecution they had suffered under Zinoviev and 
doubting his will to fight. Some of these, such as Karl Radek and Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, 
even argued for an alliance with Stalin.36 Others wanted nothing to do with either side. For 
example, Sergei Mrachkovskii advised, “Neither with Stalin nor with Zinoviev. Stalin will 
deceive and Zinoviev will run away.”37  
Nevertheless, the actions of the party majority continued to push Trotsky toward 
Zinoviev and Kamenev. Perhaps out of fear that the 1923 and 1925 oppositions would join 
forces, leaders of the majority resorted to new measures to isolate Trotsky. Under various 
pretexts Uglanov banned Trotsky from addressing proletarian party cells in Moscow. At the 
same time, rumors were circulated that Trotsky preferred speaking to capitalists rather than 
workers. Other rumors alleged that all the disagreements within the Politburo had been stirred up 
by the Jews—Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Again, Trotsky unsuccessfully approached 
Bukharin to participate in an investigation of these matters.38 
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 It was the debate over economic policy at the April plenum of the Central Committee that 
finally united Trotsky with Zinoviev and Kamenev. At that plenum Trotsky presented a series of 
amendments to Rykov’s draft resolution on the economy. Basing his proposals upon the 
decisions of the Fourteenth Party Congress that vaguely had endorsed industrialization, Trotsky 
again asserted that a more rapid tempo of industrial construction was essential in order to 
maintain the smychka and to increase agricultural productivity. Trotsky urged that the Central 
Committee instruct the Politburo to draw up a concrete plan for industrialization for the next five 
to eight years. During the coming year, capital construction should expand by at least twenty 
percent over that of the previous year. The resources for industrialization were to come from 
various sources, including a higher tax on the upper strata of the villages. While Kamenev 
rejected Trotsky’s criticisms of the economic policies of previous years, he endorsed Trotsky’s 
demand for higher taxation of the kulaks, and presented his own amendments to combat 
differentiation in the countryside. Although Trotsky also criticized Kamenev’s proposed 
amendments, he ended up voting for them after his own were rejected. The convergence between 
Trotsky and Kamenev was so apparent that at one point Stalin interjected, “What is this? A 
bloc?”39 
Just before or soon after the plenum, Trotsky met with Kamenev and Zinoviev to discuss 
the possibility of an alliance. In Trotsky’s first meeting with Kamenev since early 1923, 
Kamenev optimistically declared, “It is enough for you and Zinoviev to appear on the same 
platform, and the party will find its true Central Committee.” Trotsky laughed at this 
“bureaucratic optimism,” and reminded Kamenev of the “disintegrating effect on the party of the 
three years’ activity of the trio.” In further meetings Trotsky repeatedly cautioned Zinoviev and 
Kamenev about the need to “aim far ahead” and to “prepare for a long and serious struggle.”40 
To prepare himself physically for that struggle, Trotsky left for Berlin a few days after the CC 
plenum seeking a cure for his recurrent bouts of fever. 
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 5.2 THE STRUGGLE OF THE UNITED OPPOSITION 
Upon his return to Moscow near the end of May, Trotsky set to work with Zinoviev and 
Kamenev to unite the two oppositional factions. Members of both groups were hesitant. “How,” 
wondered Trotsky’s supporters, “could we sit at the same table with the bureaucrats who had 
hunted and slandered us—who had murdered the principles and ideas of the Party?”41 Initially, 
leaders of the 1923 Opposition even considered concealing from their new allies the names of 
some of their members out of fear that the Zinovievists would eventually reunite with Stalin.42 
Supporters of the Leningrad Opposition were equally uneasy that the projected fusion signified a 
capitulation to “Trotskyism.” Zinoviev and Lashevich were forced to explain to a group of 
bewildered Leningraders that the menace of “Trotskyism” had been invented entirely for the 
purposes of the power struggle.43 
While working to allay the misgivings of their supporters, the leaders of the two factions 
were also busy hammering out the platform around which the United Opposition would struggle. 
In the end they produced the most comprehensive program ever put together by a Bolshevik 
opposition group, challenging the orientation of the party leadership in a wide range of 
economic, political, and international policies. In each sphere, the program of the United 
Opposition represented a convergence of the views previously articulated by the two dissident 
factions.44 
 The United Opposition’s critique of official Soviet economic policy revolved around 
three issues: industrialization, the growth of an exploitative layer in the countryside and towns, 
and the condition of the Soviet proletariat. Perhaps the most important economic criticism 
leveled by the Opposition was that the rate of industrialization set by the leadership majority was 
far too slow. Trotsky had raised this issue repeatedly since the introduction of NEP, and 
Zinoviev and Kamenev had taken it up by the end of 1925. Now, with one voice the Opposition 
asserted that “state industry is lagging behind the economic development of the country as a 
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 whole.”45 As Trotsky previously had emphasized, this was the source of the chronic “goods 
famine,” which discouraged peasants from selling grain to the state. Without grain to export, the 
state was unable to purchase industrial equipment abroad.46 Furthermore, the United Opposition 
declared that the persistence of the goods famine ultimately threatened to undermine the smychka 
between the Soviet proletariat and peasantry.47 
A second, and closely related, economic criticism was that official economic policy was 
contributing to the growth in size and power of an exploitative layer of kulaks and NEPmen, and 
to the further impoverishment of the poor peasant. This concern had been expressed forcefully 
by the Leningrad Opposition in 1925, but it was one that Trotsky now fully shared. In part, the 
Opposition attributed these developments to the low level of Soviet industry. Often, poor 
peasants who needed tools or other industrial goods were forced to purchase them from NEPmen 
at highly inflated prices. To pay for these goods, poor peasants had to borrow from kulaks at 
usurious rates, or to lease their own plots or sell their labor to kulaks.48 According to the 
Opposition, the growing problem of social differentiation was reinforced by Soviet tax, credit, 
and price policies. The Opposition complained that the single agricultural tax and the increasing 
use of indirect taxes fell hardest upon the poor peasant, and that state credit to agriculture, 
originally intended to assist the poor peasant, more often went to the better-off strata of the 
villages. Meanwhile, the maintenance of high retail prices for industrial goods, combined with 
the reduction of wholesale prices, had enriched the private trader at the expense of the consumer 
and state industry.49  
The Opposition offered a balance sheet of these agricultural policies in its Platform, 
written in the summer of 1927. There, the Opposition noted that over the previous four years the 
number of peasants who tilled little or no land had decreased, largely through economic ruin, by 
between thirty-five and forty-five percent, while those who tilled ten desiatins (twenty-eight 
acres) or more had increased by 150 to 200 percent. According to the Opposition’s calculations, 
roughly ten percent of the peasantry now could be categorized as kulaks. Furthermore, even 
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 official sources had estimated that as much as fifty-eight percent of surplus grain was held by the 
top six percent of the peasant households. 50 
A third set of economic issues addressed by the Opposition was the steady deterioration 
in the level of employment, standard of living, and working conditions of the proletariat. Again, 
the Opposition saw these problems as partially derivative of the slow tempo of industrial 
development. For the worker, slow industrialization translated into mounting unemployment—
approximately two million and increasing in the summer of 1927, a decline in real wages due to 
rising industrial prices, and a growing housing shortage. By the summer of 1927 the problem of 
unemployment had been compounded by the laying off of workers as part of an effort to improve 
industrial efficiency. Meanwhile, working conditions had deteriorated as greater pressures were 
applied to increase labor productivity. The Opposition complained that all of these developments 
fell hardest on the woman worker and the young worker.51 
Against the economic policies of the party leadership, the Opposition demanded a more 
rapid tempo of industrialization, economic restrictions on the kulak, and greater assistance for 
the worker and the poor and middle peasant. The Platform of the United Opposition proposed net 
budget appropriations to industry of between 500 and 1,000 million rubles per year for the 
following five years, instead of the 90 to 200 million projected at the time by Gosplan. 
Regarding agriculture, the Opposition called upon the party leadership to divert the flow of credit 
from the kulaks to the poor and middle peasants, and to free the poorest forty to fifty percent of 
all peasant households entirely from the burden of taxation. At the same time, the Opposition 
suggested that the expansion of industry could pave the way for the gradual introduction of 
collective farming. On behalf of the proletariat, the Opposition demanded an increase in wages, 
beginning with the lowest paid workers, to a level at least commensurate with the rising level of 
labor productivity. Beyond that, the United Opposition appealed for an increase in 
unemployment benefits and an expansion in the construction of housing.52  
The Opposition envisioned that the resources for this program could be obtained from a 
variety of sources. Most importantly, they argued that the taxes of the kulak and NEPman should 
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 be raised by 150 or 200 million rubles. Furthermore, they demanded the imposition of a forced 
loan of no less than 150 million puds (2,700,000 tons) of grain from the most prosperous ten 
percent of the peasantry. A large part of the grain thus acquired was to be exported to the West to 
finance the import of industrial machinery. Although the Opposition endorsed the reduction in 
retail prices of industrial goods initiated by the majority on behalf of the consumer, it demanded 
a simultaneous narrowing of the gap between wholesale and retail prices in order to maintain a 
greater share of the mark-up in the hands of state industry. The reduction in retail prices was to 
be achieved mainly by an increase in the volume of production and by cutting the costs of 
production and overhead.53 
While denouncing the orientation of official Soviet economic policy, the United 
Opposition also launched an attack upon the party leadership’s international policies. The 
Opposition charged that the approach of the leadership in international affairs increasingly 
paralleled its domestic policies. Just as the majority leaders based their internal economic 
policies upon the kulak and the NEPman to the detriment of the proletariat and poor peasantry, 
externally, they had begun to rely upon alliances with petty-bourgeois elements at the expense of 
the international revolution. In the view of the Opposition, the clearest example of this in 1926 
involved the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee.54 
The Anglo-Russian Committee, composed of leading representatives of the trade-union 
federations of Britain and the Soviet Union, was established in the spring of 1925. Its purpose, as 
outlined in a joint declaration of trade-union delegations of the two countries, was to promote 
“the international unity of the workers of all countries” in order to establish “an impregnable 
force against capitalist oppression” and “an unbreakable pledge of peace and economic 
security.”55 From the point of view of the Soviet leadership, the value of the committee was 
twofold: it could provide a means by which to influence the entire British labor movement in a 
revolutionary direction; and it would serve as a bulwark against British interventionist attempts 
against the Soviet Union.56 The test of the efficacy of the committee regarding the first of these 
goals was not long in coming. On May 3, 1926, the General Council of the British Trades Union 
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 Congress (TUC) declared a general strike in solidarity with the striking British coal miners. This 
action was greeted with enthusiasm in the Soviet Union where hundreds of thousands of workers 
participated in sympathy demonstrations and contributed millions of rubles to support the 
strikers. However, Soviet enthusiasm quickly gave way to dismay when the General Council 
rejected the Soviet offer of financial support. The sense of betrayal was compounded when, on 
May 12, the General Council called off the general strike.57 
Soon afterwards, the Anglo-Russian Committee became an issue in the unfolding 
struggle within the Soviet Union. From the beginning Trotsky had been critical of the party 
leadership’s justifications for the alliance.58 Now, six days after the TUC leadership’s betrayal of 
the general strike, Trotsky called upon the party leadership to repudiate the Anglo-Russian 
Committee.59 Probably because he had been involved in setting up the committee, Zinoviev 
initially hesitated over a complete rupture with that organization.60 Nevertheless, by July 
Zinoviev had been won over to Trotsky’s position. 
The leaders of the Opposition asserted that the General Council had betrayed the general 
strike and were preparing for the final betrayal of the miners. In the meantime, the Opposition 
claimed, the General Council continued to use its association with the Bolsheviks through the 
Anglo-Russian Committee to cover themselves from the criticisms of the British workers. The 
Opposition called upon the Politburo to convene a session of the committee immediately in order 
to use it as a forum for exposing the role of the General Council. Then, the Soviet delegation was 
to dissolve the ARC. The Opposition argued that such a course would contribute to the 
radicalization of the British workers and facilitate their break with reformism. Continuing the 
alliance, leaders of the Opposition claimed, would only strengthen the position of the British 
trade-union bureaucrats. Against the majority’s argument that the committee still provided a 
shield against war, the Opposition predicted that the betrayers of the British proletariat would 
“betray the British proletariat even more outrageously—and with them the Soviet Union and the 
cause of peace—the moment a war threatens.” Finally, the Opposition warned that if the Soviets 
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 did not dissolve the Anglo-Russian Committee, the British would do so anyway at a point when 
the break would be most favorable to them.61 
The third general preoccupation of the United Opposition involved the decline of 
democracy in the functioning of Soviet political institutions. Previously, both the 1923 and 1925 
Oppositions had warned of the erosion of workers’ democracy in the party. Now, in response to 
the growing authoritarianism of the party leadership, the increasing concentration of power at the 
party summit, and the development of similar tendencies in other important Soviet political 
institutions, the United Opposition raised this issue more forcefully than ever before.  
In the spring of 1926, Trotsky noted that more than five years had passed since the Tenth 
Party Congress had proclaimed a “course toward party democracy,” which was to include “the 
constant control on the part of the public opinion of the party over the work of its leading 
bodies.” Furthermore, over two and a half years had elapsed since the Central Committee’s New 
Course resolution had defined workers’ democracy as “the liberty of frank discussion of the most 
important questions of party life by all members, and the freedom to have organized discussions 
on these questions, and the election of all leading party functionaries and commissions from the 
bottom up.” The intervening period had been years of peace, economic growth, working class 
revival, and party proletarianization—conditions that should have been favorable for the 
expansion of party democracy. Yet, Trotsky observed, “never before has the party regime been 
so permeated by the practice of appointment from above, habits of command, suspicion, and 
administrative pressure, i.e., by an all-embracing principle of apparatus rule.”62 Trotsky and the 
other leaders of the Opposition charged that, instead of encouraging the free exchange of views 
essential to workers’ democracy, the majority had stifled all critical discussion. The result was 
that “those who are dissatisfied, have doubts, or are in disagreement are afraid to raise their 
voices at party meetings.”63  
In the view of the Opposition, the sentiments and aspirations of the proletarian section of 
the party had found a voice in its own program. Yet, throughout 1926-27 the Opposition 
repeatedly complained that its views were being withheld from the party rank and file by the 
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 refusal of the majority to publish its documents and speeches.64 When Oppositionists tried to 
address party gatherings, their voices were drowned out by the whistling and shouting, and their 
meetings were broken up violently by “fascist gangs” organized by the party leadership. 
Meanwhile, the party ranks were subjected to a completely one-sided and slanderous discussion 
of the issues.65 Furthermore, prominent Oppositionists were removed from leading party bodies, 
and rank and file Oppositionists were threatened with the prospect of exile, expulsion from the 
party, or loss of employment.66  
Simultaneously, the Opposition charged that the power of the central party institutions 
had continued to grow at the expense of the “constant control . . . of the party over the work of its 
leading bodies.” In the summer of 1927 the Opposition asserted that “the real power of one 
member of the party at the top (above all, the secretary) are many times greater than the real 
rights of a hundred members at the bottom.”67 Most important in this regard was the continued 
practice of appointing of party secretaries.68 According to the Opposition, a similar process was 
observable in the soviets and trade-union organizations.69 
Connected with these developments was the growth of majority factionalism first 
condemned by the 1923 Opposition. At the time of the formation of the United Opposition, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev had revealed that from 1923-1925 the party had been controlled by a 
secret factional “Septemvirate” consisting of the chairman of the Central Control Commission 
and all of the members of the Politburo but Trotsky. Now the Opposition asserted that “a similar 
factional grouping at the top has no doubt existed since the Fourteenth Congress as well.”70 Its 
purpose was “to deny the party the chance to use the normal means, provided by the party rules, 
to make changes in the personnel and policies of the party apparatus.”71 Echoing the Leningrad 
Opposition, Trotsky now warned that the growing “bureaucratic [biuokraticheskii]” practices of 
appointment, repression, centralization, and majority factionalism were leading “fatally toward 
one-man rule” in the party.72  
The United Opposition called for a return of the soviets, trade unions, and the party to the 
principle of “workers’ democracy” as defined by the Tenth Party Congress and the New Course 
219 
 resolution. As a first step in this direction, the Opposition declared, it was necessary for the party 
leadership to put an end to the repression of oppositionists and to ensure the free discussion of all 
contested questions, both in the party press and at party meetings. The Opposition demanded the 
opening of a discussion at least three months prior to the next party congress in which it would 
have the opportunity to present its program. Against the growing separation of leading bodies of 
the party from the working class, the Opposition called for the election of all officials, the further 
proletarianization of the party and its apparatus, and the assignment of a large number of the 
members of the party apparatus to work in industry and among the rank and file. The budget and 
the size of the party apparatus were to be cut, and limits were to be imposed on the length of time 
an individual could hold a party post. Furthermore, the Opposition demanded the restoration of 
collective leadership and the implementation of Lenin’s recommendation to remove Stalin from 
the post of General Secretary.73 
In the early summer of 1926 the Opposition launched a campaign to win party members 
to its program. Although the United Opposition was quickly joined by the remnants of the 
Workers’ Opposition and the Democratic Centralists, it still remained, in the words of the 
Stalinist historian Popov, a “staff without an army.”74 To rectify this situation, the Opposition 
sent organizers throughout the country to scour the party cells for prospective adherents. In every 
city clandestine meetings were held in workers’ apartments or on the outskirts of town. One such 
gathering soon became an issue in the party struggle when it was reported to the party leadership. 
That meeting, held in a wooded area outside of Moscow, was presided over by an official of the 
Comintern named Belenkii, and was addressed by Lashevich, the Deputy Commissar for War.75  
Observing the activities of the United Opposition with apprehension, the party majority 
leadership decided to strike before the July plenum of the Central Committee. In early June a 
commission of the CCC met to investigate the Lashevich affair. It concluded with a stern 
condemnation of Lashevich, Belenkii, and five other participants in the “illegal conspiratorial 
meeting” and recommended the removal of Lashevich from his post as deputy Commissar for 
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 War and from the Central Committee. Finally, the CCC warned both Lashevich and Belenkii that 
further factional activities would result in their expulsion from the party.76  
The Opposition counterattacked at the July plenum. Early in the proceedings the leaders 
of the Opposition read statements in which Zinoviev and Kamenev admitted that the 1923 
Opposition had been correct in warning of the dangers of party bureaucratism, and Trotsky 
asserted that he had made a “gross mistake” in accusing Zinoviev and Kamenev of opportunism. 
Then the Opposition presented a series of documents that included its indictment of Soviet 
economic policy, Comintern policy in Britain, and the party’s internal regime.77  
The majority refused to give ground on any of the issues raised by the Opposition. It 
rejected the Opposition’s demand for a break with the Anglo-Russian Committee, arguing that 
the ARC could still contribute to the radicalization of the British working class and the 
movement against intervention, and charging that the Opposition had abandoned Lenin’s policy 
of working in the most reactionary trade unions.78 Equally, the majority leadership repudiated the 
Opposition’s economic proposals, asserting that the policy of industrialization adopted by the 
Fourteenth Party Congress already was being implemented, and that in the coming year industry 
would be in a better position to supply the peasantry with goods. Against the Opposition’s 
demand for higher taxation of the kulak, the majority rejected a course that, it claimed, would 
undermine the peasant’s incentive to produce. The majority also opposed the demand for wage 
increases, insisting that these, if not tied to rising productivity, would be inflationary and 
ultimately would hurt the standard of living of the workers. Finally, it dismissed as nonsensical 
the accusation that the majority leadership was guilty of factionalism. The majority, it asserted, 
could not have any factional views distinct from those of the collective party since it was the 
majority that determined the political line of the party.79 On the contrary, it was the Opposition 
that had violated party discipline. For his conspiratorial activities, Lashevich was expelled from 
the Central Committee and stripped of his post in the War Commissariat. All who had 
participated in the meeting with Lashevich were banned from party office for two years. Most 
importantly, Zinoviev, who had been implicated indirectly was removed from the Politburo.80 
221 
 Undaunted, the minority continued its offensive, now taking its case openly to the party 
rank and file. Increasingly, the Opposition circulated its theses among the party membership, and 
in late September and early October, its leaders attended and addressed a series of factory cell 
meetings. There, they were met by organized supporters of the majority who attempted to shout 
them down. On October 2 the Moscow party committee branded the appearance of Opposition 
leaders the previous day at the Aviapribor factory as “a crime against the party” and an attempt 
“to fasten a discussion on the party.” The Politburo, in turn, condemned the Opposition for 
violating party discipline, and referred the matter to the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission for consideration.81  
For the most part, the party membership observed the struggle between the majority and 
the minority in silence. Aside from the effects of the majority’s campaign of intimidation, the 
failure of the Opposition to arouse the party ranks in the fall of 1926 may have been partly due to 
the economic situation. The harvest of that year was especially good; and contrary to the 
predictions of the Opposition, the grain collection was proceeding well. Also, in August and 
September the party leadership, reversing its earlier position, suddenly promised a wage increase 
for industrial workers, thereby undercutting a central demand of the Opposition.82  
Faced with defeat and the prospect of severe reprisals, the United Opposition petitioned 
the leadership for a truce. Stalin agreed, but dictated severe terms: the Opposition was to accept 
the decisions of the party organs, admit that its factional activities had been harmful to the party, 
and disavow its domestic supporters who advocated a new party and its foreign sympathizers 
who had been expelled from their respective sections of the Comintern.83 The Opposition 
reluctantly complied with Stalin’s conditions and promised henceforth to defend its views “only 
in the forms established by the statutes and decisions of the congresses and the CC.”84 
However, soon after the conclusion of the truce, Stalin moved to crush the Opposition. 
Within a week after the minority’s statement of surrender, the Politburo commissioned Stalin to 
prepare theses on the Opposition for the upcoming party conference. Trotsky, embittered by the 
treachery of the majority leaders, protested this violation of the truce and denounced Stalin as 
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 “the grave-digger of the revolution.” Subsequently, the Central Committee removed Zinoviev 
from the Executive Committee of the Comintern and revoked Trotsky’s membership and 
Kamenev’s candidate membership on the Politburo.85 
Although the party leadership clearly had broken the truce, the leaders of the Opposition 
realized that any immediate renewal of the struggle would result in their expulsion from the 
party. Consequently, at the Fifteenth Party Conference in late October and early November, they 
attempted to fulfill the conditions of their surrender by remaining silent during the discussion of 
the economic situation. Only after Stalin presented his report on the Opposition did Kamenev, 
Zinoviev, and Trotsky rise to defend themselves.  
In his report Stalin denounced the Opposition as a “Social-Democratic deviation within 
the party,” and explained that its “principal error” was its refusal to admit the possibility of 
constructing socialism in one country. Stalin admitted that that the victory of socialism in the 
Soviet Union could not be considered “final” until the danger of imperialist intervention had 
been eliminated by revolutions “in at least several other countries.” Nevertheless, he insisted 
that, even if the world revolution did not materialize, “the proletarian dictatorship in the 
U.S.S.R., by its own efforts” was “capable of overcoming the bourgeoisie of the U.S.S.R.,” and 
of building a “complete socialist society.” The failure of the Opposition to recognize this 
elementary truth, Stalin asserted, explained both its pessimistic forecasts about the political 
degeneration of the Soviet state and its economic and international adventurism.86  
Trotsky responded to these arguments at the party conference and, one month later, at the 
plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI).87 In the process, he 
developed a comprehensive critique of the theory of socialism in one country. Trotsky asserted 
that there was no doubt on the part of the Opposition that the Soviet Union was constructing 
socialism. Otherwise, what would be the point of the alleged desire of the Opposition to “rob” 
the peasantry? Rather, the issue was whether or not this process could be completed in one 
country. To insist that it could, one had to assume both that the world revolution would not 
materialize for at least thirty to forty years, and that the Soviet Union would not succumb to 
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 external pressures in the meantime. The problem, Trotsky argued, was that both premises were 
groundless. Regarding the international revolution, the most likely prospect was that European 
capitalism would continue to decay and decline, presenting the proletariat in a number of 
countries with the possibility of seizing power. The rejection of this view by the leaders of the 
majority indicated that it was they, and not the Opposition, who were guilty of pessimism. On 
the other hand, Trotsky predicted that if capitalism somehow managed to avert revolution 
through rising prosperity, then “we shall surely be strangled or crushed,” if not through military 
intervention, then through competition with capitalism on the world market.88  
Leaving aside the question of world revolution, Trotsky also condemned Stalin’s theory 
for its implications regarding economic policy. Trotsky argued that contemporary history 
demonstrated the growth of international economic interdependence. Yet, in the face of this 
tendency the proponents of socialism in one country glorified the ideal of national self-reliance. 
Trotsky warned that “if we attempt to ignore the division of labor in world industry, and jump 
over our economic past that has made our industry what it is now, . . . if, according to the famous 
‘socialist’ Monroe Doctrine which is now being preached to us, we are to make everything 
ourselves, this will unavoidably mean an extreme slowing down of the rate of our economic 
development.”89 This, in turn, would considerably reduce the ability of the Soviet Union to 
compete with world capitalism.90  
In the end the conference unanimously endorsed Stalin’s theses and threatened further 
disciplinary action if the Opposition resumed its struggle. In early December the ECCI 
confirmed the decision of the party conference, asserting that the Opposition represented “a 
Right danger within the C.P.S.U., screened by Left phrases.”91 
The winter of 1926-1927 brought a lull in the party struggle. Following the party 
conference, the Opposition significantly curtailed its factional activities. Internally, it found itself 
increasingly divided over how to proceed and demoralized over its defeat. Trotsky utilized this 
“breathing-space” to delve into a number of theoretical questions.92 However, in the spring of 
1927 the struggle resumed with even greater intensity over developments taking place in China.93 
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 Since 1924 the entire Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had been part of Sun Yat-sen’s 
nationalist organization, the Guomindang (GMD). The CCP had entered the GMD reluctantly, 
and only under pressure from the Comintern leadership in Moscow. Initially, the entire Central 
Committee of the CCP had opposed the merger on the grounds that the Guomindang was a 
bourgeois political party, and that the fusion would obstruct the pursuit of an independent 
proletarian line by the Chinese Communists.94 During the following years, the growth of the 
revolutionary movement and of Communist influence, rightward shifts by the Guomindang, and 
the tightening of control over the CCP by the GMD leadership continued to strain the alliance. 
Repeatedly, Chen Duxiu, the founder and general secretary of the CCP, appealed to the 
Comintern for permission for the CCP to leave the Guomindang. Each time, his appeals were 
rejected. 
The Comintern leadership justified its position on entry into the Guomindang on the basis 
of its analysis of the immediate tasks of the Chinese revolution and the class character of the 
GMD. According to this view China was not yet ripe for proletarian power, but was undergoing 
a bourgeois-nationalist revolution to unite the country and free it from imperialist control. 
Furthermore, the Comintern leadership argued that the GMD was not, strictly speaking, a 
bourgeois party; rather, it was an organization that represented the interests of the broad masses 
of Chinese society, including the petty-bourgeois intellectuals, peasants, workers, and the 
revolutionary bourgeoisie. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the CCP to remain within, 
and to subject itself to the discipline of, the GMD for the time being. (Although at least Stalin 
seems to have anticipated that the CCP ultimately would seize power within the GMD.)95  
 By late 1926 and early 1927, China was in the midst of a revolutionary upheaval 
precipitated by Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition against the warlord regimes in central 
China and Manchuria. In the wake of Chiang’s Guomindang armies, peasants throughout central 
and northern China seized land from their landlords, rose in revolt against their local warlords, 
and entered the newly-formed peasant associations that were taking control of the villages. 
Meanwhile, workers engaged in acts of economic sabotage and political strikes against the 
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 warlords, seized concessions from the British, and organized mass trade unions in liberated cities 
and towns. The spectacular culmination of this rebellion was the successful insurrection in 
Shanghai in March 1927.   
Frightened, Chiang attempted to repress the upsurge, banning strikes and demonstrations, 
disarming workers, and closing down trade unions and peasant associations. When Chen Duxiu 
suggested again that the Communists leave the GMD, the ECCI emphatically rejected his 
proposal. In October 1926 the Soviet party leadership urged the CCP to restrain “peasant 
excesses” in order to avoid antagonizing the GMD generals. Then, following the Shanghai 
insurrection, when Chen requested permission from the Comintern to arm the workers of 
Shanghai in preparation for the imminent clash with Chiang, the CCP was instructed to bury its 
weapons and avoid clashes with Chiang’s army.  
Meanwhile, Trotsky was growing increasingly critical of Comintern policy in China. 
Years later, he asserted that he had opposed the entry of the CCP into the Guomindang as early 
as 1923—a claim that has never been confirmed by independent evidence.96 Nevertheless, at 
least by April 1926 Trotsky was demanding in the Politburo that the CCP be permitted to 
withdraw from the GMD.97 Until September 1927 he accepted the view that China was 
experiencing a bourgeois-democratic revolution. However, for Trotsky this did not imply that the 
Chinese working class would play only a subordinate role. He observed that, as the Chinese 
revolution unfolded, the bourgeoisie who controlled the GMD were shifting rapidly to the right. 
Only the proletariat, supported by the broad masses of the Chinese peasantry, would be able to 
lead the revolution to victory. To do so, however, the proletariat had to be free to organize its 
own independent Communist party. Such an independent party, Trotsky argued, would be able to 
form an alliance with the Guomindang, to the extent that the GMD pursued a revolutionary 
course.98 
At Trotsky’s insistence the United Opposition as a whole took up the China question in 
the last days of March 1927. When Zinoviev and his supporters, along with the Trotskyists 
Piatakov and Radek, rejected abandoning the Guomindang, Trotsky agreed to refrain from 
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 raising this demand in order to preserve the unity of the United Opposition.99 Nevertheless, the 
Opposition began to urge the party leadership to encourage the CCP to adopt a more independent 
line. In particular, Trotsky proposed that the CCP begin to form soviets of workers, peasants, and 
soldiers in order to block a fascist or Bonapartist coup by Chiang Kai-shek, to organize the 
insurgent workers and peasants, and to prepare for the seizure of power. Simultaneously, he 
denounced the subordination of the CCP to the bourgeois GMD as analogous to the line pursued 
by the Russian Mensheviks in 1917.100 
Trotsky’s fears of a coup were confirmed on April 12 when Chiang Kai-shek launched a 
reign of terror against workers and communists in Shanghai and a number of other cities. Soon 
afterwards, Stalin drafted theses proclaiming a new line for the CCP. Chiang Kai-shek’s coup, 
Stalin argued, had signified the “desertion of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution” and 
had marked the beginning of a new stage in the struggle. The Chinese communists were to 
remain within the Guomindang, but now they were to cooperate closely with its left wing in 
struggle against Chiang. In particular, they were to support the left GMD government in Wuhan, 
which was destined to become “the organ of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the peasantry.”101 
From the point of view of the Opposition, the new line of the party leadership was little 
better than the old. Trotsky noted that although the Central Committee theses vaguely advised 
the CCP to “preserve its independence” within the left Guomindang, they said nothing about the 
need for the Chinese communists to issue their own daily paper, and the need for “relentless 
criticism” of the left GMD. And although the theses called for the arming of the workers and 
peasants, they opposed the formation of soviets, which could coordinate the mass struggle. 
Furthermore, Trotsky argued that the theses were mistaken about the character of the left GMD 
government. He predicted that it would soon unite with Chiang Kai-shek against the workers and 
peasants, and would inflict “a new and perhaps even more serious defeat” upon the Chinese 
revolution.102 Again, Trotsky’s predictions were quickly confirmed. In May and June, troops of 
the Wuhan government carried out widespread massacres of peasants. On July 15 the left 
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 Guomindang expelled all communists from its ranks and began a campaign of arrests and 
executions of communists and trade unionists. Finally, in September the remnants of the Wuhan 
government reunited with Chiang Kai-shek. 
Embarrassed by the debacle in China, in the spring and summer of 1927 the majority 
leadership attempted to silence the Opposition. The Politburo rejected Trotsky’s request for a 
special closed session of the Central Committee to discuss the Chinese question, and the Soviet 
press refused to publish any statements by Oppositionists on the issue. At a mass public meeting 
on May 9, Zinoviev protested against this press boycott of the Opposition’s views. In response, 
the Central Committee denounced Zinoviev’s speech as a violation of the October truce, and 
referred the matter to the CCC. Unable to obtain a hearing within the party, Trotsky appealed to 
the Executive of the Comintern for a chance to present his position.103  
During the plenum of the ECCI in late May, the conservative British government broke 
off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of alleged evidence of Soviet 
espionage. In the Soviet Union this incident immediately gave rise to fears of imminent war with 
Britain. At the ECCI plenum Stalin utilized this concern against the Opposition, denouncing 
Trotsky’s “attacks on the Party and the Comintern” as an example of “something like a united 
front from [British foreign secretary] Chamberlain to Trotsky.” In the end, the plenum approved 
Stalin’s report on the situation in China and condemned the factional activities of the 
Opposition.104 
Meanwhile, the Opposition, aroused by the developments in China, was renewing its 
offensive on a broad range of issues. While the ECCI plenum was still in session, the Opposition 
presented the Politburo with a comprehensive statement of its views on the economic, political, 
and international situation, concluding with the demand for a broad discussion of all contested 
questions in preparation for the Fifteenth Party Congress.105 
The majority retaliated by subjecting the Opposition to a new wave of punitive transfers. 
Leading members of the United Opposition were sent abroad on diplomatic assignments or 
transferred to administrative positions in remote corners of the country. When one Opposition 
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 leader, I. T. Smilga, was assigned to a new post on the Manchurian border, a large number of 
Oppositionists gathered at the Iaroslavl railway station in Moscow to see him off. Both Trotsky 
and Zinoviev made brief, restrained remarks to this gathering. Immediately, the party leadership 
charged the Opposition with organizing an unlawful public demonstration. In subsequent weeks, 
rank and file Oppositionists who had been present at the Iaroslavl station were expelled from the 
party and Pravda ran an editorial accusing the Opposition of disloyalty to the Soviet state in the 
face of the imperialist threat. In late June the CCC met to consider the expulsion of Trotsky and 
Zinoviev from the Central Committee for Trotsky’s speech before the ECCI and for their 
organization of the “demonstration” at Iaroslavl station.106  
Addressing the CCC, Trotsky quickly dispensed with the formal accusations. The real 
significance of the proceedings, Trotsky argued, was to use the war scare “to hound the 
Opposition and to prepare for its physical annihilation.” Although the CCC again condemned the 
factional activities of the Opposition, it balked at expelling the Opposition’s leaders from the 
Central Committee, and referred the matter to the upcoming joint CC-CCC plenum.107 
Soon afterwards, Trotsky inadvertently provided the majority with further evidence of the 
Opposition’s disloyalty. In a July 11 letter to Ordzhonikidze, the Stalinist head of the CCC, 
Trotsky attempted to refute allegations that the Opposition would adopt a “defeatist” position in 
the event of war. Trotsky recalled that during the world war when Paris was threatened by 
German troops, Clemenceau had denounced the vacillation of French military policy. In so 
doing, he had been able to win power and rally the French to victory. In a war with Britain, 
Trotsky implied, the Opposition would behave likewise.108 The majority leadership immediately 
proclaimed that Trotsky had admitted that the Opposition favored only a “conditional defense” 
of the USSR and was prepared to carry out an insurrection in the midst of the imminent war.109 
The CC-CCC plenum that met in late July and early August concentrated on international 
issues, and again took up the question of Trotsky’s and Zinoviev’s expulsion from the Central 
Committee. During the discussion Trotsky warned the majority that the Stalinist line would make 
a Soviet victory in war difficult, if not impossible. He flatly denied the charges that he advocated 
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 defeatism or insurrection, but reaffirmed his position that it was the duty of oppositionists to 
attempt to correct a fundamentally false line, even in the midst of war. Nevertheless, the 
Opposition was able to avert the removal of its leaders from the CC by a conciliatory statement. 
The Opposition proclaimed its loyalty to the Soviet Union, rejected the view that the party 
leadership was reinstituting capitalism, criticized efforts by its German supporters to set up a 
new communist party, and rejected factionalism and the formation of a new party in the Soviet 
Union.110 However, the rift between the Opposition and the party majority was now too deep to 
be papered over, even temporarily. Soon after the plenum, both sides resumed the struggle. 
While the majority leadership continued to persecute oppositionists, the Opposition began to 
draft a platform in preparation for the Fifteenth Party Congress. 
5.3 TROTSKY AND THE OPPOSITION ON BUREAUCRATISM 
According to the classical Marxist analysis, the problem of bureaucracy was essentially 
one of political alienation—that is, the tendency for political institutions in class societies to 
separate themselves from, and to rule over, the masses of society. In normal periods this 
tendency was seen as closely interrelated with the degree of control exerted by the dominant, 
exploitative, economic class over the state. Thus, Marx and Engels believed that the more the 
state was subordinated to the control of an exploitative class, the more it became alienated from 
the masses of society; and conversely, the more the state separated itself from the control of the 
masses, the more it was subject to conquest by an exploitative class.  
In 1923 Trotsky first perceived the relevance of this analysis for understanding political 
and economic developments in the Soviet Union. During that year he began to define the 
problem of Soviet bureaucratism in terms of the growing power of the apparatuses of the party 
and state in relation to the party rank and file and the Soviet people, respectively. He argued that 
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 part of the source of state bureaucratism was the pressure exerted upon the Soviet state by alien 
class forces. Furthermore, he warned that the continued growth of political alienation in the state 
and party could strengthen bourgeois elements within the Soviet Union and, ultimately, could 
facilitate a restoration of capitalism. During the years 1923-1925, however, Trotsky did not 
develop these views beyond the level of a loosely connected set of insights and concerns.  
With the formation of the United Opposition in 1926, Trotsky returned to, and began to 
amplify upon, many of the themes he had developed during the New Course controversy. Events 
in the Soviet Union since 1923 had convinced Trotsky more than ever before that the classical 
Marxist analysis of bureaucracy provided the key to understanding the current Soviet situation. 
Utilizing this analysis, Trotsky began, for the first time, to construct a coherent theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy.  
5.3.1 The Conception of Bureaucracy 
Consistent with the classical Marxist analysis of bureaucracy, Trotsky’s conception of the 
problem during the years 1926-1927 focused on two developments: the growing alienation of 
institutions of power from the masses, and the increasing subordination of those institutions to 
alien class interests. Throughout the years 1926-1927, Trotsky and the United Opposition 
denounced the “bureaucratism” inherent in the continuing centralization of decision making and 
in the growing manifestations of authoritarianism within the party, state, and other important 
Soviet institutions. Simultaneously, Trotsky and the United Opposition sharply condemned the 
developing links they perceived between Soviet political institutions and capitalist elements 
within Soviet society, and the responsiveness of Soviet institutions to those elements. More 
clearly than before, Trotsky and the Opposition argued that these class shifts within Soviet 
institutions were, in themselves, manifestations of bureaucratism.  
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 During the New Course controversy Trotsky had expressed his concern about the 
separation of the party apparatus from the control of the average rank and file party member. In 
particular, Trotsky had criticized the tendency of party officials to decide all questions, including 
the selection of lower-level officials, and the efforts of party leaders to repress the free discussion 
of important issues. In 1926-1927 Trotsky and the United Opposition asserted that centralization 
of decision making within the party had continued to rise, in violation of the principle of 
workers’ democracy. Thus, in the spring of 1926 Trotsky denounced the “unlimited domination 
of the party apparatus,” and the establishment of a “regime based on the absolute authority of the 
apparatus.” These anti-democratic tendencies, Trotsky asserted, constituted the “essence of 
bureaucracy [biurokratiia].”111 
However, in the view of Trotsky and the United Opposition, the process of bureaucratic 
centralization had gone beyond the concentration of all power in the hands of the apparatus. In 
October 1926 Trotsky spoke of the “concentration of the all-powerful party apparatus in the 
hands of an ever more restricted leadership core.” In particular, Trotsky had in mind the growing 
authority of the Stalin faction that he described as “a faction within the ruling faction.” 
Repeating the warnings of the Leningrad Opposition, Trotsky observed that this development 
was leading inexorably toward the creation of “a ruinous regime of one-man rule in the party.”112  
 According to the United Opposition, the bureaucratic authoritarianism of the party 
leadership was also much worse than it had been in 1923. At the time of the New Course 
controversy, Trotsky and the Opposition were mainly concerned about the stifling of free 
discussion in the party cells. While the United Opposition complained that this practice had 
become even more widespread by 1926-1927, it also asserted that the party leadership now was 
actively engaged in the repression of party dissidents. As we have seen, the methods employed 
by the majority and denounced by the Opposition ranged from the suppression of Opposition 
documents to the use of anti-Semitic innuendo, the breaking up of meetings by “fascist” gangs,” 
and the firing of Oppositionists from their jobs. As the party struggle approached its climax in 
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 the summer of 1927, Trotsky predicted that this course could only culminate in the attempt by 
Stalin to achieve the “physical extermination” of the Opposition.113 
At the same time, the United Opposition described the growth of similar bureaucratic 
centralist and authoritarian norms in state institutions. In the period 1923-1925, Trotsky had 
devoted considerable attention to the problem of state bureaucratism. In the Platform of the 
Opposition, submitted to the CC in September 1927, the Opposition described the bureaucratic 
regime in the soviets as comparable to that in the party: 
 
The soviets have had less and less to do with the settling of 
fundamental political, economic, and cultural questions. They have 
become mere appendages to the executive committees and 
presidiums. The work of administration has been entirely 
concentrated in the hands of the latter. . . . The elected leaders in 
important spheres of soviet administration are removed at the first 
conflict of the chairman of the soviet. They are removed still more 
quickly in cases of conflict with the secretary of the regional 
committee of the party. In consequence of this the elective 
principle is being reduced to nothing, and responsibility to the 
electors is losing all meaning.114  
Furthermore, as Trotsky had done in 1923, the United Opposition condemned the imposition of 
state “bureaucratism [biurokratizm], sustained by the spirit of great power chauvinism” upon the 
national republics of the Soviet Union.115  
Beyond the state and party Trotsky and the United Opposition also had begun to detect 
the pervasive symptoms of bureaucratism in all social institutions and “all . . . nonparty mass 
organizations.” Within the factory, “the . . . administrative bodies are striving more and more to 
establish their unlimited authority. The hiring and discharge of workers is actually in the hands 
of the administration alone.”116 In the unions “the established regime obstructs the development 
of activism by the workers and prevents them from setting about the construction of socialism to 
the fullest extent.”117 Even the Comintern, though not a “Soviet” organization, had been infected 
with the disease of Soviet bureaucratism. Thus, in January 1927 Trotsky wrote of the “hidden 
and disguised . . . bureaucratic apparatus regime in the Comintern itself” and the growth of 
“bureaucratism within the foreign Communist parties” under pressure from Moscow.118  
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 Although Trotsky and the United Opposition usually employed the term bureaucratism in 
reference to the growth of centralism and authoritarianism, this was not always the case. 
Following the traditional Marxist analysis of political alienation, during 1923-1925 Trotsky 
described bureaucratism as related to the growth of alien (i.e., non-proletarian) class influence 
within the state and party. Trotsky and the Opposition now expanded upon this analysis, at times 
explicitly defining bureaucratism in terms of this influence. This was suggested by Trotsky in a 
speech before the CCC in the summer of 1927 when he observed that bureaucratism “is not a 
question of the mere number of functionaries. It is a question of the regime, of the course, of the 
attitude of the rulers to the ruled.” He noted that ordinary working people were increasingly 
heard to complain about the treatment they received at the hands of party officials: These voices 
“signify not only that the number of bureaucrats [biurokraty] has increased, but also that the 
ruling circles are becoming more and more fused with the upper layers of the Soviet-Nep 
society; and that two floors are being created, two forms of life, two kinds of habits.”119 Even 
more clearly, the Platform characterized the problem as follows: 
 
The question of Soviet bureaucratism [biurokratizm] is not 
only a question of red tape [volokita] and swollen staffs. At bottom 
it is a question of the class role played by the bureaucracy, of its 
social ties and sympathies, of its power and privileged position, its 
relation to the NEPman and the unskilled worker, to the 
intellectual and the illiterate, to the wife of a Soviet grandee and 
the most ignorant peasant woman, etc., etc. Whose hand does the 
official grasp? That is the fundamental question which is daily 
being tested in life’s experience by millions of working people.120  
As these passages indicate, part of the problem was the shifting class composition of the 
leading institutions of the state and party. In this regard, the situation was especially bad in the 
state apparatus. In the “Declaration of the Thirteen” written in July 1926, the leaders of the 
Opposition observed, “It is quite obvious that the state apparatus in its social composition and 
standard of living is bourgeois or petty bourgeois to a great extent, and is drawn away from the 
proletariat and poor peasantry and toward, on the one hand, the comfortably fixed intellectual 
and, on the other, the merchant, the renter of land, the kulak, and the new bourgeois.”121 
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 Although party apparatus was more proletarian than the apparatus of the state, the Platform 
deplored the fact that only one-tenth of the members of the “decision-making bodies of the 
party” were workers in industry (compared with one-third of the party membership as a 
whole).122  
A related development in the eyes of the Opposition was the change in the political 
composition of the party apparatus. In 1923 Trotsky had criticized the virtual monopoly of power 
of the “Old Guard” who had joined the party before the revolution. His point was that the Old 
Bolsheviks in the apparatus should make room for younger party members and new ideas. In 
1927 the Platform of the Opposition described the problem quite differently, warning of the 
“sapping of the influence of the proletarian and Old Bolshevik nucleus of the party” and noting 
the rise in the percentage of party officials who had formerly been members of “petty bourgeois” 
organizations like the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries. The Platform pointed out that, 
at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress, “38 percent of those occupying responsible and 
directing positions in our press were persons who had come to us from other parties.” Now, the 
political composition of the directing organs of the press was even worse, and “about a quarter of 
the higher cadres of the active elements in the party” were former SRs and Mensheviks.123 Aside 
from actual changes in the composition of the leading party organs, one factor that was probably 
partially responsible for this shift in the Opposition’s critique was the changed composition of 
the Opposition itself. The fusion of Zinoviev’s group with Trotsky’s 1923 supporters had 
brought into the United Opposition a large number of Old Bolshevik leaders. Thus, by 1927 the 
Opposition was able to criticize the apparatus from the politically advantageous standpoint of 
Old Bolshevism.  
However, the factor that most convinced Trotsky and the United Opposition of the 
growth of alien class influences within the party was their perception that the policies of the 
leadership majority had continued to drift steadily to the right. In 1923, Trotsky had warned that 
the bureaucratization of the party was raising the prospect of the “opportunistic degeneration” of 
the apparatus. By 1926-1927 he and the United Opposition concluded that this danger was in the 
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 process of being realized. To indicate the degree of degeneration that had already occurred, they 
utilized Lenin’s analysis of opportunism in the Second International during the world war.  
When a majority of the parties of the Second International endorsed the war efforts of 
their respective countries at the outbreak of the war, Lenin and the Bolsheviks denounced this 
“opportunist” betrayal of revolutionary socialism. In the pamphlet Socialism and War, Lenin and 
Zinoviev explained that “opportunism expresses bourgeois policies within the working-class 
movement, expresses the interests of the petty bourgeoisie and the alliance of a tiny section of 
bourgeoisified workers with their ‘own’ bourgeoisie, against the interests of the proletarian 
masses, the oppressed masses.”124 However, Lenin was even more critical of those groups and 
individuals, such as Karl Kautsky, who attempted to maintain an intermediate position between 
full opportunism and revolutionary internationalism. Kautsky, leader of the “Marxist Centre” of 
the SPD, stated that the outbreak of war had rendered the Socialist International temporarily 
irrelevant. Furthermore, he argued that all workers should fight to defend their own fatherlands, 
but that they should be prepared to reunite in the International when the war ended. For Lenin, 
the “Kautskyites,” the “Kautskyan Centre,” or simply the “Centrists,” were even more harmful 
than the open chauvinists in the International, for they hid “their advocacy of an alliance with the 
former [i.e., the chauvinists] under a cloak of plausible, pseudo-‘Marxist’ catchwords and 
pacifist slogans.” He perceived the Centrists as vacillating “between opportunism and 
radicalism,” that is, between opportunism and revolutionary socialism. However, in the final 
analysis they were only “only a fig-leaf for opportunism.” In contrast to both revolutionary 
Social-Democracy and blatant opportunism, centrism was not an independent trend for it had no 
social roots, “either in the masses or in the privileged stratum that has deserted to the 
bourgeoisie.” It was this absence of social roots that accounted for its inconsistent, vacillating 
behavior.125  
Although the United Opposition at times criticized various policies of the party 
leadership as “opportunist” or “Menshevik,” it did not perceive the general line of either Soviet 
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 domestic or international policy as fully opportunist.126 Echoing Lenin, the Platform defined 
“opportunism in its fully developed form” as follows: 
 
Opportunism in its fully developed form—according to the classic 
definition of Lenin—is a bloc formed by the upper strata of the 
working class with the bourgeoisie and directed against the 
majority of the working class. In the conditions now existing in the 
Soviet Union, opportunism in such fully developed form would 
express the desire of the upper strata of the working class to 
compromise with the newly resurrected native bourgeoisie (kulaks 
and NEPmen) and with world capitalism, at the expense of the 
interests of the broad mass of the workers and poor peasants.127  
 
In contrast, the general line of the party leadership was centrist, occupying a space somewhere 
between the revolutionary proletarian politics of the Opposition and the complete opportunism of 
the Second International and the Mensheviks. At times, Trotsky and the Opposition spoke of 
centrism with regard to international policy, as in September 1926 when Trotsky referred to “the 
centrist deviation on questions of the world labor movement (the Anglo-Russian Committee, the 
Guomindang, etc.).”128 In other passages Trotsky denounced “the gradual Centrist back-sliding 
with respect to internal policies.”129 In both cases the centrism of the party leadership was 
characterized by political vacillation.130 
Beyond deepening Trotsky’s 1923 critique of Soviet bureaucratism, during 1926-1927 
Trotsky and the United Opposition began to introduce important terminological changes that 
reflected the beginning of deeper conceptual shifts. One of these was their increasing reference 
to the “bureaucracy” within each of the major political and social institutions of the Soviet 
Union. In 1923 Trotsky and his supporters had directed their attacks exclusively at the problem 
of “bureaucratism [biurokratizm]” in the state and party. Although in 1926-1927 they continued 
to use that term most frequently, at times they now characterized the problem in terms of the 
“bureaucracy [biurokratiia]” of each of the most important institutions of the Soviet Union—and 
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 especially of the state and party. In such passages it seems that Trotsky and the Opposition were 
suggesting that the problem was not just that a disease had infected these institutions, but that a 
bureaucratic social formation had usurped power within each of them.131 
Thus, on some occasions Trotsky and the Opposition used the term bureaucracy when 
speaking of the apparatus of the state and of other nonparty institutions. For example, while 
discussing the “bureaucratic deformations of the workers’ state” in July 1926, the “Declaration 
of the Thirteen” argued that “the colossal political and economic role of the bureaucracy 
[biurokratiia]” was demonstrated by the large number of “government personnel, professional 
people, those working in the cooperative network and all other office workers.”132 The following 
year, the Platform of the Opposition asserted in its section on the soviets that “the question of 
Soviet bureaucratism [biurokratizm]” was not simply one of red tape, swollen staffs, etc.” 
Rather, it was fundamentally a “question of the class role played by the bureaucracy 
[biurokratiia], of its social ties and sympathies, of its power and privileged position.”133 
Similarly, Trotsky and the Opposition at times utilized bureaucracy or equivalent terms 
when referring to the secretarial apparatus of the party. For example, in a memorandum written 
in October 1926 Trotsky asserted, “A bureaucratized apparatus [biurokratizirovannyi apparat], 
imposing its will on the party, inevitably seeks a single will at the top.”134 Along the same lines, 
in a letter to the Central Committee on June 27, 1927, Trotsky argued that the party was in the 
midst of a deep crisis, consisting of the fact that “the bureaucracy [biurokratiia]” had displaced 
the vanguard of the proletariat, and “within the bureaucracy [biurokratiia]” the upstarts had 
displaced the old revolutionaries.135 A few months later, in its section on the party, The Platform 
of the Opposition insisted that the degeneration of the political course and of the party regime 
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 was giving birth to “an enormous layer of a genuine bureaucracy [mnogochislennyi sloi 
podlinnoi biurokratii].”136  
There are a couple possible explanations for this shift from bureaucratism to bureaucracy. 
First, as the manifestations of bureaucratism multiplied quantitatively, the problem was 
perceived to have changed qualitatively. From the point of view of the Opposition, 
bureaucratism had become so pervasive among officials of Soviet institutions that it began to 
seem as if these bodies of officials were themselves inseparable from that phenomenon. Perhaps 
another contributing factor was the growth in size of the apparatuses of the major Soviet 
institutions. By the end of 1925 the number of paid party officials had reached approximately 
25,600, while by 1926 the number of employees of state institutions exceeded two million.137 
Thus, the Platform complained that “the ‘layer of administrators’—in the party, the trade unions, 
the economic organs, the cooperatives and the state apparatus—now numbers in the tens of 
thousands.”138 This growth in turn encouraged the perception of Trotsky and the Opposition that 
these apparatuses were large enough to be considered distinct social groupings.  
Even while speaking increasingly of the bureaucracy in the party, the bureaucracy in the 
Soviet state, etc., Trotsky and the Opposition simultaneously began to introduce another 
important terminological and conceptual modification. With growing frequency they now spoke 
as if the organizational apparatuses of all Soviet political and social institutions were really just 
parts of one large social formation: the apparatus or, more frequently, the bureaucracy. In 
previous years Trotsky always had distinguished clearly between the apparatuses of the state and 
party. In fact, in 1923 he even had offered different explanations for the growth of bureaucratism 
in each of those institutions. Now Trotsky and the Opposition began to blur these distinctions. 
For example, the “Declaration of the Eighty-four” written in May 1927 complained that the 
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 “whole official apparatus both party and soviet [ves’ ofitsial’nyi apparat, i partinyi i sovetskii],” 
was striking out at the left wing of the party.139 Similarly, as we have seen, the Platform spoke of 
the singular “layer [sloi] of ‘administrators’” in the party, state, etc.140 Another example appears 
in Trotsky’s speech before the joint plenary session of the Central Committee and Central 
Control Commission on August 1, 1927 where he enumerated steps that might be taken on a 
“Thermidorian path,” including raising and reinforcing “the importance of the bureaucracy 
[biurokratiia], of the administration [administratsiia].” The alternative, he suggested, was to 
“create a political environment in which it would be impossible for “the bourgeoisie and the 
bureaucracy [biurokratiia]” to push aside the workers. Here, Trotsky’s institutional referent was 
undefined.141  
Again, various factors may have contributed to the Opposition’s critique of a single 
bureaucracy. In part, it may have been promoted by the perception of important similarities in 
the various apparatuses. According to Trotsky, all of these apparatuses had come to be 
characterized by the same centralization of authority.142 In all of them, personnel allegedly were 
selected and promoted on the basis of their hostility to the revolutionary proletariat and its 
vanguard.143 Furthermore, Trotsky asserted, all of them participated directly in the persecution of 
the party Opposition.144 Thus, from the standpoint of the Opposition the specific institutional 
affiliations must have begun to seem less and less significant. Perhaps another contributing factor 
was the Opposition’s evolving explanation of the source of the problem. During 1926-1927 the 
Opposition increasingly described bureaucratism as originating primarily in the shifting 
relationships between the fundamental classes of Soviet society. As it did so, it tended to view 
the bureaucracy in the USSR as just one more social grouping, situated among and responding to 
the conflicting pressures exerted by the various social classes of Soviet society. 
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 However, neither the shift from bureaucratism to the bureaucracies of various 
institutions, nor the identification of a single social layer, the bureaucracy, should be 
exaggerated. For the time being, in 1926-1927 Trotsky and the United Opposition still most 
frequently characterized the problem as one of bureaucratism in all Soviet institutions. 
5.3.2 Causes of Bureaucratism 
During 1923 Trotsky offered a number of different explanations for the growth of state 
and party bureaucratism. State bureaucratism, he explained, arose out of a variety of factors that 
included the low level of Soviet culture, the difficulties of state construction, the need to utilize 
tsarist experts, the growth of market relations under NEP, the influx of members of the “NEP 
bourgeoisie” into the state apparatus, and the “heterogeneity of society.” At the same time, he 
argued that bureaucratism in the party derived from the specialized work of its members 
employed in state or party offices, was transmitted from the state apparatus, and was exacerbated 
by the relative decline in the level of proletarian membership.  
Although during 1926-1927 Trotsky retained and expanded upon a number of these 
themes, he explicitly or implicitly discarded a number of others. Most importantly, he moved 
away from the notion he had inherited from Lenin that the continuing growth of bureaucratism 
was due to the low level of Soviet culture. In June 1926 Trotsky rejected the argument advanced 
by the majority that party bureaucratism was a product of the low level of the national culture, 
combined with the leading role of the party in the state. First, Trotsky argued, “The uncultured 
character of the country is on the wane while party bureaucratism is on the rise.” Second, he 
observed that “if the party’s role as a ruling party inevitably entailed its increased 
bureaucratization, that would imply the destruction of the party.” This was a conclusion Trotsky 
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 was not prepared to accept. He conceded that “lack of culture . . . in the form of illiteracy and the 
absence of the simplest necessary skills leads mostly to bureaucratism in the state apparatus.”145 
However, even regarding state bureaucratism, Trotsky accorded this explanation a far smaller 
role than previously. In the same statement Trotsky also appears to reject the idea that party 
bureaucratism was due to the low percentage of workers in the party. He noted that, as a 
consequence of the Lenin Enrollment of 1924, “the party, in its basic composition, has become 
proletarian.” Nevertheless, the party was further from workers’ democracy than ever before.146 
Finally, by September 1926 Trotsky seems to have completely abandoned the view, expressed in 
early 1923, that party bureaucratism was a product of the specialization of party members. In his 
New Course writings Trotsky had begun to imply that the overly specialized mentality of the 
party leadership was more a consequence than a cause of bureaucratism.147 Now Trotsky made 
this point more explicit: 
Ideological near-sightedness is always bound up with 
bureaucratism. The leaders of the ruling faction, who are isolating 
themselves to an ever greater extent, prove incapable of assessing 
the situation as a whole, foreseeing the future, and issuing broad 
directives to the party. The policy becomes small-minded or tail-
endist.148  
At the same time, Trotsky and the United Opposition retained Trotsky’s 1923 
explanations for the growth of bureaucratism which stressed the increasing impact of market 
forces and the NEP bourgeoisie upon Soviet economic and political institutions. These 
explanations were now placed within the context of a clearer and more elaborate account of the 
evolving character of class relations in Soviet society. 
In 1926-1927 Trotsky’s and the Opposition’s most basic explanation for the growth of 
bureaucratism was the change that had occurred in the relative strength of the different social 
classes within the Soviet Union. As Trotsky explained in June 1926, 
 
The fundamental cause of bureaucratization must be sought 
in the relations between classes. . . . The bureaucratization of the 
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 party . . . is an expression of the disrupted social equilibrium, 
which has been and is being tipped to the disadvantage of the 
proletariat. This disruption of the equilibrium is transmitted to the 
party and weighs upon the proletarian vanguard in the party.149  
Trotsky’s view was that, due to a variety of reasons, the Soviet proletariat had become 
demoralized since the revolution and had retreated into passivity. Meanwhile, bourgeois 
elements had grown in size and economic influence and had become more self-confident. This 
change in the relation of class forces had exerted a rightward pressure upon the apparatuses of 
the major political and social institutions of Soviet society. Under this pressure, the state and 
party had adopted policies beneficial to the bourgeois elements, contributing to the further 
disruption of the class equilibrium. Meanwhile, to implement its rightist course in domestic and 
international policy, the party leadership had resorted to increasing repression against the section 
of the party that had retained its revolutionary, proletarian perspective. The defeats of the 
Opposition also had contributed to the shift in the balance of class forces.  
According to Trotsky, since 1917 the Russian proletariat had entered a prolonged period 
of demoralization and disillusionment. At least in the early phase of Soviet power, this decline of 
proletarian self-confidence was largely inevitable. In part, it had been a product of the “terrible 
exertions of the revolution” and the “sufferings of 1917-1921” that had resulted in the “nervous 
exhaustion” of working class.150 Besides that, the gap, inevitable in any revolution, between the 
hopes and expectations of the masses and the realities of revolutionary power had contributed to 
popular disillusionment: 
 
The hopes engendered by the revolution are always exaggerated. 
This is because of the class mechanism of society, the terrible 
plight of the overwhelming majority of the masses, the objective 
need of concentrating the greatest hopes and efforts in order to 
insure even the most modest progress, and so on. . . . The 
conquests gained in the struggle do not correspond, and in the 
nature of things cannot directly correspond with the expectations 
of the backward masses awakened for the first time in the course of 
the revolution. The disillusionment of these masses, their return to 
routine and futility, is as much an integral part of the 
postrevolutionary period as is the passage into the camp of “law 
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 and order” of those “satisfied” classes or layers of classes that had 
participated in the revolution.151 
Although the proletarian masses had “greatly improved their lot” since 1921, this improvement 
had been a very gradual one. Consequently, the workers had “grown more cautious, more 
skeptical, less directly responsive to revolutionary slogans, less inclined to place confidence in 
broad generalizations.”152 
Aside from these domestic developments, the defeats of the international revolution—
some of which had occurred even before the rightist perversion of Comintern policy—also had 
an impact. According to Trotsky, the Soviet proletariat had expected that “the European 
revolution would follow immediately after 1917.” Instead, the period since the revolution had 
been “years of very big defeats for the European proletariat.” Thus, the “tense, highly 
concentrated expectation” among the Soviet proletariat in the period of revolutionary upheaval 
had given way to “deep discouragement.”153 
Simultaneously, the years since 1917 had witnessed a growth of self-confidence and 
political activity on the part of bourgeois elements within Soviet society. Partly, this had 
occurred as a result of the demoralization of the working class. Trotsky explained, “The 
disillusionment of a considerable section of the oppressed masses . . . and . . . the decline of the 
political energy and activity of the revolutionary class engender a revival of confidence among 
counterrevolutionary classes—both among those overthrown by the revolution but not shattered 
completely and among those who aided the revolution at a certain phase, but were thrown back 
into the camp of reaction by the further development of the revolution.”154 Added to this was the 
effect of the New Economic Policy. Although Trotsky and the Opposition accepted the fact that 
NEP was “necessary as a road toward socialism,” they argued that it had “revived forces hostile 
to socialism.”155 NEP had regenerated “the contradictory petty-bourgeois tendencies among the 
peasantry” that had been held in check by War Communism. In the process it had resurrected a 
layer of peasant exploiters (the kulaks) and a layer involved in “trading capital” (the NEPmen) 
who dreamed of a restoration of capitalism.156  
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 According to Trotsky and the Opposition, the effect of these developments upon the party 
and state had been profound. Lenin had warned of the danger that the kulak, NEPman, and 
bureaucrat would “strive to unite, introduce their own ‘amendments’ into our plans, exercise an 
increasing pressure on our policy, and satisfy their interests through our apparatus.”157 Now, it 
seemed that Lenin’s predictions were being realized. The kulak and NEPman were exerting a 
growing pressure upon the state and party apparatuses, both from without and from within. The 
state apparatus, which had been penetrated by bourgeois elements, had been most directly 
affected. However, because the Communist Party maintained a necessary monopoly of political 
power, the state apparatus had been able to feed “much that is bourgeois and petty bourgeois into 
the party, infecting it with opportunism.”158 The most important consequence of this process had 
been a “backsliding from the proletarian class line” in economic and international policy.159 
Meanwhile, the implementation of this rightist course had necessitated ever-sharper 
deviations by the party apparatus from the principle of workers’ democracy. In particular, it had 
led to the use of repression against the Opposition, which remained true to the principles of 
revolutionary Marxism and which most clearly articulated the orientation of the proletarian 
vanguard. The “Declaration of the Thirteen” written in July 1926 explained, 
 
It is quite clear that it is more and more difficult for the 
leadership to carry out its policies by methods of party democracy, 
the less the vanguard of the working class perceives these policies 
as its own. The divergence between economic policies and the 
thoughts and feelings of the proletarian vanguard inevitably 
strengthens the need for high-pressure methods and imparts an 
administrative-bureaucratic character to all politics. All other 
explanations for the growth of bureaucratism are of a secondary 
character and do not grapple with the heart of the problem.160 
Similarly, in a letter to a fellow Oppositionist in August 1927, Trotsky argued that the 
“intolerable” character of the party regime was a direct result of the political line pursued by the 
majority: 
 
The party regime is a function of the political line. It was precisely 
because Stalin stakes everything on Chiang Kai-shek and Purcell, 
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 on the bureaucrat and the upper layers of the village, etc., that he 
feels compelled to carry out his policies, not by relying on the 
mind and will of the proletarian vanguard but by suppressing the 
vanguard with administrative-apparatus methods, thereby 
reflecting and refracting the pressure of other classes upon the 
proletariat. That is the explanation for the frenzied fight against the 
Opposition, because it resists and combats that hostile class 
pressure.161  
Once initiated, the growing bureaucratization of the party quickly acquired an internal 
dynamic that was relatively independent of the shifting balance of class forces. This dynamic 
helped to explain not only the escalation of repression, but also the continuing constriction of the 
sphere of power within the party. Trotsky asserted in June 1926, “Any regime develops its own 
internal logic, and a bureaucratic regime develops it more rapidly than any other.” He explained 
that the wave of repression that had been unleashed against party dissidents had led to “the 
fragmentation of the party cadres, the removal from the party leadership of valuable elements 
representing a significant portion of its accumulated experience, and the systematic narrowing 
down and ideological impoverishment of the leadership core.” This process had generated “a 
new and extremely acute contradiction—between the growing might of the apparatus and the 
ideological enfeeblement of the leading center.” Trotsky predicted that “under these conditions 
fear of deviations is bound to grow progressively, with inevitable consequences in the form of 
so-called organizational measures, which narrow down still further the range of those called 
upon to be part of the leadership and which push them even further down the road of 
bureaucratization of the party regime.”162   
While Trotsky and the Opposition believed that the rightward drift in policy and the 
decline in workers’ democracy ultimately were caused by the shift in the relationship of class 
forces in the Soviet Union, they also argued that these manifestations of bureaucratism, in turn, 
had contributed greatly to the further disruption of the class balance. This was especially the case 




 The lag of industry behind the economic development of the 
country as a whole means the lowering of the specific weight of 
the proletariat in society, despite its numerical growth. The lag in 
the exertion of influence on agriculture by industry and the rapid 
growth of kulaks diminishes the social weight of the poor peasants 
and agricultural workers and lower their confidence in the 
government and in themselves. The lag in the rise of wages behind 
the higher living standards of the nonproletarian elements in the 
cities and the upper strata in the villages inevitably means a 
reduction in the workers’ political and cultural consciousness of 
themselves as the ruling class.163  
 
Similarly, in a memorandum written in October 1926 Trotsky asserted, 
Industry lags behind the overall growth of the economy; socialist 
accumulation lags behind accumulation in the economy as a 
whole; wages lag behind the generally higher level of the 
economy. This means that the economic role of the proletariat is 
not growing rapidly enough and is even shrinking in relative terms. 
And this cannot help but have political repercussions.164  
 The Opposition also believed that the opportunist errors of the party leadership in 
international policy had facilitated, or had directly produced, major new defeats of the world 
revolutionary movement. Trotsky argued that these new international defeats had contributed 
further to the demoralization of the Soviet proletariat. It was this analysis that governed his 
attitude toward the prospects for the party struggle in the wake of Chiang Kai-shek’s coup in 
Shanghai. At that time many supporters of the Opposition were hopeful that the transparent 
failure of the majority policy in China would strengthen the Opposition. Trotsky’s approach was 
different: 
 
I tried to show them that the opposition could not rise on the defeat 
of the Chinese revolution. The fact that our forecast had proved 
correct might attract one thousand, five thousand, or even ten 
thousand new supporters to us. But for the millions, the significant 
thing was not our forecast, but the fact of the crushing of the 
Chinese proletariat. After the defeat of the German revolution of 
1923, after the break-down of the English general strike in 1925, 
the new disaster would only intensify the disappointment of the 
masses in the international revolution. And it was this same 
disappointment that served as the chief psychological source for 
Stalin’s policy of national-reformism.165  
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 At about the same time Trotsky wrote a private letter to Krupskaya in which he addressed the 
same problem: 
 
The defeat of the German revolution in 1923; the defeats in 
Bulgaria, in Estonia [where communists had attempted abortive 
revolutions in 1923 and 1924]; the defeat of the Chinese revolution 
in April, have severely weakened international communism. . . . 
Are we really excluded from this worldwide process? The grave 
defeats of the world revolution and the slowness of our growth 
surely have an impact on our proletariat, too.166  
 
Finally, the Opposition argued that the deterioration of the party regime also had 
weakened the proletariat and had reduced its ability to influence policy. The “Declaration of the 
Eighty-four” in May 1927 explained that the policy of repression against party dissidents had 
contributed to the growing apathy within the party and the working class: 
The internal regime established for the party in recent times 
has caused an immense decline in the activity of the party, this 
leading force of the proletarian revolution. For broad layers of 
rank-and-file members the opportunities for discussing and helping 
to solve the essential problems of the revolution in a fully 
conscious way have been restricted and minimized in the extreme. 
This could not help but affect the attitude of the working class 
toward the party and the level of activism of the working class as a 
whole—and it has affected them in the most negative way.167  
 
At the same time, the decline of workers’ democracy within the party had cut off the apparatus 
from rank-and-file, and ultimately, proletarian influence. Freed from the control the working 
class, the party apparatus had found itself increasingly drawn into orbit around the bourgeois 
elements within the Soviet Union. In June 1926 Trotsky wrote, “A class with a disorganized 
vanguard (and the lack of free discussion, of control over the apparatus, and of election rights 
means a disorganized vanguard) cannot help but become a mere object in the hands of a 
centralized apparatus, which in turn removes itself further and further from the party and is more 
and more bound to come under the pressure of hostile class forces.”168   
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 Thus, according to Trotsky and the Opposition, the party apparatus and leadership found 
themselves trapped in an enormous vicious circle. Shifting class forces had engendered 
rightward lurches in policy and increasing repression, all of which had disrupted the class 
balance even further. For Trotsky and the Opposition, this vicious circle defined the trajectory of 
the downward spiral of the revolution. The ultimate danger was that this process would 
culminate in the restoration of capitalism. 
5.3.3 The Prospect of Thermidor 
As early as 1923 Trotsky had warned that mistaken economic policies and bureaucratism 
in the party could lead to a restoration of capitalism. At that time Trotsky suggested three 
“political paths” by which the counterrevolution could occur: “either the direct overthrow of the 
workers’ party, or its progressive degeneration, or finally, the conjunction of a partial 
degeneration, splits, and counterrevolutionary upheavals.”169 Trotsky returned to this question in 
the summer of 1927. He now argued that the three potential scenarios of counterrevolution 
suggested in 1923 ultimately resolved into two possibilities: either “a decisive and sharp overturn 
(with or without intervention) or . . . several successive shifts [to the right on the part of the 
revolutionary party].” Trotsky would not predict categorically which course the 
counterrevolution might take. Rather, he advised the Opposition to “keep our eyes out for either 
of these variants . . . to weigh the odds, and to note elements contributing to either.”170 
Nevertheless, during this period Trotsky placed the greatest emphasis upon the possibility of the 
degeneration of the party through “several successive shifts.” Most frequently, he described this 
as the danger of a Soviet “Thermidor.” 
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 The term “Thermidor” was a historical reference to the ninth of Thermidor, Year II of the 
French Revolution (July 27, 1794)—the date when Robespierre and his supporters were 
overthrown. This event had marked a critical turning point in the revolution, inaugurating a 
period of sharp decline in mass political activity and a retreat on the part of the government from 
radical social measures. In the view of the Bolsheviks, the regime of Robespierre had represented 
the interests of the sans-cullottes and the petty-bourgeoisie. His fall, it was believed, had paved 
the way for the assumption of power by the big bourgeoisie. 
Long before the formation of the United Opposition, the Bolsheviks were haunted by the 
prospect that the Russian Revolution might experience a similar fate.171 Apparently, the term 
Thermidor was first employed by Lenin in early 1921. As Trotsky later recalled, “Before the 
introduction of NEP and during its first phase, many of us had quite a few discussions with Lenin 
about Thermidor. The word was in great currency among us.”172 Also, Trotsky’s supporter 
Victor Serge later described how, at the time of the Kronstadt rebellion in early 1921, Lenin 
insisted to one of Serge’s friends, “This is Thermidor.”173 It seems that Lenin meant to suggest 
that a successful uprising at Kronstadt could lead to the extermination of the Bolshevik 
leadership and the phased restoration of capitalism under the cover of radical slogans. Thus, at 
the Tenth Party Congress Lenin explained that Kronstadt 
was an attempt to seize political power from the Bolsheviks by a 
motley crowd or alliance of ill-assorted elements, apparently just to 
the right of the Bolsheviks, or perhaps even to their “left”. . . . The 
nonparty elements served here only as a bridge, a stepping stone, a 
rung on a ladder, on which the White Guards appeared. This is 
politically inevitable.174  
 To avoid this eventuality, Lenin proposed that the Bolsheviks themselves institute a 
“Thermidorian” shift to the right in the form of the New Economic Policy. To Serge’s friend 
Lenin remarked, “‘But we shan’t let ourselves be guillotined. We shall make a Thermidor 
ourselves.’”175 In other words, Lenin was proposing that the Bolsheviks introduce their own 
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 rightward shift in policy in order to retain power.176 Similarly, in 1922 Trotsky explained that 
with NEP, “concessions to the Thermidor mood and tendencies of the petty bourgeois, necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining the power of the proletariat, were made by the Communist Party 
without effecting a break in the system and without quitting the helm.”177  
By May 1921 Lenin was already considering another possible variant of Thermidor. In 
notes for a speech, Lenin expressed his concern that the revival of market relations under NEP 
might increase the possibilities of a Thermidorian reinstitution of capitalism.178 As we have seen, 
by 1923 Trotsky had come to share Lenin’s concern about the gradual restoration of capitalism. 
In fact, in later years Trotsky asserted that the 1923 Opposition explicitly had described this as a 
danger of “Thermidor.” However, there is no known speech or document of Trotsky’s from this 
period in which the term itself appears.179 In his pamphlet The New Course, Trotsky raised the 
question of “historical analogies with the Great French Revolution (the fall of the Jacobins) made 
by liberalism and Menshevism” only to dismiss these as “superficial and inconsistent.” Unlike 
the Bolsheviks, Trotsky argued, the Jacobins had been forced to grapple with domestic economic 
relations that were not yet mature enough to sustain their program, and to confront a Europe that 
was politically and economically more backward than their own country.180  
According to Trotsky’s later account, the term “Thermidor” surfaced again in the summer 
of 1925 in a conversation between himself and E. M. Sklianskii, a former deputy in the War 
Commissariat. In that conversation, Trotsky claimed, he “realized for the first time with absolute 
clarity the problem of the Thermidor—with, I might even say, a sort of physical conviction.” 
After defining Stalin as “the outstanding mediocrity in the party,” Trotsky attempted to account 
for the origins of his power: 
  
“This is the reaction after the great social and psychological 
strain of the first years of revolution. A victorious counter-
revolution may develop its great men, but its first phase, the 
Thermidor, demands mediocrities who can’t see any farther than 
their noses.”181 
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 Soon after this, the term became an issue in the escalating conflict between the party 
majority and the Leningrad Opposition. In a private conversation in October between the 
secretary of the Leningrad provincial party organization, Peter Zalutskii, and a party member 
named Leonov, Zalutskii stated that the party leaders were creating a “kingdom of a bourgeois 
state”; and he allegedly accused the leadership of “degeneration” and attempting to bring about a 
“Thermidor.” When Leonov reported the discussion to party leaders in Moscow, Zalutskii 
admitted the substance of Leonov’s report, while denying that he had ever accused the Central 
Committee of “degeneration” or “Thermidor.” Nevertheless, he was promptly removed from his 
party office.182  
Although the discussion of this incident at the Fourteenth Party Congress revived 
Trotsky’s interest in the question, Trotsky did not raise the question of Thermidor publicly until 
1927.183 Perhaps he wanted to think the analogy through more carefully, or perhaps he wanted to 
avoid the furor that the term had provoked in 1925. However, the intensification of the party 
struggle in 1927 inflamed the passions and the rhetoric on both sides. In the early summer of 
1927, A. A. Solts, a member of the Central Control Commission, warned one of Trotsky’s 
supporters of the implications of the latest declaration of the Opposition: “You know the history 
of the French Revolution,—and to what this led: to arrests and the guillotine.” At his hearing 
before the CCC in June, Trotsky seized upon this statement and turned it back against his 
accusers, challenging Solts, “Do you clearly understand in accordance with what chapter [of the 
revolution] you are now preparing to shoot? I fear, comrade Solts, that you are about to shoot us 
in accordance with the . . . Thermidorian chapter.”184 From this point on, the term Thermidor 
occupied a central place in Trotsky’s polemical and theoretical arsenal. 
As Trotsky defined it in the summer of 1927, Thermidor was “a special form of 
counterrevolution carried out on the installment plan . . . , and making use, in the first stage, of 
elements of the same ruling party—by regrouping them and counterposing some to others.”185 
On the surface, a Thermidor appeared to involve only a minor change in the revolutionary 
leadership, “a stepping down one rung on the ladder of revolution—a slight shift of power to the 
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 right as the result of a certain crucial change or break in the psychology of the revolution. At the 
top, at the helm, there same to be the very same people, the same speeches, the same banners.”186 
This, Trotsky argued, was how it appeared to the French Thermidorian leaders. The day after the 
arrest of Robespierre, Thermidorians had not said to themselves that they had transferred power 
to the bourgeoisie. Rather, they had said, “We have destroyed a handful of people who disrupted 
peace in the party, but now, after their destruction, the revolution will triumph completely.”187 
However, beneath the surface the French Thermidor had marked a fundamental realignment of 
class forces: 
 
The propertied elements had succeeded by that time in 
righting themselves, recovering their strength, and gathering 
courage. Civil order was restored. The new property owners 
wanted more than anything not to be prevented from enjoying the 
fruits of their property. They pressured the state apparatus and the 
Jacobin clubs, many of whose members felt themselves also to be 
property owners, people of order, and the Jacobin party was forced 
to regroup itself, to put forward some elements more disposed to 
swimming with the new stream, to link up with new elements, not 
of Jacobin origin—and to press back, cast out, incapacitate, and 
decapitate those elements who reflected the interests and passions 
of the urban lower classes, the sansculottes. In turn, these lower 
strata no longer felt the pressure of the new propertied elements 
and the state apparatus that covered up for the people of 
property.188  
 
Trotsky feared a similar event was possible in the Soviet Union. Throughout the country 
Trotsky perceived the growth of “elements of Thermidor”—particularly among the NEPmen and 
kulaks, but also within the party’s right wing, led especially by prominent members of the state 
and trade union apparatuses.189 He explained that, on the political level, a Soviet Thermidor 
could occur by means of a rightward shift of power within the Soviet state, or even within the 
party, “with the banner of communism in one’s hands.”190 On the deeper level of class relations, 
a Soviet Thermidor would involve “a shift from the path of proletarian revolution in a petty 
bourgeois direction,” that would lead ultimately to the restoration of capitalism.191   
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 Trotsky attempted to explain the same idea utilizing analogies from the Russian 
Revolution. Between the February and October revolutions of 1917, the Bolsheviks believed that 
a large measure of political power had slipped from the hands of the old ruling classes, but that 
complete class rule had not yet been achieved by the proletariat. The situation was one of “dual 
power” in which political control was shared by the Provisional Government, representing the 
bourgeoisie, and the soviets, controlled by the working class. Now, Trotsky observed, “elements 
of dual power” were once again emerging in the country.192 Thermidor would involve the return 
to a full dual power situation as a transitional stage on the road to the reinstitution of capitalism. 
It would be “a kind of Kerenskyism in reverse”: 
 
Thermidor is in its essence a transitional regime, a kind of 
Kerenskyism in reverse. Kerenskyism in 1917 was a screen over 
dual power, and in that situation it floundered around and, against 
its will, helped the proletariat to wrest power from the bourgeoisie. 
A Thermidorian regime would mean the legalization once again of 
a dual power situation, and once again, against its own will, such a 
regime would help one class, the bourgeoisie, wrest power from 
the other, the proletariat.193 
Some Oppositionists, particularly those who had come from the Democratic Centralist 
and Workers’ Opposition groupings, believed that the Soviet Thermidor had already occurred.194 
However, despite the fact that the party leadership accused the United Opposition as a whole of 
sharing this view, the statements and documents of Trotsky and the Opposition repeatedly denied 
this. In a memorandum written in November 1926 Trotsky argued, “It would be a crude 
distortion of reality to speak of Thermidor as an accomplished fact. Things have gone no further 
than the holding of some rehearsals within the party and the laying of some theoretical 
groundwork.”195 Furthermore, in June 1927 Trotsky sharply rejected Ordzhonikidze’s accusation 
that Trotsky believed the revolution had “perished,” and later in the year the United Opposition 
as a whole disavowed the view that the party or its leadership was Thermidorian.196  
Nor did Trotsky believe that Thermidor was inevitable in the Soviet Union as it had been 
in France. Returning to views he had expressed on this question in 1923, Trotsky pointed out the 
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 advantages of the Russian Revolution. First, it had been made by a developed and class 
conscious proletariat rather than the weaker “pre-proletariat” of eighteenth-century France. 
Second, it was surrounded by industrially more advanced neighbors each of which had a strong 
proletariat, not by backward feudal countries.197 Nevertheless, Trotsky insisted that a Soviet 
Thermidor was possible as long as the European proletariat failed to take power.198  
Beyond warning of the danger of Thermidor, Trotsky and the Opposition attempted to 
anticipate how it would unfold in the Soviet Union. They believed that, most probably, it would 
begin with the crushing of the resistance of the Opposition itself. For example, in a declaration 
from May 1927 the Opposition argued, “If the new blow being prepared against the left, against 
the Opposition, is carried out, it will give a completely free hand to the elements of the right, the 
nonproletarians and antiproletarian elements, which are inside our party but for the most part 
outside it.”199 Similarly, in December 1927 Trotsky asserted, “The most important (but not the 
only) condition for a victory of Thermidor would be to crush the Opposition so thoroughly that it 
no longer needed to be ‘feared.’”200 This would be followed by deeper shifts to the right in 
economic and social policy. Trotsky predicted what these would look like in an address to the 
CCC in August 1927: 
 
As the first step, repeal the monopoly of foreign trade. Give the 
kulak the opportunity of doubling the export and the import. 
Enable the kulak to squeeze the middle peasant. Compel the poor 
peasant to understand that without the kulak there is no other road. 
Raise and reinforce the importance of the bureaucracy, of the 
administration. Cast aside the demands of the workers as so much 
“guildism.” Restrict the workers politically in the Soviets, 
reestablish last years’ election decree [which restored electoral 
rights to employers of auxiliary labor] and gradually extend it in 
favor of the property owners. That would be the road of 
Thermidor. Its name is—capitalism on the installment plan.201 
Once implemented, these rightist policies would lead in turn to further changes in the 
political system. As in France, the counterrevolution sooner or later would be forced to remove 
its revolutionary mask and institute a repressive and dictatorial “Bonapartist” regime. In June 
1927 Trotsky asserted that, following a Thermidor, the Soviet bourgeoisie “would subsequently 
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 discard completely the Soviet covering and transform its power into a Bonapartist rule.”202 At the 
end of the year, he spelled this out in greater detail: 
 
The Thermidorian regime would, by its essence, be of short 
duration; its objective role would be to cover the bourgeoisie’s 
acquisition of power with a screen of Soviet forms, to which the 
workers are accustomed. But there would inevitably be resistance 
by the proletariat; it would attempt to hold on to its positions or 
win back those it had lost. To beat back these attempts and to 
consolidate their hold in a genuine way, the bourgeoisie would 
soon need, not a transitional regime, but a more serious, solid and 
decisive kind—in all probability, a Bonapartist or, in modern 
terms, a fascist regime.203  
5.3.4 Characteristics: Political Divisions 
During the years 1926-1927, Trotsky and the United Opposition repeatedly 
attempted to define the most important political currents and groupings within the Soviet 
Union, and the relationship of each to the party struggle. Broadly speaking, these 
attempts focused on the two major aspects of the problem of Soviet bureaucratism. At 
times, Trotsky and the Opposition concentrated upon the party groupings that were 
relevant to the growing centralization of political authority. In other statements they tried 
to map the broad range of political currents in the country along a right/left continuum, 
and to describe the role played by each current in the shifting balance of class forces. 
As part of its effort to establish that the party leadership was undemocratically 
usurping authority, the Opposition sought to demonstrate that the supporters of the party 
“majority” actually constituted a minority of the party membership. In October 1926 
Trotsky wrote a memorandum in which he explained that, due to the increasingly 
repressive and undemocratic internal party regime, the “party has at present been 
artificially divided into three rather sharply marked-off parts: (1) the ruling faction, which 
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 constitutes the backbone of the apparatus selected from above; (2) the Opposition 
elements, fighting for a rectification of the party line and a restoration of normality in the 
party regime; and (3) the broad mass of the party in between, atomized, disoriented, and 
in effect deprived of any chance to actively affect the fate of the party.”204 Thus, although 
the leadership legitimately could assert that it represented the position of the majority of 
those involved in the struggle, it could not honestly claim to represent the views of the 
majority of the rank and file. Similarly, in a series of “Questions and Answers about the 
Opposition” written in September, Trotsky portrayed the party debate as a contest 
between the “faction of the majority” and the party minority. “The faction of the 
majority,” he argued, “uses the party machine to prevent the party from determining by 
democratic means where the real majority and minority are.”205  
At the same time, Trotsky and the Opposition commented upon the extreme 
centralization of authority within the majority faction. First, they noted the division 
between the lower-level supporters of the majority faction and the “leading factional 
clique” at the top. According to Trotsky, the latter was merely “the tiny leading group” of 
the “sealed off [majority] faction.”206 Similarly, the “Declaration of the Thirteen” 
explained, “The ruling faction has its own [ruling] minority, which places faction 
discipline above that of the party.”207 Beyond that, the Opposition observed a growing 
centralization of authority within top leadership of the majority faction. In October 1926 
Trotsky argued that Stalin, “relying on a group of comrades who always agree with him,” 
was attempting to institute a regime of “one-man rule” in the party. Increasingly, the 
pursuit of this goal was bringing Stalin into conflict with all the other prominent leaders 
of the ruling faction:  
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One-man rule in the administration of the party . . . requires not 
only the defeat, removal, and ouster of the present United 
Opposition but also the gradual removal of all authoritative and 
influential figures in the present ruling faction. It is quite obvious 
that neither Tomsky, nor Rykov, nor Bukharin—because of their 
past, their authority, etc.—is capable of playing the role under 
Stalin that Uglanov, Kaganovich, Petrovsky, et al. play under him. 
The ouster of the present Opposition would in fact mean the 
inevitable transformation of the old group in the Central 
Committee into an opposition. A new discussion would be placed 
on the agenda, in which Kaganovich would expose Rykov, 
Uglanov would expose Tomsky, and Slepkov, Sten, and Company 
would deglorify Bukharin.208  
In other statements Trotsky and the Opposition attempted to describe the attitude of 
various political currents in the country to the shifting balance of class forces. Broadly speaking, 
the Opposition perceived the existence of three distinct political currents: the Thermidorians, the 
centrists, and the genuine revolutionaries. 
At the far right of the political spectrum were the Thermidorians. As we have already 
noted, Trotsky and the Opposition saw this political tendency as especially strong among the 
kulaks and NEPmen. Politically, its views were most clearly articulated by the economist N. 
Ustrialov and by the Mensheviks. According to the “Declaration of the Thirteen,” Ustrialov was 
“the most logical, most principled, and most uncompromising enemy of Bolshevism.”209 
Elsewhere, Trotsky described Ustrialov as the “ideologist” of the bourgeois classes, and “the 
(temporarily) conciliationist representative of the new bourgeoisie.”210 Trotsky explained that 
Ustrialov advocated a gradual and phased restoration of capitalism, or a policy of “going 
downhill with the brakes on.”211 Nevertheless, Ustrialov was “realistic in his Thermidorianism” 
because he recognized that the completion of this process ultimately would require “a 
Bonapartist-fascist shift—by installments—onto bourgeois rails.”212 To achieve this aim, Trotsky 
noted, in the fall of 1926 Ustrialov explicitly supported Stalin’s war against the Opposition and a 
“Neo-Nep” consisting of further economic shifts to the right.213  
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 A second political force working for a Thermidor was the Menshevik Party. In contrast 
with Ustrialov, the Mensheviks feared “a Bonapartist regime, preferring a democracy which 
would give the petty bourgeoisie a chance to preserve some semblance of a political role.”214 
Consequently, they advocated replacing the proletarian dictatorship with a system of “bourgeois” 
parliamentary democracy.215 Given the Russian heritage of revolutions and civil wars, Trotsky 
believed that Bonapartism was “a much more likely road for the return to bourgeois society than 
[bourgeois] democracy.”216 For this reason he dismissed Menshevism as “utopian through and 
through,” and seems to have considered the Mensheviks as less of a threat than the supporters of 
Ustrialov.217  
Trotsky and the United Opposition also perceived the growth of a Thermidorian tendency 
within the Communist Party. This tendency was composed of two groups. One was described by 
Trotsky as a “right deviation [within the ruling faction] toward the kulak, the petty bourgeoisie, 
and middle class elements in general.”218 In the words of the Platform of the Opposition, this 
grouping “to a great extent reflects the interests of the ‘economically strong’ middle peasant, 
toward whom it steers its course and by whose ideals it is inspired.” Its leaders included A. I. 
Rykov, A. P. Smirnov, M. I. Kalinin, G. Petrovskii, V. Chubar, and G. Kaminskii. Around them 
was a layer of “‘nonparty’ politicians, . . . and other ‘business agents’ of the wealthy peasantry, 
more or less openly preaching the doctrines of Ustryalov.”219 The second Thermidorian grouping 
within the party was described by Trotsky in September 1926 as “a trade unionist deviation 
which is marching hand in hand with the deviation toward the peasant proprietor but which 
frequently comes into hostile conflict with the latter.”220 The Platform characterized this as a 
group of “trade union leaders who represent the better-paid class of industrial and office 
workers.” Its leaders included M. P. Tomskii, G. Melnichanskii, and A. Dogadov. Although 
there was often tension between the two rightist groupings within the party, they were “at one in 
the desire to turn the course of the party and the Soviet state to the right, in both international and 
domestic policies.”221 The Platform insisted that neither of the two groupings consciously desired 
a Thermidor.222 Nevertheless, as Trotsky explained, the political significance of the party’s right 
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 wing was that it served “as a transmitting mechanism” for pressures from the “bourgeois classes 
who are raising their heads.”223 The implication was that the displacement of the Stalinist 
leadership of the party by the right wing would constitute the beginning of a Soviet Thermidor.  
To the left of the Thermidorians were the centrists, consisting of Stalin and his 
supporters, who had achieved dominance within the party.224 Unlike the right and the left wings 
of the party, the centrist tendency had no deep roots in the fundamental classes of Soviet society. 
The Platform stated that “this centrist-official group least of all expresses the attitude of any 
broad mass, but it is trying—not without success—to substitute itself for the party.”225 Similarly, 
in October 1927 Trotsky spoke of “this bureaucratic centrist faction, lacking all class basis.”226 
Its strength was to be found in the apparatuses of the party, the state, the economic institutions, 
and the mass organizations—which, combined, constituted an enormous “layer of 
‘administrators’.”227 Without any solid base in either the proletariat or the petty bourgeoisie, the 
centrists were unable to pursue either a consistently revolutionary, or a consistently reformist 
policy. Instead, they followed an intermediate course, lurching left and right in response to the 
pressures of antagonistic classes. In October 1927 Trotsky explained, 
 
In reality the whole policy of this centrist faction is itself going 
forward under the blows of two whips—one from the right and one 
from the left. . . . This bureaucratic centrist faction, lacking all 
class basis, staggers between two class lines, . . . systematically 
sliding away from the proletarian to the petty-bourgeois course. It 
does not slide away in a direct line, but in sharp zigzags.228  
This represented a refinement in the Opposition’s critique of Soviet domestic and 
international policy over the analysis it had offered for the previous year and a half. Here, the 
general orientation of Soviet policy was viewed as a reflection of the political character of the 
party leadership. The weakening of the proletariat and the strengthening of bourgeois elements 
had resulted in a shift of political power to the right, but not yet as far right as the Thermidorian 
tendency. As Trotsky explained in December 1927, “Predominance in the party, and therefore in 
the country too, is in the hands of the Stalin faction, which has all the features of centrism.”229 
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 Thus, it was the predominance of this centrist tendency that accounted for the centrism of Soviet 
policy.  
Although Trotsky and the United Opposition recognized Stalin as the preeminent leader 
of the centrists, they paid little attention to Stalin’s personal significance and influence. At least 
as far as Trotsky was concerned, this was because Stalin had little personal significance. In a 
later account Trotsky recalled explaining his view of Stalin in two conversations with supporters 
in 1924 and 1925. In both, Trotsky portrayed Stalin as a “mediocrity” who owed his growing 
power to impersonal social forces. In 1924, Trotsky predicted to I. N. Smirnov that “Stalin will 
become dictator of the U.S.S.R.” When Smirnov protested that Stalin was nothing but a 
“mediocrity, a colorless nonentity,” Trotsky responded, 
 
“Mediocrity yes; nonentity no . . . . The dialectics of history 
have already hooked him and will raise him up. He is needed by all 
of them—by the tired radicals, by the bureaucrats, by the nepmen, 
the kulaks, the upstarts, the sneaks, by all the worms that are 
crawling out of the upturned soil of the manured revolution. He 
knows how to meet them on their own ground, he speaks their 
language and he knows how to lead them. He has the deserved 
reputation of an old revolutionist, which makes him invaluable to 
them as a blinder on the eyes of the country.”230 
Similarly, in a conversation with E. M. Sklianskii in 1925 Trotsky described Stalin as “the 
outstanding mediocrity in the party”—one of those mediocrities whose “strength lies in their 
blindness, like the mill-horse who thinks that he is moving up when really he is only pushing 
down the belt-wheel.”231  
Aside from Stalin, the Platform listed V. M. Molotov, N. A. Uglanov, L. M. Kaganovich, 
A. Mikoian, and S. M. Kirov—a group that was “de facto, the present Politburo”—among the 
leaders of the centrist tendency. Although the Leningrad Opposition had denounced Bukharin as 
the leading rightist in the party, the Platform now described him, too, as a centrist: “Bukharin, 
wavering between one side and the other, generalizes the policies of this [centrist] group.” This 
new evaluation of Bukharin may have been due to the fact that, since 1925, he had been 
gradually moving toward the left in his economic views.232  
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 According to the Platform, the centrists were even less inclined to support Thermidor 
consciously than was the right-wing tendency within the party. Stalin and his supporters were 
“convinced that, with their powerful apparatus, they can outwit all the forces of the bourgeoisie 
rather than having to overcome them through an open struggle.” In this, they were “carrying out 
a typical policy of illusion, self-consolation, and self-deception.”233 In particular, the repressive 
measures enacted by the Stalinists had bolstered the right. Trotsky observed that “when Stalin 
makes the crushing of the left wing of the party the main focus of his work, . . . he strengthens 
them [i.e., the Thermidorians] and weakens the positions of the proletariat.”234  
Trotsky and the United Opposition considered both the centrist faction and its alliance 
with the right wing of the party to be inherently unstable. As far as the centrist faction was 
concerned, this seems to have been due to its lack of a firm class basis. In August 1927, Trotsky 
noted that the centrist faction was “already splitting into a Right and a Left wing, both of which 
are incessantly growing at the expense of the center.” Furthermore, he predicted this process 
would only accelerate in the event of war when the “Stalinist Center will inevitably melt 
away.”235 At the same time, the Platform argued that the uneasy alliance between the centrists 
and the party right was held together only by a mutual animosity toward the Opposition.236 
Throughout 1927 Trotsky and the Opposition repeatedly asserted that the defeat of the 
Opposition would bring to the surface all the suppressed tensions within the majority. In the 
summer of 1927, for example, Trotsky prophesied that if “the Opposition were to be ‘smashed,’ 
then the majority faction backsliding to the right, would immediately begin to be split up into 
new factional groupings, with all the ensuing consequences.”237  
The final tendency in the Soviet Union, according to Trotsky and the United Opposition, 
was the far left of the party. Most importantly, this tendency was embodied in the Opposition 
itself, the “Leninist wing of the party,” which was “fighting for a rectification of the party line 
and a restoration of normality in the party regime.”238 Although the Opposition admitted that it 
was a minority within the party, it predicted that, once the Platform was circulated, “the working 
class sections of the party and all genuine Leninists will be for it.”239 Included among the 
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 “genuine Leninists” were a large number of the officials within the “agencies of administration 
and leadership” of the party, state, and mass organizations. Within these institutions, the 
Platform claimed, “there are to be found many thousands of sturdy revolutionists, workers who 
have not lost their ties with the masses but who give themselves heart and soul to the workers’ 
cause.”240 
5.3.5 The Struggle against Bureaucratism and Thermidor  
The strategy pursued by the Opposition flowed directly from the preceding analysis. 
Most importantly, this analysis dictated that, for the time being, the Opposition would attempt to 
reform Soviet political institutions, and not to organize a new revolution. In December 1927 
Trotsky argued that the struggle of the Opposition against the danger of Thermidor was a “class 
struggle,” while noting that the class struggle necessarily took different forms in different 
situations. He explained, “The struggle aimed at tearing the power from the hands of another 
class is revolutionary.”241 Such would be the character of the class struggle in the event of 
Thermidor when “the Opposition would lead the revolutionary cadres of Bolshevism over to the 
struggle against the bourgeois state.”242 However, as long as the bourgeoisie had not reconquered 
the state, political power remained, in some sense, in the hands of the proletariat. Thus, the 
Opposition was obliged to confine its activities to attempts at reform: 
 
The struggle for changes (sometimes of a decisive character, but 
still under the rule of the same class) is a reformist struggle. Power 
has not yet been torn from the hands of the proletariat. It is still 
possible to rectify our political course, remove the elements of dual 
power, and to reinforce the dictatorship [of the proletariat] by 
measures of a reformist kind.243  
Furthermore, since the party itself was still reformable, and since any attempt to establish a 
second party would set the Opposition on the road of revolution, the United Opposition had to 
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 conduct its struggle within the limits of the Communist Party. Thus, Trotsky explained at the 
Fifteenth Party Conference, 
 
Those who believe that our state is not a proletarian state, and that 
our development is not socialist, must lead the proletariat against 
such a state and must found another party. 
But those who believe that our state is a proletarian state, 
but with bureaucratic deformations formed under the pressure of 
the petty-bourgeois elements and the capitalist encirclement; . . . 
these must use party methods and party means to combat that 
which they hold to be wrong, mistaken, or dangerous.244 
The immediate goal of the Opposition was to arouse and mobilize the working class 
members of the party to press for a correction of the party regime and political line. Thus, the 
Platform declared the conviction of the Opposition that “the fundamental mass of the working 
class section of the party will prove able in spite of everything to bring the party back to the 
Leninist road.”245 In a memorandum written in November 1927, Trotsky reaffirmed that “the 
Opposition is fighting for influence in the party, above all for influence upon the proletarian core 
of the party.”246 As part of this struggle, the United Opposition addressed its demands, far more 
than had the 1923 Opposition, to the concerns of the Soviet working class. Throughout 1926-
1927 it circulated its statements and manifestos within the party’s working class cells; and, 
whenever possible, its leaders directly addressed meetings of workers. 
However, the United Opposition found it exceedingly difficult to implement this strategy. 
In particular, they discovered that it was virtually impossible to carry its message to the 
proletarian core of the party while abiding by officially accepted “party methods.” Whenever 
leaders of the United Opposition appeared before meetings of workers, or even distributed its 
statements within factory cells of the party, they were accused of “factionalism” and threatened 
with expulsion. Although Trotsky and the United Opposition explicitly recognized the legitimacy 
of the prohibition against party factions, they repeatedly tried to circumvent this ban by defining 
their activities as those of a loose “grouping,” not a disciplined “faction,” or by claiming that 
their violations of party rules were justified by exceptional circumstances. Thus, in his June 1926 
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 letter to the Central Committee Trotsky stated, “That a ruling party, under conditions of 
revolutionary dictatorship, cannot accept a regime of contending factions is absolutely 
unquestionable.” Nevertheless, he insisted that “under a closed-off apparatus regime, which only 
gives orders but permits no control over itself, the formation of groupings is generally the only 
possible way to make corrections in apparatus policy.”247 In other statements the United 
Opposition openly admitted it had engaged in factional activities, but justified these as a 
response to the factionalism of the majority.248 At the same time, the Opposition repeatedly 
demanded that the leadership circulate its speeches, articles, and statements to the entire party 
and that it open a party-wide discussion in preparation for the Fifteenth Party Congress. 
However, to avoid expulsion for the party, the Opposition ultimately was compelled to conduct 
the most important debates of its struggle within the walls of the Kremlin. There, the best they 
could hope for was to win the sympathies of the “genuine Leninists” remaining in the party 
apparatus.  
When the United Opposition was able to obtain a hearing within the proletarian cells of 
the party, it encountered an even greater obstacle: the passivity of the Soviet working class. 
Because of the depth and complexity of this problem, Trotsky had little hope that it could be 
rectified immediately or in the short run. That is why, at time of the formation of the United 
Opposition, Trotsky advised Zinoviev and Kamenev that the Opposition “must aim far ahead.” 
That is also why Trotsky insisted in late 1927 that the principal method of the Opposition was 
“propaganda, that is, explaining its views, applying them to specific questions, and defending 
them.”249 Nevertheless, Trotsky and the United Opposition repeatedly declared their confidence 
that, in the long run and with the aid of the Opposition, the proletarian nucleus would arise and 
reassert its control over the party. Thus, the Platform proclaimed the Opposition’s conviction 
that “the fundamental mass of the working class section of the party will prove able in spite of 
everything to bring the party back to the Leninist road.”250 Or again: “This working class section 
of the party will reawaken. It will find out what is really happening. It will take the fate of the 
party into its own hands. To help the vanguard of the workers in this process is the task of the 
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 Opposition.”251 According to Trotsky, one factor that could contribute to the reawakening of the 
Soviet proletariat would be an upsurge in the international revolution in the West or the East.252 
On the other hand, he believed that the Soviet working class might revive once it clearly 
perceived the domestic consequences of the rightist economic policies of the party leadership. As 
Trotsky warned the Central Committee in February 1927, “The increased activism of the 
nonproletarian classes inevitably will bring the proletariat to its feet. It will arise to defend itself 
and, when conditions become at all favorable, will go over to the offensive.”253  
5.4 ON THE EVE OF THERMIDOR  
In the fall of 1927 the internal party struggle escalated feverishly toward its climax. The 
Opposition, determined to proceed with the pre-Congress discussion, exerted every effort to 
bring its program before the proletarian component of the party. At the same time the party 
leadership was equally determined to silence the Opposition. It resorted to unprecedented 
methods of repression, culminating in the expulsion of the leaders of the Opposition and a large 
number of their supporters. On the basis of this repression, Trotsky concluded that the Soviet 
state was teetering on the brink of Thermidor. 
On September 6 the United Opposition again addressed the Politburo and the presidium 
of the CCC, protesting the persecution of its adherents and demanding the return of banished 
Oppositionists to participate in a full pre-Congress debate. Furthermore, it called for the 
publication and circulation of its platform as part of the party discussion. The party leadership 
rejected the demand for publication of the Platform on the grounds that it had no desire to 
legalize the Oppositional faction. Instead, the leadership was prepared to permit only the 
publication of brief counter-theses to its own official theses.254 
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 Short of total surrender, the only alternative left to the Opposition was to publish and 
circulate the Platform on its own. On the night of September 12-13 the GPU raided a house 
where a handful of Oppositionists were duplicating the Platform on typewriters. The following 
day the GPU reported to the CCC that it had uncovered an “illegal printshop, which was 
publishing the antiparty documents of the Opposition prohibited by the party.”255 Involved in the 
affair was a former officer of Wrangel’s White Guards who, the GPU alleged, was also tied to a 
“military conspiracy.” Fourteen Oppositionists involved in the duplication of the Platform were 
expelled from the party, and one, Mrachkovskii, was imprisoned.256  
Meanwhile, in response to inquiries from Opposition leaders V. Menzhinskii, the head of 
the GPU, admitted that the former “Wrangel officer” was an employee of the secret police. The 
Opposition immediately protested that an agent provocateur had been utilized to create the 
impression that it was working hand in hand with White Guardists and military conspirators.257 
To this, Stalin replied, 
But is there anything wrong in this former Wrangel officer helping 
the Soviet authorities to unmask counter-revolutionary 
conspiracies? Who can deny the right of the Soviet authorities to 
win former officers to their side in order to employ them for the 
purpose of unmasking counter-revolutionary organisations?258  
On September 27 the presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist 
International met to consider the expulsion of Trotsky, Rakovskii, and Vuiović from the ECCI. 
Again, Trotsky denounced the opportunist deviations of the Comintern and the “Stalinist regime” 
in the party “which has now been transplanted in its entirety into the Comintern.” He described 
the incident with the Wrangel officer as an example of “Thermidorian slander” and “Bonapartist 
frameups.”259 After a heated debate that lasted through the night, the expulsions were approved. 
A few weeks later the party leadership abruptly proclaimed a number of leftward 
revisions in economic policy. On October 10 Bukharin called for “a reinforced offensive against 
capitalist elements and, first of all, against the kulak.” Then, at the opening session of the 
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 Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Congress of Soviets, Rykov announced that the 
proportion of peasant households exempted from taxation would be increased from twenty-five 
to thirty-five percent.260 At the same time, the party leadership unveiled a manifesto in honor of 
the tenth anniversary of the revolution that announced the introduction of a seven-hour workday 
and five-day workweek (in place of the eight-hour day and six-day week) with no cut in pay.261 
To a large degree, these measures seem to have been motivated by the desire of the party 
leadership to undercut the potential appeal of the Opposition’s Platform among the working 
class. At a subsequent session of the CC, Trotsky insisted that these measures did not 
fundamentally alter the rightist character of the official economic policy: 
 
Today’s shouting about “forced pressure” on the kulak—that same 
kulak to whom yesterday they were shouting “Enrich 
yourselves!”—cannot change the general line. Anniversary 
celebration surprises, such as a seven-hour workday, cannot 
change it either. . . . The political line of the present leadership is 
not defined by these individual adventuristic gestures.262 
Trotsky denounced the shortening of the workday as transparent demagogy, pointing out 
that it had been introduced without regard for any of the existing long-term economic plans. 
Furthermore, the manifesto contained only vague promises to introduce the seven-hour day 
among certain categories of workers at some indefinite point in the future.263   
Continuing its efforts to win the allegiance of the proletarian section of the party, the 
Opposition launched a campaign to get 20-30,000 signatures to its Platform prior to the Fifteenth 
Party Congress. (Ultimately, it succeeded only in obtaining 5,000-6,000.) Meanwhile, the 
Opposition’s hopes of a proletarian resurgence were renewed by an event that occurred on 
October 15. Immediately after the session of the CEC, demonstrations were held in Leningrad to 
celebrate the seven-hour day. The demonstrators filed past the main body of officials, but 
recognizing Trotsky and Zinoviev on a separate reviewing stand, gathered in a crowd of 
thousands around them, waving and shouting greetings. Zinoviev, convinced that this 
spontaneous demonstration indicated mass support, was immediately optimistic about the 
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 chances of success. Trotsky shared Zinoviev’s view that the demonstration indicated deep 
popular dissatisfaction with the party heads, but warned that it would impel the leadership to 
accelerate the destruction of the Opposition.264 
The October plenum of the CC-CCC convened to approve the majority’s economic theses 
for the Fifteenth Party Congress. However, in the course of the plenum Stalin renewed his 
demand for the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. The session was 
marked by a high degree of violence. Both Trotsky and Zinoviev were shouted down, and books 
and a water glass were thrown at Trotsky while he spoke.265 In his address Trotsky repeatedly 
returned to the theme of “Thermidor.” Again, he raised the issue of the “Wrangel officer,” 
describing this as an example of a “Thermidorian amalgam.” Stalin’s goal, according to Trotsky, 
was “to split the party, to cut off the Opposition, to accustom the party to the method of physical 
destruction.” To these ends, Stalin and his supporters had resorted to expelling and arresting 
Oppositionists, and to “fascist methods” such as the shouting down or beating up Oppositionists, 
and throwing books and stones. In attempting to destroy the Opposition, Trotsky warned, Stalin 
was carrying out the social orders of Ustrialov. However, the Opposition would not be silenced. 
Defiantly, Trotsky concluded, “Expel us. You will not stop the victory of the Opposition—the 
victory of the revolutionary unity of our party and the Communist International!”266 
Subsequently, the plenum unanimously approved the expulsion of Trotsky and Zinoviev from 
the Central Committee.267 
Once again the Opposition attempted to take its case to the masses. On the tenth 
anniversary of the October Revolution, Oppositionists marched in the official parades in 
Moscow and Leningrad, carrying banners with their own slogans: “Strike against the NEPman 
and the bureaucrat!”, “Down with opportunism!”, “Carry out Lenin’s testament!”, “Beware of a 
split in the party!”, and “Preserve Bolshevik unity!”268 Police and agents of the majority 
leadership ripped these banners from the hands of the demonstrators and beat up large numbers 




When Bolsheviks are beaten up because they call for turning our 
fire to the right, against kulak, NEPman, and bureaucrat, then the 
danger of Thermidor is at hand. Those who do the beating, those 
who organize the beatings, and those who regard them with 
indulgence are Thermidorians or connivers at Thermidor.269 
 In reply to Trotsky’s request for a special inquiry into the events in Moscow and 
Leningrad, the CC and CCC called upon the Opposition cease its illegal, anti-party meetings. 
When Trotsky and Zinoviev stalked out of this joint session in protest, they were expelled from 
the party, while five more Oppositionists were removed from the CC and six were dropped from 
the CCC. A few days later Adolf Ioffe—a prominent Soviet diplomat and a close friend of 
Trotsky’s—committed suicide in protest against Trotsky’s expulsion. Ioffe’s funeral was the 
occasion for the last public demonstration of the Opposition and Trotsky’s final public speech in 
the Soviet Union.270 
By this point the Opposition was in disarray. Zinoviev and Kamenev now balked at 
further oppositional activity out of fear that the expulsions would push the Opposition onto the 
road of a second party, while Trotsky urged a continuation of the struggle. Still, the Opposition 
managed to close ranks in a final appeal to the Fifteenth Party Congress for unity. In a statement 
signed by 121 Oppositionists, the United Opposition agreed to accept part of the responsibility 
for the crisis in the party, promised to renounce factionalism and abide by the decisions of the 
party congress, and called upon the congress to readmit Oppositionists who had been expelled 
and release those who had been imprisoned. At the congress, Stalin rejected the Opposition 
statement as inadequate, and a resolution was passed declaring adherence to the Opposition as 
incompatible with membership in the party.271 
Stalin’s intransigence immediately provoked a split in the Opposition. On December 10 
the Trotskyist and Zinovievist groupings issued separate statements—the Zinovievist statement 
being the more conciliatory of the two. Again, the congress declared both statements to be 
inadequate. Subsequently, a special commission expelled 75 more Oppositionists from the party. 
Finally, on December 19 Kamenev offered the congress a statement of total capitulation in which 
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 the Zinovievists renounced their “anti-Leninist” views. The congress then subjected the 
Zinovievists to the final insult by rejecting their recantation and granting the expelled 
Oppositionists only the option of applying individually for readmission after six months had 
elapsed. Immediately after the congress, 1,500 more Oppositionists were expelled and 2,500 
signed capitulatory statements.272 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
During the years 1926-1927 Trotsky and the United Opposition developed a theory of 
Soviet bureaucracy that was able to account for a wide range of political and social phenomena, 
and yet was remarkably simple and elegant. To a large extent, this theory elaborated upon 
Trotsky’s previous insights from the period 1923-1925. At the same time, it represented a 
deepening of Trotsky’s commitment to the traditional Marxist analysis of bureaucracy. 
According to that understanding, there is a direct interrelationship between the rise of political 
alienation in a society, and the growing power of exploitative classes. In the period examined in 
this chapter, Trotsky found considerable evidence—including developments in economic, 
international, and regime policy areas—that this was increasingly the case in the USSR. It is 
beyond the scope of this work to attempt a full evaluation of Trotsky’s perception of these 
developments and the United Opposition’s programmatic alternative. Nevertheless, perhaps a 
few words in this regard are in order. 
For the most part, Trotsky’s views on international policy matters in this period seem to 
have been generally sound. Although Trotsky probably exaggerated the potential of the British 
general strike in 1926, his critique of the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee made 
sense, both from the point of view of revolutionary politics and Soviet foreign policy 
considerations.273 Even more convincing was his criticism of Comintern policy in China. 
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 Preoccupied with other matters and constrained by his alliance with the Zinovievists, Trotsky 
was slow in turning his attention to Chinese developments. However when he did so his analysis 
and predictions proved to be amazingly accurate. There is, of course, no way to know whether 
Trotsky’s approach would have fared better in China than Stalin’s. However, it is hard to 
imagine how it could have fared worse.274 Finally, regarding the main Soviet international 
doctrine of this period, the theory of socialism in one country, there is little question that Trotsky 
and the Opposition were on much firmer ideological ground than were their adversaries. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this ideological correctness counted for little among the 
Soviet masses who were increasingly cynical about revolutionary appeals. 
Trotsky’s and the Opposition’s economic views were somewhat more problematic. The 
Opposition convincingly argued the need for a more vigorous industrialization policy to combat 
a broad range of economic problems, including the growing social differentiation in the 
countryside, difficulties in grain collection, the inability of state industry to satisfy consumer 
demand, the expansion of urban unemployment, and shortages in workers’ housing. By 1926-
1927 even Bukharin had come to recognize the validity of the Opposition’s views in this 
respect.275 Furthermore, in the light of Stalin’s later economic successes, it is evident that a rapid 
tempo of industrialization certainly was possible in the Soviet Union. However, it is unclear 
whether the Opposition’s program of industrialization could have been realized as painlessly as 
the Opposition suggested, or without a simultaneous curtailment of democracy. In the plan of the 
Opposition the main resources for industrialization were to be obtained by imposing a forced 
grain loan and a steeply progressive tax upon the top ten percent of the peasantry. Could this 
have been done without reducing the incentive of the most productive peasants—the kulaks and 
the middle peasants who aspired to become kulaks—to produce? The Opposition insisted that it 
could, arguing, “Our tax policy by no means ‘strips’ the kulak. It does not hinder him in the least 
from concentrating in his hands a continually greater accumulation in money and kind.”276 We 
cannot know if the peasant would have agreed.277  
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 More importantly, there is the question of whether the Opposition could have carried out 
its policy of rapid industrialization while simultaneously implementing its democratic and anti-
bureaucratic reforms. It has been suggested that, in advocating rapid industrialization, increased 
pressure on the kulaks, and collectivization, the Opposition anticipated all of the brutality and 
repression of Stalin’s later “revolution from above.”278 As far as the Opposition’s explicit 
program is concerned, this simply is not true. As a number of contemporary scholars have 
demonstrated, the United Opposition’s economic program lay solidly within the gradualist 
framework of the New Economic Policy. The tempo of industrialization advocated by the 
Opposition never approached the rate later ordered by Stalin; the Opposition’s call for a forced 
loan and increased taxation of the kulak was far different from Stalin’s later de-kulakization 
campaign; and the collectivization advocated by the Opposition was intended to be fully 
voluntary.279 However, it is possible that the effort to industrialize by extracting social surplus 
from the kulaks would have required the use of coercion and would have contributed to the 
growth of bureaucratism, despite the intentions of the Opposition. Thus, John Molyneaux has 
argued, 
 
It is unlikely that sufficient surplus could be extracted without the 
use of force and without provoking a grain strike (as, in fact, 
happened) . . . . Ultimately the problem was that the extraction of a 
large surplus from a poor workforce . . . on the basis of a low 
productivity of labor . . . cannot be done by exhortation alone—it 
requires coercion and it requires a social agency with a material 
interest in the process. In the Soviet Union this instrument of 
forced accumulation was the very bureaucracy Trotsky was trying 
to oppose.280 
As far as the political sphere is concerned, Trotsky and the United Opposition provided 
what appears to be a fully accurate and well-documented critique of the continuing deterioration 
of the democratic norms and traditions of the Bolshevik Party and of the Soviet state and mass 
institutions. Furthermore, they offered a real alternative to these developments in their demands 
for the enforcement of the electoral principle for all offices, for the right of all party members to 
present their views to the party, and for an end to the persecution of party dissidents. However, 
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 there continued to be serious weaknesses in the Opposition’s program for the reform of Soviet 
political institutions. Most importantly, there was still no admission that one-party rule and the 
ban on party factions may have had a corrosive effect upon the political activity of the working 
class. In fact, the Platform even went so far as to argue, “The dictatorship of the proletariat 
imperiously demands a single and united proletarian party as the leader of the working masses 
and the poor peasantry. Such unity, unweakened by factional strife, is unconditionally necessary 
to the proletariat in the fulfillment of its historic mission.”281 It is possible that many of the 
Opposition leaders, including Trotsky, sincerely believed in the legitimacy of these restrictions 
on political activity.282 Regarding the question of one-party rule, the Opposition may have feared 
that the legalization of oppositional parties would strengthen the Mensheviks and other conscious 
Thermidorians. It is also clear that in the context of the party struggle of 1926-1927 it would 
have been politically suicidal for the Opposition to advocate openly either freedom for 
contending factions or a multi-party system. Nevertheless, acceptance of these restrictions also 
carried a price. To maintain the fiction that they were simply a loose grouping of like-minded 
party members, the Opposition leaders repeatedly were forced to abandon propaganda work 
among their natural constituency—party and non-party workers. 
Beyond these programmatic points, there is the question of the validity of Trotsky’s and 
the Opposition’s perception of the fundamental dynamics involved in Soviet politics in the late 
1920s. Was it true that the basic conflict in the Soviet Union was between the proletariat and the 
exploitative layers of Soviet society? Did the policies of the party leadership largely reflect the 
prevailing balance of class forces in the Soviet Union? Was the fundamental cleavage within the 
party really between the party’s right and left wings? Was the Soviet Union sliding dangerously 
close to a Thermidorian restoration of capitalism? All of these views were part of what has been 
called Trotsky’s “somewhat fantastic perception of the USSR in the late twenties and early 
thirties.”283 Yet, in the context of that time, the analysis of the United Opposition did not appear 
so fantastic. It is probably true that the Opposition exaggerated the size of the kulak stratum of 
the peasantry.284 However, it is clear that during the late 1920s the economic power and political 
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influence of the kulaks and the NEPmen were on the rise, and that this was perceived as a threat 
by a large part of the party leadership.285 At the same time, intelligent conservative observers 
such as Ustrialov, believing that the party majority’s economic policies could facilitate a 
restoration of capitalism, supported the majority against the Opposition. In fact, if one does not 
look beyond 1927, the analysis of Trotsky examined in this chapter offered a plausible account 
of the dynamics of Soviet politics in the late 1920’s. 
Nevertheless, subsequent developments demonstrated that Trotsky’s analysis in this 
period was deeply flawed.286 Trotsky anticipated that the party centrists would be unable to resist 
the pressures from the right without the countervailing pressure exerted by the United 
Opposition; and he predicted that the defeat of the United Opposition would accelerate the 
disintegration of the centrist faction, strengthen the right wing in the party, and lead to a 
Thermidorian restoration of capitalism. In fact, the “centrist faction” proved to be far more 
durable and more radical than Trotsky’s analysis suggested. After crushing the United 
Opposition in late 1927, Stalin was able to turn on his allies within the party leadership and to 
destroy the Right Opposition. Far from inaugurating a Thermidor, the defeat of the United 
Opposition was followed by radical shifts to the left in both economic and international policy. 
According to Trotsky’s theory, the subsequent expropriation of the Soviet kulak and virtual 
eradication of free enterprise within the USSR should have eliminated the soil upon which 
political alienation thrived. Instead, by Trotsky’s own account, the party regime after 1927 was 
characterized by the unprecedented centralization of authority, repression of free discussion, and 
smothering of “workers’ democracy.” In the years 1928-1933, Trotsky attempted to come to 
grips with these developments theoretically. Initially, he was inclined to dismiss them as 
insignificant, or even to view them as confirming the perspective of the United Opposition. 
Subsequently, he was forced to resort to a series of highly strained interpretations of events and 
ad hoc theoretical modifications in order to reconcile them with his theory. 
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 6.0  LEFT TURN AND THEORETICAL CRISIS 
In 1928-29, Trotsky’s theory of bureaucracy entered what could be described as a period of 
crisis.1 Repeatedly, unfolding events contradicted the expectations and predictions Trotsky had 
derived from the theory he had developed in the party struggle of 1926-27. During that struggle, 
Trotsky had come to view the Opposition as the only force within the party capable of 
implementing a genuinely leftist, proletarian course. Furthermore, he had predicted that if the 
Opposition were crushed and no major proletarian upsurge occurred, the most likely results 
would include the disintegration of the centrist current, the conquest of power by the party right, 
the shifting of the party’s economic and international policies to the right, and the probable 
restoration of capitalism.2 In late 1927 and early 1928 the Opposition was beaten decisively and 
thousands of Oppositionists, including Trotsky, were exiled to remote regions of the Soviet 
Union. However, instead of moving to the right, the party leadership actually initiated what 
could be interpreted as a dramatic policy shift to the left that would continue to deepen in the 
following years. Furthermore, instead of dissolving, the Stalinist current within the leadership 
ultimately emerged triumphant in a power struggle with its moderate opponents. 
In the face of this widening gulf between theory and reality, a growing number of 
Oppositionists began to reject the theory. Trotsky himself responded to the theoretical crisis as 
scientists and politicians commonly do: he continued to insist upon the validity of his theory.3 To 
maintain this position, Trotsky found it necessary to resort to highly strained interpretations of 
events, squeezing and trimming reality to fit into a Procrustean theoretical bed. On other 
occasions, he explained various developments by introducing ad hoc modifications into his 
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 analysis, stretching it to accommodate troublesome facts that could not be explained away.4 
Throughout this period Trotsky’s adherence to the theory he had developed in 1926-1927 
continued to lead him to make further erroneous predictions. However, during the same period, 
Trotsky began to revise that theory in a number of significant ways. 
6.1 THE BEGINNING OF THE LEFT TURN 
During the weeks following the Fifteenth Party Congress, thousands of supporters of the 
“Trotskyist” wing of the Opposition were arrested and exiled to remote regions of the Soviet 
Union. 5 On January 17, 1928 Trotsky himself was apprehended by the G.P.U. and, with his wife 
Natalia Sedova and son Lev Sedov, was deported to Alma Ata, capital of Kazakhstan.6 While 
reestablishing contact with the scattered colonies of exiles, in the spring of 1928 Trotsky began 
preparing a series of documents to be submitted to the upcoming Sixth Congress of the 
Communist International in July.7 At the same time, much of his effort during this period was 
devoted to analyzing important shifts that were already taking place in both Comintern and 
domestic policy.  
The first indications of a turn in the policy of the Communist International were evident 
in China as early as the summer of 1927. Following the expulsion of the Chinese Communist 
Party from the Guomindang in July 1927, an Emergency Conference of the CCP was convened 
in Hankou on August 7. Acting upon instructions from the Comintern, the conference placed the 
blame for the recent failures of the party on the “opportunist policy of capitulation” allegedly 
advocated by Chen Duxiu. Furthermore, it endorsed a new strategy of armed insurrection already 
being implemented at Nanchang. The result of this strategic shift was a series of failed uprisings 
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 that culminated in the Canton Commune of December 11-13, an abortive insurrection in which 
approximately 5,700 revolutionaries were killed.8  
During the following months, the turn was tentatively extended to other sections of the 
Comintern. At the Fifteenth Party Congress Stalin announced that “Europe is now plainly 
entering the phase of a new revolutionary upsurge”; and Bukharin declared that the immediate 
task of Communists was “to sharpen the struggle against social-democracy and, in particular, 
against the so-called ‘Left’ social democratic leaders.”9 Further indications of a shift to the left 
were evident at the ninth plenum of the ECCI in February 1928. Although Bukharin devoted the 
bulk of his report at that plenum to the struggle against “the so-called Trotskyite opposition,” he 
introduced a new note by stressing the need for “a struggle against Right deviations within the 
communist parties.” Similarly, the resolutions on the British and French parties approved by the 
plenum emphasized the themes of mass radicalization and the importance of intensifying the 
struggle against social democracy.10 
Meanwhile, a parallel left turn also had begun in Soviet economic policy. As we have 
seen, in October 1927 Bukharin called for a “reinforced offensive against capitalist elements, 
and, first of all, against the kulak.”11 In December, the Fifteenth Party Congress endorsed 
proposals for a “more decisive offensive against the kulak,” and for the “gradual transformation 
of individual peasant holdings” into large-scale collective farms. However, at this point there 
was no suggestion that a radical change in policy was being proposed. At the Congress party 
leaders continued to stress the moderate nature of the anti-kulak measures they were advocating, 
as well as the necessarily gradual character of collectivization.12 
The issue that finally precipitated an abrupt revision of economic policy was a crisis in 
the collection of grain. Through the spring and summer of 1927, grain collections had proceeded 
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 well, even running somewhat ahead of schedule. However, by the end of the year these began to 
fall off so sharply that the grain collected in November and December totaled less than half the 
collections of the last two months of 1926. Increasingly, the party leadership grew alarmed over 
the prospect of food shortages and a general disruption of economic plans. In December 1927 the 
Central Committee issued two directives to local party organizations urging the intensification of 
efforts to bring in the grain. Simultaneously, the leadership ordered an increase in supplies of 
industrial goods to key regions in order to stimulate grain sales. When these measures failed to 
produce results, on January 6 the Politburo issued a third directive that threatened leaders of local 
party organizations with severe penalties if they failed “to secure a decisive improvement in 
grain procurements within a very short time.” Additionally, 30,000 party workers, including 
some of the highest party leaders, were dispatched throughout the country to assist in the 
collection.13  
Contemporary research has suggested that the causes of the procurement crisis were 
many and complex. Various aspects of the problem included a poor harvest in the main regions 
of market production, weaknesses in transport, deficiencies in the state collections apparatus, and 
passivity on the part of state grain collections agencies. However, much of the crisis also was due 
to conscious withholding of grain by the peasants. To a large degree, this had been made possible 
by the growing prosperity of a layer of the peasantry. In this period many better-off peasants 
found themselves in a position to pay their taxes and make necessary purchases out of their 
savings, while holding onto their grain in anticipation of higher prices in the spring. In 1927 
these peasants withheld grain partially in reaction to agricultural price policies set by the state. 
Late that year official prices of grain were lowered, while prices of livestock products and 
industrial crops remained relatively high. Quite reasonably, peasants who were in a position to 
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 do so sold livestock products, but kept their grain as a reserve. Furthermore, peasants were 
discouraged from selling by the general shortage of industrially produced goods that could be 
purchased with the proceeds of grain sales. That year in particular the chronic “goods famine” 
was aggravated by the panic buying that accompanied the war scare. At the same time, peasants 
also hoarded their grain in direct response to the growing threat of war. Finally, it seems that 
some peasants withheld their grain simply because they anticipated that the string of good 
harvests they had experienced from 1925 to 1927 could not last for another year.14 
Despite the complexity of the problem, party leaders, and especially Stalin, placed the 
blame for the grain crisis squarely upon the kulak. As Stalin argued to party officials in western 
Siberia, the problem was that the Soviet kulak was engaging in “unbridled speculation.”15 
Similarly, an anonymous Pravda editorial of February 15—believed by some to have been 
written by Stalin, despite the fact that Bukharin was the editor of Pravda— explained, 
The rural economy has increased and prospered. Above all the 
kulak has increased and prospered. Three good harvests have not 
gone for nothing. An increase in the revenues of the peasants from 
crops other than grain, from animal husbandry and from industrial 
earnings, together with the relative backwardness in general in the 
supply of industrial goods, have given the peasant in general, and 
the kulak in particular, the opportunity to hold back grain products 
in order to force prices up.16 
As a secondary cause, Stalin argued that speculation had been facilitated by local party and state 
officials who had been negligent in their struggle against the kulaks. He taunted the Siberian 
officials, “Can it be that you are afraid to disturb the tranquility of the kulak gentry?!”17  
To deal with the crisis, the party leadership resorted to a series of “exceptional” or 
“extraordinary” measures. First, it called upon local officials to order the kulaks to deliver all 
their grain surpluses immediately at government prices. If the kulaks refused, they were to be 
prosecuted for speculation under Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and their 
surpluses were to be confiscated. To ensure the allegiance of the majority of the peasantry, the 
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 leadership attempted to foster class struggle in the countryside by announcing that twenty-five 
percent of the surpluses collected would be resold to poor and middle peasants at low 
government prices or distributed in the form of long-term loans. Prosecuting and judicial 
officials who resisted the application of Article 107 were to be dismissed. None of these 
immediate measures addressed what was viewed as the ultimate source of the grain crisis—the 
existence of a powerful kulak stratum among the peasantry. However, in a portent of things to 
come, Stalin asserted that the final solution to the kulak problem required the collectivization of 
agriculture.18  
In practice, the extent and severity of the coercive measures applied in the countryside far 
exceeded those officially endorsed by the party leadership. Local party officials quickly 
discovered that the bulk of the grain surpluses were not held by the kulak, but by the middle 
peasant. Faced with demands from the center to collect large quantities of grain on penalty of 
expulsion from the party, they extended the extraordinary measures to middle and even poor 
peasants. Markets were forcibly closed so that peasants would be compelled to sell their grain to 
the state procurement organizations. As in the civil war, grain quotas were assigned to individual 
households. Peasant hoarders were publicly ostracized, barred from purchasing goods at village 
cooperative stores, and expelled from the cooperatives. Militia units set up road blocks and 
conducted illegal house-to-house searches to confiscate grain. Finally, in some areas peasants 
were forcibly collectivized. During the early months of 1928 the harshness of the procurement 
campaign revived memories of War Communism to the extent that peasants were heard to 
observe, “The year ’19 is back.”19 
Although the Politburo had adopted the extraordinary measures unanimously, the 
implementation of these policies soon generated conflict within the leadership. The first sign of 
disagreement appears to have surfaced at the Politburo session of February 6. There, Aleksei 
Rykov, president of the Sovnarkom, reportedly exchanged angry words with Stalin over the 
latter’s proposal for a wholesale purge of party organizations in Siberia. Subsequently, Rykov, 
together with Mikhail Tomskii (chairman of the Central Trade Union Council), and Mikhail 
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 Kalinin (president of the Central Executive Committee), were able to restrain Stalin’s plan for 
the purge.20 Beyond that, it is likely that these moderates were responsible for pressuring Stalin 
and his supporters into disavowing some of the more extreme measures employed in the grain 
collection. In a Pravda article of February 12, the Stalin’s supporter Anastas Mikoian 
condemned some of the administrative measures of the campaign as “harmful, unlawful, and 
inadmissible.” The following day in a letter to local party officials, Stalin defended the use of 
emergency measures, but denied that these implied an abandonment of NEP, rejected the use of 
emergency measures against the middle peasants, and condemned the “distortions and excesses” 
that had occurred.21  
By April the crisis seemed to be over. Grain collections for January-March 1928 were far 
higher than those of the corresponding months of the previous year, and the collection for 1927-
1928 exceeded that of 1926-1927.22 The resolution adopted by the April plenum of the Central 
Committee represented a compromise between the Stalinists and the moderates within the party 
leadership. Although it continued to blame the kulak for the crisis and approved the recent use of 
extraordinary measures, it also condemned the “excesses” that had occurred, and pledged that the 
future offensive against the kulaks would be conducted in accordance with the methods of 
NEP.23 
However, by the end of April, grain collections began to fall off sharply. Partly, this 
seems to have been due to a poor harvest of winter wheat in the Ukraine and the northern 
Caucasus; partly, it was because most of the peasant’s grain reserves had been confiscated during 
the preceding three months.24 Again, the party leadership imposed the exceptional measures that 
had proven so successful in the winter. This time, the widespread “excesses” provoked a wave of 
discontent among the peasants who rioted and demonstrated in villages throughout the country.25  
The renewal of the grain crisis and the growth in peasant discontent further fueled the 
differences within the party leadership. Increasingly, Stalin and his supporters insisted that the 
ultimate source of the grain crisis was the private, individual character of Soviet agriculture. The 
only way out, Stalin argued, was through “the transition from individual peasant farming to 
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 collective, socially-conducted economy in agriculture.”26 At this point the moderates within the 
party leadership recoiled from both the use of extraordinary measures and from Stalin’s 
proposals for collectivization. Bukharin, who was beginning to emerge as the principal 
spokesman for the party right, publicly attacked the idea of a “class war” and “some kind of 
sudden leap” in agriculture. Privately, in letters to the Politburo in May and June, he warned that 
the emergency measures were alienating the whole peasantry, and he dismissed Stalin’s proposal 
for large-scale collectivization as nonsense. He called upon the Politburo to put an end to the 
emergency measures, to provide aid to the peasants, and to normalize market conditions. 
Meanwhile, lesser moderates denounced Stalin’s policies in even sharper terms.27   
Another domestic issue that contributed to the mounting tensions within the Politburo 
during this period was the “Shakhty affair.” In March it was announced that the OGPU had 
uncovered a conspiracy of technical specialists to sabotage production in the Shakhty mines of 
the Donets Basin of the Ukraine. Many of the fifty-five accused confessed to charges, now 
recognized as fabricated, of plotting with foreign powers to wreck Soviet industry. Throughout 
the ensuing show trial in May and June, the Soviet press, echoing Stalin’s pronouncements on 
the subject, utilized the Shakhty affair to demonstrate the need for greater vigilance against 
foreign and domestic class enemies, and particularly for closer supervision of the bourgeois 
specialists. For the moderates in the Politburo, this response represented a serious challenge. 
Most generally, it called into question their view that socialism could be constructed through the 
peaceful collaboration of all sectors of Soviet society. More specifically, it tended to discredit 
Rykov who headed the state apparatus that employed the specialists, and Tomskii who led the 
trade unions responsible for overseeing them. Rykov, Tomskii, and Bukharin publicly insisted 
that the Shakhty affair was an isolated incident, and warned against indulging in “specialist 
baiting.”28 
Meanwhile, in early 1928 a series of scandals were exposed in the party organizations of 
Smolensk and Artemovsk.29 Citing these and the Shakhty affair, on June 3 the Central 
Committee appealed to party members and workers to participate in the campaign of “self-
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 criticism” against “bureaucratism” initiated at the April plenum. Stalin clearly viewed this, at 
least in part, as an invitation to the masses to criticize rightist officials. He denounced “the 
bureaucratic elements . . . in our Party, government, trade-union, co-operative and all other 
organisations.” Echoing Trotsky, Stalin explained that “bureaucracy is a manifestation of 
bourgeois influence on our organizations.” Unable to openly oppose the campaign, the moderates 
within the party leadership could only warn of its potential “abuses.”30 
6.2 EXPLAINING THE TURN 
Despite previous signs that the leadership was contemplating a turn in both international 
and economic policy, Trotsky was unprepared for the events of early 1928. His first reaction to 
the extraordinary measures was to express satisfaction over this apparent confirmation of the 
correctness of the Opposition’s economic program. However, in early 1928 a growing number of 
Oppositionists began to recognize the serious challenge that the turn posed for Trotsky’s theory 
of bureaucracy and for his general political perspective. In contrast, Trotsky continued to insist 
upon the validity of his theory. Ultimately, Trotsky’s theory of bureaucratism shaped every 
aspect of his analysis of the turn. During this period, Trotsky’s theory led him to accept without 
criticism the Stalinist accounts of both the “kulak strike” and the Shakhty affair. At the same 
time, his theory led him to minimize the seriousness of the turn, to explain it in terms of shifts in 
the balance of class forces and/or as a consequence of Oppositional pressure, and to continue to 
predict that unless a major proletarian upsurge occurred both the left course and the Soviet 
workers’ state were doomed. 
Trotsky had not been at all impressed by the party leadership’s leftist initiatives in 
economic and Comintern policy in late 1927. In both cases, he viewed the new policies as 
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 temporary maneuvers that would be followed by deeper shifts to the right. As we have seen, he 
described Bukharin’s October call for an offensive against the kulaks and the anniversary 
declaration of the seven-hour workday as “individual adventuristic gestures” that would not 
change the general line. Together, according to Trotsky, these constituted a “zigzag to the left,” 
but “only a zigzag.”31 Similarly, his first reaction to the news of the abortive Canton insurrection 
was to characterize it as nothing but an “adventurist zigzag by the Comintern to the left,” in 
reaction to the debacle that had resulted from the previous “Menshevik policy” in China. He 
predicted that the disaster in Canton soon would be followed by “a new and longer zigzag to the 
right in the field of international politics, especially Chinese.”32 
Thus, the turn of early 1928 took Trotsky by surprise. His first reaction to the 
extraordinary measures was simply to gloat over this tacit admission by the leadership that the 
Opposition had been correct in its economic analysis. In spite of themselves, the party leaders 
had been forced to acknowledge the reality of kulak threat.33 In a letter to Lev Sosnovskii on 
March 5, Trotsky noted that the February 15 editorial in Pravda had attributed the difficulties in 
grain collection to the kulaks and to state and party officials conciliatory to the kulaks. Trotsky 
quipped, “Why, you know, this is an antiparty document, not an editorial.” He noted that when 
the Opposition had sounded the alarm about the kulak danger in the past, the leadership had 
accused it of advocating war communism; but now “when the kulak is squeezing your tail, then 
the matter is no longer literary and you even remember something from Marxism.” The 
“advantage” of the Opposition, Trotsky observed, was that it had “correctly foreseen.”34  
However, the truth was that neither Trotsky nor anyone else in the Opposition had 
“correctly foreseen” the turn. In fact, the turn of early 1928 directly contradicted Trotsky’s belief 
that only the Opposition could lead a genuine left turn, as well as his predictions that the 
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 crushing of the Opposition would result in the shifting of policy and power to the right while 
raising the immediate prospect of a Thermidor.  
Early in 1928 a small but growing number of Oppositionists began to recognize and to 
comment upon this contradiction and to urge that the Opposition seek reconciliation with the 
party leadership. As Isaac Deutscher has suggested, these “conciliators” were partially 
responding to the pressures that now confronted the individual members of the Opposition. Many 
had once held high political office; most had devoted years of sacrifice for the revolution; now 
all found themselves expelled from their party and subjected to the humiliation and hardship of 
exile.35 Beyond that, however, as Deutscher also notes, it was the left turn that led many to 
question the traditional analysis and political perspectives of the Opposition: 
The turn that events had taken appeared to call into question some 
of the Opposition’s major assumptions and predictions, especially 
its appraisal of the political trends within the party. Had we been 
right, some Trotskyists began to wonder, in denouncing Stalin as 
the protector of the kulak? Had we been justified in saying that 
once the left opposition was defeated, the inner-party balance 
would be so upset that the Bukharinist right would assert itself and 
sweep away the Stalinist centre? Had we not overrated the strength 
of the conservative elements in the party? The Stalinist faction, far 
from being overwhelmed, was beginning to overwhelm the right—
had we then not exaggerated with our Cassandra cries about the 
dangers of Thermidor? And had we, generally speaking, not gone 
too far in our struggle against Stalin?36 
Within the Opposition the left turn had provoked a theoretical crisis that was rapidly becoming a 
political one.  
The most prominent leaders of the conciliators included E. A. Preobrazhenskii and, by 
the summer of 1928, Karl Radek. Early in 1928 Preobrazhenskii argued that the party leaders 
had implemented the extraordinary measures in reaction to the kulak offensive and under the 
pressure of the mounting class struggle in Europe. In doing so, they had acted as the unconscious 
agents of historic necessity. Furthermore, Preobrazhenskii predicted that the leadership soon 
would be forced even deeper to the left as the class struggle in the countryside escalated. Thus, 
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 he concluded that the Opposition seriously had misread the situation, misjudging the role played 
by the Stalinists and exaggerating the danger from the right. In line with this analysis, 
Preobrazhenskii proposed that the Opposition request permission to convene a conference for the 
purpose of establishing an alliance with the party center.37 By the summer of 1928 Karl Radek 
had arrived at a similar view. Early in the summer he appealed to the Comintern Congress for the 
readmission of the expelled members of the Opposition. In his theses to the Comintern, Radek 
suggested that perhaps “‘a number of party leaders with whom we crossed swords yesterday are 
better than the theories which they defended,’” and he defined the task of the Opposition as one 
of “‘fighting ruthlessly . . . against all the evils against which the party is now mobilized.’”38  
Largely in reaction to the statements of the conciliators, in early 1928 an opposing 
current began to take shape at the opposite end of the Oppositional spectrum. This grouping, 
which became known as the “intransigents” or “irreconcilables,” tended to be younger, less 
concerned about economic questions, and more preoccupied with the issue of party democracy 
than the conciliators. Its leaders included Lev Sosnovskii, Boris Eltsin, and F. N. Dingel’shtedt.39 
In contrast to the conciliators, the intransigents were inclined simply to deny the significance of 
the extraordinary measures. As Dingel’shtedt wrote to Trotsky in July, “The measures have been 
provoked by the menace of famine and by economic crisis. [...] Mounting unemployment, the 
slowing down of industrialization continue: where is this new course?”40 Consequently, the 
intransigents angrily rejected conciliator proposals for a reconciliation with the Stalinists.41 
However, it does not appear that they did so out of loyalty to Trotsky’s theory. During this 
period, some of the more extreme intransigents were drawn toward the remnants of the old 
Democratic Centralist grouping, which had concluded that a Thermidor had already occurred and 
that it was time to form a new revolutionary party.42 
Trotsky ultimately adopted a position roughly mid-way between these two extremes. He 
was too concerned about policy issues, and too much of a realist simply to dismiss the shifts in 
economic and international policy as meaningless. At the same time, however, he was unwilling 
to give up the struggle against the leadership or to abandon his theory because of the turn. 
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 Against the intransigents, Trotsky insisted that the shift in policy was real and highly significant; 
but in contrast with the conciliators, he sharply criticized various aspects of the turn, which he 
now analyzed entirely from the perspective of his theory of bureaucracy.  
In early 1928 Trotsky agreed with the conciliators that a real and significant shift to the 
left had occurred in both economic and international policy. Thus, on May 9 Trotsky argued in a 
circular letter to the Opposition that “the decisions on domestic matters (in regard to the kulak, 
etc.) and the decisions of the recent ECCI . . . are unquestionably a step in our direction, that is, 
toward the correct path”; and he further described these policy changes as “a serious step to the 
left.”43 Similarly, in a circular letter written on July 17 Trotsky lectured a group of 
irreconcilables: “It is impermissible to have a formally negative approach to the left shift, to say: 
nothing has happened, only machinations; everything remains as before. No. The greatest events 
have happened and are happening.”44 
However, even while he was arguing that the new policies were an important 
development, throughout most of 1928-1929 Trotsky seems to have been somewhat more 
concerned with combating the tendency he perceived among the conciliators to exaggerate the 
significance of the shift that had occurred. Trotsky’s skepticism was understandable in light of 
the party leadership’s previous policy record. As he observed in early May, “After the 
experiences we have gone through, we must be more cautious than ever when a turn comes, 
giving no unnecessary credit in advance.”45 Besides that, Trotsky consistently measured the 
leadership’s turn against the entire program of the Opposition. When he did so in early 1928, he 
noted that the shift to the left in both economic and international policy fell far short of what the 
Opposition had demanded.46  
Beyond these considerations, however, much of Trotsky’s skepticism regarding the turn 
was inspired directly by his theory of bureaucracy. In this respect, part of Trotsky’s skepticism 
seems to have derived from the fact that, according to his theory, the party leadership was simply 
incapable of a serious turn to the left. For example, this attitude seems to be reflected in his 
evaluation of the turn in a May 16 letter to Aleksandr Beloborodov: 
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The authors of policy are stuck in a situation where some deep-
going, serious turn is necessary. But because of their entire 
position and all their ingrained habits they would like to carry out 
this unavoidable turn . . . by the methods of a bureaucratic 
maneuver.47 
More clearly, however, the influence of Trotsky’s theory is evident in the fact that he 
persistently evaluated the turn in terms of the nature of the party regime. As we have seen, 
Trotsky’s theory suggested a direct relationship between the opportunism of Soviet policy and 
the absence of proletarian democracy in the most important political institutions of the Soviet 
Union. One implication that Trotsky now drew from this was that a true left course would have 
to be accompanied or immediately followed by a profound reform of the party regime. 
Consequently, he viewed the character of the party regime—and particularly the treatment of the 
Opposition—as a critical indicator of the seriousness of the turn. As he explained in a May 23 
letter to Beloborodov,  
 
For us the party regime has no independent significance—it only 
expresses everything else. That is why any experienced and serious 
politician must necessarily ask, “If you think that a deep class shift 
in official policy had occurred, how do you explain the continuing 
‘export’ of people who are guilty only of having understood earlier 
and demanded a class shift earlier? . . . . [The treatment of the 
Opposition] is a faultless gauge of how serious, well thought out, 
and deep is the shift that has occurred.”48  
Approaching the same question from another angle, Trotsky asserted that only a healthy regime 
would enable the party to maintain a correct political line once it was established. Trotsky 
explicitly argued this position in a number of places, including a letter written June 2. In that 
letter Trotsky endorsed Khristian Rakovskii’s observation that “a correct political line is 
inconceivable without the correct methods for elaborating and realizing it,” and that even if the 
leadership happened to “stumble onto the tracks of a correct line,” without a dramatic 
improvement in the party regime there would still be no guarantees that the line would be carried 
out.49 Again, Trotsky’s conclusion was that the left turn was completely unreliable.50 
298 
 Even while downplaying the depth and significance of the turn, Trotsky insisted that in 
one respect it had actually had confirmed his own predictions. In his circular letter of May 9 
Trotsky reminded the exiled Oppositionists, “We predicted that the tail would strike the head and 
cause a realignment of forces.”51 Similarly, in his July “Declaration” to the Sixth Comintern 
Congress Trotsky asserted that the Opposition had foretold that the right-wing “tail” inside and 
outside the party “would inevitably strike at the [centrist] head, and that such a blow could 
become the starting point for a profound regroupment within the party.” According to Trotsky, 
this was exactly what had happened: “The bloodless kulak revolt of 1927-28, which occurred 
with the assistance of members of the party . . . is precisely a blow struck by the tail at the 
head.”52 However, in his May 23 letter to Beloborodov and again in a circular letter in September 
Trotsky conceded that he had made one small error in prediction. Trotsky admitted that in late 
1927 he had anticipated a “rather imminent economic shift to the right under the pressure of 
aggravated economic difficulties.” In fact, as it turned out, “the next shift was to the left.”53 
Nevertheless, in Trotsky’s estimation this was only “a partial mistake” and “one of a completely 
secondary character, within a correct overall prediction.”54   
According to Trotsky, this “partial” or “secondary” error hardly justified the major 
theoretical revisions that the conciliators were proposing. Against Preobrazhenskii’s contention 
that the “objective logic of the situation” had proven capable of forcing the leadership to turn 
left, Trotsky replied that the same “objective logic also existed two years and three years and one 
year ago.”55 Furthermore, he abruptly dismissed Preobrazhenskii’s contention that the right had 
turned out to be much weaker than the Opposition had thought, asserting: “To think that the right 
is weak is to understand nothing.”56 Finally, he ridiculed as non-Marxist Radek’s argument that 
many party leaders had turned out to be better than their theories: 
 
We Marxists have been accustomed to appraise leaders by their 
theory, through their theory, by the ability of leaders to understand 
and apply theory. Now it would seem that there may be excellent 
leaders who are accidentally armed with reactionary theories on 
almost all the basic questions.57 
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 In contrast to the conciliators, Trotsky was convinced that he could explain the left turn 
completely without abandoning or even significantly altering his theory. In a March 10 letter to I. 
N. Smirnov, Trotsky endorsed Smirnov’s view that the party leaders had instituted the domestic 
left turn as “a drastic attempt to get out of the difficulties they blundered into with their eyes 
closed.”58 Similarly, in a circular letter of June 24 he argued that the turn in agriculture had been 
“crudely empirical and at the same time panic-stricken.”59 But why had the party leadership 
turned left when confronted with difficulties instead of to the right as the Opposition had 
predicted? Previously, Trotsky had explained the fundamental dynamics of Soviet politics, 
including the growth of bureaucratism, in terms of the shifting balance of class forces in the 
country. Now, he attempted to utilize the same factor to explain the turn. In his “Declaration” to 
the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Trotsky asserted that the domestic left turn been “carried 
out under pressure, as yet vague and unformed, from the proletarian core of the party.”60 
Perhaps the clearest example of this argument appears in a letter by “an outstanding 
member of the Russian Opposition” written in April 1928. Although it has never been verified, 
the style and content strongly suggest that the author was Trotsky.61 According to this letter, a 
“revival in the spirit of the Russian working class” had been evident since 1926.62 In fact, the 
entire struggle of the Opposition since 1926 had been “just a reflection” of this working-class 
revival. Riding on the crest of this wave of proletarian discontent, the Opposition had launched 
its offensive, “expecting that the working class by simultaneous pressure would force the Central 
Committee to change its line.” Unfortunately, the working class did not come to the aid of the 
Opposition in time, and the apparatus was able to “stifle the voice of the working class, postpone 
the effects of its pressure, and meanwhile crush the opposition.”63  
However, according to the letter, Stalin had crushed the Opposition “at the last possible 
moment,” for “three months later he would not have been able to do so.” In early 1928 the 
working-class upsurge intensified in response to the difficulties in the grain collection and to the 
“Donets conspiracy,” both of which, according to the letter, had completely confirmed the 
Opposition’s analysis. The crisis in grain collections had “revealed the power and influence of 
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 the kulaks, and thus made it clear where such policies were leading.” At the same time the 
Shakhty affair had “revealed with special trenchancy the inner rottenness of the bureaucratic 
regime and its counterrevolutionary character.”64 (It should be noted that in various other 
statements from this period, Trotsky also accepted the veracity of Stalinist accounts of both the 
“kulak strike” and the Shakhty “conspiracy.”65) The proletariat had responded to these 
developments with the only form of protest at its disposal—the wildcat strike. The letter 
describes how a “mighty strike wave swept over the whole country,” and how “an even greater 
number of strikes were derailed at the last moment.” Faced with this display of proletarian 
militancy, “Stalin had no choice but to hastily proclaim a political turn to the left, and, in order to 
pacify the working class, raise the slogans of the opposition which the day before were 
characterized as counterrevolutionary.”66 
There is independent evidence that there really were widespread manifestations of 
working-class discontent in early 1928.67 However, if official strike statistics from this period 
can be believed, the characterization of these as “a mighty strike wave” appears to be somewhat 
of an exaggeration.68 Perhaps for this reason, in other accounts from early 1928 Trotsky put more 
emphasis on the role that the Opposition, the political current that most represented the interests 
of the proletariat, had played in forcing the left turn in agriculture. For example, in a letter to 
Beloborodov in May Trotsky insisted that “if all our previous work had not existed—our 
analyses, predictions, criticisms, exposés, and ever newer predictions—a sharp turn to the right 
would have occurred under the pressure of the grain collections crisis.” According to Trotsky, it 
was the “good, strong wedge” that the Opposition had driven in that had made it impossible for 
the party leadership “at this particular time, to seek a way out of the contradictions on the right 
path.”69 Trotsky never explained precisely how the Opposition’s criticism had blocked a right 
turn domestically. Most likely, he meant to suggest that the party leadership were afraid to turn 
right following the “grain strike” because they believed the workers would see this as a 
confirmation of the Opposition’s predictions and would rebel.  
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 In the same period, Trotsky offered a variety of explanations of the leftward shift of the 
Communist International. One of these, contained in a document Trotsky submitted to the 
Comintern Congress, described the international turn as a by-product of the domestic economic 
difficulties.70 However, in most of his comments on the origins of the shift in Comintern policy 
Trotsky stressed international factors that closely paralleled his explanations of the domestic 
turn. Thus, in various circular letters and in his critique of the Comintern draft program, Trotsky 
asserted that the previous “right-centrist” course of the Comintern had led to serious defeats, 
landing the leadership in a “blind alley.” Now, it was “trying to find a way out . . . to the left” 
under the impact of mounting proletarian pressure. Partly, the leadership had turned left in 
reaction to “the undeniable shift . . . taking place in the mood of the great working masses, 
principally in Europe and especially in Germany.”71 Partly, it had been the Opposition’s “four 
years of struggle” that had “compelled the ECCI . . . to hastily alter the draft program from one 
of a national type to one of an international type.” In this regard, Trotsky explained that praise of 
Stalin’s policies by Social Democrats and members of the bourgeoisie had been embarrassing to 
the party leadership. Consequently, it “became necessary to prove the Opposition was not being 
exiled for being leftist.”72 
From this analysis of the origins of the turn in policy, Trotsky concluded that there was 
no reason for the Opposition to place any confidence in the party leadership, as the conciliators 
were inclined to do. Trotsky believed that for the rightists within the leadership, the left turn was 
nothing but a maneuver. As he explained in his May 23 letter to Beloborodov, the rightists were 
afraid to engage the centrists in open conflict for they understood that “within the framework of 
the party the proletarian core, even in its present condition, could crush them to bits in two 
seconds.” Beyond that, even the rightists recognized the need for a maneuver to the left in the 
face of working class pressure.73 However, Trotsky did not expect that the rightists would 
tolerate the left course for long. In a document submitted to the Comintern Congress he asserted 
that the right intended “to pass from the defensive to the offensive and to take their revenge 
when the Left experiment will be terminated by defeat.”74  
302 
 Regarding the centrists and the “wide circles of the party” that followed them, in his May 
23 letter to Beloborodov Trotsky described the matter as somewhat “more complex.” Within 
these groupings Trotsky discerned “all shades—from bureaucratic tricksterism to a sincere desire 
to switch all policies onto the proletarian-revolutionary track.”75 Yet, even assuming some of the 
centrist leaders were sincere about the left turn, Trotsky was convinced that their commitment to 
the turn soon would collapse unless it was buttressed by mass pressure. Again, this view was 
most clearly expressed in the previously discussed anonymous letter: “As always the centrist 
Stalin group will choose the course of least resistance. Just as they are now feigning a left turn 
under the pressure of the working class, they will quickly make a turn to the right under the 
combined pressure of the kulak and the Nepman.”76 In such an event, a Thermidorian restoration 
of capitalism was the most likely outcome. Thus, on July 12 Trotsky warned the Comintern 
Congress that “never has this danger [from the right] been so great, so threatening, and so 
imminent as it is now.”77  
However, given that the left “maneuver” had originated in the pressure of the Opposition 
and/or the proletariat, Trotsky believed that it was possible that it could be transformed “into a 
turn—with very energetic help from below.”78 As the author of the anonymous letter put it, “The 
fate of the ‘left course’ . . . depends upon the degree of activity of the working class at the 
decisive moment.”79 During the spring and summer of 1928 Trotsky perceived signs that the 
working class was beginning to take the turn seriously, and to take an active part in the official 
campaign against the right.80 Thus, in July Trotsky concluded that “the initial maneuver has 
grown over into a profound political zigzag, seizing in its vise ever wider circles of the party and 
wider class strata.” For this reason, Trotsky would not exclude the “possibility of the present 
zigzag developing in a direction of a consistent proletarian course.”81 
The situation described by Trotsky clearly required a carefully balanced approach on the 
part of the Opposition. On one hand, Trotsky proclaimed the Opposition’s “unconditional” 
support for the left turn and for the struggle against the party right, insofar as these were real. 
“Are we ready to support the present official turn?” Trotsky asked the Opposition in May. “We 
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 are,” he answered, “unconditionally and with all our forces and resources.”82 Similarly, in his 
“Declaration” to the Sixth Comintern Congress Trotsky asserted, 
 
The Opposition supports every step, even a hesitant one, 
toward the proletarian line, every attempt, even an indecisive one, 
to resist the Thermidorian elements. The Opposition does so and 
will continue to do so completely independently of whether the 
center, which continues to look to the right, wants it or not. The 
Opposition of course does not set any prior conditions for this, 
demands no agreements, concessions, etc.83 
  
However, the kind of support Trotsky had in mind was not passive endorsement. The task of the 
Opposition, as Trotsky defined it in his July 12 “Declaration” to the Comintern Congress, was 
“to see that the present zigzag is extended into a serious turn onto the Leninist road.”84 To 
accomplish that task, Trotsky believed it was essential for the Opposition to denounce all the 
weaknesses and inadequacies of the turn. As he bluntly explained in his “Declaration,” 
The Opposition’s support for every correct move, even a half-
hearted one, toward a proletarian line, will never be the mere yea-
saying of the party philistine to the centrism of the apparatus . . . ; 
the Opposition will never pass over in silence the centrists’ 
inclination to do things only halfway, their incoherence, the errors 
they continue to commit, and will never hypocritically ignore their 
revisionist theories, which pave the way for new, even greater 
mistakes. While supporting against the right every step of the 
center toward the left, the Opposition should (and will) criticize the 
complete insufficiency of such steps and the lack of guarantees in 
the entire present turn, since it continues to be carried out on the 
basis of orders from on high and does not really emanate from the 
party.85 
  In fact, Trotsky viewed criticism as the most important aspect of the Opposition’s support 
for the turn. Thus, he reacted sharply when Radek asserted that the Opposition’s support for the 
turn “should consist of fighting ruthlessly . . . against all the evils against which the party is now 
mobilized.” To this Trotsky responded, “But it should not only consist of that. The pitiless 
unmasking of the half-measures and confusion of centrism in each practical matter or theoretical 
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 question constitutes the most important part of our support for any progressive steps of 
centrism.”86  
Again, the perspective from which Trotsky criticized the turn was that outlined in the 
Opposition’s 1927 Platform. In fact, Trotsky insisted that “a continued fight for the ideas and 
proposals expressed in the Platform is the only correct, serious, and honest way to support every 
step by the center that is at all progressive.”87 Beyond that, he again highlighted the connection 
he saw between party leadership’s policies and the character of the party regime by emphasizing 
the importance of four new democratic demands: (1) the freeing of the imprisoned 
Oppositionists, return of the deportees, and readmission of the Opposition to the party; (2) the 
convening of a Sixteenth Party Congress in 1928 with guarantees for a full discussion and 
genuine elections; (3) the publication of all of Lenin’s suppressed articles, speeches, and letters, 
including his “Testament”; and (4) the reduction of the party budget to one-twentieth of its 
existing size (that is, to five or six million rubles). In Trotsky’s view these particular demands 
provided “a serious test of the sincerity and honesty of the leadership’s steps toward party 
democracy.”88 Furthermore, Trotsky argued that the first of these demands constituted “the 
essential proof, the infallible means of verification, and the first indicator of the seriousness and 
depth of all the recent moves to the left.”89 
6.3 THE STALINIST OFFENSIVE 
By early July tensions within the Politburo were so high that Stalin and Bukharin were no 
longer on speaking terms. However, the Politburo continued to present a facade of unity, 
unanimously adopting a resolution on the grain collections for the consideration of the Central 
Committee. The resolution, written by the Stalinists on the basis of a declaration presented by 
Bukharin, largely reflected the views of the moderates in the leadership. It emphasized the 
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 importance of the alliance with the middle peasant and the continuation of NEP, terminated the 
exceptional measures, and raised the price of grain twenty percent. Fearing a premature 
confrontation with the moderates, who held powerful positions in the party, the state apparatus, 
the trade unions, and the press, Stalin had retreated.90  
Nevertheless, at the subsequent July plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin returned to 
the offensive. In the heated debate on agricultural policy, Stalin insisted that Soviet 
industrialization could only proceed on the basis of a “tribute” paid by the peasantry. 
Furthermore, he predicted the escalation of class struggle in the countryside, again defended the 
emergency measures, and renewed his demand for collectivization of agriculture.91 During the 
discussion, the Politiburo members Kalinin and Voroshilov unexpectedly abandoned the 
moderates. Just as unexpectedly, the Ukrainians swung over to Stalin, and the Leningrad 
delegation disavowed the speech by the moderate Leningrader, Stetskii.92  
In despair, while the plenum was still in session, Bukharin visited Kamenev, hoping to 
conclude an alliance with him and Zinoviev, or at least to dissuade them from supporting Stalin. 
Bukharin seemed obsessed with Stalin’s vindictiveness and unprincipled maneuvering. He 
described Stalin as a “Genghis Khan,” and repeatedly predicted that Stalin “will cut our throats.” 
To Kamenev, Bukharin gave “the impression of a man who knows he is doomed.”93 Meanwhile, 
in public the moderates behaved like victors. Addressing the Moscow party organization on July 
13, Rykov assured his listeners that the emergency measures were now over and would not be 
revived. According to one account, Rykov also repeated the warning of Klement Voroshilov, the 
Commissar of War, that if the emergency measures were reintroduced, “This will be the end of 
the NEP. . . . Then there will certainly be an uprising in the army.”94 
Soon after this, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, held from July 17 to September 1, 
continued the turn begun at the ninth plenum of the ECCI. Although Bukharin delivered the main 
report to the Congress, his address contained major concessions to the international orientation 
now advocated by Stalin. Bukharin endorsed the view, first advanced by Stalin at the Fifteenth 
Party Congress, that the period of world capitalist stabilization was giving way to a “third 
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 period” of “capitalist reconstruction,” which was “accompanied by the growth of the forces 
hostile to capitalism and by the extremely rapid development of its internal contradictions.” For 
communists, Bukharin asserted, this change in the world situation required a shift in tactics. 
Most importantly, it was necessary to intensify the struggle against social democracy, which 
consciously defended the capitalist state and which had demonstrated “social fascist tendencies.” 
Thus, Bukharin rejected the possibility of alliances between communists and Social Democratic 
leaders, arguing that “united front tactics must, in most cases, now be applied only from below.” 
Finally, he now argued that the central danger within the Comintern was the “Right deviation.”95  
The Comintern Congress contributed to the further weakening the right within the 
AUCP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. Although Bukharin’s concessions 
postponed open conflict, they ultimately helped to legitimize Stalin’s struggle against the party 
moderates. At the same time, the Stalinists utilized the Congress to undermine Bukharin’s 
authority. At the beginning of the Congress the Russian delegation embarrassed Bukharin by 
recalling his theses on the tasks of the Comintern in order to add twenty amendments. Also, 
throughout the Congress Stalinists conducted a whispering campaign among foreign delegations 
about Bukharin’s “right deviation” and “political syphilis.”96 
At this point new differences began to emerge within the leadership regarding economic 
questions. Though the Stalinists and the moderates had clashed repeatedly over agricultural 
policy, through the summer of 1928 there were still no clear differences concerning the other 
fundamental question of Soviet economics—the rate of industrialization. By late September, 
however, this question too came under dispute. The Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927 
had approved the preparation of a five-year plan, stressing that industrialization should proceed 
with caution and balance. Throughout 1928 Gosplan attempted to fulfill this charge, but found its 
efforts repeatedly challenged by VSNKh, which pressed for much higher tempos of 
industrialization. On September 19 the Stalinist head of VSNKh, Valerian Kuibyshev, addressed 
the Leningrad party organization in support of VSNKh’s ambitious industrial projections. He 
rejected the assertions of anonymous individuals that “we are ‘overindustrializing’ and ‘biting 
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 off more than we can chew.’“ Furthermore, he warned that the most serious misproportion . . . is 
that between the output of the means of production and the requirements of the country.”97  
On September 30 Bukharin responded with an article in Pravda entitled “Notes of an 
Economist.” Ostensibly, the article was directed against the “‘superindustrializers’ of the 
Trotskyist variety.” In reality, it was a sustained polemic against the industrial and agricultural 
policies advocated by the Stalinists. In the face of the mounting clamor for ever higher tempos of 
industrialization and increased pressure on the peasantry, Bukharin appealed for a policy of 
moderation. Most importantly, he explained, it was necessary to maintain the proper balance 
between agriculture and industry. According to Bukharin, the American example had 
demonstrated that industrial growth requires the presence of a large and prosperous peasantry. 
Attempting to industrialize faster than the development of agriculture, pumping too much capital 
out of the peasantry, inevitably would undermine the very basis of industrialization. 
Simultaneously, excessively forcing the pace of industrialization would create shortages and 
bottlenecks, further retarding the development of industry. Bukharin’s solution was to increase 
agricultural productivity by limiting the kulaks, by encouraging the gradual and voluntary 
collectivization of agriculture and spread of cooperatives, and by adopting a more correct price 
policy. Although he insisted that the tempo of industrialization could not be accelerated beyond 
existing levels, Bukharin asserted that it was possible to maintain the current tempo by 
increasing productivity and efficiency. Soon after “Notes of an Economist” appeared in print, the 
Stalinist majority of the Politburo censured the article and aggressively began to promote rapid 
industrialization.98  
Meanwhile, the Stalinists had been steadily encroaching upon the organizational 
strongholds of the party right. In the late summer of 1928 they wrested control of Pravda, the 
theoretical journal Bolshevik, and the Institute of Red Professors from the moderates. Even more 
important were the victories achieved by the Stalinists in the Moscow party organization in the 
early fall. In September and October the central party leadership encouraged insurgents within 
Moscow to denounce the rightist errors of Uglanov, the secretary of the Moscow party 
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 committee. When the Moscow Committee met on October 18-19, Uglanov found himself 
politically isolated within his own organization. Stalin personally addressed the meeting to warn 
against the “Right, opportunist danger in the Party” and against the “vacillations and waverings 
in the Moscow organisation.” Despite Uglanov’s recantation on October 19, he was severely 
weakened by the dismissal of a number of his high-level supporters.99 
Through the month of October Bukharin observed these skirmishes from a vacation 
retreat in the Caucasus. In early November, hearing that Rykov was beginning to yield to Stalin’s 
demands regarding industrialization, he returned to Moscow. In the Politburo he presented a list 
of eleven economic and organizational demands. Only after Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii 
threatened to resign from the Politburo did Stalin agree to a compromise, withdrawing some of 
his more offensive nominations and, apparently, making certain concessions regarding economic 
policy.100 
Although the resolutions unanimously presented by the Politburo to the Central 
Committee contained evidence of the compromise, particularly in the emphasis placed on the 
needs of agriculture, the November CC plenum represented another clear defeat for the 
moderates. The Central Committee endorsed Stalin’s demand for rapid industrialization, justified 
by the need “to overtake and outstrip” the advanced capitalist countries and to collectivize 
agriculture, and condemned the right deviation as the main danger confronting the party. Finally, 
it approved a party purge of “socially alien, bureaucratized, and degenerate elements, and other 
hangers on”—a campaign later applied to rank and file supporters of the moderates in the 
leadership.101  
Following the plenum, Stalin stepped up his organizational campaign against the right. 
On November 27 Molotov replaced Uglanov as party secretary in Moscow and moderates were 
removed from office throughout the Moscow party organization. At the Eighth Trade Union 
Congress held December 10-24, Stalinists assailed Tomskii for the excessive centralism and lack 
of democracy in the trade unions. Furthermore, the party fraction at that Congress passed a 
resolution endorsing rapid industrialization and urging an intensification of the struggle against 
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 the right danger. When five Stalinists were elected to the Central Trade Union Council on the 
recommendation of the party fraction, Tomskii resigned as chairman. Then, when his resignation 
was rejected, Tomskii refused to return to his post. About this time Bukharin, finding himself 
unable to control Pravda, withdrew from his editorial responsibilities on that paper. Meanwhile, 
at the ECCI plenum on December 19, Stalin launched an attack upon Bukharin’s supporters in 
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) for their “craven opportunism,” declaring that “the 
presence of such people in the Comintern cannot be tolerated any longer.” Soon afterwards, the 
KPD began a campaign of expulsions against rightists within its ranks, and in 1929 this was 
extended to the other sections of the Comintern.102 
In desperation, Bukharin counterattacked with a series of articles containing a thinly 
veiled critique of Stalin’s economic policies. Most important in this regard was Bukharin’s 
speech, “Lenin’s Political Testament,” delivered on the fifth anniversary of Lenin’s death and 
published in Pravda on January 24. In the midst of renewed difficulties in grain collection and 
signs that the party leadership was reviving the exceptional measures of the previous year, 
Bukharin reaffirmed his understanding of Lenin’s final comments on the peasant question. 
Bukharin’s message was that a correct agricultural policy involved a prolonged period of 
expanding market relations and peaceful collaboration with the peasantry.103 
At about this time tensions between the Stalinists and the moderates were inflamed even 
further by two new issues, both of which concerned the leaders of the defeated Opposition. The 
first was the question of what was to be done with Trotsky, who had continued to engage in 
oppositional activity from exile in Alma Ata. In mid-January 1929 the Politburo majority, 
against the protests of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii, voted to banish Trotsky from the Soviet 
Union. This decision was carried out on February 10, with the forcible deportation of Trotsky 
and his family to Constantinople. The second issue involved Bukharin’s July conversations with 
Kamenev. In late January Trotskyists issued a pamphlet containing an account of Bukharin’s 
July conversation with Kamenev. On January 30 Stalin convened a meeting of the Politburo and 
members of the CCC to discuss the party right’s factional activities. There, he denounced 
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 Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii as a “group of Right deviators and capitulators,” and charged that 
they had attempted to form “a bloc with the Trotskyites against the party.”104 
Bukharin responded that his discussion Kamenev was justified by the “abnormal 
conditions” within the party. Then, supported by Rykov and Tomskii, he utilized the occasion to 
indict the growing “bureaucratization” of the party and Stalin’s economic policies. Regarding the 
former, Bukharin complained that “the party doesn’t participate in deciding questions. 
Everything is done from above.” He further condemned “that practice where collective control 
has been replaced by the control of one person, however authoritative.” At the same time, he 
attacked Stalin’s “Trotskyist” program of rapid industrialization, based on the “impoverishment” 
of the country and “the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry.” Subsequently, Bukharin, 
Rykov, and Tomskii were censured by the Politburo and the CCC for factionalism.105 
6.4 EXPLAINING THE STALINIST OFFENSIVE 
In light of the renewed Stalinist offensive against the party right, in the late summer and 
fall of 1928 Trotsky began to introduce a number of implicit modifications into his theory of 
bureaucracy, while continuing to reaffirm its principal tenets. Viewing the decisions of the July 
plenum through the lens of his theory, Trotsky initially concluded that the left turn was over, that 
the right had defeated Stalin decisively, and that a Thermidor was imminent. However, in the 
following weeks it became increasingly clear that no major shift to the right was about to occur, 
and that Stalin had managed to retain and even enhance his organizational power. To account for 
these developments, Trotsky modified his theory by emphasizing the relative autonomy of the 
party apparatus. Specifically, Trotsky asserted that in certain periods the “logic of the apparatus” 
had a more immediate impact upon events than did the balance of class forces. Consistent with 
this view, he acknowledged for the first time that the Stalinists might actually defeat the right 
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 without the aid of either the Opposition or the working class. In line with his previous analysis, 
Trotsky continued to insist that capitalism would be restored in the Soviet Union unless the 
proletariat intervened. However, his new emphasis on the relative autonomy of the apparatus led 
Trotsky to revise his understanding of how this might occur. Furthermore, it contributed to his 
increasing emphasis upon democratic demands. When the leadership struggle intensified in the 
fall, Trotsky again explained the conflict primarily in terms of the logic of the apparatus. 
However, on the basis of his theory of bureaucracy, Trotsky continued to insist that centrism 
would soon collapse under mounting pressure from both the left and the right.  
It came as no surprise to Trotsky when the July plenum of the CC decided to terminate 
the exceptional measures and to raise the price of grain. After all, on the basis of his theory 
Trotsky had predicted that unless the proletariat intervened, the right wing of the party leadership 
soon would seize power and implement a thoroughly rightist course. Consequently, when the 
plenum decisions were announced and the text of Rykov’s July 13 “victory” speech appeared in 
Pravda, Trotsky concluded that the right had soundly defeated the center. In a statement to the 
Comintern on July 22 Trotsky asserted, “The right has issued entirely victorious from its first 
skirmish with the center, after four or five months of ‘left’ politics.”106 Meanwhile, Stalin, “the 
vanquished,” had been reduced to “turning his back and occupying himself with the 
manipulation of the apparatus.” Trotsky commented, “Stalin is losing time under the impression 
that he is gaining it. After the feverish shake-up of February we are now again in the presence of 
tail-endism in all its pitiable impotence.”107 
Once again, the threat of Thermidor seemed imminent to Trotsky, who warned that the 
increase in the price of grain “constitutes, and can only constitute, the beginning of a deep and 
perhaps decisive turn to the right.” Soon, he predicted, the right would attempt further economic 
concessions such as the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Following that, it would 
unleash a wave of persecutions that would even exceed the repression that Stalin had inflicted 
upon the Opposition. “One can imagine,” Trotsky shuddered, “what persecutions the right is 
going to turn loose when relying openly upon the property instinct of the kulak.” Again he 
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 sounded the alarm, calling upon the party “to lift up its voice,” and upon the proletarian vanguard 
to “take its destiny in its own hands.”108  
However, the events of the following weeks and months again failed to confirm Trotsky’s 
worst fears. There was neither any immediate sign of deeper shifts to the right in policy, nor any 
indication that a right-wing reign of terror was about to begin. In fact, during this period 
Oppositionists in Moscow reported rumors that Stalin was preparing to renew his left course, and 
that both he and the rightists were seeking the support of the left.109 Although Trotsky continued 
to speak of “the right turn of July” and the “retreat of the centrists,” by the end of the summer he 
clearly recognized that the right had not been able to seize control of the party, or to implement a 
rightist course.110 On this issue he even challenged a group of intransigents who continued to 
claim that the right had eliminated the center at the July plenum. Responding to the views of this 
group in a letter of August 30, Trotsky observed that “the centrists still have the apparatus,” and 
warned that “conflicts are still ahead.” The same day he cautioned a member of the Democratic 
Centralists that “the important disputes are still ahead, and they are bound to come to the 
surface.”111  
Trotsky seems to have modified his estimation of the plenum even further in late October 
on the basis of a report he received about Bukharin’s hysterical discussion with Kamenev in 
July.112 From that report Trotsky concluded that Stalin had shifted course at the plenum, not 
because he had been defeated, but as a maneuver in order to “split the right wing.” By this 
temporary swing to the tight, Stalin actually had enhanced his own organizational power. In 
other words, while policies were moving rightwards, the balance of power within the party 
leadership was continuing to shift to the center. Trotsky was forced to recognize that, at least in 
this respect, reality was not unfolding in conformity with his theory. As he expressed it, “the 
development of the apparatus has its own logic, which so far has not coincided with the general 
shifts of power in the party and the working class, and is even contrary to it.”113 
For the moment it seemed to Trotsky that the social classes were not actively intervening 
in the party struggle. In their absence, Trotsky suggested, the “logic of the apparatus”—including 
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 the characteristics of individual leaders—was able to play an unusually significant role. He 
observed, 
 
Naturally, if the classes would speak out loud, if the proletariat 
should pass over to a political attack, the positioning of these 
apparatus actors would lose nine-tenths of its meaning; in fact, 
they would drastically change their positions, moving in one 
direction or another. But we are passing through an as yet 
unfinished era in which the apparatus remains all-powerful . . . . 
Stalin and Rykov are the government. And the government plays a 
role of no little importance.114  
Some of the more significant “apparatus” factors that Trotsky saw as shaping the leadership 
struggle included Stalin’s authority within the party machine and the passivity of the right-wing 
leaders. For the rightists to win, they would have “to carry their fight against Stalin outside of the 
apparatus,” openly appealing to the new proprietors and “thundering . . . like the Black 
Hundreds, like Thermidorians.” However, despite Bukharin’s tentative step in that direction with 
his “Notes of an Economist,” the leaders of the party right obviously were not prepared for such 
an all-out struggle.115 (In contrast to the “lower ranks of the right faction,” Trotsky explained in 
November, the rightist leaders were still constrained by the sentiments of the working-class and 
by the traditions of Bolshevism.116) Meanwhile, according to Trotsky, Stalin was plotting to 
eliminate his rivals by a series of policy maneuvers and organizational assaults. Trotsky now 
realized that the center actually might defeat the right without the assistance of either the 
Opposition or the working class. “As long as the classes are silent,” he commented, “Stalin’s 
scheme will work.”117 
Trotsky’s new emphasis upon the relative autonomy of the party apparatus did not alter 
his conviction that, ultimately, the logic of classes was decisive. Thus, he remained convinced 
that capitalist restoration was inevitable unless the proletariat intervened. In fact, in his circular 
letter of October 21 Trotsky revised his metaphor of “Kerenskiism in reverse” to emphasize this 
central conclusion of his theory. He probably did so in reaction to conciliators who were 
encouraged by Stalin’s new offensive. It will be recalled that in late 1927 Trotsky employed the 
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 expression “Kerenskiism in reverse” to characterize the role that would be played by a future 
Thermidorian regime—that is, in a “dual power situation, . . . with the bourgeoisie holding the 
upper hand.”118 Now, in his letter of October 21 Trotsky argued that the Soviet Union was living 
through a “Kerensky period in reverse” at that very moment. He explained that, whereas under 
Kerenskii “the power of the bourgeoisie passed over to the proletariat,” under Stalin power was 
now “sliding over from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie.”119 In other words, the existing 
Stalinist regime was the last possible stopping place on the road to capitalist restoration. 
As in the past, Trotsky reviewed two familiar scenarios by which capitalism might return 
to Russia. First, there was the possibility of a “Thermidorian overturn,” which would be followed 
quickly by the establishment of a “Bonapartist” or “fascist” regime. In light of the organizational 
weakness of the party right, Trotsky viewed this prospect as somewhat less imminent than it had 
appeared during the summer.120 However, Isaac Deutscher’s observation that in this letter 
Trotsky “virtually abandoned his conception of the Soviet Thermidor” is certainly an 
exaggeration. 121 In the same letter Trotsky cautioned the Opposition that “the conditions 
necessary for Thermidor to materialize can develop in a comparatively short time.”122 And 
during the following weeks and months Trotsky referred to the possibility of Thermidor on a 
number of occasions. In his second scenario, Trotsky suggested that the army or a section of it 
might stage a “Bonapartist” coup and establish an authoritarian, right-wing regime. According to 
Trotsky, Rykov had alluded to this possibility in July when he had repeated Voroshilov’s 
prediction that the army would “answer with an insurrection” if the emergency measures were 
reintroduced. Trotsky viewed this prediction as a threat; and he concluded that the most likely 
candidate for the role of Bonaparte—albeit “a third-rate type of Bonaparte”—was Voroshilov.123  
However, consistent with his growing recognition of the relative autonomy of the 
apparatus, Trotsky now suggested that capitalism might return by yet another route, which was 
actually a variation of the first two: through the “independent victory of the centrists without the 
Opposition, without the masses.” According to Trotsky, such a centrist victory would not 
eliminate the “Thermidorian-Bonapartist perspective,” but “only change and postpone it.” He 
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 reasoned that, without the assistance of the Opposition or the masses, the Stalinists could only 
hope to conquer the right “through increased repression, through a further narrowing of the mass 
base of centrism,” and “through a further fusion of the centrist faction with the apparatus of 
governmental repression.” However, Trotsky’s theory of bureaucracy suggested that such a 
worsening of the party regime would only strengthen rightist tendencies within the country. 
Thus, Trotsky concluded that an independent victory of the centrists would prepare the way for a 
“Bonapartist” capitalist regime. In fact, it was even possible that Stalin himself would one day 
“mount the white horse.”124  
Perhaps at least partly because he had begun to fear that a victory of Stalinist 
authoritarianism ultimately posed as great a danger to Soviet power as a victory of rightist 
conservatism, during this period Trotsky began to stress democratic demands even more than 
before. In addition to his previous demands, Trotsky now called for the introduction of the secret 
ballot in the party and the trade unions to help workers combat “bureaucratic pressure.” At this 
point, Trotsky recommended waiting “until we have the necessary experience” before extending 
the experiment to the soviets “where different classes take part in the voting.”125   
Even more important, however, was the fact that for the first time Trotsky now suggested 
a united front with the party right in the name of democracy. In the past, he had dismissed the 
possibility of any kind of alliance between the Opposition and the right.126 However, by 
September 1928 he was already beginning to realize that an independent Stalinist victory was 
possible, and to fear that such a victory might be as dangerous for the revolution as a victory by 
the right.127 At the same time, Trotsky also saw an opportunity in the likelihood that elements of 
the right would soon be willing to support democratic demands for the sake of their own self-
preservation.128 In a September 12 letter to a “Rykovist” by the name of Shatunovskii, Trotsky 
observed that “the regime existing in the party . . . has brought the whole party into a state of 
illegality, so to speak.” To rectify this situation, he proposed a “common effort” to “restore the 
ruling party to a condition of legality.” Restating the Opposition’s principal democratic demands, 
Trotsky declared that “on the basis of these proposals we would even be willing to negotiate with 
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 the rights, because the implementation of these elementary preconditions of party principle 
would give the proletarian core the opportunity to really call to account not only the rights but 
also the centrists, i.e., the main support and protection for opportunism in the party.”129  
When this letter was circulated among the Oppositionists in exile, many responded with 
dismay. In their view Trotsky had abandoned the traditional position for the sake of an 
unprincipled “bloc” with the right. In December Trotsky replied that, of course, a real “bloc” 
between the Opposition and the right, involving a common platform, was still inconceivable. 
Nevertheless, he predicted the rightists inevitably would come into conflict with the apparatus 
over the issue of the party regime. When they did so, they would be forced to repeat the 
Opposition’s democratic demands. Thus, according to Trotsky, it was the rightists who would 
eventually adopt the positions of the Opposition, “shamefacedly renouncing their theory and 
practices of yesterday and thus helping us to expose both themselves and the entire party 
regime.” All he had offered was to “support” the rightists in this “as a rope supports a hanging 
man.” He had only proposed an “agreement,” like that between two duelists, “about the 
conditions for an irreconcilable struggle.”130 
By the end of the year it was clear to Trotsky that the leadership conflict had entered a 
new phase. As he observed in a letter of November 11, “We are now witnesses of a new centrist 
campaign against the right-wingers.”131 Furthermore, he noted in a memorandum written in 
December that “the campaign against the right has taken an open form and a broad apparatus 
scale.”132 Yet, even more than previously Trotsky stressed the limitations of this conflict, 
which— in his view—was distinguished by an “extraordinary amount of noise and tumult” but 
“with a total absence of concrete form politically.”133 In this regard he especially emphasized the 
inconsistencies of Stalin’s leftism.134 Still, the most important indication for Trotsky of the 
limitations of the official struggle against the right remained the fact that thousands of 
Oppositionists continued to languish in exile while party rightists occupied positions of power. 
From all of this Trotsky concluded that the new campaign against the right was “unbalanced, 
false, contradictory, and unreliable.”135 
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 Largely because he could see no clear programmatic differences that could be attributed 
to class pressures, Trotsky again explained the new leadership conflict primarily in terms of the 
dynamics of the apparatus. He continued to argue that the entire left turn, including the 
leadership struggle, was a result of the “political revival” of the working class and the pressure of 
Opposition. At the same time, however, he immediately added that “like all other processes in 
the party, the struggle of the centrists and rights must be considered not only from the angle of 
class tendencies and ideas but also from the narrow angle of the bureaucratic regime.” 
Approaching the question from this angle, he observed that the rupture between Stalin and the 
rightist trio of Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomskii had resulted “from the tendency of the 
bureaucratic regime toward personal power.”136 The clear implication of Trotsky’s argument was 
that the current phase of the struggle could best be understood as a manifestation of this 
tendency.  
Of course, Trotsky had referred to the tendency of the regime toward personal power in 
previous years. In fact, in his November 1928 article “Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc” he 
recalled that he had written about the tendency toward the “one-man rule of Stalin” as early as 
1926, and had even predicted that this would require not only the defeat of the Opposition, but 
also “the gradual removal of all authoritative and influential figures in the present ruling 
faction,” including Tomskii, Rykov, and Bukharin. To this extent Trotsky was justified in 
asserting that the leadership conflict had confirmed his previous analysis.137 However, the 
emphasis he now gave to this approach, including the argument that it was necessary to analyze 
all party developments from this point of view, clearly was a new development in his thinking. 
During this period Trotsky also suggested one additional “apparatus” explanation for the 
intensification of the leadership conflict. During the fall of 1928, Trotsky began to detect hints in 
various statements by Stalinists that the repression of the Opposition was about to be 
intensified.138 In particular, he observed that the Stalinists were stating continually that the views 
of the right and the Opposition were “basically” the same. In Trotsky’s view such assertions 
were obviously nonsense if taken literally. However, he reasoned that they made perfect sense 
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 from a tactical point of view if their intent was to prepare the party for a new assault upon the 
Opposition. Trotsky concluded, “The campaign against the right serves only as a “springboard” 
for a new monolithic attack upon the left. Whoever has not understood this has understood 
nothing.”139  
Trotsky soon found confirmation of this analysis of the leadership struggle. On December 
16 he was warned by a GPU official that, unless he immediately ceased all 
“counterrevolutionary” activity, he would be moved to a new location and completely isolated 
from all political life. In his reply to the Central Committee Trotsky again charged, “The 
campaign against the right danger, undertaken with such clamor, remains three-quarters sham 
and serves above all to conceal from the masses the real war of annihilation against the 
Bolshevik-Leninists.”140 
Despite the new campaign against the party right and the threat of a new campaign 
against the left, Trotsky remained convinced that the strength of the centrist grouping in late 
1928 was a temporary phenomenon. In the first place, he predicted that the zigzags and war on 
two fronts characteristic of centrism would lead inevitably to a fragmentation of Stalin’s own 
political current. “More often than not,” Trotsky observed in November, “these zigzags form the 
point of departure for a differentiation within centrism, for the separation of one of its layers, of a 
section of its adherents, for the appearance within the centrist leadership of various groupings, 
which in turn facilitates the work of Bolshevik agitation and recruiting.”141 Similarly, in early 
January 1929 he predicted, “As the fight against the right and the left goes on, centrism will 
extrude from its own midst both right-centrist and left-centrist elements, that is, it will undergo a 
political differentiation and fall apart.”142 
At the same time, on the basis of his theory Trotsky predicted that the social classes and 
elements closely connected to them would continue to gravitate to the left and right of centrism. 
According to Trotsky, the Soviet proletariat, which would not benefit materially from an 
independent victory by the Stalinists, would move to the left: 
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 The alert mass will continue to think in its own way about the 
questions of the right danger. In this the Leninists will help them. 
On the left flank of centrism there is an open wound which does 
not heal, but, on the contrary, goes deeper, keeps centrism in a 
feverish agitation, and does not leave it in peace.143  
 
On the other hand, the “proprietor and the bureaucrat” who had supported the center-right bloc in 
its struggle against the Opposition, were already beginning to view the centrists as “strangers, 
almost enemies” and to abandon them for the right. In light of this process, Trotsky asserted that 
“in contrast to centrism, the right wing has great reserves of growth which, from the political 
point of view, have as yet scarcely broken through.” Thus, in November 1928 he foresaw “the 
strengthening and clearer demarcation of the wings at the expense of centrism, despite the 
growing concentration of power in its hands.”144 
6.5 DEFEATING THE RIGHT AND DEEPENING THE TURN 
In the following months Stalin completed his victory over the moderates. At the Moscow 
and Leningrad party conferences and in the press, the Stalinists continued to escalate the 
campaign against the anonymous “right deviation” within the party. Within the Politburo, they 
easily defeated attempts by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskii to moderate the industrial projections 
of the five-year plan. The final showdown occurred at the April plenum of the Central 
Committee. There, while professing their support for rapid industrialization, the moderate leaders 
asserted that this goal was being undermined by “ideological capitulation to Trotskyism” in 
agricultural policy. The extraordinary measures, they argued, had inflamed relations between the 
state and the peasantry and were threatening to put an end to NEP. In response, Stalin rehearsed 
at length the sins of the party right—from their bending to kulak pressure, to their failure to 
attack “conciliationists” within the Comintern, to their factional activities. In the end, the Central 
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 Committee endorsed the proposed five-year plan; reaffirmed that the right deviation was the 
greatest danger facing the party; voted to remove Bukharin and Tomskii from their official posts 
in the Comintern, Pravda, and the trade unions; and warned that continued factionalism would 
result in further reprisals.145 
During the remainder of 1929, Stalin steadily whittled away at the remaining power of 
the moderates. At the end of the Sixteenth Party Conference in late April, Uglanov forfeited his 
positions as candidate member of the Politburo and member of the Secretariat; in late May, the 
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions formally removed Tomskii as its chairman; and on 
July 3, the ECCI dropped Bukharin from membership on its presidium and barred him from 
further Comintern work. Up until this point, the Soviet press had only attacked anonymous 
rightists within the party. However, at the end of August Pravda began to denounce Bukharin by 
name as “the chief leader and inspirer of the right deviationists,” and to portray his entire 
political record as anti-Leninist. Finally, at the November CC plenum, Bukharin, Rykov, and 
Tomskii were forced to recant their errors, and Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo.146 
Meanwhile, the defeat of the moderates had eliminated a major obstacle to radical 
changes in policy by the Stalinists. As far as Comintern policy was concerned, indications of the 
change were evident in early July at the tenth plenum of the ECCI. At that meeting the “third 
period” announced by Bukharin at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern was portrayed as a 
general radicalization of the world working class. The immediate task proclaimed for communist 
parties was to conquer the leadership of the workers’ movement in preparation for the seizure of 
power. More insistently than before, social democracy was equated with fascism. Otto Kuusinen, 
the Finnish Comintern secretary, explained that, while the slogans and “to some extent” the 
methods of the two movements differed, their aims were identical. Consequently, communists 
were permitted to participate only in “united fronts from below” with rank and file socialists, not 
with Social Democratic leaders. In line with this, the ECCI suggested that in certain 
circumstances communists should organize revolutionary trade unions in opposition to those 
controlled by Social Democratic parties.147 
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 At the same time, projected targets for industrialization continued to climb. In March, 
Gosplan adopted a minimal and an optimal version of the proposed five-year plan predated to 
begin in October 1928. Even the minimal variant was optimistic, projecting a 250 percent 
increase in total investments by the end of five years, a 340 percent increase in the planned sector 
of industry, and a rise in total industrial output by 135 percent. The optimal version (based upon 
such unrealistic assumptions as five consecutive good harvests), was even more ambitious, 
proposing a growth of total investments by 320 percent, an increase of investments in planned 
industry of 420 percent, and an expansion of industrial production by 181 percent. It was the 
latter version that was adopted by the April CC plenum and the Sixteenth Party Conference. 
During the remainder of 1929, however, even these goals were steadily revised upwards. By 
September, Pravda was declaring that the five-year plan would be fulfilled in four years. And at 
the beginning of November, Stalin announced that the former “optimum” of the five-year plan 
had “actually turned out to be a minimum variant.”148 In the words of contemporary historian 
Stephen Cohen, “What remained was no longer a plan but a kaleidoscope of escalating figures, a 
rationalization of the breakneck heavy industrialization of the next three years.”149  
Finally, throughout 1929 the party leadership continued the leftist offensive in 
agriculture. One form this took was a revival of the extraordinary measures in the collection of 
grain. During the winter of 1928-1929 the grain procurements campaign again encountered 
severe difficulties. Part of the problem was a poor harvest in Ukraine and other important grain 
producing regions of the Soviet Union; part was the fact that peasants with grain were selling it 
on the free market to take advantage of the much higher prices. Again, the authorities resorted to 
extraordinary measures, including fines, arrests, imprisonment, internal exile, and the 
confiscation of the property of peasants engaged in speculation. In response, many peasants 
simply reduced their sowings, while in some areas whole villages retaliated by withholding grain 
from the state. In the same period, there were frequent shootings of state procurement agents, and 
even cases of peasant uprisings. Nevertheless, from July through December, over twice as much 
grain was collected as in the corresponding months of the previous year. Despite the poor 
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 harvest, by the beginning of December 1929 Mikoian was able to announce that the grain 
collections plan virtually had been completed.150 
The second aspect of the turn in agriculture in the summer and fall of 1929 was the move 
towards the mass collectivization of agriculture. Although the five-year plan approved by the 
Sixteenth Party Conference in April projected modest growth of state and collective farms, it did 
so within the context of a continuing emphasis on the long-term importance of private 
farming.151 However, In the summer it became increasingly evident that the difficulties in grain 
collection were threatening to disrupt the industrialization drive. Probably it was largely in 
response to this threat that the leadership resolved to put an end to difficulties in grain collection 
by radically transforming the character of Soviet agriculture. During the summer of 1929 the 
press began to speak for the first time of “mass collectivization”; party members who were 
peasants were compelled to join the kolkhozy; and state agents, party members, and trade 
unionists were mobilized to assist in the collectivization drive. Between June and October, the 
number of collectivized holdings increased from 3.9 to 7.6 percent of the total.152 
In the fall the central party leadership decided to intensify the campaign even further. On 
October 31 a Pravda editorial called for the transfer of all the forces used in the procurements 
campaign over to the collectivization drive. A week later, on the twelfth anniversary of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Pravda published an article by Stalin which claimed that peasants, 
including middle peasants, were voluntarily enlisting in the collectives “not in separate groups, . . 
. but by whole villages, volosts, districts, and even okrugs.” The subsequent November plenum 
of the Central Committee, bowing before this “spontaneous” movement of the peasantry, passed 
a resolution declaring that the “collective farm movement is already posing the objective of 
comprehensive collectivization of individual regions.” What has become known as Stalin’s 
“revolution from above” had begun.153 
Meanwhile, the events of the year had severely exacerbated the crisis within the 
Opposition. As in 1928, the renewal of the left course fostered the growth of conciliatory 
sentiments among Oppositionists in exile. This time, however, the impulse toward reconciliation 
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 with the party was even stronger than a year before. In the first place, the left turn in industry, 
agriculture, and the Comintern was certainly far deeper than in 1928, reinforcing the perception 
that the Opposition’s program was about to be implemented, with or without the participation of 
the Opposition. Second, the abrupt shift in economic policy had created a crisis atmosphere, 
especially in the countryside but also in the city, giving rise to serious concerns within the 
Opposition that the revolution was in danger. Third, the months of exile had taken their toll upon 
many Oppositionists who had expected to be welcomed back to the party, if not to the leadership, 
within a short period of time. Finally, the expulsion of Trotsky from the Soviet Union had 
removed from the Opposition a powerful force for resistance. 
Again, Preobrazhenskii and Radek assumed the leadership of the conciliatory tendency. 
In April Preobrazhenskii distributed a document to the members of the Opposition in exile 
calling upon them to recognize that, although Stalin might not be employing methods they had 
advocated, he was carrying out the program of industrialization and collectivization the 
Opposition had demanded. Now, Preobrazhenskii asserted, it was time for the Opposition to 
swallow its pride and come to the aid of the revolution, which was facing its greatest threat since 
Kronstadt. In May Preobrazhenskii travelled to Moscow to negotiate with the party leadership. 
There, he was joined in June by Radek and the former irreconcilable, I. T. Smilga. On July 10 
the trio signed a document, along with 400 other exiles, renouncing the Opposition and appealing 
for reinstatement in the party. This was the first significant wave of capitulations by active 
members of the Trotskyist wing of the Opposition.154 
More capitulations soon followed. From June through most of October another grouping 
led by Trotsky’s close associate I. N. Smirnov bargained with the leadership over the conditions 
of their return to the party. Smirnov explained his own motivation to a friend: “‘I can’t stand 
inactivity. I want to build! In its own barbaric and sometimes stupid way, the Central Committee 
is building for the future. Our ideological differences are of small importance before the 
construction of great new industries.’”155 Aside from such sentiments, it is clear that the 
theoretical failures of the Opposition also played a part in the defection of this group. Early in 
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 their negotiations Smirnov and his supporters conceded in a draft statement that the Opposition 
had been mistaken in its prediction that the Central Committee would turn right and initiate a 
Thermidor. Ultimately, a statement of surrender signed by Smirnov and hundreds of other 
Oppositionists appeared in Pravda on November 3.156 Altogether, according to Oppositionist 
Victor Serge, “The movement of surrender to the Central Committee in 1928-1929 carried off 
the greater part of the 5,000 Oppositionists under arrest.”157 
Not all Oppositionists in exile surrendered at this time. In August 1929 Khristian 
Rakovskii, V. Kossior, and M. Okudzhava submitted to the Central Committee their own 
“Declaration,” which, by mid-September, had been signed by approximately 500 Oppositionists. 
The Rakovskii declaration, moderate in tone, also took the form of an appeal for reinstatement in 
the party. It expressed support for the five-year plan, for the collectivization campaign, for the 
party struggle against the right, and for the left turn in the Comintern. Furthermore, it asserted 
that events had “in part swept away those barriers which have separated the Bolshevik-Leninist 
opposition from the party.” However, the declaration differed from the statements of the 
capitulators in its continued insistence upon a number of the basic demands of the Opposition 
that had not been implemented. Above all, it stressed the need to restore democracy to the state, 
trade unions, and party. In addition to the democratic demands previously raised by the 
Opposition, the declaration called upon the CC to bring Trotsky back from his exile in Turkey.158  
6.6 EXPLAINING THE NEW TURN  
On February 11, 1929 Trotsky arrived in Constantinople with his wife and son. Within a 
few weeks, he had settled on the Turkish island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmara. This would 
be his home for the next four years.159 From the beginning of Trotsky’s arrival in Turkey, his 
political and literary activities were far more international in scope than they had been in 
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 previous years. His first priority was to explain to the world the significance of the party struggle 
of recent years within the Soviet Union. During his first year abroad Trotsky attempted to do this 
through the publication of a series of articles in the international press, several volumes of 
Opposition documents and an autobiography. In the same period, he was also eager to utilize the 
new freedom afforded by exile to collaborate with his international co-thinkers. He immediately 
established contact with many scattered groupings of left communists recently expelled from 
their respective Communist parties; and he began working to forge these into one cohesive 
international organization.160 
However, throughout 1929 much of Trotsky’s attention remained fixed upon the dramatic 
events unfolding within the Soviet Union. During his first weeks abroad, Trotsky wrote about his 
own expulsion and the escalating repression of the Opposition. Soon afterwards, he turned his 
attention to Stalin’s struggle against the party right, and to the latest shifts to the left in economic 
and international policy. Trotsky’s interest in these developments was made especially urgent by 
the fact that a growing number of Oppositionists had begun to view them as grounds for 
surrender. In contrast to the capitulators, Trotsky continued to analyze the left turn from the point 
of view of his theory of bureaucracy. In doing so, he repeated much of his argument from the 
previous year. While noting the leftist measures taken, Trotsky tended to minimize their 
significance; to the extent that he recognized that a deepening of the turn was in progress, he 
explained it as a consequence of the pressure of the Opposition and of the Soviet working class; 
and finally, he continued to insist that the future success of the turn depended entirely upon the 
Opposition’s intransigence. 
 In late February, shortly after his arrival in Turkey, Trotsky wrote a series of articles for 
the international press in which he described his deportation from the Soviet Union, and in which 
he reported “new arrests—of several hundred people, including a hundred and fifty members of a 
so-called ‘Trotskyist center.’”161 In light of the obvious weakness of the party right, Trotsky 
attempted to explain these events not as the result of a rightward shift in the balance of class 
forces, but rather in terms of the “apparatus” factor of Stalin’s own motivations. He noted that 
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 both events provided further confirmation of his view that the main objective behind the most 
recent campaign against the right was to prepare for a new assault upon the left. Beyond that, 
Trotsky argued that Stalin had felt compelled to take these actions in response to the fact that 
during 1928 the Opposition had grown “noticeably, especially at major industrial plants.”162 
Following his first few weeks of exile, however, most of Trotsky’s writings about Soviet 
events were devoted to the deepening of the turn. During 1929 Trotsky clearly recognized the 
progress of the campaign against the party right, as well as the leftist character of the economic 
and international policies introduced by the Stalinists that year.163 Nevertheless, Trotsky 
continued to minimize the significance of these developments, despite the fact that both the 
struggle against the right and the policy shifts had gone much further than in 1928. Thus, in an 
article for his new journal, Biulleten’ oppozitsii, written on June 14 Trotsky described the 
crushing of the right as “sharp in form but superficial in content”; and in an October letter to 
Soviet Oppositionists he spoke of the “shrill, theatrical, harsh but not deep-going, break [of the 
Stalinists] with the right wing.”164 In a March 31 letter Trotsky rejected assertions by party 
rightists that Stalin had adopted the Opposition’s economic program, insisting that Stalin had 
“made use of slivers of the Opposition’s program,” nothing more.165 As far as the new 
international line was concerned, Trotsky asserted in a letter of September 25 that “the leadership 
of the Comintern departs no less, probably, from the Leninist line than it did when it oriented 
itself toward the Kuomintang and the Anglo-Russian Committee.”166 
Trotsky’s skepticism continued to be based largely upon his adherence to the theory of 
bureaucracy he had developed in previous years. As far as the struggle against the right was 
concerned, there was little reason for Trotsky to dismiss it as abruptly as he did except that his 
theory could not accommodate a real struggle by centrists against the right. Beyond that, his 
theory suggested that the worsening of the regime involved in an organizational campaign by the 
centrists might actually strengthen rightist forces in the country. Thus, in a letter to Soviet 
Oppositionists written in October, Trotsky expressed the concern that the Stalinist repression of 
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 the right was drawing “the noose tighter around the neck of the party and the trade unions.” In 
Trotsky’s view, this consequence outweighed the “positive features” of the struggle.167 
Trotsky offered a variety of reasons for his critical attitude regarding the new 
international and economic policies. Already he had begun to criticize some of these—such as 
the use of “administrative pressure” against the kulaks and the rejection of alliances with “social 
fascists”—as ultraleft in character.168 (We will examine these criticisms more closely in the next 
chapter.) At the same time he complained that both economic and international policy remained 
grounded in the opportunist perspective of socialism in one country.169 However, once again, the 
character of the party regime remained the most important reason for Trotsky’s skepticism 
regarding the new line. Consistent with his theory of bureaucratism, Trotsky again asserted that a 
healthy, democratic regime was both the best indicator of a correct line and the only guarantee 
that such a line would be maintained. Thus, when Radek, Smilga, and Preobrazhenskii asserted 
that the “concrete figures of the five-year plan” expressed a genuine program of socialist 
construction, Trotsky reminded them of the character of the party regime: 
 
Till now, we had thought all five-year plans were valuable 
insofar as their roots lay in correct methods of economic 
leadership, particularly in the political leadership of the party and 
the Comintern. . . . 
The central question is not the figures of the bureaucratic 
five-year plan themselves but the question of the party as the main 
weapon of the proletariat. The party regime is not something 
autonomous: it expresses and reinforces the party’s political 
line.170 
More specifically, Trotsky continued to evaluate the recent policy shifts in terms of the 
treatment of the Opposition. In a September 25 letter to Oppositionists who had signed 
Rakovskii’s declaration, Trotsky argued that if all important differences between the Opposition 
and the leadership had been resolved, as Radek and Preobrazhenskii asserted, then the ongoing 
repression of the Opposition was nothing more than “naked bureaucratic banditry.” However, 
Trotsky was no more willing to accept such a conclusion than were the capitulators. Instead, he 
insisted that the persecution of the Opposition demonstrated that “the leadership, even after 
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 having absorbed officially a good number of our tactical deductions, still maintains the strategic 
principles from which yesterday’s right-center tactic emerged.”171  
Nevertheless, to the degree that Trotsky recognized the renewal of the turn, he was again 
compelled to explain it. Once again, Trotsky’s answer was based upon the view that only the 
proletariat or the Opposition could initiate a real left turn. At times, he argued that the entire left 
turn since early 1928 was one single process set in motion by proletarian/Oppositional 
pressure.172 However, on a number of occasions Trotsky explicitly argued that the current 
manifestation of the turn was the direct result of continuing pressure exerted by the Opposition. 
Thus, in May Trotsky explained that it was the Opposition’s “uncompromising attitude” that was 
preventing the Stalinists from returning to a more “normal” course.173 Again, in an October letter 
to exiled Oppositionists in the USSR Trotsky wrote that “it was precisely our criticism that 
forced and is forcing the centrists to go further left than they originally intended to go.”174 And in 
November Trotsky explained to Soviet Oppositionists that “every week ‘the master’ [Stalin] 
threatens his Klims [i.e., Stalin’s “Voroshilovs”] with the words: ‘We can’t deviate to the right 
just now—that is what the Trotskyists are waiting for.’”175  
Trotsky’s belief that external pressure was required for any real shift to the left on the 
part of the leadership also continued to govern his approach to the tasks of the Opposition. Once 
again Trotsky urged his supporters to redouble their efforts to push the Stalinists further left. For 
example, in July he appealed to his wavering comrades: “The centrists will move over to the left 
only under our whip. That is why there is no reason to give up the whip in our hands. On the 
contrary, we have to use three whips.”176 Likewise, in November he reminded his Soviet 
supporters that “an ideologically irreconcilable Opposition remains the best aid to the centrists in 
the struggle against the Right.177 
Conversely, Trotsky also argued that every capitulation of an Oppositionist actually 
weakened the left turn. Thus, when Preobrazhenskii and Radek justified their recantations in 
terms of their desire to assist the party’s turn and its war on the right, Trotsky responded by 
predicting that the wholesale capitulation of the Opposition would mean not only “condemning 
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 ourselves to a Zinovievist vegetable existence,” but that it would also result in “an immediate 
swerving of the Stalinists to the right.”178 Similarly, in a November letter to an Oppositionist in a 
“precapitulationist” frame of mind Trotsky remarked, “If the Opposition were to disappear, the 
Voroshilovs and their cronies would tomorrow climb into the saddle on the backs of the left 
centrists.”179    
6.7 REVISING THE THEORY  
As far as his general theory of bureaucracy was concerned, during 1928-1929 Trotsky’s 
primary concern was to apply and defend the perspective he had developed in previous years. 
However, as we have seen, in late 1928 Trotsky found it necessary to modify that analysis in 
various ways, largely in order to reconcile it with the successes of the Stalinist campaign against 
the party right. This section will examine a number of additional ways in which Trotsky altered 
and elaborated upon his theory during 1928 and, especially, 1929 in response to new 
developments, influences, challenges, and opportunities. Increasingly, Trotsky defined the 
problem in terms of a bureaucracy, understood as a single social formation that had usurped 
power, rather than as the disease of bureaucratism in the apparatuses of the state, party, and 
other Soviet institutions. Consistent with this, Trotsky began to revise his explanation of the 
origins of the problem. Also, he began to sketch a number of the most important traits he 
perceived as characteristic of the bureaucracy. Against arguments voiced by communists on 
Trotsky’s left, he insisted that capitalism had not yet been restored in the USSR. In fact, while 
Trotsky continued to fear that the problem of bureaucracy would lead to restoration, during 1929 
he clearly believed that this danger had receded somewhat. However, he now concluded that 
reform of the party and state could not be achieved without a major party crisis. Finally, during 
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 1929 Trotsky began to redefine the reform strategy of the Opposition to include the activities of 
his new international collaborators.180 
6.7.1 Conception  
During 1928-1929 Trotsky’s general conception of the problem of bureaucracy continued 
to evolve. In the party struggle of 1926-1927 Trotsky and the Opposition most commonly 
characterized the issue of concern as the bureaucratism that had infected the organizational 
apparatuses of the party, state, etc. However, in that period they also began to describe the 
problem in terms of the bureaucracy of each of those institutions. Furthermore, while continuing 
at times to distinguish between the apparatuses of the party, state, etc., by late 1927 Trotsky and 
the Opposition were beginning to speak at times of the bureaucracy, as a single social layer or 
entity that had usurped power in all the major political and social institutions of the Soviet 
Union. In the course of 1928-1929 Trotsky essentially completed these terminological and 
conceptual shifts.  
Although at times Trotsky still referred to the problem of bureaucratism, with increasing 
frequency he now spoke of the bureaucracy, the bureaucratic apparatus, the bureaucratic stratum, 
and the bureaucratic caste—especially within the party.181 For example, in his November 1928 
article “Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc” Trotsky asserted that the party line had slid “from the 
[proletarian] class to the apparatus [apparat], that is, to the bureaucracy [biurokratiia].”182 
Similarly, in “Where Is the Soviet Republic Going?” written in February 1929 Trotsky 
anticipated a new party purge, not only of “‘Trotskyists,’” but also “of the most degenerate 
elements within the bureaucracy [biurokratiia].”183 In a March 1929 open letter to Soviet 
workers, Trotsky explained, “It was the bureaucrats [apparatchiki] who exiled me, people who 
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 have got the power into their hands and converted themselves into a bureaucratic caste 
[biurokraticheskaia kasta].”184 Later that year in his autobiography, Trotsky referred to the 
“party stratum [sloi] that held the direct power over the county,” and of the “statum [sloi] that 
made up the apparatus of power,” and described how defeats of the international revolution had 
strengthened “the Stalin bureaucracy [Stalinskaia biurokratiia] against me and my friends.”185 
Again, it is clear that for Trotsky the concern now was less with negative characteristics within 
the various apparatuses, and more with the power of the apparatuses themselves. 
It is likely that various factors were responsible for this shift in terminology. To a large 
degree, it was simply a continuation of a process that began in 1926-1927. The previous chapter 
suggested that at least one of the reasons Trotsky began to substitute bureaucracy for 
bureaucratism was that he had begun to see political alienation as so deep and so pervasive in 
the apparatuses of Soviet organizations that it seemed virtually inseparable from them. If that 
was the case, then subsequent developments—such as the exile of the Opposition and Trotsky’s 
own expulsion from the country—that suggested a further deepening of political alienation could 
only have reinforced this perception. Beyond that, other events in late 1928 and 1929 also may 
have played a role. As we have seen, in the fall of 1928 Trotsky explicitly recognized that the 
Stalinist leadership had begun to deviate from the course his theory had suggested it would take. 
From this, he concluded that the party apparatus was capable of acting far more independently in 
relation to social classes than he previously believed possible. This, in turn, may have reinforced 
Trotsky’s inclination to view that apparatus, at least, as a relatively autonomous entity, a 
bureaucracy, with its own distinct impulses and behaviors. 
Meanwhile, Trotsky also increasingly employed the term bureaucracy not just in 
reference to each separate organizational apparatus, but as a label for the single, broad social 
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 layer that, he believed, had assumed power in all Soviet institutions. Of course, where it was 
important to distinguish between the different organizational apparatuses, Trotsky continued to 
do so.186 Furthermore, it seems that at times when Trotsky spoke of an unspecified bureaucracy, 
as in some of the examples above, he was referring specifically to the party apparatus. However, 
on other occasions Trotsky utilized the singular bureaucracy when speaking of the combined 
apparatuses of the party, state etc. Thus, in a letter to the Democratic Centralist Borodai written 
in November 1928, Trotsky asserted that the proletariat could “regain full power, overhaul the 
bureaucracy [biurokratiia], and put it under its control by way of party and soviet reform.”187 
The same month in his “Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc,” Trotsky described the “immanent 
idealism which has become the specific philosophy of the party-soviet bureaucracy [partiino-
sovetskaia biurokratiia].”188 In the same article he spoke of the new social role of the “labor 
bureaucracy [rabochaia biurokratiia]”—evidently referring to the party apparatus—but also of 
“the Soviet bureaucracy [sovetskaia biurokratiia] in general”—apparently speaking of the 
broader bureaucratic layer.189 The following month, in his essay “Philosophical Tendencies of 
Bureaucratism,” after describing the bureaucratic degeneration in the trade unions, party, state, 
etc., Trotsky depicted the situation as one in which a single “bureaucratic hierarchy 
[biurokraticheshkaia ierarkhiia] . . . , with all its ministries and departments, has raised itself 
over above society.”190  
Again, a variety factors may have fostered Trotsky’s tendency to ignore institutional 
distinctions in his evolving analysis of bureaucracy. One was his perception that the hierarchies 
of the various apparatuses shared important similarities in outlook, personnel, and mode of 
functioning, and—perhaps most significantly—that they all participated in the persecution of the 
Opposition. Consistent with this view, Trotsky spoke in his letter to Borodai in November 1928 
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 of the “autocracy of the party apparatus, which is fusing with the state apparatus.”191 Likewise, in 
a May 1, 1929 preface to a collection of his oppositional writings entitled La Révolution 
Défigurée, Trotsky described the “interlocking system” formed by the functionaries of the state, 
the trade unions, and the cooperatives, as well as by members of the liberal professions and 
middlemen. “Ultimately,” Trotsky argued, “the party functionaries should be counted among 
them as well, inasmuch as they form a definitely constituted caste, which assures its own 
permanence more through the state apparatus than by internal party means.”192  
At the same time, theoretical developments also promoted Trotsky’s inclination to view 
the apparatuses of all major Soviet political and social institutions as part of a single 
bureaucracy. As in 1926-1927, Trotsky’s continuing tendency to explain major Soviet 
developments in terms of shifting class relations encouraged Trotsky to perceive the bureaucracy 
as one more social grouping, comparable in some respects to the major classes of Soviet society. 
Beyond that, Trotsky’s thinking on this question may have been influenced by the analysis of the 
party/state bureaucracy put forward in this period by his friend Khristian Rakovskii in his now 
famous “Letter to Valentinov.”193 On August 8, 1928 in a letter to a fellow Oppositionist, N. V. 
Valentinov, Rakovskii traced the emergence of a single “soviet-party bureaucracy [sovetskaiia 
partiinaia biurokratiia, sov-partbiurokratiia]” or “party-soviet bureaucracy [part-sovetskaia 
biurokratiia]” in the Soviet Union after the revolution.194 Trotsky clearly was greatly impressed 
by Rakovskii’s analysis. In a letter of September 18, 1928 he described Rakovskii’s letter as 
“interesting” and “significant” and suggested that it had mapped out “for investigation some 
topics of exceptional importance.”195 As already noted, in his “Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc,” 
Trotsky echoed Rakovskii in characterizing the combined apparatuses as the “party-soviet 
bureaucracy [partiino-sovetskaia biurokratiia].”196 Then, in a February 1929 article for the 
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 international press, Trotsky spoke approvingly of the “remarkable letter dealing with the 
phenomenon of degeneration” in which Rakovskii had “shown in a very striking fashion that, 
after the conquest of power, an independent bureaucracy [samostoiatel’naia biurokratiia]” 
differentiated itself out from the working-class milieu.”197 
At any rate, these terminological and conceptual shifts had important implications for 
Trotsky’s general analysis of Soviet bureaucracy. From this point onwards, Trotsky defined the 
problem not as a disease infecting various Soviet institutions, but as a single social layer that had 
usurped power throughout the country. In turn, this posed new questions related to the causes of 
the problem, including: how had this bureaucracy arisen in the first place; what was its role in 
Soviet society; and how was this grouping able to wrest power from the proletariat? At the same 
time, Trotsky’s recasting of the issue inspired new explorations of the characteristics of the 
problem, including examinations of the distinctive features of the bureaucracy as a social layer.  
6.7.2 Causes 
In his account of the origins of the problem of bureaucracy, even more clearly than in his 
definition of the problem, Trotsky’s thinking was greatly influenced by Rakovskii’s “Letter to 
Valentinov.” In that letter Rakovskii offered his own explanation for the tremendous rise of 
despotism, corruption, and scandal within Soviet political institutions, and for the passivity of the 
Soviet masses in the face of these developments. Rakovskii agreed with Trotsky that these 
developments were related to such factors as the shifting balance of class forces and the 
international isolation of the Soviet Union. However, he argued that such explanations were 
inadequate, for “these difficulties would continue to exist up to a certain point, even if we 
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 allowed for the moment, that the country was inhabited only by proletarian masses and the 
exterior was made up solely of proletarian states.”198 
According to Rakovskii, the root of the problem was that “any new directing class” 
encounters “inherent difficulties” that can be described as “the professional dangers of 
power.”199 Although an insurgent class is bound together by the great aim of revolution during a 
revolutionary offensive, Rakovskii argued, this cohesion begins to dissolve as soon as the class 
takes power. First, some of its members assume political and administrative responsibilities and 
constitute themselves into a bureaucracy in order to deal with the new tasks of power:  
When a class takes power, one of its parts becomes the 
agent of that power. Thus arises bureaucracy [biurokratiia]. In a 
socialist state, where capitalist accumulation is forbidden by 
members of the directing party, this differentiation begins as a 
functional one; later it becomes a social one. I am thinking here of 
the social position of a communist who has at his disposal a car, a 
nice apartment, [etc.].200 
 
At the same time, many functions previously exercised by the revolutionary class or party as a 
whole become “the attributes of power,” that is, they are taken over by the bureaucracy. 
According to Rakovskii, both of these processes occur because, to a large degree, the 
revolutionary class always is uneducated and politically inexperienced.201 
Although Rakovskii agreed with Trotsky that the French Revolution provided the classic 
model of the degeneration of revolution, the pattern he described differed somewhat from that 
traced by Trotsky. According to Trotsky, the degeneration of the French Revolution primarily 
involved the transfer of class power from the revolutionary sans-culottes to the bourgeoisie at the 
time of Robespierre’s overthrow. For Rakovskii, on the other hand, “the political reaction which 
began even before Thermidor consisted in this, that the power began to pass both formally and 
effectively into the hands of an increasingly restricted number of citizens.”202 Applying this 
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 analysis to the Soviet experience, Rakovskii argued that, since the revolution, the conquest of 
power had introduced a functional differentiation into the bosom of the proletariat. As a result, 
the psychology of the officials of the state apparatus had “changed to such a point that they . . . 
have ceased to be a part of this very same working class.” Meanwhile, “the same differentiation” 
had occurred in the party, leading to the creation of a combined state/party apparatus so 
autonomous that, according to Rakovskii, “The bureaucracy [biurokratiia] of the soviets and of 
the party constitutes a new order.”203 
For Rakovskii, this image of a highly autonomous bureaucracy helped to explain the 
leadership’s left turn of early 1928. In fact, it is likely that he developed his theory largely in 
response to the left turn. Rakovskii rejected the view put forward by the conciliator Ishchenko—
but also partially held by Trotsky—that “the collection of the wheat and the self-criticism are due 
to the proletarian resistance of the party,” arguing, 
Unfortunately it has to be said this is not correct. These two facts 
result from a combination arranged in high places and are not due 
to the pressure of the workers’ criticism; it is for political reasons 
and sometimes for group reasons, or should I say faction, that a 
part of the top men in the party pursue this line. It is possible to 
speak of only one proletarian pressure—that guided by the 
opposition. But it has to be clearly said, this pressure had not been 
sufficient to maintain the opposition inside the party; more, it has 
not succeeded in changing its political line. I agree with Leon 
Davidovich [Trotsky] who has shown, . . . the true and positive 
revolutionary role which certain revolutionary movements have 
played by their defeat . . . . However, the effects of such 
conquering defeats are of short duration if they are not reinforced 
by a new revolutionary upsurge.204 
 
Thus, according to Rakovskii the turn had been introduced by the leadership for “political” 
reasons, or reasons of “faction.”  
Trotsky was so impressed with Rakovskii’s analysis that he immediately adopted 
portions of it, combining them with arguments from his own, earlier explanation of the process 
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 of bureaucratization. As in the past, Trotsky continued to argue that the problem of political 
alienation had arisen primarily as a consequence of shifts in the balance of class forces in the 
Soviet Union since the civil war. Thus, in one of his February 1929 articles for the international 
press, Trotsky attributed Stalin’s victory over the Opposition to the “significant shifts that have 
occurred in class relations in the revolutionary society.”205 Again, Trotsky divided the history of 
the Soviet revolution into two stages, separated by Lenin’s illness and the beginning of the 
struggle against “Trotskyism.” The first period had been characterized by “the active 
intervention and initiative of the masses . . . numbering in the millions”; the second, “by an 
unquestionable reduction in the level of direct mass intervention.”206 Along the same lines, in his 
May 1, 1929 preface to La Révolution Défigurée Trotsky explained that in the second period, 
“the proletariat . . . was pushed aside, forced into the background, as a result of a series of 
objective and subjective factors of both an international and external nature.”207  
However, at this point in Trotsky’s account the influence of Rakovskii’s letter became 
apparent. First, Trotsky accepted Rakovskii’s argument that the proletariat had lost much of its 
political power because it was poorly prepared to rule. As Trotsky asserted in his preface to La 
Révolution Défigurée, “centuries of oppression” had resulted in the fact that the proletariat 
possessed “neither the historical traditions of rule, nor, even less, an instinct for power.”208 More 
importantly, he accepted Rakovskii’s view that the administrative apparatuses of the important 
institutions of Soviet society had actively promoted and directly benefited from the period of 
reaction after the revolution. Thus, in his February article “Where Is the Soviet Republic 
Going?” Trotsky explained how in the second period, 
Over and above the masses the centralized administrative 
apparatus [apparat] rises higher and higher. . . . The apparatus 
acquires more and more a self-sufficient character. The 
government official is increasingly filled with the conviction that 
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 the October Revolution was made precisely in order to concentrate 
power in his hands and assure him a privileged position.209 
 
Finally, Trotsky also embraced Rakovskii’s explanation of how the bureaucracy had taken shape 
in the first place. In his “Crisis in the Right-Center Bloc” written in November 1928 Trotsky 
endorsed Rakovskii’s argument that during the period of reaction after the revolution, 
“differentiation [within the proletariat] set in with a bureaucracy [biurokratiia] emerging at the 
top and acting more and more in its own interests.”210 Again in “Where Is the Soviet Republic 
Going?” written in February 1929, Trotsky repeated that the “independent bureaucracy 
[samostoiatel’naia biurokratiia]” had “differentiated itself out from the working-class milieu.”211 
Furthermore, in that latter work Trotsky observed that Rakovskii had shown that this 
differentiation “at first only functional, . . . later became social.”212 In later years Trotsky would 
elaborate upon this idea at length. 
However, commenting in “Where Is the Soviet Republic Going?” that “naturally, the 
processes within the bureaucracy developed in relation to the very profound processes under way 
in the country,” Trotsky quickly reverted to his previous class explanation for the growth of 
political alienation within the Soviet Union. Thus, he argued that, parallel with the emerging 
independence of the bureaucracy from the working class, bourgeois and petty bourgeois 
elements in the Soviet Union accumulated considerable economic and political power during the 
NEP. Increasingly, “broad sections of officialdom [chinovnichestvo]” found themselves attracted 
to the lifestyle of these elements, “drew close to the bourgeois strata and established ties with 
them.”213 Furthermore, a large section of the combined state/party bureaucracy grew responsive 
to bourgeois pressures and was ultimately transformed into “the effective agent of bourgeois 
conceptions and expectations.”214 In the process, the bureaucracy came to perceive popular 
initiative and criticism as interference, and began to exert pressure against the masses.215 
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 6.7.3 Characteristics 
As Trotsky shifted from viewing the problem as a disease to defining it as a thing, he also 
increasingly emphasized features he saw as characteristic of the bureaucracy as a social 
formation. Foremost among these were a series of attitudes, moral-psychological traits, and 
patterns of recruitment and promotion that all emerged within the bureaucracy as it first began to 
differentiate itself from the proletariat.  
Perhaps the most important attitude that Trotsky saw as characteristic of the bureaucracy 
was the preoccupation of its members with privilege and power. As David Law has suggested, 
the exposure in early 1928 of various cases of corruption, such as those involved in the Smolensk 
affair, seems to have helped focus Trotsky’s attention upon the issue of material privilege.216 In a 
discussion of these scandals in one of the documents he submitted to the Comintern in June 
1928, Trotsky noted the “great encrustations of interests and connections around the 
apparatus.”217 By 1929 Trotsky had begun to describe the pursuit of privilege and power and the 
central preoccupation of the bureaucracy. In February 1929 Trotsky described how during the 
early 1920s the Soviet government officials became increasingly convinced that the revolution 
had been made “precisely in order to concentrate power in his hands and assure him a privileged 
position.”218 Similarly, in his March 29 “Open Letter to the Workers of the USSR,” Trotsky 
spoke of the “bureaucratic caste bound together by a solidarity of privilege”; while in his 
autobiography he described how, over the course of time, the “stratum that made up the 
apparatus of power developed its own independent aims and tried to subordinate the revolution 
to them.”219 
A closely related issue for Trotsky was the general loosening of the moral standards he 
perceived within the bureaucracy. Again, the importance of this issue seems to have been 
suggested by the revelations in early 1928 regarding chronic drunkenness, promiscuity, and 
340 
 sexual exploitation by party officials in Smolensk and other cities.220 In one of his statements to 
the Comintern in June 1928, Trotsky asked, 
 
Who is the hero, in the social sense of the term, of the 
Artemovsk, Smolensk, etc. affairs? He is a bureaucrat who had 
freed himself from the active control of the party and who has 
ceased to be the banner-bearer of the proletarian dictatorship. 
Ideologically, he has become drained; morally, he is unrestrained. 
He is a privileged and an irresponsible functionary, in most cases 
very uncultured, a drunkard, a wastrel, and a bully, in short, the old 
familiar type of Derjimorda [the inspector in Gogol’s Inspector-
General].221 
 
In 1929 Trotsky described in his autobiography how this decline of moral standards became 
typical within the bureaucracy as a whole during the “second period” of the revolution. 
Although, according to Trotsky, many members of the apparatus had devoted themselves 
selflessly to the revolution in the first period, during the period of reaction, “the traits of the man 
in the street, the sympathies and tastes of self-satisfied officials revived in them.”222 The 
prevalent outlook became one of “moral relaxation, self-content, and triviality.” Trotsky recalled 
that members of the bureaucracy increasingly amused themselves with “philistine gossip” and 
“vulgarity,” and that they grew especially fond of visiting one another, attending the ballet 
regularly, and participating in drinking parties. In the presence of Bolsheviks such as Trotsky 
who would not share their new interests, they displayed shame and resentment.223  
Also related to the growing preoccupation with power and privilege on the part of the 
bureaucracy, was its increasing social and political conservatism. In his article “Where Is the 
Soviet Republic Going?” Trotsky asserted, 
The majority of this officialdom [chinovniki v bol’shinstve] which 
has risen up over the masses is profoundly conservative. They are 
inclined to think that everything needed for human well-being has 
already been done, and to regard anyone who does not 
acknowledge this as an enemy.224  
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 In fact, according to Trotsky this “layer” was so politically conservative that it was “inclined to 
go much further to the right, in the direction of the new propertied elements, than Stalin himself 
or the main nucleus of his faction.” Trotsky argued that it was the conservatism of this layer that 
accounted for the struggle between Stalin and the “right wing.”225 
As Robert McNeal has observed regarding a slightly later period, Trotsky’s various 
statements at this time regarding the extent of the bureaucracy’s political conservatism appear—
at least at first glance—to be inconsistent.226 For example, in contrast to passages that suggest 
that the majority of the state/party bureaucracy was fully opportunist, in late October 1928 
Trotsky asserted, “The right wing is more weakly represented in the [party] apparatus than the 
center is.”227 Furthermore, a few weeks later he argued that the “social and historical origin of 
our bureaucracy” had given the “centrist elements an obvious and undeniable predominance over 
the right”; and that “Centrism is the official line of the apparatus.”228 The probable explanation 
has to do with the different senses in which Trotsky used the term bureaucracy in this period. 
Most likely, Trotsky meant to suggest that the overwhelming majority of the members of the 
state apparatus—and hence, of the combined state/party bureaucracy—were opportunist, while 
the majority of the members of the party bureaucracy were centrist.  
Other distinctive characteristics that Trotsky previously had touched upon but now 
emphasized included the criteria for recruitment and promotion within the party apparatus. By 
late 1923, Trotsky asserted, the apparatus had begun to replace the most gifted and independent 
individuals in the party machinery with adaptable “mediocrities who owed their positions 
entirely to the apparatus.” Once again, Trotsky suggested that the foremost among the 
mediocrities selected by the apparatus was Stalin himself.229 Subsequently, according to Trotsky, 
the apparatus had made selection and promotion, even at the lowest levels, dependent upon the 
candidate’s vigor in the campaign against “Trotskyism.”230 
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 6.7.4 Consequences 
For years Trotsky and the Opposition had predicted that the rightward drift of policy 
combined with the steady deterioration of the party and state regimes might result in a restoration 
of capitalism. In 1928-1929 Trotsky continued to defend this view, not only against 
Oppositionists who now concluded that these fears had been exaggerated, but also against other 
left communists who believed that these fears already had been realized. In response to the latter, 
Trotsky advanced a number of arguments to demonstrate that the class nature of the Soviet state 
had not yet changed fundamentally. Beyond that, Trotsky argued that the left turn actually had 
reduced the danger of restoration. Nevertheless, he remained convinced that, without profound 
party and state reform, restoration was inevitable in the long run. 
In 1928 and 1929, the defeat of the Opposition convinced some left-wing communists 
within the Soviet Union and abroad that that a Thermidor already had occurred and that the 
counterrevolution had triumphed. The first to raise these views were members of the Democratic 
Centralist group in the USSR. In October 1928, the Democratic Centralist leader Borodai wrote 
to Trotsky from exile in Tiumen demanding that he admit that both the party and state had 
“‘degenerated,’” that the “‘dictatorship of the working class’” had ceased to exist, and that the 
situation within the party and the proceedings of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern were 
evidence of a “‘Thermidor with a dry guillotine.’”231 The following year Trotsky confronted 
similar arguments from Hugo Urbahns, leader of the Leninbund, a German Zinovievist 
organization of several thousand members.232 Urbahns asserted that Trotsky's expulsion from the 
Soviet Union constituted an event analogous to the execution of Robespierre and his followers, 
implying that the proletarian dictatorship had been replaced by a bourgeois state in the USSR.233 
Against these challenges, Trotsky put forward a number of arguments he would reiterate 
frequently in the following years to demonstrate that, despite the degeneration, the Soviet state 
remained ultimately proletarian in character.  
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 Trotsky’s first argument involved the question of class political power. Again, for 
Trotsky the leadership’s current shift to the left demonstrated that the line of the party leadership 
could be corrected by proletarian pressure. As Trotsky explained to Borodai in November 1928, 
“The functionary of the party, the trade unions, and other institutions, . . . in spite of everything, . 
. . depends upon the working masses and seems to be obliged in recent times to take these masses 
into account more and more.”234 At least partially for that reason he insisted to Borodai that the 
proletariat was still able to “regain full power, overhaul the bureaucracy, and put it under its 
control by the road of reform of the party and the soviets.”235 In that sense and to that extent, 
then, he believed the working class retained political power in the USSR.236 Thus, at another 
point in the same letter Trotsky challenged Borodai,  
 
Is the proletarian core of the party, assisted by the working class, 
capable of triumphing over the autocracy of the party apparatus, 
which is fusing with the state apparatus? Whoever replies in 
advance that it is incapable thereby speaks not only of the 
necessity of a new party on a new foundation but also of the 
necessity of a second and new proletarian revolution.237 
 
Following his expulsion from the Soviet Union, he raised the same argument in his polemic with 
Urbahns. As in his response to Borodai, Trotsky insisted that the left turn was the result of 
proletarian pressure, demonstrating that the Soviet state remained reformable and based upon the 
proletariat. Thus, in “Defense of the Soviet Republic and the Opposition,” a response to Urbahns 
written September 7, 1929, Trotsky argued that in the previous two years, 
Stalin found himself driven, simultaneously with the crushing of 
the Left Opposition, to plagiarize partially from its program in all 
fields, to direct his fire to the right, and to convert an internal party 
maneuver into a very sharp and prolonged zigzag to the left. This 
shows that despite everything the proletariat still possesses powers 
to exert pressure and that the state apparatus still remains 
dependent upon it.238 
 
A second major argument put forward by Trotsky for the proletarian character of the 
Soviet state involved the notion that power could only be transferred from one class to another 
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 through civil war. Since no new civil war had occurred, it was clear to Trotsky that there had 
been no fundamental change in the class nature of the Soviet state. In embryonic form, Trotsky 
first advanced this argument in his November 1928 letter to Borodai. After asserting that the 
situation within the Soviet Union was characterized by growing elements of dual power, Trotsky 
observed, “A condition of dual power is unstable by its very essence. Sooner or later, it must go 
one way or another. But as the situation is now, the bourgeoisie could seize power only by the 
road of counterrevolutionary upheaval.”239 Trotsky developed this idea more fully in his 
September 1929 in his polemic against Urbahns. There, he enumerated again the advantages of 
the Russian Revolution over the French, including a larger, more homogeneous, and more 
resolute revolutionary class; a revolutionary leadership that was “far more experienced and 
perspicacious”; and the inauguration of far deeper political, economic and cultural changes. 
Given all these advantages, Trotsky argued, how could the Russian Revolution be defeated 
peacefully when the victory of the French Thermidor had required a civil war? For Trotsky, such 
a conception of Thermidor was “nothing else but inverted reformism.”240 
Trotsky’s third major argument for the proletarian nature of the Soviet state was 
economic. Trotsky believed that a victorious Thermidor would abolish the property relations 
introduced by the Bolshevik Revolution.241 The fact that this had not happened indicated that the 
counterrevolution had not yet triumphed. Trotsky did not raise this argument in his response to 
Borodai. According to Max Shachtman, this was because the economic criterion was relatively 
unimportant to Trotsky during this period.242 However, it seems at least as likely that Trotsky did 
not raise the issue because Borodai was arguing a Thermidor had just occurred. If that was the 
case, a Thermidorian state might not yet had have had time to overturn property relations. At any 
rate, Trotsky articulated this argument forcefully the following year, insisting that “ultraleftists” 
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 such as Urbahns focused all of their attention on the damaged "shell" of the revolution while 
ignoring the “socio-economic kernel of the Soviet republic” that still survived:  
The means of production, once the property of the 
capitalists, remain to this day in the hands of the Soviet state. The 
land is nationalized. The exploiting elements are still excluded 
from the soviets and from the army. The monopoly of foreign trade 
remains a bulwark against the economic intervention of capitalism. 
All these are not trifles.243  
 
Despite its many crimes and blunders, Trotsky observed, “Soviet centrism” still defended “the 
social system that originated from the political and economic expropriation of the 
bourgeoisie.”244  
Beyond rejecting arguments that the counterrevolution already had triumphed, in 1929 
Trotsky continued to perceive that the danger of capitalist restoration actually had diminished 
somewhat. As we have seen, Trotsky’s fear of an imminent Thermidor began to subside in the 
fall of 1928 with the launching of the Stalinist offensive against the party right. During 1929 he 
was further reassured by Stalin’s victory over the right. In “Defense of the Soviet Republic and 
the Opposition” Trotsky explained, “By the power of its attack, the Opposition has forced the 
centrists to deliver a number of blows . . . to the Thermidorean class forces and the tendencies 
that reflect them inside the party.”245 
However, this does not mean that Trotsky was no longer concerned about restoration. He 
remained convinced that ultimately such a restoration was inevitable unless the proletariat 
succeeded in reforming the party. Thus, Robert McNeal is mistaken in asserting that in 1929 
Trotsky was “sufficiently impressed by the leftward swing of the Stalin regime to drop the matter 
[of Thermidor and Bonapartism] temporarily.246 In fact, even while noting Stalin’s blows against 
the right in his article of September 7, Trotsky stressed that these were “of course by no means 
mortal and decisive”; and he warned that “the classes have not yet spoken their final word.” 
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 Furthermore, in the same article he again emphasized the danger of capitalist restoration by 
reaffirming his characterization of Stalinism as “inverted Kerenskyism,” and explaining that 
“ruling centrism is, on the road to Thermidor, the last form of the rule of the proletariat.”247 
Similarly, in an October 1929 letter to Soviet Oppositionists, Trotsky asserted that the right was 
still strong enough within the apparatus that “at the first serious push by the elemental 
Thermidorean mass, not only Bukharin and Rykov but, even before them, Kalinin, Voroshilov, 
and Rudzutak would overturn the Stalinists” if the Stalinists tried to resist.248 
6.7.5 Cure  
A final important area of change during this period was in Trotsky’s understanding of 
how the problem of bureaucracy could be corrected. Despite Stalinist accusations to the contrary, 
in these years the strategy advocated by Trotsky remained one of reform, not revolution. In his 
letter to Borodai in November 1928 Trotsky insisted that efforts for “reviving and consolidating 
the October Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat” had not yet been “tried to the very 
end.”249 Explaining his reform perspective in his September 1929 polemic against Hugo 
Urbahns, Trotsky asserted that the left turn had demonstrated that “the proletariat still possesses 
powers to exert pressure and that the state apparatus remains dependent on it.” On this basis, 
Trotsky concluded, it was necessary for the Russian Opposition to maintain its traditional 
strategy, a “policy of reform and not of revolution.”250 Similarly, in an October 1929 letter to the 
Soviet Opposition published in the Bulletin following the rejection of Rakovskii’s declaration by 
E. Iaroslavskii, member of the presidium of the party’s Central Control Commission, Trotsky 
argued that “our line remains as before the line of reform.”251 However, he quickly added that 
“we are not ready to fight for these reforms within the limits of legality that Stalin and 
Yaroslavsky, in their struggle for self-preservation, constantly narrow.” In particular, Trotsky 
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 insisted upon the need for Bolshevik-Leninists to increase their efforts to organize as a “faction 
within communism.”252 
Nevertheless, by late 1929 Trotsky had become convinced that reform was impossible 
except as the result of a major party crisis. No doubt, Trotsky’s pessimism here represented a 
reaction to repeated failures by the Opposition to bring about reform, and perhaps also to the 
recent wave of defections from the Opposition. The most likely form such a crisis would take, 
according to Trotsky, was a renewed attempt by Thermidorian forces to restore capitalism. Thus, 
in a letter to Oppositionists in October, he observed, 
  
Short of a party crisis of the most profound kind, which 
would in all likelihood be the result of a subterranean push by the 
Thermidorean forces, a transition to a new stage is, unfortunately, 
no longer conceivable. Such a new stage could be either a stage of 
revival or the Thermidor stage. A party crisis would be 
accompanied by a new crystallization of the Bolshevik Party out of 
the present apparatus-stifled ideological chaos.253 
A further development in Trotsky’s reform strategy during 1929 was his redefinition of 
the Opposition as an international current. As we have noted, during Trotsky’s first weeks and 
months abroad he began to establish contact with various groups of international supporters, 
most of whom had been expelled from their own Communist parties in recent years.254 From the 
beginning, it was clear that Trotsky envisioned that these groups would play a role in relation to 
their own Communist parties analogous to the role played by the Soviet Opposition vis-à-vis the 
AUCP. Just as he rejected the idea of forming a new party in the Soviet Union, Trotsky similarly 
dismissed as “utter rubbish” the idea that he would attempt to organize his international 
supporters into a “Fourth International” as a rival to the Comintern. As he explained to a 
Japanese correspondent in April and again to his American supporters in May, the Opposition 
had no intention of surrendering the banner of the Comintern. It had been Stalin, not the 
Opposition, who had abandoned its ideas and principles. Besides, as he again asserted, centrism 
was inherently unstable and would soon be “ground away between the millstones of social 
democracy and communism.”255  
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 Instead, Trotsky characterized the Left Opposition as an “international current” that was 
preparing to transform itself into a more disciplined “international faction” of the Comintern. Its 
purpose was to work for the reform of the various Communist parties and of the Communist 
International, much as the Soviet Opposition was working for the reform of the AUCP and the 
Comintern.256 In line with this, Trotsky stressed the need to begin “right away” to elaborate an 
international platform that could “serve as a bridge to a future program of the Communist 
International.” He explained optimistically, “it is absolutely self-evident that the regenerated 
Communist International will require a new program.”257 
In the meantime, Trotsky stressed the need for clear ideological criteria to evaluate the 
various groupings attracted to the Left Opposition. He saw this as especially important because 
centrism was driving into opposition not only leftist critics of Stalinism, “but also the more 
consistent opportunists.”258 Trotsky identified “three classic questions” that could be used to sort 
out these various tendencies: “1) the policy of the Anglo-Russian Committee; (2) the course of 
the Chinese revolution; (3) the economic policy of the USSR, in conjunction with the theory of 
socialism in one country.”259 Significantly, he omitted from this list the issue of the “party 
regime,” or “bureaucratism.” This omission was completely intentional, for as Trotsky 
explained, “A party regime has no independent, self-sufficient meaning. In relation to party 
policy it is a derivative magnitude.”260 Furthermore, Trotsky noted that “heterogeneous 
elements,” including Mensheviks, claimed to oppose “Stalinist bureaucratism” when their real 
target was “revolutionary centralism.” As far as these elements were concerned, Trotsky 
commented, “Obviously, they cannot be our cothinkers.”261  
349 
 6.8 CONCLUSION  
In retrospect, is clear that Trotsky’s perception of developments in the Soviet Union 
during 1928-1929 was severely distorted. Throughout these years Trotsky consistently accepted 
at face value the simplistic Stalinist account of the “grain strike” and the false allegations 
regarding the “Shakhty conspiracy.” To his credit, and in contrast with the extreme intransigents, 
during these years Trotsky recognized that an important change was occurring in Soviet 
economic and international policy. Nevertheless, throughout this period, and especially in 1929, 
he greatly underestimated the significance of the shift in policy, even at various points refusing 
to describe it as a “turn.” At the same time, during this period he continued to reaffirm his 
erroneous predictions from 1927 that only the Opposition could lead a genuine left turn; that the 
“centrist” current would soon dissolve; and that without a major proletarian upsurge, the 
leadership would soon turn back to the right and a section of it would participate in the 
restoration of capitalism. 
Furthermore, although aspects of Trotsky’s analysis are persuasive, his main explanation 
for the turn is implausible. It seems quite likely, as Trotsky argued, that the leadership shifted left 
in early 1928 at least partly in reaction to a series of economic and international crises, 
precipitated to some degree by previous Soviet policy. Furthermore, it is conceivable that worker 
unrest at home and growing working-class militancy abroad were factors that played a role in 
pushing the leadership to the left. Beyond that, it is clear that many of the policies adopted by the 
leadership during this period were influenced by the Opposition’s program. However, Trotsky’s 
argument that the Opposition was mainly responsible for blocking a right turn or forcing a left 
turn in late winter/early spring 1928 is highly questionable. Following the Fifteenth Party 
Congress, the Opposition still maintained a following among the Soviet working class; and it 
was perceived by the leadership as enough of a threat (or annoyance) to merit repression. 
Nevertheless, in the winter of 1927-1928 it remained a relatively small grouping, seriously 
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 weakened by the defeat it had just suffered.262 Abroad, it was virtually nonexistent. It is highly 
doubtful that fear of the Opposition, or the growth of proletarian sympathy for the Opposition’s 
views, would have been able to bring about a turn. To the extent that the Opposition was a factor, 
it seems more likely that it was the organizational defeat and silencing of the Opposition in late 
1927 that made a left turn politically acceptable for the leadership. 
If Trotsky’s argument that the Opposition was primarily responsible for the turn in 1928 
is dubious, his assertion that it forced the deepening of the turn in 1929 seems almost absurd. 
After a flurry of activity in working-class districts and some significant growth in 1928, by the 
middle of 1929 the Opposition found itself weakened by defections, increasingly demoralized, 
and on the brink of collapse.263 According to Victor Serge, in 1929 the Opposition was reduced 
to a handful of leaders, plus, “a few hundred comrades” in prison, and “in deportation a few 
hundred others.” Of that period, he remarked, “Our intellectual activity is prodigious, our 
political action nil. Altogether there must be less than a thousand of us.”264 Another 
Oppositionist, Ante Ciliga, also subsequently described the general mood of demoralization that 
swept the Opposition in 1929.265 Meanwhile, the Left Opposition was only beginning to organize 
itself internationally. In such a state of disintegration at home and of disorganization abroad, the 
Opposition was hardly in a position to exert serious pressure on the leadership. 
A number of writers have commented upon the failure of Trotsky’s analysis to anticipate 
or comprehend the developments discussed in this chapter and the next.266 Of these, several have 
argued that Trotsky’s essential problem was that he was misled by his Thermidorian analogy. 
For example, Stephen Cohn has asserted, “The analogy would obsess and finally mislead 
Trotsky, blunting his perception of what was happening in the Soviet Union.”267 Similarly, 
Robert Wistrich has argued, 
 
The Thermidorian analogy misled him into thinking that the ‘film 
of revolution’ was running backwards from Bolshevism to 
capitalism with the kulaks and the nepmen at the end of the road. 
In fact the film was running forwards towards industrialization, a 
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 planned economy and collectivization at an unimaginable cost in 
human lives.268 
Taken literally, however, this argument is mistaken. As we have seen in this and the 
previous chapter, and as we will see again in subsequent chapters, the “Thermidorian analogy” 
was used in various ways at different times by Trotsky and the other Bolsheviks. In each case, 
although the reference was always to the “Ninth of Thermidor” in the French revolutionary 
calendar, the understanding of the significance of that date varied considerably. For example, in 
the early 1920’s Lenin even asserted that, by introducing NEP, the Bolsheviks were making a 
Thermidor themselves. Similarly, in 1922 Trotsky argued that the Bolsheviks had retained power 
by making “concessions to the Thermidor mood and tendencies of the petty bourgeoisie.”269 That 
is to say, the concept of “Thermidor” was never one simple yardstick by which Soviet reality 
could be measured, correctly or incorrectly. By itself, the use of “Thermidor” could not lead 
Trotsky into making any specific predictions or evaluations of Soviet reality. Furthermore, one 
might equally argue that Trotsky’s errors during this period were the fault of other analogies he 
used to explain his analysis, including comparisons to the history of the Second International 
(“centrism” and opportunism”); or to the history of the Russian Revolution and the Russian 
socialist movement (“dual power,” “Kerenskiism in reverse,” and “Menshevism”). 
However, the principal source of Trotsky’s errors during this period was not in the 
analogies he employed, but in the assumptions behind those analogies. As Robert Wistrich has 
also suggested, one of the most important of Trotsky’s mistaken assumptions at this time was his 
view that the bureaucratized state and party apparatuses were incapable of any significant degree 
of autonomy in relation to social classes.270 In fact, it was this assumption that lay behind 
Trotsky’s particular understanding of “Thermidor” during this period, and also behind his use of 
analogies from the history of the Second International and of the Russian revolutionary 
movement. More importantly, this assumption was central to the entire theory of bureaucratism 
developed by Trotsky in 1926-1927. Although that theory had seemed a compelling one when it 
was first articulated, events of 1928 and 1929 began to demonstrate how flawed it really was. 
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Despite various adjustments and modifications, the theory of bureaucracy defended by 
Trotsky in late 1929 was essentially the theory he developed in previous years. By the end of 
1929, it was already in crisis. As Stalin’s left turn continued to deepen in the following years, 
this crisis would become even more pronounced. 
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 7.0  THE TURN AND THE THEORETICAL CRISIS DEEPEN 
From late 1929 through early 1933 Trotsky continued his Turkish exile, living most of this 
period with members of his family and a small number of supporters on the island of Prinkipo 
off the coast of Istanbul. During these years Trotsky spent part of his time writing his 
monumental History of the Russian Revolution; another portion he devoted to assisting his 
supporters in resolving the myriad political and organizational questions that confronted the 
International Left Opposition (ILO), founded in Paris in April 1930. However, he also dedicated 
a great deal of time and energy to analyzing developments in Soviet economic policy, Comintern 
policy, and policy related to the party/state regime of the USSR.  
Throughout these years, reality continued to diverge sharply from the theory of 
bureaucracy developed by Trotsky in 1926-1927. On the basis of that theory, had Trotsky 
predicted in 1928-1929 that, without an increase in proletarian and/or Oppositional pressure, a 
deep turn to the right by the leadership was imminent. Instead, in 1929-1933 Trotsky perceived 
the leadership as veering sharply to the left, adopting orientations in economic and international 
policy so radical that they fell entirely outside of the framework assumed by Trotsky’s theory. 
Furthermore, Trotsky had viewed the worsening of the state and party regimes as directly related 
to the leadership’s rightist orientation. However, even while implementing its left course, the 
leadership continued to institute a regime in the party and state that, to Trotsky, seemed to 
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 deviate more and more from the norms of workers’ democracy. In this context, the crisis in 
Trotsky’s theoretical perspective that first had appeared in 1928-1929 deepened dramatically.  
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn has described the phenomenon 
of theoretical crisis in the natural sciences. According to Kuhn, crises generally emerge in 
response to the growing recognition of the existence of anomalies or counter instances to the 
existing paradigm. However, Kuhn further argues that for an anomaly to evoke a crisis, it usually 
must be more than just an anomaly. It may call into question explicit and fundamental 
generalizations of the paradigm; or it may persist over a long period of time. In each such case, 
scientists respond by devising numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications to the theory. 
Nevertheless, the anomaly continues to resist resolution. Ultimately, this situation results in the 
proliferation of competing articulations of the paradigm, and in the blurring of the paradigm’s 
rules.1 
The preceding paragraph in many ways describes the situation that confronted Trotsky 
and his supporters in the early 1930s. The left turns of the leadership, combined with the 
continued worsening of the regime, were anomalies that challenged the most fundamental 
assumptions of Trotsky’s theory of bureaucracy. At the same time, these anomalies were 
persistent: they had appeared as early as 1928, and they continued into 1933. As in 1928-1929, 
Trotsky responded to these anomalies in part by a series of strained interpretations of reality, but 
also by devising various theoretical articulations and ad hoc modifications. Meanwhile, Left 
Oppositionists within Soviet prisons created their own diverse articulations of the theory—a 
development that resulted in the proliferation of contending Trotskyist groupings. Ultimately, 
even within Trotsky’s own writings on bureaucracy, there was growing theoretical confusion and 
blurring. 
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 As in 1928-1929, Trotsky repeatedly attempted to force the unfolding situation into the 
Procrustean bed of his traditional theory. His efforts to do so again resulted in a number of 
analyses and formulations that today seem fundamentally mistaken. These included Trotsky’s 
acceptance of the validity of the charges in the show trials of specialists, his belief that in the 
main collectivization was accomplished voluntarily, his explanation of the ultraleftism of the 
First Five-Year Plan in terms of capitalist sabotage, his insistent predictions that the kolkhozy 
would foster the development of a new layer of kulaks, and his repeated forecasts that the 
leadership was about to veer sharply back to the right, perhaps even instituting capitalism.  
There are a number of likely explanations—theoretical, political, and personal—for why 
Trotsky continued to interpret reality in terms of a theory that appears in retrospect to be so 
misguided. One theoretical reason certainly involved the previous successes of Trotsky’s theory. 
As we have seen, in 1926-1927 that theory provided a fairly convincing account of a variety of 
developments, including the conservative drift in Soviet economic and international policies and 
the steady worsening of the party and state regimes. In light of those theoretical successes, it is 
understandable that Trotsky was reluctant to abandon his traditional approach. At the same time, 
there was no apparent theoretical alternative that was persuasive. Of course, alternatives were 
advanced at the time by other Oppositionists and left communists. Various conciliators argued 
that the leadership had proven to be “better than their theories” or more responsive to objective 
necessity than the Opposition had imagined. On the other hand, some extreme irreconcilables 
and left communists insisted that a Thermidorian restoration already had occurred. However, 
from Trotsky’s perspective, all of these alternatives involved theoretical problems that were even 
greater than those of his own theory.  
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 Aside from theoretical concerns, there also were good political reasons for Trotsky, as the 
central leader of the Opposition, to continue to uphold the fundamentals of the traditional theory. 
The Opposition’s program, its past activities, and its entire self-definition were all bound up with 
the theoretical perspective articulated by Trotsky in 1926-1927. If Trotsky had abandoned that 
perspective, it could have called into question the entire meaning of the Opposition’s recent 
struggle. Furthermore, as far as the theoretical innovations advocated by the conciliators and the 
extreme intransigents were concerned, from Trotsky’s perspective all of these led to political 
positions—either capitulation or dead-end sectarianism—that precluded serious activity on 
behalf of reform. At the same time, Trotsky must have recognized the value of his own 
reaffirmation of the traditional theory for strengthening the political center of the Opposition, and 
thus minimizing the defection of Oppositionists to the Stalinists or to the “sectarians.”  
A final factor that helps to explain Trotsky’s ability to uphold the theory he had 
developed in 1926-1927 was his own personality. Trotsky was an extraordinarily strong-willed 
individual. This is evident from his years of political activity independent of both the Bolsheviks 
and the Mensheviks before the revolution; from his ongoing debates with other Bolshevik 
leaders, including Lenin, after the revolution; and from his persistence in isolated oppositional 
activity during his years in exile. It is likely that this stubborn streak contributed to Trotsky’s 
ability to persist in reasserting the essentials of his traditional theory, even in the face of 
mounting counterevidence. 
Nevertheless, and despite all of these factors, the obvious discrepancies between 
Trotsky’s traditional theory and reality during the years 1929-1933 repeatedly compelled Trotsky 
to introduce implicit and explicit ad hoc modifications and adjustments into his theory. Thus, at 
times Trotsky was forced to explain major shifts in policy, not in terms of class pressure, but in 
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 terms of factors such as the panic, excitement, or stupidity of the leadership or the bureaucracy. 
Similarly, he increasingly was compelled to attribute the worsening of the regime, not to the 
shifting balance of class forces, but to the conscious efforts by the bureaucracy or the Stalin 
group to advance their own interests. Along the same lines, in this period Trotsky found it 
necessary to introduce into his more general theoretical formulations a whole series of 
adjustments, all of which emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy. 
Although these revisions seemed to bring Trotsky’s analysis into a closer correspondence 
with reality, the result was a theoretical orientation that was increasingly incoherent. Thus, on 
occasions Trotsky found himself explaining the leftist economic policies of the leadership as 
inspired by proletarian pressure, bourgeois influence, or the emotional states of an autonomous 
bureaucracy. At times he asserted the turn had been made against the wishes of the bureaucracy; 
while other times he insisted it had been made by the bureaucracy. He variously argued that the 
left course had either increased or decreased the danger of capitalist restoration, and that it had 
increased the probability such a restoration would take either the Thermidorian or the 
Bonapartist path. He repeatedly described as “centrist” the grouping that stood to the left of the 
Left Opposition, while criticizing as “rightist” a party current that held views indistinguishable 
from those of the left. Finally, he continued to denounce the “conservatism” of a leadership that 
was dramatically transforming the Soviet economy while implementing a radical left course 
internationally. The result of these modifications was to stretch Trotsky’s traditional theory 
nearly to the breaking point. 
Eventually, Trotsky was able to break free of his old theory and to construct a new one 
that resolved many of the problems mentioned above. However, that process was not precipitated 
directly by the left turns in policy of the early 1930s, but by the disastrous failure of Comintern 
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 policy in Germany in 1933. Following that event, Trotsky began a long and painful process of 
theoretical reconstruction. We will take up that story in the next chapter. 
7.1 ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL 
In late 1929 the leadership dramatically deepened the turn in economic policy it had 
initiated in 1928. In industry, this policy shift took the form of a frenetic campaign to fulfill ever 
higher production targets. In the countryside, it involved a declaration of war against the kulaks 
and the complete restructuring of the Soviet system of agriculture. Together, during the years 
1930-1933 these policies transformed the face of the Soviet Union. 
 
7.1.1 The Soviet Industrial Revolution  
At the end of the summer of 1929 the leadership began to push industrial goals higher 
even than those envisioned in the optimal variant of the plan adopted in April. In August VSNKh 
estimated that industrial output in the economic year 1929-1930 would increase 28 percent 
instead of the previously projected optimum of 21.5 percent. The November plenum of the 
Central Committee increased this figure again to 32.1 percent; and by the following February 
many production goals for the plan had doubled. Still the targets continued to climb.2 At the 
Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 the General Secretary publicly endorsed the demand to 
“carry out the Five-Year Plan in four years.” Even more ambitiously, he went on to declare that 
“in quite a number of branches of industry, we can carry it out in three years, or even two and a 
half years.”3 
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 To achieve these goals, the Soviet leadership called upon the workers to exert themselves 
to the maximum. In this campaign the leadership relied in part upon moral incentives, utilizing 
the trade unions to mobilize the latent idealism of the Soviet working class. Throughout the 
country young workers responded with heroic acts of self-sacrifice for the sake of 
industrialization, enlisting in “shock brigades” engaged in “socialist competition.” However, 
physical coercion also played a significant role in the leadership’s drive to industrialize. During 
these years the OGPU set hundreds of thousands of prisoners to work digging canals, building 
roads, felling timber, and laboring in coal mines.4 
Despite these efforts, by the summer of 1930 Soviet industry was already in crisis. A 
number of industries failed to meet planned targets, and production in others—such as coal, iron, 
steel, and copper—even began to fall. Rail transport proved incapable of meeting the demands 
placed upon it; the overall quality of goods deteriorated dramatically; and attempts by the 
leadership to fill the gap between revenues and expenditures by the unplanned issue of currency 
resulted in serious inflation. At the same time, the industrial work force expanded far more 
rapidly than anticipated, straining the supply of consumer goods, housing, and public services, 
and contributing to a sharp decline in the standard of living of Soviet workers.5 An additional 
problem in this period was the increase in labor turnover: by 1930 the average worker was 
changing jobs every eight months, and the average coal miner every four, seriously undermining 
efforts by the Soviet leadership to create a skilled work force.6  
The leadership attempted to address the deepening crisis in a variety of ways. Its initial 
reaction to the shortage of food and consumer goods was to extend the rationing system that had 
been in effect since 1928. During 1930, a hierarchy of towns and consumer groups was 
established with preferential rations going to factory and rail workers and to technicians and 
engineers in key industrial cities and regions. For industrial workers, the effect was to increase 
their level of consumption in relation to the rest of the urban population, while greatly equalizing 
consumption among the industrial workers themselves.7 However, in the context of the 
deepening crisis the Soviet leadership soon grew concerned that rationing was reducing the 
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 incentive of skilled workers to produce. From the fall of 1930 through early 1931, party officials 
increasingly began to denounce the practice of wage leveling. On June 23, 1931, in a speech to a 
conference of economic executives, Stalin condemned the “‘Leftist’ practice of wage 
equalization” for undermining the development of skilled labor and promoting the “fluidity of 
manpower.” Soon afterwards, the leadership began to introduce significant wage differentials, 
especially in priority industries, to benefit skilled workers. “Shock workers” (i.e., workers who 
carried out obligations that exceeded the norm) were also granted special privileges, including 
extra rations of meat and fat and preferential access to consumer goods and housing. At the same 
time, an extensive system of privileges was established for higher officials of the party, state, and 
other Soviet organizations. In line with these changes, in 1932 the leadership officially 
abandoned the old Bolshevik principle that limited the income of all party members to that of 
skilled workers.8 
The leadership also dealt with the crisis by utilizing administrative coercion to reduce 
rates of labor turnover and absenteeism. A Central Committee resolution adopted on October 20, 
1930 and a governmental decree of December 15 deprived job changers of the use of the labor 
exchanges and of unemployment benefits for six months, while requiring that enterprises hire 
only through the labor exchanges. A decree of January 19, 1931 made absenteeism grounds for 
immediate dismissal. Subsequently, a decree of November 15, 1932 declared that workers absent 
without cause for even one day were to be dismissed and evicted from enterprise housing, and 
were to have their ration cards confiscated. In practice, it seems that none of these measures was 
particularly effective, for they were easily circumvented by factory managers desperate for 
workers.9 
Another response to the crisis by the leadership was to place the blame for it upon the 
wrecking activities of “saboteurs.” In the early 1930’s Soviet leaders uncovered a number of 
such “conspiracies,” now generally viewed as fictitious by Western historians. Two of these 
cases were especially important. In November and December 1930 eight technical specialists, 
mostly high officials in Gosplan and VSNKh, confessed to having organized a 
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 counterrevolutionary “Industrial Party” of some two thousand members. The specialists were 
accused of conducting sabotage in a wide variety of industries in preparation for a coup and for 
the military intervention of France and Britain. As part of their wrecking activities, the 
defendants allegedly drew up economic targets that they believed to be unrealistically high, but 
that unexpectedly turned out to be achievable. The court convicted all the accused. Five of the 
specialists were condemned to death, but their sentences were ultimately commuted to 
imprisonment. Another important show trial held in March 1931 involved fourteen members of a 
“Union Bureau” of the Menshevik Party. Most of the accused in this case were former 
Mensheviks who recently had held responsible positions in Soviet economic and planning 
agencies. After rejoining the Mensheviks in the late 1920s, the defendants allegedly engaged in 
various wrecking activities, including attempts to slow Soviet economic development by 
lowering economic goals. Furthermore, it was charged, they had plotted a counterrevolutionary 
insurrection in collaboration with the Industrial Party and a group called the “Toiling Peasant 
Party.” On the basis of confessions, all fourteen defendants were convicted and sentenced to 
various terms of imprisonment.10 
Despite these various responses by the leadership, the economic crisis continued to 
deepen. By the winter of 1932-33, the entire Soviet economy seemed to teeter on the brink of 
collapse. Bottlenecks and shortages appeared in all branches of the economy. Labor productivity 
failed to rise as anticipated and, by some accounts, actually began to fall. Growth rates for 
industrial output declined steadily, and actual production in various industries began to drop. 
Furthermore, the quality of industrially produced goods continued to deteriorate. Meanwhile, 
inflation mounted ever higher, and Soviet workers experienced what Alec Nove has described as 
“the most precipitous peacetime decline in living standards known in recorded history.”11  
At that point, on January 7, 1933, Stalin announced that the First Five-Year Plan had 
been completed successfully in four years and three months. (Three months had been added to 
the fourth year to make the economic year coincide with the calendar year.) According to Stalin, 
the entire plan had been fulfilled by 93.7 percent, and the plan for heavy industry had been 
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 fulfilled by 108 percent.12 In fact, during the First Five-Year Plan, production in most areas 
increased both absolutely and relatively, and in some industries it showed considerable gains. 
Furthermore, the First Five-Year Plan laid the foundations for even greater industrial expansion 
in the mid-1930s. However, as most Western scholars have observed, the first piatiletka was not 
nearly as successful as described by Stalin. Production of coal, pig iron, and steel fell far short of 
the planned targets; many branches of light industry did not grow at all; and textile production 
actually declined. In fact, the only area in which the plan was exceeded was the machinery and 
metalworking group, the final figures of which were subject to significant statistical inflation.13  
In early 1933, reacting to the economic crisis and to these overall failures in the plan, the 
leadership began to retreat from the extremism of the First Five-Year Plan. During the previous 
year the Seventeenth Party Conference, resolving to continue the offensive, had adopted high 
targets for the Second Five-Year Plan. However, Stalin modified these projections at the Central 
Committee plenum of January 1933, calling for “less speedy rates” of industrialization, and 
proposing as a minimum a “3-14 per cent average annual increase in industrial output” in place 
of the 22 percent annual increase allegedly achieved in the first plan.14 
 
7.1.2 Mass Collectivization and Dekulakization 
Meanwhile, a comparable revolution was taking place in agriculture. As we saw in the 
last chapter, during the summer of 1929 the party leadership began to accelerate the tempo of 
collectivization, apparently in an attempt to resolve the chronic difficulties of grain collection. 
Agitators were dispatched from the cities to harangue the peasantry about the merits of collective 
farming, while the state extended promises that tractors and credits would be supplied to the 
kolkhozy. A combination of political pressure and coercion was utilized to convince peasants 
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 who resisted. As a result of these efforts, from June to October, the overall level of 
collectivization rose from 3.9 to 7.6 percent of all peasant households.15  
Still, the leadership continued to press for higher levels of collectivization. On October 
31 a Pravda editorial called for the reassignment of all the forces employed in the procurements 
campaign, as well as the mass mobilization of all party and soviet personnel, for the 
collectivization drive. A week later, on the twelfth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 
Pravda published an article by Stalin in which he asserted that peasants were voluntarily joining 
the collectives “not in separate groups, . . . but by whole villages, volosts, districts, and even 
okrugs.” Speaking for the Politburo at the November plenum of the Central Committee, Molotov 
announced that the time had come for “a decisive move in the matter of the economic 
rehabilitation and collectivization of millions of peasant households.” He predicted that by the 
following autumn “we shall already be in a position to say definitely that, for all essential 
purposes, collectivization has been completed, not just in one oblast, and not only in the North 
Caucasus.” At the same plenum the Central Committee, bowing before this “spontaneous” influx 
of poor and middle peasants into the kolkhozy, endorsed the “continued acceleration of the 
process of collectivization and sovkhoz construction,” and resolved to mobilize at least 25,000 
industrial workers for the effort.16 
During the winter, collectivization brigades managed to bring about a massive influx of 
peasants into collective farms. To a large extent, this was accomplished by coercion or threats of 
coercion. Many joined the collectives to avoid being persecuted as kulaks or kulak supporters. 
Peasants who attempted to evade collectivization often found themselves subject to increased 
taxation, fines, or arrest. Some recalcitrant villages were surrounded by armed units and driven 
into the kolkhozy by force. By March 1, 1930 the total level of collectivization had climbed to 
14.6 million peasant households—57.2 percent of the total.17 
Closely related to the collectivization campaign was the simultaneous intensification of 
the offensive against the kulaks. When asked at the November plenum whether or not kulaks 
should be admitted to the collectives, Molotov advised: “Treat the kulak as a most cunning and 
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 still undefeated enemy.” In December local authorities initiated “dekulakization” drives, 
expropriating kulaks and sometimes arresting or deporting them. Stalin endorsed these measures 
in a speech on December 27, calling for a policy of “eliminating the kulaks as a class.”18 Moshe 
Lewin has argued persuasively that the leadership initiated the campaign against the kulak “to 
‘convince’ the peasants that all roads, save those that led to the kolkhoz, were barred to them,” 
and at the same time to accumulate property that was to be used for setting up the new 
kolkhozy.19 
In late January and early February 1930 local authorities received their first instructions 
on how to implement the campaign. Kulaks who were most actively hostile to collectivization 
were to forfeit their property. Additionally, they were to be imprisoned, sent to concentration 
camps [kontslageri], or shot; and their families were to be exiled. “Economically strong” kulaks 
were to be expropriated and deported with their families to remote areas of the country or to 
remote districts within their region. The remaining kulaks who were considered loyal to the 
regime were to have part of their means of production confiscated and were to be resettled on 
inferior land within their own districts. Altogether, over a million families were to be 
dekulakized.20  
The dekulakization drive was led by local soviet, party, and GPU officials, and was 
carried out by special detachments consisting of local party or Komsomol cadres, members of 
the militia or GPU, poor peasants, and industrial workers. As implemented, the campaign 
actually turned out to be more massive and more brutal than projected by the center. In violation 
of stated policy, local authorities often dekulakized areas not scheduled for mass collectivization. 
Frequently, they applied the label of “kulak” or “ideological kulak” to middle or even poor 
peasants who resisted collectivization. Also, officials who found themselves short of real kulaks 
often simply branded peasants as kulaks in order to fill quotas. In violation of policy the brigades 
seized not only land, tools, and animals, but also personal property. Beyond that, the conditions 
of deportation were so horrible that large numbers of deportees died en route of exposure, 
starvation, and disease.  
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 In numerical terms the campaign was a great success, by some accounts vastly over 
fulfilling the original plans of the center.21 However, both the dekulakization and collectivization 
campaigns provoked significant resistance among the peasantry. In early 1930 large numbers of 
peasants began to leave the collective farms. At the same time, a wave of peasant demonstrations 
and uprisings swept the Soviet Union. Arson, sabotage, murder of communists, and peasant 
suicides were common. Perhaps most significant for the future of Soviet agriculture was the 
widespread slaughter of livestock, which peasants assumed would be confiscated for the 
kolkhozy. It has been estimated that between 1929 and 1934 over half of the county’s horses, 
cattle, and pigs, and two thirds of its sheep and goats disappeared, most slaughtered in the first 
two months of 1930.22  
In the face of such resistance, and reportedly under pressure from other members of the 
Central Committee, Stalin sounded the retreat. In an article published in Pravda on March 2, 
1930, Stalin conceded that serious excesses had been committed. He placed the blame upon 
overzealous local officials who had become “dizzy with success.” Although Stalin called upon 
the party to “consolidate” its successes, he insisted that the collective-farm movement should be 
“voluntary.” Stalin’s article immediately touched off a mass exodus from the collective farms. 
By June 1, only 24.8 percent of the total of peasant households remained collectivized; and by 
September 1, this figure was down to 21.5 percent.23 
However, the leadership had no intention of abandoning its plans for wholesale 
collectivization. In the fall of 1930 the campaign was resumed anew. As part of this drive, a 
massive new assault was launched against kulak and “better-off” peasants. Also, “hard 
obligations” of extraordinarily high volumes of grain were imposed upon private farms in order 
to encourage collectivization. Peasants who were unable to deliver the required amount of grain 
could have their lands sold and were subject to fines and imprisonment. By July 1932, 61.5 
percent of Soviet peasants found themselves back in the kolkhozy.24  
The most devastating tragedy associated with mass collectivization was the famine of 
1932-1933. In the early 1930’s agricultural production stagnated, at least partly because of the 
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 low productivity of the collective farms. Nevertheless, in order to collect the grain needed for a 
growing urban population, for the army, and for export, the leadership continued to push 
procurement targets ever higher while keeping prices low. During the summer and fall of 1932 
many collectivized peasants withheld grain for personal consumption or to sell on the recently 
reopened markets, while others simply refused to work on the kolkhozy. The leadership 
responded with force. Refusal to deliver grain for state procurements was made a capital offense. 
Mass arrests were carried out in the rural areas, and large numbers of “pro-kulak” elements were 
expelled from the party. Ultimately, even grain set aside for seed and fodder was taken from the 
peasantry. The resulting famine was particularly acute in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the 
lower and middle Volga, the southern Urals, and Kazakhstan. By all accounts, millions of 
peasants died from starvation.25 
7.2 TROTSKY’S RESPONSE TO THE TURN 
Not surprisingly, the abrupt shift in economic policy generated extreme confusion within 
the ranks of unrepentant Left Oppositionists in the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav oppositionist, 
Ante Ciliga, has described the situation he encountered among the imprisoned Bolshevik-
Leninists in the Verkhne-Uralsk isolator in November 1930: “The burning problems put by the 
revolution, and in particular by the Five Year Plan in its present stage, produced the greatest 
animation in this circle and a state of ideological crisis singularly favourable to the breaking up 
of opinion into small sections.” The small Trotskyist organization in the isolator had split into 
three sections with three different programs. The “Right section” argued that the turn had met the 
essential demands of the Opposition, and that it should be supported while the Opposition 
continued to criticize the exaggerated pace of the plan as well as the Stalinist regime. According 
to Ciliga, this group hoped for reform from above, expecting that increasing difficulties would 
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 force the leadership to modify its polices, but it opposed appeals to the masses because it feared 
“the ‘Thermidor front might well include the working class’.” In contrast, the leftist “Militant 
Bolsheviks” declared that the entire industrialization drive was mere bluff. It insisted that reform 
could only come from below through a split in the party, and it called for reliance upon the 
working class. Between the other two groupings, the “Centre section” advocated methods of 
reform from above and below.26 
Meanwhile, Trotsky was also having difficulties comprehending the new situation. 
Although he had not anticipated the deepening of the turn, he shifted his critique quickly—
perhaps because he was becoming accustomed to abrupt policy shifts by the leadership. By early 
1930 he was denouncing the leadership’s ultraleftism just as sharply as he previously had 
condemned its conservatism. However, throughout this period Trotsky struggled to understand 
the origins of the turn and to predict where it was heading. By veering to the left, the leadership 
had acted directly counter to expectations Trotsky had derived from his theory of bureaucracy. In 
an effort to understand what was happening, Trotsky now returned to his theory. However, he 
repeatedly found himself forced to introduce implicit modifications in order to reconcile his 
theory with unfolding developments.27 
 
7.2.1 Trotsky’s Critique of the Left Turn 
In certain respects Trotsky was inclined to view the new economic course positively. In 
the first place, for Trotsky it represented yet another indication that the Opposition’s program 
had been correct. Early in 1930 he recalled that just a few years previously the leadership had 
attacked the Opposition as “‘romantics,’’fanatics,’ and ‘superindustrializers’” for advocating a 
mere 20 percent annual growth rate in industry. Furthermore, when the Opposition had 
demanded more attention to collectivization, “three-quarters of the Politburo and 90 percent of 
380 
 the government apparatus had their orientation to the . . . kulak.” Now he observed, “Experience 
has shown that the Opposition was right.”28  
Beyond that, throughout the early 1930s Trotsky repeatedly acclaimed the achievements 
of the plan as a clear demonstration of the superiority of socialist economic methods over those 
of capitalism. As early as February 1930 he spoke of the “universal significance” of the 
successes of industrialization, insisting that these had provided empirical evidence of the infinite 
potentialities inherent in socialist methods.”29 Subsequently, Trotsky praised Soviet industrial 
accomplishments as “enormous in their historical importance,” and as “the most colossal 
phenomenon of contemporary history.”30 Similarly, in April 1930 he spoke of the “deeply 
progressive and creative significance of collectivization.”31 A year later he even characterized 
“the present tempos of collectivization” as signifying the birth of “a new epoch in the 
development of humanity, the beginning of the liquidation ‘of [what Marx described as] the 
idiocy of rural life.’”32 
Yet, despite such statements such as these, throughout the early 1930s Trotsky continued 
to criticize Soviet economic policy at least as sharply as he had in the past. In one respect, 
Trotsky’s critique was familiar. Echoing his earlier statements on Soviet economic policy, he 
denounced the plan’s isolationism, which he saw as flowing inevitably from the doctrine of 
socialism in one county. In his March 1930 “Open Letter” to the party Trotsky characterized this 
isolationism as “the fundamental flaw of the entire economic plan.”33 The following December 
he observed that, in spite of the fact that the expanding Soviet economy soon would need to 
increase its reliance upon the world market, the point of departure of the plan had been the vision 
of “a reactionary utopia of an enclosed socialist economy developing on its internal 
foundations.”34  
However, as Trotsky himself repeatedly acknowledged, during these years most of his 
critique of Soviet economic policy was leveled not from the left, but “from the right.”35 In this 
regard, he insisted, it was the party leadership that had changed positions, making a “curve of 
180 degrees” over the heads of the Opposition and adopting the extreme leftist policies it 
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 previously had denounced as “Trotskyism.”36 In industrial policy this ultraleftism was evident in 
the tempo of the industrialization effort and the virtual elimination of the role of the market in 
planning. In agricultural policy it could be seen in the leadership’s attempt to eliminate the 
kulaks as a class, and in the tempo and scale of collectivization.  
The central theme of Trotsky’s new critique of industrial policy was that the goals of the 
plan were insanely high. Repeatedly, Trotsky denounced the pace of the industrialization drive, 
and especially the decision to fulfill the goals of the plan in four years, as sheer economic 
madness. He ridiculed the leadership’s “industrialization races,” its “hazardous bureaucratic 
superindustrializations,” its “racetrack-gallop approach” and its “sporting method,” 
characterizing these as manifestations of “bureaucratic adventurism” and “ultraleft lunacy.”37 For 
Trotsky, the problem was not simply that the overall goals of the plan could not hope to be 
achieved—though he was certain they could not. Beyond that, he was convinced that the attempt 
to reach them would lead inevitably to unevenness if the fulfillment of the plan. In turn, Trotsky 
insisted, this unevenness would result in serious disproportions and bottlenecks between 
industries and between different sectors of the economy. As early as December 20, 1929 he 
warned that “we are heading for a disturbance of the total economic equilibrium and 
consequently of the social equilibrium.”38 By the following February he was noting that 
“disproportions in production are accumulating in different branches of industry.” These, he 
predicted in April, would only continue to worsen, “and may manifest themselves sharply, if not 
in the first year then in the second or third year . . . , which would result in an arrest of growth.”39 
By late 1932, on the basis of economic reports from the Soviet press, Trotsky concluded that his 
prophesies had been realized. “The whole trouble,” he observed, “is that the wild leaps of 
industrialization have brought the various elements of the plan into dire contradiction with each 
other.”40 
Another concern repeatedly expressed by Trotsky was that excessive investment in 
industry was reducing the resources that could be allotted to consumption and to raising the 
standard of living of the working class.41 Already in March 1930 he was noting that the living 
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 standard of workers was falling.42 The following summer he asserted that the economic position 
of the proletariat had “extraordinarily worsened” in recent years.43 Subsequently, using examples 
from the Soviet press, he painted a bleak picture of deteriorating working conditions, and of 
dwindling supplies of food, housing, and consumer goods.44 Trotsky saw this issue as 
intrinsically important, for he believed that the standard of living of workers, together with their 
role in governing the state, constituted “the highest criteria of socialist successes.”45 Beyond that, 
he insisted that improving the material and cultural level of the proletariat, “the main producing 
force,” was necessary for rapid industrialization.46 Along these lines, Trotsky argued that the 
decline in the standard of living of industrial workers was at least partially responsible for the 
labor shortage, for it had meant that fewer peasants were attracted to the urban centers.47 
Furthermore, he asserted, low incomes and unbearable working conditions had contributed to 
high rates of labor turnover by forcing workers to wander from factory to factory in order to 
improve the quality of their lives. Finally, he observed that poor nutrition, abominable working 
conditions, and nervous exhaustion were generating indifference among workers regarding the 
proper care of machinery, the general conditions within the factories, and the quality of goods 
produced.48 Ultimately, Trotsky warned in April 1930, this decline in quality would affect not 
only the individual consumer, but also the rate of industrialization, “for industry itself is the chief 
consumer of products.”49 Repeatedly during the following years he noted accounts in the Soviet 
press that confirmed this prediction as well.50 
According to Trotsky a further inevitable consequence of the excessive tempo of 
industrialization was rampant inflation. As he explained in an open letter to the AUCP(b) in 
March 1930,  
 
An accelerated pace which runs ahead of existing possibilities soon 
leads to the creation of imaginary resources where there are no real 
ones. That is called inflation. All the symptoms of it are already 
present and they are also the symptoms of a threatening economic 
crisis.51  
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 Three years later he insisted that inflation was a serious problem that was contributing to the 
declining standard of proletarian life while distorting planning.52 
While condemning the excessive pace of industrialization, Trotsky also denounced the 
leadership for proceeding without regard for two factors that he viewed as essential for correct 
planning: the market and democracy.53 Again echoing the arguments of the party right, Trotsky 
asserted that the market was necessary during the entire transition period between capitalism and 
socialism. In part, it was needed for consumers to be able to express their needs “by the direct 
pressure of supply and demand.” Besides that, it was indispensable as a means of checking by 
“commercial calculation” on the “economic efficacy” of the plan.54 However, as Trotsky 
complained in October 1932, the Stalinists had prepared and implemented the First Five-Year 
Plan without any concern for the market, abolishing NEP and replacing market mechanisms with 
“methods of compulsion.”55  
The second factor missing from Stalinist planning, according to Trotsky, was proletarian 
democracy. Previously, Trotsky had only insisted upon the political necessity of democracy. 
Now he began to insist that it was also crucial from the economic standpoint.56 As he observed in 
February 1930, the preparation of a five-year plan was a complex task requiring the participation 
“by all related industries and by the working class.” In particular, popular involvement was 
needed not only to determine what the workers and peasants wanted to consume, but also what 
they were able and willing to set aside for accumulation.57 However, Trotsky noted in October 
1930, the existing plan had been “worked out at the top, behind closed doors, then handed down 
to the masses like tablets from Sinai.”58 
Trotsky advanced a wide range of demands to correct the industrial policies of the First 
Five-Year Plan. Against the isolationism of the plan, he urged the leadership to work 
aggressively for the integration of the Soviet economy into the world market. Toward this end 
Trotsky called upon the leadership of the Comintern and the Soviet Union to approach Social 
Democratic parties of the West with a public appeal for joint economic cooperation: Western 
powers could be called upon to provide the Soviet Union with machinery and agricultural 
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 implements in exchange for raw materials and consumer products. Trotsky predicted that the 
workers of the West would respond positively to such an appeal as a way to eliminate 
unemployment and food shortages. If these workers pressured their Social Democratic leaders 
into supporting such a plan, the Soviet Union might receive much-needed machinery and 
equipment. On the other hand, even if the Social Democratic leaders ultimately rejected the 
proposal, Trotsky believed the USSR would benefit politically. Simply by raising the proposal 
the Soviet leadership would forge a bond with workers of the West while driving a wedge 
between them and their reformist leaders.59 
Throughout these years Trotsky also urged the Soviet leadership to slow the pace of 
industrialization, specifically imploring it to abandon the effort to complete the five-year plan in 
four years.60 Beyond that, in October 1932 he proposed that the leadership delay inauguration of 
the Second Five-Year Plan for one year, and that it use 1933 as a “buffer year in which economic 
disproportions could be rectified and gaps filled.61 In March 1933 he additionally suggested that 
the starting point for industrial growth targets in 1933 should be the 8.5 percent actually attained 
in 1932, rather than the 16 percent projected in the Second Five-Year Plan.62 He saw such 
cutbacks as necessary for establishing strict financial discipline and stabilizing the ruble.63 
Furthermore, he suggested that the resources freed by the reducing the pace of industrialization 
could be utilized to improve the living standards and working conditions of the Soviet 
proletariat.64 
Finally, Trotsky addressed the issue of the planning process. He openly admitted that the 
Opposition had no “a priori plan” that would painlessly extricate the Soviet economy from the 
“mud” into which it had been driven. Rather, he argued that the plan for building socialism could 
only be developed through “broad soviet democracy.”65 As a first step in this direction, he called 
upon the party leadership to submit the experiences of the five-year plan for discussion by a 
democratically-convened party congress.66 
Trotsky’s critique of agricultural policy during these years, like his critique of industrial 
policy, was “from the right.” Trotsky condemned the leadership’s dekulakization drive as 
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 unnecessarily violent and as futile. Beyond that, he denounced the campaign for mass 
collectivization as hopelessly premature, and predicted it would decimate Soviet agriculture 
while providing cover for the regeneration of a new stratum of kulaks.  
Although in previous years the Opposition had demanded increased pressure upon the 
kulaks, it had proposed to implement this through tax increases and the imposition of a “forced 
loan.” Now, upon learning of the leadership’s dekulakization drive in the fall of 1929, Trotsky 
repudiated the brutality of the campaign, characterizing it as nothing but “naked bureaucratic 
violence.”67 However, Trotsky’s primary concern was not with the ethics of the operation, but 
with his belief that it could not hope to succeed. In line with this, in early 1930 Trotsky ridiculed 
the attempt to liquidate the kulak “by administrative order” as “a bureaucratic adventure, spiced 
with theoretical charlatanism.” Of course, he conceded, it was technically possible to liquidate 
every kulak with just “two policemen (well-armed).” However, preventing the reappearance of a 
stratum of kulaks was quite another matter: “For that, an industrial and cultural revolution is 
necessary.”68 The ambitious projections of the First Five-Year Plan notwithstanding, Trotsky did 
not see such a revolution on the horizon. 
At greater length Trotsky denounced the tempo and scale of the collectivization drive. 
Although the Opposition had called for greater collectivization, it had intended to collectivize 
gradually and voluntarily. In Trotsky’s view, the current pace of collectivization, like that of 
industrialization, had nothing to do with rational planning. This was clearly indicated by the fact 
that the plan adopted in early 1929—presumably on the basis of technical and economic 
considerations—had projected the collectivization of only 20 percent of the peasantry by 1933. 
Yet, by early 1930 already 40 percent of the peasants were inside kolkhozy, and it appeared that 
the remainder would be joining them there shortly. For Trotsky, such a prospect was disastrous.69  
The biggest problem with the tempo of collectivization in Trotsky’s estimation was that it 
was outpacing the development of industry. Trotsky repeatedly insisted that true collectivization 
required the mechanization of agriculture, and that this in turn presupposed a strong industrial 
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 base. Attempting to collectivize without such mechanization, he argued in February 1930, was 
like trying “to build a ship out of a flock of shipping boats”: 
 
A collective farm is above all large. The rational size for the farm 
is determined, however, by the character of the means and methods 
of production being applied. With the aid of peasant plows and 
peasant nags, even all of them put together, it is not possible to 
create large agricultural collectives, even as it is not possible to 
build a ship out of a flock of fishing boats. The collectivization of 
agriculture can be achieved only through its mechanization. From 
this it follows that the general level of industrialization of a 
country determines the possible speed of the collectivization of its 
agriculture.70 
Unfortunately, Trotsky observed, Soviet industry was still quite backward, and would remain so 
for years to come. He calculated that if that the Soviet Union remained isolated it would take at 
least ten to fifteen years to create the industrial base necessary for total collectivization.71 
One result of wholesale collectivization under these circumstances, Trotsky predicted, 
would be the lowering of individual initiative and therefore of agricultural productivity. In April 
1930 he warned that “with the artificial, i.e., too-precipitate formation of large collective farms,” 
agricultural productivity actually could be “inferior to that in individual peasant holdings.”72 By 
October 1932, he found evidence in the Soviet press that this prediction also had been verified. It 
seemed that 100 percent collectivization, had “destroyed the incentive of the small commodity 
producer long before it was able to replace it by other and much higher economic incentives,” 
and had resulted in “100 percent overgrowth of weeds on the fields.”73  
A further concern repeatedly expressed by Trotsky was that the new collectives would 
facilitate the regeneration of a new layer of kulaks. He suggested several ways in which this 
might occur. First, the kolkhozy would necessarily provide a higher income to any peasant who 
brought more horses or other “capital” into the farms. Otherwise, no peasant would surrender his 
horses, and the state would be faced with the impossible task of providing all the kolkhozy with 
machinery.74 Second, differentiation would occur if families with several adult workers received 
higher incomes than families with only one. Third, inequality from either of these sources could 
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 grow even larger if the collective borrowed part of this income to invest in machinery and then 
repaid the loan with interest.75 Fourth, Trotsky believed that Stalin’s restoration of open markets 
in 1932 would enrich the kolkhozy situated closest to the cities while also promoting 
“differentiation within the collectives.”76 For these reasons, in his March 1930 “open letter” to 
the AUCP Trotsky predicted that, by proclaiming he collectives to be socialist enterprises, the 
leadership actually had provided “camouflage for the kulaks within the collectives.”77 
Throughout the First Five-Year Plan Trotsky called upon the leadership to retreat from 
both dekulakization and massive collectivization. First, he called for an end to the policy of the 
“administrative abolition of the kulak.” In its place, he proposed “a policy of severely restricting 
the exploiting tendencies of the kulak,” and the creation of a system of tough contracts that 
would require the kulak to surrender specific products at predetermined prices.78 Regarding the 
collectivization drive, beginning in March 1930 Trotsky demanded a retreat from complete to 
“selective collectivization,” concentrating resources in the most viable of the collective farms, 
and reorganizing these according to the wishes of the peasants.79 In early 1933 Trotsky suggested 
that this might involve a reduction in the extent of collectivized agriculture from 60 to 40, or 
even 25 percent.80 
 
7.2.2 Analyzing the Turn 
During this period Trotsky struggled to understand the turn in Soviet economic policy. As 
in 1928-1929, he attempted to analyze the turn in terms of the theory of bureaucracy he had 
developed in previous years. Again, however, events continually challenged those views, 
compelling Trotsky to modify his analysis by emphasizing the autonomy of the bureaucracy. 
This was especially the case regarding three important questions: (1) what was the attitude of the 
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 state and party bureaucracy to the turn; (2) why had the turn occurred; and (3) what was the most 
likely outcome of the turn? 
Throughout the course of the First Five-Year Plan Trotsky made various statements about 
precisely who was responsible for the change of policy. Most frequently he simply characterized 
the turn as a change initiated by the individual, individuals, or group standing at the summit of 
political power. Thus, at times Trotsky attributed the turn to “Stalin,” the “Stalinists,” the 
“Stalinist leadership,” or simply the “leadership,” leaving undefined the attitude of the state and 
party apparatuses to the new policy orientation.81 However, in a number of apparently 
contradictory passages he explicitly discussed this question. 
As we have seen, in previous years Trotsky defined the party/state bureaucracy as a 
social formation greatly influenced by bourgeois pressure and deeply conservative in its political 
and economic orientation. For Trotsky, it was difficult to imagine such a formation supporting a 
radical shift to the left in economic policy. Consequently, on at least two occasions he asserted 
that the turn had been made against the desires of the bureaucracy. For example, in an article of 
October 17, 1929 he stated that, after years of acting like economic Mensheviks, the “apparatus 
[apparat] . . . received an order to change course, but “the apparatus—both the Communists and 
the specialists—was absolutely unprepared for this assignment.” In the same article Trotsky 
further predicted that implementation of the plan would encounter significant opposition within 
the apparatus—“nine-tenths of the apparatus being more right-wing than the official right 
wing.”82 Similarly, in an article written approximately a year later Trotsky explained that the 
“Soviet and party bureaucracy [Sovetskaia i partiinaia biurokratiia]” lifted Stalin on a wave of 
reaction, but now the “majority of the real Stalinist bureaucracy [bol’shinstvo podlinoi stalinskoi 
biurokratii]” felt betrayed by Stalin: 
 
The majority of the real Stalinist bureaucracy feels it has been 
doublecrossed by its leader since 1928. . . . [Various factors] 
compelled Stalin to make this turn in spite of the partly active, 
mainly passive resistance of the majority of the apparatus 
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 [apparat]. The turn took place with a gnashing of teeth by the 
majority of the bureaucrats [biurokraty].83 
Still, as a Marxist Trotsky could hardly attribute such a major policy shift to the 
autonomous actions of individuals. Rather, it was necessary to identify the social formation that 
was responsible for the turn. Thus, in a series of passages that seem to contradict directly those 
just cited, Trotsky explicitly attributed the turn to the “Stalinist bureaucracy,” to the 
“bureaucracy,” or to the “apparatus.” For example, in an article of February 13, 1930 he 
observed that the “Stalinist bureaucracy [Stalinskaia biurokratiia] after its years of opportunist 
policy—is going through a period of brief but thorough ultraleft lunacy.”84 In his draft theses on 
the Russian question written in April 1931, Trotsky characterized the turn as “an attempt of the 
bureaucracy [biurokratiia] to adapt itself to the proletariat.”85 On July 15, 1931 he wrote that it 
was “precisely the Stalinist bureaucracy [stalinskaia biurokratiia] which, contrary to us, posed as 
a practical task the liquidation of the kulak.”86 On March 1, 1932 Trotsky described how in 1928 
“the Stalinist bureaucracy [stalinskaia biurokratiia] . . . made a whirlwind turn of 180 degrees 
over our heads” and then plunged into “monstrous economic and political adventurism.”87 And 
on October 22, 1932 he complained that during the First Five-Year Plan the “bureaucracy 
[biurokratiia]” disastrously instituted “administrative collectivization” and “liquidated the 
NEP.”88 
Trotsky might have attempted to reconcile these statements by arguing that the 
overwhelming majority of the state bureaucracy opposed the turn, while a majority of the party 
bureaucracy supported it. Such an explanation is suggested by Trotsky’s draft theses on the 
Russian question of April 1931. In that work Trotsky asserted that the “bourgeois elements of the 
state bureaucracy” first “gained considerable strength on the basis of the NEP.” Later, and partly 
by supporting itself on this “strengthened and emboldened petty-bourgeois and bourgeois 
bureaucracy,” the “centrist bureaucracy [tsentristskaia biurokratiia]” or “centrist apparatus 
[tsentristskii apparat]”—evidently, of the party—was able to triumph. Trotsky then went on to 
describe the left turn as just the latest of “the political zigzags of the apparatus”—again, 
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 apparently referring to the party bureaucracy.89 However, while this explanation seems to resolve 
the apparent contradiction in Trotsky’s statements, it only underlines his difficulty in explaining 
how a “centrist” apparatus could have been responsible for such a radical turn to the left. We 
shall return to this problem later. 
During the early 1930s Trotsky also offered various explanations for precisely why the 
leadership or the bureaucracy initiated the turn in late 1929. At times, in line with his traditional 
theory, he attempted to explain the turn in class terms. On other occasions, when compelled to 
recognize that such statements were problematic, Trotsky explained the turn as the subjective, 
emotional response of the leadership/bureaucracy to economic developments.  
Previously, Trotsky had explained the left turn of 1928 as the leadership’s response, 
under mounting pressure from the proletariat and Opposition, to the “kulak strike” of 1928. Now, 
confronted with the radical deepening of the turn, Trotsky reiterated this argument, depicting the 
entire left turn since 1928 as a single process set in motion by these same factors. For example, 
in an article published in November 1930 he asserted, 
 
Coming to the edge of the capitalist precipice, Stalin—even though 
he is no lover of jumps—made a breakneck jump to the left. The 
economic contradictions, the dissatisfaction of the masses, the 
tireless criticism of the Left Opposition, compelled Stalin to make 
this turn.90  
Similarly, in his April 1931 draft theses on the Russian question Trotsky argued, “The course of 
1928-31—if we again leave aside the inevitable waverings and backslidings—represents an 
attempt of the bureaucracy to adapt itself to the proletariat.”91  
Even if such statements explained the initial turn of 1928-1929, they hardly accounted for 
the radical deepening of the turn between late 1929 and early 1933. Through the summer of 1929 
Trotsky had insisted that an increase in proletarian or Oppositional pressure was needed just to 
maintain the existing policy orientation. However, no such upsurge occurred. In fact, by the fall 
of 1929 all but a handful of Oppositionists had capitulated, and most of the remainder were in 
prison. Beyond that, even if the Opposition had remained an active force, this could not have 
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 helped explain a policy orientation that, by Trotsky’s own admission, was far more radical than 
anything the Opposition had demanded. Finally, Trotsky was not at all inclined to accept credit 
on behalf of the Opposition or the proletariat for policies that he considered to be so seriously 
misguided. Consequently, Trotsky found himself forced to supplement his class explanations of 
the turn with others. In these, he stressed the autonomy of the leadership and/or bureaucracy in 
relation to all social classes.  
Most frequently during these years Trotsky explained the turn as the product of various 
emotional states of the leadership and/or bureaucracy. Thus, he argued repeatedly that the radical 
shift to the left in economic policy was largely a product of the “panic” experienced by the 
leadership when confronted with the disastrous results of its own previous policies. In his March 
23, 1930 “Open Letter” to the party, Trotsky explained that after its first revisions of the plan, 
“the leadership, alarmed at its own indecisiveness, no longer knew any restraint.”92 In December 
1930 he asserted that “the economic turn toward industrialization and collectivization took place 
under the whip of administrative panic.”93 Similarly, in April 1931 Trotsky insisted that the 
“abruptness” of the Stalinists’ leap to the left “corresponded to the extent of the panic created in 
their ranks by the consequences of their own policy.” 94 
On other occasions Trotsky argued that the leadership had gotten carried away with 
excitement in the face of the first achievements of the plan. For example, in an article dated 
February 13, 1930 Trotsky explained that, after revising the initial Five-Year Plan upwards, the 
Soviet leaders discovered to their surprise that the first-year projections really could be realized. 
At that point, they “abandoned their petty doubts and rushed to the opposite extreme,” trading 
their former “passive possibilist position” for one of “unrestrained subjectivism.”95 That same 
month Trotsky elaborated upon this argument in a discussion with a visiting American supporter, 
Max Shachtman. When Shachtman asked how Stalin had come to adopt an economic program 
even more radical than the Opposition’s, Trotsky responded that “requirements of the economic 
situation” had initially forced Stalin’s centrist faction to revise the five-year plan upwards. Then, 
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 The startling successes of the first year—startling to the centrists, 
who never really believed such a rapid tempo possible—not only 
demonstrated the enormous latent possibilities for industrial 
development under a proletarian dictatorship . . . , but immediately 
produced an extreme boldness born precisely out of centrism’s 
previous timidity. Almost overnight, the initial successes of the 
plan gave rise to the wildest kind of exaggerations.96 
Regarding the turn in agriculture, Trotsky occasionally offered an explanation that was 
slightly more complex, but that equally stressed the role of subjective emotional states in the 
behavior of the leadership. First, in February 1930 Trotsky described the initial phase of mass 
collectivization in 1929 as a peasant response to the “hail of administrative blows” inflicted upon 
the top layer of the peasantry. According to Trotsky, the blows directed against the top layer in 
the countryside discouraged the peasantry from any hope of improving its lot through the market. 
Consequently, the peasants began joining the collectives en masse: “The gate of the market was 
padlocked. The peasants stood frightened in front of it awhile, and then rushed through the only 
open door, that of collectivization.”97 Up to this point, Trotsky essentially accepted the 
leadership’s characterization of collectivization as a spontaneous movement by the peasantry. 
Undoubtedly, Trotsky’s credulity in this regard was due to his continuing adherence to his 
traditional theory of bureaucracy. He simply could not imagine a bureaucratic leadership—by 
definition, highly responsive to bourgeois pressure—initiating such an assault upon private 
property.   
However, at this point in Trotsky’s account the leadership’s subjective reaction became 
the decisive factor in the process. In the face of this spontaneous self-collectivization of the 
peasantry, the leadership was overwhelmed with excitement. Anticipating Stalin’s “dizzy with 
success” argument in an article of February 13, 1929, Trotsky explained, 
  
The leadership itself was no less surprised by the sudden 
rush of the peasants into the collectives than the peasants were 
surprised by the liquidation of NEP. After getting over its 
astonishment, the leadership created a new theory: the building of 
socialism has entered into its “third” stage: there is no longer any 
need for a market; in the future the kulak as a class will be 
liquidated.98 
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 Similarly, in April 1930 Trotsky described how, after the initial peasant influx into the 
collectives, 
the bureaucracy not only proclaimed this policy as its greatest 
victory—”If we’re going for a ride, let’s really ride!” cried the 
parrot as the cat dragged it off by the tail—but also developed a 
mad pressure on the peasantry under the banner of the liquidation 
of classes. Tail-endism was transformed directly into 
adventurism.99 
It is likely that Trotsky was uncomfortable attributing such independence to the 
leadership/bureaucracy, and with explaining such major policy shift in terms of such subjective 
factors as “panic” and “excitement.” At any rate, as soon as developments suggested an 
alternative explanation that was more consistent with his theory, Trotsky seized upon it.  
The key Trotsky discovered was in the confessions by the technical specialists convicted 
of sabotage in late 1930 and early 1931. Incredibly, Trotsky accepted these confessions, like 
those in the “Shakhty affair,” at face value, perceiving them as a clear confirmation of his own 
previous analysis.100 Thus, in November 1930 Trotsky endorsed the confessions of Ramzin and 
his codefendants. Trotsky noted that the Opposition had argued consistently that the slow pace of 
industrialization and collectivization in the period 1923 -1928 were “dictated on the one hand by 
the kulak and on the other by the foreign bourgeoisie, through the agency of the Soviet 
bureaucracy.” Now, these “sociological generalizations” had been confirmed by Ramzin’s own 
admission that he and his colleagues had plotted during that period to slow the tempo of 
development.101 Similarly, during the Menshevik trial of March 1931 Trotsky asserted that the 
“connection of the Mensheviks with the saboteurs . . . and the imperialist bourgeoisie” had been 
“irrefutably confirmed by the members of the Menshevik center.” For Trotsky it followed that 
the centrists, in their struggle against the Opposition, unconsciously had “carried out the tasks of 
the capitalist general staff abroad.”102  
Trotsky was convinced that these confessions also explained the ultraleft character of 
current economic policy. In connection with the trial of Ramzin and the Industrial Party, Trotsky 
reasoned that, since 1928 saboteurs would not have been able to deepen Soviet economic 
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 difficulties by slowing the pace of industrialization. Thus, “the opposite road was taken: an 
excessive acceleration of the tempo in the individual branches of industry.” Trotsky concluded 
that “the indictment itself demonstrates . . . that in the period of economic slowdown . . . as well 
as in the period of its economic adventurism—beginning with the second half of 1928—the 
Stalinist economic leadership acted under the dictation of the saboteurs’ center, that is, a gang of 
the agents of international capital.”103 Trotsky reiterated this argument after the trial of the 
“Menshevik Center.” Thus, in March 1931 he predicted that the next trial would reveal the 
saboteurs had been guilty of “disruptive acceleration of disproportionate rates” through 
“complete collectivization” and “administrative dekulakization,” and that many Menshevik 
economists had become “veritable superindustrializers” in 1928 in order “to prepare, by means 
of economic adventurism, the political downfall of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”104 The 
following month, in his draft theses on the Russian question Trotsky again referred to the 
“Menshevik-saboteur program of industrialization and collectivization.”105 And once again, in an 
article written September 2, 1931 he reaffirmed, “The artificial speedup of the rates of 
industrialization and collectivization can be just as much an act of sabotage as the artificial 
slowing-down.”106  
Even Trotsky must have sensed the absurdity of suggesting that the entire left turn was 
little more than a capitalist plot. Consequently, by March 1932 he returned to his “panicky 
leadership” explanation, attributing the adventurism of the Stalinist bureaucracy to its having 
been “hit over the head by the kulaks.”107 Again, one year later he asserted that the members of 
the Politburo, “threw themselves into the adventure of 100 percent collectivization.” because 
they were “frightened by the consequences of their own negligence.” 108 
Trotsky’s predictions regarding the ultimate outcome of the left turn were also 
contradictory. At times, influenced by his traditional theory of bureaucracy, Trotsky insisted that 
the new collective farms would regenerate a layer of kulaks and also that a major turn to the right 
in both industrial and agricultural policy was imminent. However, by late 1932 Trotsky’s 
growing apprehension regarding the economic crisis seems to have convinced him that, instead, 
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 the independent course of the bureaucracy might bring about complete economic collapse, 
perhaps combined with a counterrevolutionary upheaval that would unite elements of all classes 
against it.  
Trotsky’s economic forecast from this period that has received the greatest criticism from 
contemporary scholars was his repeated prediction that the collective farms would mask, and 
ultimately foster, the regeneration of a new stratum of kulaks.109 In fairness to Trotsky, it should 
be noted that he was not the only observer who was worried about differentiation within the 
collectives; it was also a concern to the Stalinists. In November 1930 the head of Pravda’s 
department of agricultural affairs warned in a series of articles that kolkhozy with a small degree 
of socialization provided the conditions for the reemergence of economic inequality.110 Beyond 
that, the fact is that during this period a significant degree of differentiation actually did take 
place, both within and between kolkhozy.111 
Nevertheless, as Isaac Deutscher argued, while Trotsky grasped a real tendency when he 
spoke of differentiation within the collectives, he overemphasized its strength. In particular, 
Deutscher notes, Trotsky did not foresee that the leadership would be able to control the 
development of private property “by a combination of economic measures and terror.”112 To this 
we might also add that, even though Trotsky foresaw that collectivization would lower the 
productivity of Soviet agriculture, he did not anticipate that it could do so to the extent that it 
would eliminate the surplus required to sustain a new layer of kulaks. The most likely 
explanation for Trotsky’s erroneous predictions regarding the collectives has been suggested by 
Alec Nove: Trotsky “was unable to grasp what was happening in the villages,” at least partly 
“because he mistakenly identified the interests of the ‘Stalinist bureaucracy’ with the village 
rich.”113 Once again, Trotsky’s perception was distorted by his continuing adherence to his 
traditional theory of bureaucracy. 
Another conviction of Trotsky’s that obviously was inspired by his traditional theory was 
his belief that the leadership inevitably would revert to conservative economic policies. During 
the First Five-Year Plan Trotsky repeatedly suggested this concern in his frequent 
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 characterization of the turn as a left “zigzag.”114 Even more clearly, it was expressed in his 
explicit predictions regarding the imminence of a new right turn. For example, in February 1930 
Trotsky asserted, 
 
The more frenzied the character of the present course, the sooner 
and sharper its contradictions will break out. Then to the former 
180-degree curve, the leadership will add another, returning close 
to its starting point from the other end. So it has been, so it will be 
again.115 
In the same article he further predicted that, “after the present precarious offensive” of 
collectivization, “a panicky retreat will follow, elemental down below, and allegedly 
‘maneuvered’ from above.”116 Soon after this, Trotsky perceived Stalin’s “Dizzy with Success” 
speech to be the signal for the beginning of the retreat. In a March 14 article he asked, “At what 
point will this retreat come to a halt? It is as yet impossible to tell. It is probable that this time 
also the retreat will go much further than the objective conditions require.”117 Even more 
categorically, at about the same time Trotsky predicted to Max Shachtman that “Stalin, who is on 
the road leading away from the recent ultraleft zigzag in Russia, will not come to a halt until he 
has reached the other extreme and accepted the original program of the right wing.”118   
In line with this view, during the following years Trotsky carefully scrutinized Soviet 
economic policy for evidence of the anticipated shift to the right. In the fall of 1930, seeing the 
Stalinists as “waist-deep in trouble with the five-year plan,” he observed that the renewed 
campaign against the party right suggested that Stalin himself was about to initiate “an inevitable 
turn to the right.”119 In the summer of 1931, Trotsky described Stalin’s reintroduction of 
piecework as a new turn to the right.120 And in late 1932 and early 1933 Trotsky saw Stalin’s 
restoration of open markets and his abrupt reduction of the goals of the Second Five-Year Plan as 
evidence of a right turn that could lead to the weakening in the state monopoly of foreign 
trade.121  
However, by late 1932 and early 1933, Trotsky began to perceive another danger as even 
more menacing. The deepening of the economic crisis convinced Trotsky that the leadership had 
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 brought the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse. As early as March 23, 1930 he warned in his 
“Open Letter” to the party that the policy of the leadership was “pushing the country full speed 
toward the most dangerous crisis and the worst catastrophe.”122 By October 1932 Trotsky 
concluded that the economy had “suffered a rupture from excessive and poorly calculated 
exertion”; and in March 1933 he asserted that the leadership had “brought the national economy 
to the brink of chaos.”123 A result of this crisis, according to Trotsky, was growing disaffection—
especially among the peasantry, but also among the proletariat. In January 1933 Trotsky 
summarized this development: 
  
The hungry workers are discontented with the party’s 
policy. The party is discontented with the leadership. The 
peasantry is discontented with the industrialization, the 
collectivization, and the town. A part of the peasantry is 
discontented with the regime.124 
The most ominous prospect for Trotsky was that a disruption of the economic smychka would 
“break the political alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry.” For Trotsky, this was 
especially dangerous because, in his view, the collective farms had become “organized 
formations for peasant strikes against the state.”125 Trotsky’s ultimate fear here was a peasant 
revolt, perhaps even assisted by certain elements of the proletariat. 
7.3 THE LEFT COURSE IN THE COMINTERN 
Meanwhile, during these same years the leadership of the Comintern was deepening the 
radical international course inaugurated in 1928-1929. Comintern leaders continued to assert that 
the world had entered a “Third Period,” characterized by a general sharpening of the 
contradictions of imperialism and by the intensification of international class conflict. For them, 
this prognosis was confirmed by the onset of the Great Depression following the Wall Street 
crash of October 1929. In this context, the leadership proclaimed that the task of communists in 
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 the capitalist world was to prepare the proletariat for an imminent struggle for power. Most 
immediately, it was necessary to wage a merciless struggle against the “social fascists” of the 
Second International, who were instituting fascism in the name of socialism. To this end, the 
Comintern banned all alliances of Communist parties with Social Democratic leaders, declaring 
that the only acceptable form of collaboration with Social Democrats was a united front “from 
below” with socialist workers.126 The most important testing ground for the “Third Period” 
strategy of the Comintern was in Germany.  
As the tidal wave of the Great Depression swept across Europe, it brought severe 
economic dislocation to Germany. Foreign loans and trade that had fueled German economic 
prosperity since 1923 suddenly disappeared, industrial production faltered, banks were forced to 
close, and thousands of small businesses were wiped out. Unemployment in Germany climbed 
from 1.32 million in September 1929, to over 6 million in the early months of both 1932 and 
1933.127  
In turn, the deepening economic crisis gave rise to political destabilization. In March 
1930, the coalition government led by the Social Democratic Chancellor Hermann Müller 
collapsed in a conflict over the unemployment insurance fund. Subsequently, President 
Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning of the Center Party as Chancellor. Confronted with 
parliamentary resistance to his austerity program, Brüning asked Hindenburg to dissolve the 
Reichstag. In the ensuing elections of September 14, the Social Democratic Party as well as the 
traditional center and right parties lost ground, while the parties at the left and right extremes of 
the German political spectrum made significant gains. The Communist Party (KPD) improved its 
position with a vote of 4.6 million—up 40% from its totals in 1928. Even more remarkable was 
the success of the National Socialist Party, which increased its support from 810,000 votes in 
1928 to over 6.4 million—making the Nazis the second strongest party in the Reichstag.128  
The Communist Party leadership was not impressed by the Nazi electoral successes. The 
day after the elections, the KPD paper Die Rote Fahne asserted that although the election had 
been Hitler’s “‘greatest day,’” it had also signaled “‘the beginning of the end’” for the Nazis.129 
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 Addressing the Eleventh Plenum of the ECCI the following April, KPD leader Ernst Thälmann 
similarly observed, 
 
After 14 September, following the sensational successes of the 
National Socialists, their adherents all over Germany expected 
great things from them. We, however, did not allow ourselves to be 
misled by the mood of panic which showed itself . . . in the 
working class, at any rate, among the followers of the Social 
Democratic Party. We stated soberly and seriously that 14 
September was in a sense Hitler’s best day after which there would 
be no better but only worse days.130  
When the economic crisis deepened in late 1930 and 1931, Brüning began to institute 
austerity measures by emergency decree. Still, the SPD leadership continued to support Brüning, 
viewing him as the lesser evil in comparison with the Nazis. In contrast, the KPD declared that 
Brüning’s dictatorial rule demonstrated that fascism already had triumphed, and insisted that the 
SPD’s support for Brüning only confirmed that the Social Democrats were truly “social 
fascists.”131  
 As communist hostility to the Social Democrats mounted through 1931, the KPD found 
itself promoting, from the left, tactics that in certain respects mirrored those of the far right. 
During this period, the KPD increasingly adapted itself to the nationalist sentiments that had 
been so effectively utilized by the National Socialists. Thus, it began to call for a “peoples’ 
revolution” for the social and national liberation of Germany from the unjust burden of the 
Versailles Peace.132 Even more striking was the KPD’s endorsement of a Nazi-sponsored 
referendum against the coalition government of Prussia led by members of the SPD. In the 
summer of 1931 the Nazis successfully demanded a plebiscite on a proposal to dissolve the 
Prussian Landtag and hold new elections. Initially, the KPD leadership resolved to boycott the 
plebiscite. However, on July 20 the ECCI sent a telegram insisting upon a change of policy. The 
following day the KPD leadership presented the Prussian government with the demand that it 
join the Communists in a united front. When this overture was rejected, the KPD endorsed the 
Nazi-sponsored initiative, labeling it the “Red Referendum.” Ultimately, on August 9 the 
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 plebiscite was defeated in the polls, at least partly because large numbers of communist workers 
boycotted the referendum.133  
By the fall of 1931 pressure was building for a unified response by the KPD and SPD to 
the threat of Nazism. Within Germany, the most vocal advocates of such an alliance were the 
members of a number of relatively small splinter groupings from the KPD and SPD, including 
the minuscule Trotskyist organization, the Brandlerites (German supporters of Bukharin), and 
the Socialist Workers’ Party (founded primarily by left-wing dissidents from the SPD). However, 
when the idea of unity also was taken up briefly by Rudolf Breitscheid—a leader of the SPD—in 
November, Thälmann abruptly rejected this proposal, asserting that the most serious danger 
confronting the Communist Party was the influence of social democracy over revolutionary 
workers. Furthermore, at the subsequent plenum of the Central Committee of the KPD in 
February 1932, he denounced local party organizations that had mistakenly interpreted the 
slogan “united front from below” to include direct alliances with SPD organizations. Though it 
appeared that the KPD was about to reverse this position in the spring of 1932 with the formation 
of a broad alliance, the “Anti-Fascist Action,” a Central Committee declaration of June 5 
clarified that “reformist organizations” were not to be included.134 
Meanwhile, the strength and aggressiveness of the National Socialists continued to grow. 
In the presidential elections of March-April 1932 Hindenburg was reelected with Social 
Democratic support. However, Hitler took 30.1 percent of the vote in the first round and 36.8 
percent in the second—more than doubling the Nazi totals of September 1930. Hindenberg then 
dismissed Brüning as Chancellor following Brüning’s attempt to outlaw Hitler’s swelling 
organization of storm troopers. When the new Chancellor, Franz von Papen, rescinded the ban 
on June 15, the SA immediately unleashed a wave of terror against the left.135 
Soon afterwards, Papen fulfilled a long-held dream of the Nazis by dissolving the 
socialist-led Prussian government and placing Prussia under military rule. Although the SPD had 
declared its intention to resist such a coup by force, it quickly capitulated. Furthermore, the 
German workers ignored the KPD’s appeal to respond with a nationwide general strike. The 
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 consequent demoralization of the left and the invigoration of the far right were reflected in the 
elections of July 31, in which the Nazis received 14 million votes, making them the largest party 
in the Reichstag.136  
At its twelfth plenum in September 1932 the ECCI seemed oblivious to the impending 
catastrophe. In the official resolutions of the plenum, all Communist parties were instructed to 
continue to direct their “main blows against social-democracy,” still characterized as “social 
fascism.” In Germany, it was asserted, the SPD had helped prepare the way for the establishment 
of the “fascist dictatorship” of the Papen government.137 In his remarks Thälmann emphatically 
continued to reject appeals by the Trotskyists and others for joint action with the SPD against the 
Nazis. According to Thälmann, Trotsky’s advocacy of such an alliance represented merely 
another attempt by this “‘utterly bankrupt Fascist and counter-revolutionary’” to “‘lead the 
working class astray.’”138 
When the new Reichstag convened on September 12, nearly all parties, including the 
KPD, SPD, and the Nazis, united in a vote of no confidence in the Papen government. Soon 
afterwards, the Reichstag recognized its own dissolution. In the elections of November 6 the 
Nazis polled two million fewer votes than they had in July, although they remained the largest 
party in the Reichstag, while the SPD vote also declined slightly. The vote for the Communist 
Party increased by 20 percent. In the press of the Comintern and the KPD, the election was 
portrayed as a great victory for the KPD, and as a sign that the Nazis had passed their peak.139 
However, events quickly revealed that such optimism was premature. On December 2 
Hindenburg formed a new government under General Kurt von Schleicher—a government 
characterized by the Comintern press as “‘a sharpened stage of the Fascist regime.’” As 
Chancellor, Schleicher unsuccessfully attempted to win the support of both the trade-union 
movement and a dissident wing of the Nazi Party. In the process, he succeeded only in alienating 
influential business, financial, and land-owning interests. On January 28, conceding his inability 
to obtain a working majority in the Reichstag, Schleicher resigned after only 57 days in office. 
Two days later, Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler Chancellor of Germany.140  
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 7.4 TROTSKY AND THE COMINTERN’S NEW STRATEGY 
During the years 1929-1933 Trotsky denounced Comintern policy, as he criticized Soviet 
economic policy, primarily “from the right.” In particular, he condemned the ultraleftism of the 
Comintern line in Germany, where he saw it as contributing to the growth, and potentially to the 
victory, of Nazism. As in the case of Soviet economic policy, the left turn of the Communist 
International had contradicted Trotsky’s expectations derived from his theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy. Here too Trotsky attempted to analyze the origins of the leftist course and to predict 
its probable outcome. In doing so, he turned first to the traditional assumptions of his theory of 
bureaucracy. However, in this area as well he repeatedly found himself forced to modify that 
theory implicitly by emphasizing the autonomy of the bureaucracy.141  
 
7.4.1 Criticizing Comintern Policy from the Right  
Since the beginning of 1928, Trotsky had denounced various aspects of Comintern policy 
as “ultraleft.” In that year he condemned the “putschism” and “adventurism” of the Canton 
Commune of the previous December, as well as the “ultraleftism” involved in the Comintern’s 
refusal to recognize the seriousness of the defeat suffered by the revolution in China in 1927.142 
In 1929, he further criticized the “element of adventurism” in the KPD’s May Day demonstration 
in Berlin for “conquest of the streets”—a demonstration that was brutally repressed by the 
police. Subsequently, he also condemned the “adventurism” of the international demonstrations 
of August 1, 1929, called to avenge the victims of May 1; to combat imperialist war; and to 
demonstrate again that the working class was capable of achieving the “conquest of the 
streets.”143  
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 By late 1929 Trotsky began to attack the ultraleftism of the entire “Third Period” line. 
For example, on September 25, 1929 Trotsky warned Oppositionists who had signed Rakovskii’s 
conciliatory August 22 declaration to the Central Committee that the new Comintern line 
combined “ultraleft conclusions with Right principles.”144 Furthermore, in an article for the 
twelfth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution Trotsky asserted that the “Third Period” line of 
the Comintern was “as if especially timed for “sowing illusions” and for “encouraging 
adventurous undertakings.”145  
Trotsky raised a variety of specific objections to the Comintern’s new line. Most broadly, 
he rejected the methodology involved in the notion that the entire world revolutionary movement 
had entered its final period. He considered it absurd to suggest that a revolutionary situation 
could emerge simultaneously throughout the whole world. Beyond that, he insisted that the issue 
of whether or not the revolutionary struggle had entered its final period was “a question of the 
relation of forces and the changes in the situation,” and that these were factors that could only be 
tested through action.146 Finally, at least through September 1930, Trotsky believed that the 
world revolutionary movement actually had declined—not intensified—since 1927, due to the 
defeats in Britain and China and in the wake of a brief economic boom in several of countries.147 
However, for Trotsky, the greatest problem with the Comintern line was its disastrous effect in 
Germany. There, he believed it was disorienting and disarming the KPD and the German 
proletariat in the face of the growing menace of National Socialism. 
According to Trotsky, the mass support enjoyed by German Nazism—especially among 
the German petty bourgeoisie—could be explained by two factors: “a sharp social crisis” and 
“the revolutionary weakness of the German proletariat.”148 He argued that in the face of 
economic ruin, the German middle classes increasingly found themselves compelled to seek 
radical solutions to their difficulties. In such a situation, he asserted, it was quite possible for a 
revolutionary party to win the allegiance of the petty bourgeoisie. However, if the party of the 
working class proved incapable of inspiring such confidence, the petty bourgeoisie would blame 
the workers for the endless strikes and political disturbances, and would turn instead to fascism, 
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 “the party of counterrevolutionary despair.”149 In Trotsky’s view, this was what was happening 
in Germany.  
Meanwhile, he argued, the big German capitalists had begun financing Nazism in order 
to carry out a fundamental shift in their method of rule. Trotsky explained that in the pre-war era 
of capitalist upsurge, the capitalist classes of the imperialist countries had found it expedient to 
legitimize their rule through “orderly, pacific, conservative, democratic forms.”150 In doing so, 
they had leaned “primarily upon the working classes, . . . held in check by the reformists.”151 
However, since the war, capitalism, together with all of its democratic forms of domination, had 
entered an era of decline. Consequently, the German capitalist class was no longer concerned 
with introducing new reforms; now its energies were focused upon abolishing the old ones. 
Although the German capitalists initially continued to rely upon the assistance of the SPD 
leadership to implement social retrenchment, as the crisis intensified they had begun to view this 
solution as unsatisfactory. Now, the bourgeois class wanted to “rid itself of the pressure exerted 
by the workers’ organizations.” For this purpose, German capitalism had begun assisting the 
development of a mass fascist movement.152 
 Repeatedly, Trotsky warned that the assumption of power by the Nazis would be 
catastrophic for the proletariat, both within Germany and internationally. Regarding domestic 
consequences, Trotsky explained that “when a state turns fascist, . . . it means, primarily and 
above all, that the workers’ organizations are annihilated; that the proletariat is reduced to an 
amorphous state; and that a system of administration is created which penetrates deeply into the 
masses and which serves to frustrate the independent crystallization of the proletariat.”153 Thus, 
within Germany a Nazi victory would result in “the extermination of the flower of the German 
proletariat, the destruction of its organizations, the eradication of its belief in itself and in its 
future.”154 Internationally, a Nazi government would be free to conduct foreign policy without 
regard for the domestic constraints that encumbered normal bourgeois parliamentary 
governments. As early as November 1931 Trotsky predicted that a Hitler government, acting as 
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 the “executive organ of world capitalism as a whole,” would launch a war against the Soviet 
Union.155  
However, as Trotsky repeatedly insisted up until 1933, the cause was not yet lost. In fact, 
the German capitalist class as a whole had not yet decided whether or not to resort to fascism. 
Although the bourgeoisie did not doubt that, ultimately, Hitler would be “a submissive 
instrument of their domination,” they still feared the social upheaval that would accompany the 
installation of a Nazi regime.156 For the time being they preferred more traditional authoritarian 
regimes such as those of Brüning or Papen—governments that Trotsky regarded as “Bonapartist” 
dictatorships, “enforced by means of the army and the police” and basing themselves upon the 
apparent balance between the organizations of the fascist petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat.157 
Thus, according to Trotsky, it was grossly inaccurate and politically disorienting for the KPD to 
characterize these governments as fascist. Under Bonapartism, it was still possible to organize an 
effective defense of workers’ organizations; under fascism, these would be quickly swept away. 
For a working-class organization to claim that there was no difference between Brüning or Papen 
and Hitler, was the equivalent of saying that “it makes no difference whether our organizations 
exist, or whether they are destroyed.”158 
Even more disorienting, according to Trotsky, was the Stalinist identification of social 
democracy with Nazism. Trotsky did not dispute the fact that the SPD served the interests of 
German capital; nor did he doubt that it shared a large part of the political responsibility for the 
growth of Nazism.159 However, he sharply rejected Stalinist assertions that social democracy was 
simply a variant of fascism, insisting to the contrary that these movements represented two very 
different forms of bourgeois rule. He explained that social democracy derived its support from 
the workers and their organizations, and was “the chief representative of the parliamentary-
bourgeois regime.” In contrast, fascism based itself largely upon the petty bourgeoisie, and 
established itself in power by destroying parliamentarism and the organizations of the 
workers.160 Because of this difference, the Social Democratic leaders correctly perceived fascism 
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 as a “mortal danger,” that threatened the “role which the Social Democracy fulfills in the 
bourgeois regime and the income which the Social Democracy derives from playing its role.”161 
Ironically, Trotsky argued, the KPD’s refusal to recognize this difference actually had 
helped to strengthen reformism. He explained that it was easy for the SPD leaders to demonstrate 
the real antagonism between their own organizations and those of the Nazis. Furthermore, the 
“social fascist” epithet absolved the Social Democratic leadership of the need to prove it was not 
“the democratic servant of capitalism.” Thus, the practical effect of the accusation was to spread 
distrust of communism among the masses of workers who followed the SPD, and to strengthen 
the bond between those masses and their reformist leaders.162 
More importantly, however, Trotsky condemned the theory of “social fascism” as an 
obstacle to the formation of the united front that was necessary for the defeat of Hitler. Because 
of the refusal of the KPD to pursue such an alliance, Trotsky asserted that “the Stalinist 
bureaucracy bears the direct and immediate responsibility for the growth of fascism before the 
proletarian vanguard.”163 In fact, he charged, the KPD had shown far less reluctance to join in a 
“united front with Hitler” by collaborating with the Nazis to bring down the Social Democratic 
government of Prussia.164  
Trotsky believed that the immediate task of the Opposition was to do all that it could to 
pressure the Comintern and its sections to abandon its ultraleft and sectarian line, especially in 
Germany. With mounting desperation, he urged the KPD to drop the rhetoric about “social 
fascism” and to forge a united front with the SPD. The purpose of such a front would be the 
armed defense of German working-class institutions against Nazi attacks. As Trotsky explained 
in September 1930, the united front would protect “those material and moral positions which the 
working class has managed to win in the German state,” including specifically such institutions 
as “workers’ political organizations, trade unions, newspapers, printing plants, clubs, libraries, 
etc.”165 
While he saw the immediate struggle in Germany as a defensive one, Trotsky suggested 
that this could change quickly. He explained that the first repulse of a rightist attack would elicit 
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 a “redoubled offensive on the part of fascism.” In turn, this Nazi offensive “would immediately 
weld together the ranks of the united front, extend the tasks, compel the utilization of more 
decisive measures, throw out the more reactionary layers of the bureaucracy from the united 
front, extend the influence of Communism by weakening the barriers between the workers, and 
thus prepare for the transition from the defensive to the offensive.” At that point, the KPD would 
be in a position to discard the defensive united front and lead an offensive struggle for power.166 
In Trotsky’s view, it was this prospect that most frightened the leaders of the SPD. Nevertheless, 
Trotsky believed that the Social Democratic leadership could be induced to join such a front 
under the pressure of its working-class supporters and for the sake of “its mandates, its meetings, 
its periodicals, treasuries, and finally for its own head.” Even if the SPD leadership rejected the 
united front, Trotsky reasoned, the campaign for such an alliance would be valuable, for it would 
attract thousands, or even millions, of Social Democratic workers to the KPD for a militant 
struggle against fascism.167 
According to Trotsky, to achieve such a correct line in Germany, as in Soviet economic 
policy, required a restoration of party democracy, both within the KPD and the Comintern. As 
Trotsky explained in September 1932, 
 
A correct policy requires a healthy regime. Party democracy, at 
present a plaything of the bureaucracy, must rise again as a reality. 
The party must become a party; then the masses will believe it. 
Practically, this means to put upon the order of the day an 
extraordinary party convention and an extraordinary congress of 
the Comintern.168 
7.4.2 Trotsky’s Analysis of the Third Period Strategy 
Trotsky’s analysis of Comintern strategy during this period, like his analysis of Soviet 
economic policy, contained contradictory approaches. As in his writings on economics, Trotsky 
attempted to explain the leadership’s left turn and to predict its most likely outcome in the class 
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 terms derived from his theory of bureaucracy. However, he quickly found himself compelled to 
modify that theory significantly by attributing the turn to autonomous characteristics of the 
bureaucracy and by warning that the autonomous policies of the Comintern bureaucracy might 
even result in a Nazi victory. 
Trotsky’s explanation of the origins of the Comintern’s ultraleft binge was similar to his 
explanation of the economic turn in the Soviet Union. In part, he suggested that the turn was a 
reaction by the Stalinist leadership to its previous defeats. In part, drawing again upon his 
traditional analysis, he described it as a response by the bureaucracy to the pressure exerted by 
the Left Opposition. Thus, in August 1929 Trotsky commented that “the Stalinist leadership, 
under the pressure of the growing danger of the Right and the whip of criticisms made by the 
Opposition, was forced to carry out its left turn” in Comintern policy.169 Similarly, in his April 
1931 theses on the Russian question Trotsky argued that the international “left course of Stalin” 
had sprung “from an attempt to undermine the roots of the Left Opposition.”170 And in an article 
on the German situation in August 1931, Trotsky asserted that “having been frightened by the 
Left Opposition, the Stalinist bureaucracy started to imitate the left platform bit by bit.”171 
However, as in his writings on the economic turn, Trotsky stopped short of attributing the 
extremes of the new line to the pressure of the Opposition. Again, it would have been difficult to 
establish that connection since the Comintern leadership’s international policy was far to the left 
of the orientation demanded by the Opposition; and again, Trotsky wanted no credit for it.  
Since there was no apparent basis for characterizing the Comintern’s new policy 
orientation as prompted by bourgeois “saboteurs,” Trotsky’s only alternative was to explain the 
extremes of the Comintern line in terms of the bureaucracy’s own autonomous behavior. Thus, 
Trotsky concluded that the leadership’s rejection of all political alliances with reformists was 
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 simply an overreaction to the failures of its previous attempts at united fronts. Furthermore, he 
suggested that the explanation for this overreaction was nothing more than the leadership’s 
stupidity. In late December 1929 Trotsky asserted that Molotov’s recent rejection of alliances 
with reformists represented a reaction by the centrists to the fact that they had “burned their 
hands” in the Anglo-Russian Committee and now hoped “to guard against scandals in the future” 
by avoiding all alliances. However, in Trotsky’s view the errors involved in the Anglo-Russian 
Committee had nothing to do with an “episodic agreement with reformists.” Rather, in that 
situation one problem was that the leadership had not confined its agreement to “concrete 
practical goals clear to the working class.” Another mistake was that the leadership had failed to 
break the alliance when the General Council turned against the general strike. Unfortunately, 
Trotsky concluded, the “strategists” of the Comintern still had “not understood the lessons of the 
Anglo-Russian Committee.”172 In a pamphlet written in January 1932, Trotsky similarly asserted 
that the bureaucracy had adopted the new international line in a mistaken reaction to the 
catastrophic failures of its own ill-conceived attempts at alliances: 
The Stalinist bureaucracy chose to behave like the nearsighted 
monkey in the fable; after adjusting the spectacles on its tail and 
licking them to no result, the monkey concluded that they were no 
good at all and dashed them against a rock. Put it as you please, but 
the spectacles are not at fault.173 
  
To a large degree, Trotsky’s expectations regarding the ultimate prospects for the 
international turn continued to be influenced by his belief in the opportunist inclinations of the 
bureaucracy. One concern repeatedly expressed by Trotsky was that the leadership would soon 
reverse itself and revert to its former rightist course. As in economic policy, this idea was clearly 
suggested by Trotsky’s persistent characterization of the turn as merely a left “zigzag.”174 
Beyond that, Trotsky offered various suggestions of how such a turn might materialize. In an 
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 article of January 8, 1930 he explained that in the course of a mass proletarian radicalization it 
would become necessary for the party to initiate alliances with Social Democratic leaders pushed 
to the left. In such a situation, the party leadership would be forced to abandon its current 
opposition to all alliances with reformists and shift back toward the right. At that point it would 
overshoot the mark once again and all the “Molotovs” would enter “with ‘both feet’ into a period 
of opportunist experiments like the Anglo-Russian Committee and the workers’ and peasants’ 
Kuomintang.”175 Alternatively, he suggested in an article of December 1932, the Soviet 
leadership might turn right in its international policy under the growing pressure of world 
capitalism: “The more the Stalin faction turns its back on the international revolution, the more it 
will feel its dependency on world capital, the more it will cling to it convulsively ‘with both 
hands.’”176 
However, as the Comintern persisted in its “Third Period” strategy, Trotsky became 
increasingly concerned about another very different danger—that the ultraleft course 
autonomously set by the Comintern and KPD would result in a Nazi victory. During the years 
1930-1933 the alarm in Trotsky’s writings about this prospect increased from month to month 
until February 5, 1933 when Trotsky for the final time pleaded with the KPD to propose a united 
front: “What is at stake is the head of the working class, the head of the Communist international 
and—let us not forget it—the head of the Soviet republic!”177 
7.5 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTY REGIME 
As far as the party regime was concerned, two developments stand out as most notable 
during these years. First, there was the continuing persecution of a variety of opposition groups 
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 and individuals—from former leaders of the Right Opposition to unrepentant supporters of the 
Left, to party members who previously had supported the Center. Second, there was the 
emergence of a new cult of public adulation for Stalin. 
From late 1929 through 1930 the leadership continued its offensive against the former 
leaders of the party right. At the end of August 1929 Pravda published denunciations of 
Bukharin marking the opening shots of a massive campaign that impugned his entire political 
record. Subsequently, at the November plenum of the Central Committee, a group of second rank 
moderates led by Uglanov were pressured into repudiating the Right Opposition. At the same 
time, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii submitted a declaration that, while recognizing the 
“positive results” of the majority’s economic policies, continued to urge moderation. In response, 
Stalin and Molotov denounced the document, and on November 17 the plenum expelled 
Bukharin from the Politburo. Just eight days later the three moderate leaders relented and signed 
a statement of recantation. When required to elaborate upon their confessions at the Sixteenth 
Party Congress in June 1930, in Bukharin’s absence Rykov, Tomskii, and Uglanov all complied. 
After subjecting the moderates to enormous verbal abuse, the Congress dropped Tomskii from 
the Politburo, demoted three of his trade-union supporters from the Central Committee to 
candidate status, and removed Uglanov together with three of his Moscow supporters from the 
Central Committee. Ultimately, Bukharin was induced to acknowledge his own errors in a 
statement signed in November 1930, in a speech to a joint plenum of the CC and CCC in 
December 1930, at the Seventeenth Party Conference in January-February 1932, and—together 
with Rykov and Tomskii—again at the Central Committee plenum of January 1933.178 
Still, the treatment of the defeated moderates was mild in comparison to the punishment 
that had been inflicted upon the left. For example, Rykov was allowed to retain both his seat on 
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 the Politburo and his position as chairman of the Sovnarkom until the end of 1930; and 
Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii all remained full members of the Central Committee until 1934, 
when they were demoted to candidate status.179 As far as their supporters were concerned, a 
relatively small number were expelled in the 1929 chistka, or purge, of the party.180 However, it 
seems no supporters of the party right were arrested immediately for oppositional activity.  
Meanwhile, the leadership continued to justify its continuing repression of the Left 
Opposition with new accusations regarding the Opposition’s “counterrevolutionary activities.” 
Stalin raised these allegations first in a memorandum to the Politburo, reprinted with minor 
stylistic changes as an editorial in Pravda on January 24, 1929. There, he charged that the 
Opposition had transformed itself completely from “an underground antiparty group into an 
underground anti-Soviet organization,” and he asserted that “an impassable gulf has opened up 
between the former Trotskyist opposition inside the ACP (b) and the present anti-Soviet 
Trotskyist underground organization outside the ACP (b).”181 He returned to this same theme in 
a letter to the journal Proletarskaia revoliutsiia in October 1931, asserting, 
Trotskyism has long since ceased to be a faction of communism. 
As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the 
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, which is fighting against 
communism, against the Soviet regime, against the building of 
socialism in the U.S.S.R.182 
Along these lines, the leadership leveled various specific charges against the Left Opposition. 
For example, Trotskyists were accused of sabotaging Soviet railroads, while Trotsky himself was 
denounced for establishing alliances with European fascism and Japanese imperialism against 
the Soviet Union.183 For such counterrevolutionary activities, the Central Executive Committee 
of the Soviets stripped Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov of their Soviet citizenship on February 
20, 1932.184 
The raising of these accusations was accompanied by new arrests of Left Oppositionists. 
By late 1929 the bulk of those who had remained faithful to the Opposition were already 
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 languishing in political “isolator prisons” or Siberian exile.185 In 1930-31 the leadership added to 
their number most of the Oppositionists who had managed until then to avoid incarceration. 
According to Victor Serge’s account, 300 Oppositionists were apprehended in Moscow in 
January 1930; an additional 400-500 were arrested in May; several hundred more were picked up 
in August; and by “1931-1932 there were no more Oppositionists at large.”186 A report from the 
Soviet Union published in Trotsky’s Biulleten’ oppozitsii in late 1930 claimed that there were 
over 7,000 Left Oppositionists “in exile, under surveillance, or in prison,” and the number was 
growing.187 
Even more ominous was the introduction of capital punishment as a method for 
persecuting the Opposition. The first to be executed was Iakov Bliumkin, an official of the GPU 
and a longtime supporter of Trotsky’s. In the summer of 1929 Bliumkin visited Trotsky in 
Turkey where Trotsky gave him a message for Oppositionists in the Soviet Union. Upon his 
return to Moscow, Bliumkin was arrested, charged with treason, and executed.188 Soon after this, 
Trotsky published reports that two lesser-known Oppositionists, Silov and Rabinovich, had been 
accused of industrial sabotage and executed.189  
Despite these developments, by 1930 it seemed to many that peace finally had been 
established within the party. Following the defeat of the Right Opposition, no differences were 
apparent within the Politburo or the Central Committee, and none were expressed at the 
Sixteenth Party Congress in June-July 1930.190 However, it was not long before new oppositional 
groupings began to emerge in response to the economic strains of the period. Predictably, each of 
these met with repression. 
The first new dissident grouping to appear was a collection of former Stalinists who came 
together under the leadership of S. I. Syrtsov and V. V. Lominadze in the autumn of 1930. 
Traditionally, Syrtsov had associated himself with the right wing of the Stalinist leadership, and 
Lominadze with the Stalinist left. The extent of their real oppositional activity is unclear. 
However, it seems that they at least participated in discussions in which they criticized official 
economic policy and agreed upon a number of demands, including the need for a reduction in the 
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 number of capital projects and for a relaxation of pressure upon the peasantry. When their 
meetings were reported, Syrtsov and Lominadze were denounced for forming a “‘Left’-Right 
Bloc,” and attacked as “double-dealers” who had “capitulated to right opportunism.” In 
December 1930 the Politburo and the presidium of the Central Control Commission removed 
them from the Central Committee. A number of their supporters were expelled from the party or 
removed from their posts.191  
As the economic crisis deepened and dissatisfaction increased throughout the country, 
oppositional sentiment also continued to rise within the party.192 Again, this was the case even 
among formerly staunch supporters of Stalin. Thus, in June 1932 Alexandra Kollontai, the 
former leader of the Workers’ Opposition and now the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, remarked 
that the “old hands” were criticizing everything. And in September or October 1932 Zinoviev 
stated to the CCC that a “fairly significant section of party members have been seized by the idea 
of retreat.”193  
Meanwhile, the crisis also was stimulating a revival among former dissidents on the party 
right. One grouping composed of former rightists was led by M. N. Riutin, formerly a Moscow 
secretary closely aligned with Uglanov. In the summer of 1932 Riutin’s group circulated an 
appeal “To All Members of the AUCP(b)” and a 200-page platform that indicted Stalin’s 
economic policies and the party regime. Particularly striking was the platform’s denunciation of 
Stalin as “the evil genius of the Party and the revolution, who, actuated by vindictiveness and 
lust for power, had brought the Revolution to the edge of the abyss.” The documents demanded a 
reduction in the rate of industrialization, the abolition of forced collectivization, the removal of 
Stalin, and the restoration of party democracy.194 In November 1932 three other prominent 
rightists—A. P. Smirnov, the former Commissar of Agriculture, and N. B. Eismont and G. G 
Tolmachev, officials of the RSFSR—privately criticized the rate of industrialization and the 
methods of collectivization and allegedly discussed the removal of Stalin. However, it is unclear 
to what extent they actually were involved in further oppositional activity.195 
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 Even more significant stirrings were evident on the left in this period. Scattered 
groupings of the Left Oppositionists had continued to be active even after 1929. However, more 
were roused to action by the crisis of 1932. In July of that year Left Oppositionists in Moscow 
and Leningrad prepared a draft program that they smuggled out of the country to Trotsky. The 
document called for a reduction in state expenditures, the dissolution of collective farms that 
were not viable, and economic cooperation with capitalist countries. It also offered collaboration 
with the ruling faction to defend the country from external danger and to overcome the economic 
crisis, and it demanded a restoration of party democracy. In September, former oppositionist I. 
N. Smirnov transmitted to Sedov in Berlin an article on the economic situation with data culled 
from a confidential Gosplan report.196 By this time, Smirnov also seems to have established a 
dissident grouping with Preobrazhenskii and N. I. Ufimtsev.197 In December 1932 Trotsky 
observed, “Many hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of former capitulators, particularly workers, 
have returned to the path of the Opposition.”198 
Another leftist current, the Zinovievists, were also growing increasingly restive. 
Reportedly, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their supporters were especially concerned about 
Comintern policy in Germany, and now regretted their surrender to Stalin. In the fall of 1932 
Zinoviev allegedly stated in an oppositional meeting that the biggest political error of his career 
was his capitulation in 1927. Meanwhile, a collection of former Zinovievists who had broken 
with Zinoviev and Kamenev at the time of their surrender had formed their own oppositional 
group under the leadership of Safarov and Tarkhanov.199  
In the summer of 1932, a number of these disparate groupings came together to establish 
an alliance. Included in this coalition were former left-Stalinists previously associated with 
Syrtsov and Lominadze and led by J. E. Sten and Lominadze; Zinoviev’s supporters; former Left 
Oppositionists led by Smirnov, Preobrazhenskii, and Ufimstev; and internationally, Trotsky’s 
own opposition. In addition, the Zinovievist Safarov-Tarkhanov group and the “Rightist” Riutin 
group were still considering joining the bloc. At this point, the purpose of the alliance—at least 
from Trotsky’s perspective—was to share information.200  
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 However, this union was short-lived, for all of these oppositional groupings soon were 
decimated in a wave of repression during the fall and winter of 1932-1933. Riutin and a group of 
his supporters were arrested in September and charged with forming a “bourgeois-kulak 
organization” to restore capitalism. Reportedly, Stalin demanded Riutin’s execution, but the 
majority of the party leaders balked at this. The presidium of the CCC expelled eighteen 
members of Riutin’s group. Subsequently, the OGPU sentenced Riutin to solitary confinement 
for ten years and sentenced the remaining seventeen members to imprisonment or exile. Other 
sympathizers throughout the country, including Sten and Uglanov, were also expelled. Zinoviev 
and Kamenev, who had seen the Riutin platform without reporting it, were expelled from the 
party for the second time and again sent into exile.201 Betrayed by an informant, in January 1933 
I. N. Smirnov and Preobrazhenskii were arrested and expelled from the party. Smirnov was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment, while Preobrazhenskii was dismissed from his position 
and sent into exile. Hundreds of other former Left Oppositionists were also arrested.202 
Meanwhile, the Rightists Eismont, Tolmachev, and A. P. Smirnov were convicted in January 
1933 of forming an underground factional group dedicated to the restoration of capitalism. 
Smirnov was removed from the CC, and the other two were expelled from the party.203  
Another significant development in the party regime during this period was the origin of 
what in subsequent years would become known as the “cult of personality” around Stalin. Up 
until this point the only political icons to whom the party leadership paid regular homage were 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin. That changed abruptly on Stalin’s fiftieth birthday. On December 21, 
1929 the Soviet press exploded in a frenzy of adulation for Stalin, “the most outstanding 
continuer of Lenin’s work and his most orthodox disciple, the inspirer of all the party’s chief 
measures in its struggle for the building of socialism . . . the universally recognized leader of the 
party and the Comintern.”204 The flow of eulogies subsided somewhat briefly following the 
Sixteenth Party Congress in the summer of 1930, but resumed again at the end of 1931. Old 
works were revised and new articles and books were published in ever-increasing volumes to 
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 proclaim Stalin’s outstanding qualities and achievements as a revolutionary and a Marxist 
theoretician.205 
7.6 TROTSKY AND THE REGIME 
Throughout the years 1930-1933 Trotsky vigorously attacked what he perceived to be the 
party leadership’s continuing deviations from proletarian democracy. As in the past, he 
denounced the apparatus for its ongoing usurpation of power through the enforcement of 
undemocratic norms and through its active, often brutal, repression of oppositionists to its left 
and right. Beyond that, he now also condemned the further concentration of power in the hands 
of Stalin and his closest supporters, the recent development of a “cult of infallibility” around 
Stalin, and the first uses by the core of the Stalinist leadership of threats and repression against 
members of the bureaucracy itself. 
In this period Trotsky offered a variety of explanations for the continuing deterioration of 
the regime. In the light of his theory of bureaucracy, he was inclined to blame bourgeois 
influence upon the apparatus for this trend. However, in this area too, Trotsky repeatedly found 
himself forced to explain policy developments in terms of the autonomous behavior the 
bureaucracy, or of Stalin and his faction. 
 
7.6.1 Trotsky’s Critique of Developments in the Party Regime  
During these years Trotsky continued to criticize the leadership for introducing a variety 
of norms that, he believed, effectively deprived the party ranks any degree of power. One of 
these was the campaign begun in 1929 for the mass recruitment of industrial workers to assist 
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 with the tasks of the Five-Year Plan. From January 1928 until January 1933 party membership 
climbed from 1,304,471 to over three and a half million.206 In his March 1930 open letter to the 
party Trotsky castigated this drive as he had denounced the “Lenin levy” of 1924 as “nothing 
less than the dissolution of the party into the class, that is, the abolition of the party.”207 His point 
was that the leadership had again swamped the party in a mass of raw, and easily manipulated, 
recruits.  
Another familiar practice again denounced by Trotsky was the centralized control of local 
party organizations. Thus, in his April 1931 “Draft Theses” on the Russian question he observed, 
Not a trace remains of party democracy. Local 
organizations are selected and autocratically reorganized by 
secretaries. New members of the party are recruited according to 
orders from the center and with the methods of compulsory 
political service. The local secretaries are appointed by the Central 
Committee.208  
 
Additionally, Trotsky accused the apparatus of usurping power from the party by 
continuing to diminish the significance and authority of the party congress. In April 1930, shortly 
before the Sixteenth Party Congress, he again recalled that party congresses had convened once 
or even twice a year during the civil war; in contrast, the leadership had called the Sixteenth 
Congress only after a delay of two and a half years.209 Beyond that, on the eve of the congress 
Trotsky noted recent threats that had been made against members who criticized the line of the 
Central Committee, and concluded that for the first time pre-congress discussions actually had 
been “completely forbidden.”210 He further charged that the delegates to the congress had been 
selected entirely according the principle “whoever is for Stalin gets to go.”211 On this basis he 
predicted that the congress would be nothing but “a carefully selected and sufficiently 
intimidated legislative body whose decisions on every fundamental issue have been prescribed 
beforehand, while the implementation of these decisions will cease to be binding as far as the 
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 Stalinist faction is concerned the morning after the congress adjourns.”212 To indicate the degree 
to which the party ranks had been deprived of power, Trotsky now coined a new expression, 
arguing that the party, as a party, had “ceased to exist.” In a letter written in late 1929 or early 
1930 Trotsky explained that the Communist Party was no longer “a party in the literal sense of 
the word, for its composition and life are regulated by methods that are of a purely administrative 
character.”213 Similarly, in October 1930 Trotsky wrote, 
It has been said above that the weakest link in the chain is 
at present the party. We speak of the party as a party, that is, as a 
free selection of the proletarian vanguard, and as an apparatus 
merged in one system with the state. One could say with a certain 
justification that the party as a party does not exist today. The 
essential functions of the party: collective elaboration of views and 
decisions, free election of functionaries and control over them—all 
these have definitely been liquidated.214 
 
Meanwhile, throughout the years 1930-1931 Trotsky also commented upon the 
intensification of the repression against party dissidents of all persuasions, beginning with the 
party right. In February 1930 Trotsky noted the recent “extortion” of “penitent documents” and 
“ritualist capitulations” from Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii. In May he further observed that the 
three had been “barred from all activity,” and (incorrectly) predicted that they would be formally 
removed from all positions of authority soon after the Congress. In November 1930 he also 
predicted that the mounting “campaign against the right-wingers” would soon culminate in their 
removal from the Central Committee. (In fact, again, all remained full members until 1934, and 
candidate members after that.)215  
However, Trotsky clearly believed that the most extreme repression still was reserved for 
adherents of the Left Opposition. Throughout these years he noted the various “literary 
campaigns” against the Opposition in the Soviet and international Communist press, especially 
during the second half of 1930 and the first half of 1932.216 He protested the waves of arrests 
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 inflicted upon Left Oppositionists in the Soviet Union and the various forms of physical abuse 
they were forced to endure in Soviet prisons and deportation camps.217 He condemned the 
repeated episodes of physical attacks and even assassination attempts by Stalinists against his 
international supporters.218 Finally, he bitterly denounced the first executions of Oppositionists in 
the USSR, gravely observing regarding in January 1930 regarding the execution of Bliumkin that 
“Stalin is trying intimidation of the last of the Opposition still in his hands by the method of—
shooting.”219 
Although Trotsky viewed the foregoing as examples of the continued worsening of the 
party regime, he also saw them as representing familiar phenomena—the usurpation of power by 
the apparatus, and the bureaucracy’s repression of its opponents. However, over the course of the 
early 1930s Trotsky for the first time noted similar developments taking place within the 
apparatus itself. That is, he perceived a constriction of the circle of power within the apparatus, 
accompanied by the development of a “cult of infallibility” around the leader. Beyond that, he 
noted the first threats of repression, and the actual use of repression, against Stalin’s critics 
within the apparatus. 
During these years Trotsky repeatedly observed that Stalin and his closest supporters 
were amassing increasing powers within the bureaucracy. For example, in March 1930, 
discussing the recent, abrupt turn in economic policy, Trotsky commented, “The top-level 
Stalinist group has taken command in the most undisguised manner.”220 The following May he 
predicted that the upcoming Sixteenth Party Congress would “sanctify the system of ‘one-man 
rule,’” and he asserted that the party “has only one right: to agree with Stalin.”221 In April 1931 
he declared that a “plebiscitary regime” had been established within the party whereby “selection 
for the whole apparatus takes place around the ‘chief.’”222 And in March 1932 he observed, “The 
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 apparatus, independent of the working class and of the party, has set the stage for Stalin’s 
dictatorship which is independent of the apparatus.”223 
Accompanying this, Trotsky noted, had been the increasingly frequent claims of Stalin’s 
infallibility. In May 1930 Trotsky asserted that Stalin’s “official coronation as the infallible 
leader accountable to no one,” had occurred in 1929.224 And in March 1932 he commented, 
Now to pledge loyalty to the “Leninist Central Committee” is 
almost the same as to call openly for insurrection. Only an oath of 
loyalty to Stalin may be taken—this is the only formula permitted. 
The public speaker, the propagandist, the journalist, the 
theoretician, the educator, the sportsman—each must include in his 
speech, article, or lecture the phrase about the infallibility of the 
policy of the Central Committee “under Stalin’s leadership,” which 
means the infallibility of Stalin who rides on the back of the 
Central Committee.225 
In the early 1930s Trotsky also observed repeated situations in which members of the 
apparatus, including previously loyal Stalinists, were subjected to threats of repression or actual 
repression. Trotsky first detected this development in April 1930 in connection with a recent 
denunciation by Iaroslavskii of the Opposition’s economic views. He suggested that 
Iaroskavskii’s real intention was “to frighten the lower ranks of the Stalin apparatus” who, under 
pressure from below, were beginning to lose faith in the leadership.226 Soon afterwards, in 
November 1930 Trotsky commented upon the actual persecution of former Stalinists in the 
Syrtsov-Lomindadze case. While Trotsky was inclined to believe that Syrtsov really was a 
“right-winger,” he dismissed the charge that Lominadze and others allegedly involved were 
“Leftists.” Rather, they were nothing but “despairing centrists,” part of the “majority of the real 
Stalinist bureaucracy” that felt “doublecrossed by its leaders since 1928.”227 In January 1932 
Trotsky commented upon further evidence of the growing threat of repression against members 
of the apparatus. The previous November Stalin had unexpectedly discovered “Trotskyist 
contraband” even in Iaroskavskii’s history of the party. According to Trotsky, this was a clear 
indication of the “conspiracy against the apparatus” that Stalin and his “narrow faction” were 
organizing.228 
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 Trotsky continued to put forward a variety of demands to facilitate the restoration of 
“workers’ democracy.” As in the past, Trotsky called for the gradual introduction of the secret 
ballot in the soviets and the trade unions.229 However, he still viewed the issue of party reform as 
paramount, for as he explained in the autumn of 1932, a change in the party regime was a 
“prerequisite for fundamental reform of the workers’ state.”230 In this regard his most important 
demand was his call for an open party discussion of the entire “general line” since the time of 
Lenin. Thus, In March 1930 Trotsky explained in a circular letter to his Russian supporters that 
the Opposition was demanding the opening of “a free discussion in the party of the ‘general 
line,’ going back to 1923” as the basis for the preparation of the Sixteenth Party Congress.231 
And in March 1932, upon being deprived of Soviet citizenship, Trotsky called upon the 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee to place its trust in the party, and to “rely on the 
working class and give the proletarian vanguard the possibility, through free criticism from top 
to bottom, to review the whole Soviet system and cleanse it ruthlessly from all the accumulated 
filth.”232  
In Trotsky’s view, such a discussion necessarily required the participation of the Left 
Opposition. This was because, as he explained in his open letter to the AUCP in March 1930, 
“Only the Left Opposition is capable in the present circumstances of fearlessly criticizing and 
explaining all that is happening in the country and the party, to the extent that it is the result of 
the whole preceding course of development.”233 Consequently, he repeatedly called upon the 
leadership to cease all forms of repression against the Opposition, and to grant its members the 
right to return to the party with the opportunity for normal work.234 
However, Trotsky also appealed for an end to the persecution of the party right, 
demanding that it too be permitted to participate in a party-wide discussion. This was not 
because he endorsed freedom for all party currents on principle. In an article of November 21, 
1930 he explained, “What we mean by the restoration of party democracy is that the real 
revolutionary proletarian core of the party win the right to curb the bureaucracy and really purge 
the party: to purge the party of the Thermidoreans in principle as well as their unprincipled and 
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 careerist cohorts.” Nevertheless, he explained that the Opposition opposed “Stalinist methods of 
reprisal against the Right” because it believed in the necessity of “a general demarcation along 
the whole party spectrum, not chicanery of the apparatus, exile, the noose.”235 
A related demand embraced by Trotsky in October 1930 was Khristian Rakovskii’s 
appeal for a “coalition central committee, i.e., one composed of the right, center, and left.” 
Trotsky argued that the “proletarian nucleus” of the party did not yet have sufficient confidence 
in the Left Opposition to hand power directly over to it, and even if it did, “such a radical change 
in the leadership would look more like a palace coup than a reform of the party to the party 
masses.” In contrast, the slogan of a coalition central committee as an “organization commission 
for the reconstruction of the party” could have mass appeal within the party in a time of crisis as 
“the only means of saving the party from a complete collapse.”236 
As far as the growth of Stalin’s personal power was concerned, in March 1932 Trotsky 
urged the Central Executive Committee “to carry out at last Lenin’s final and insistent advice: 
remove Stalin!”237 However, as we shall see, when the slogan “Down with Stalin” seemed to be 
gaining popularity within the USSR some months later, Trotsky actually rejected it. 
7.6.2 Trotsky’s Analysis of Developments in the Regime 
Consistent with the theory of bureaucracy he had developed on 1926-1927, Trotsky 
continued to blame bourgeois influence for the crushing of workers’ democracy within the USSR 
and the party since the early 1920s. However, in light of the left turn Trotsky was forced to 
provide an alternative explanation for the continued worsening of the regime in the early 1930s. 
As in the spheres of economic and international policy, in this area too Trotsky found it 
necessary to explain the actions of the leadership in terms of the autonomous behavior of the 
party apparatus, or even the autonomous behavior of Stalin and his faction. 
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 During the early 1930s Trotsky still maintained that the fundamental source of the 
worsening of the regime since the time of Lenin was bourgeois influence within the party 
apparatus. As he wrote in an article published in February 1930, 
  
More than once we have had occasion to explain that the 
party regime does not take shape independently, but is a function 
of policy, which in turn carries through the interests and reflects 
the pressures of classes. The bureaucratization of the Communist 
Party, beginning in 1922, has paralleled the growth of the 
economic strength and political influence of the petty bourgeoisie, 
basing itself on NEP, and the stabilization of the bourgeois regimes 
in Europe and the whole world, resulting from the successive 
defeats of the proletariat.238  
However, at a time when the kulaks and NEPmen were being liquidated along with the 
remnants of Soviet capitalism, it was clearly implausible to blame bourgeois influence for 
increasing violations of proletarian democracy. As in 1928-1929, Trotsky found himself forced 
to explain the continuing deterioration of the regime in terms of the autonomous actions of the 
bureaucracy. Thus, he completed the preceding passage with the following observation: 
 
But the party regime is not merely a passive reflection of these 
deep-going processes. The party is a living force of history, 
particularly the ruling party in a revolutionary dictatorship. 
Bureaucratism is not without a material base. Its vehicle is the 
large solidified bureaucracy with a whole world of self-serving 
interests. In this way, like any other secondary and superstructural 
factor, the party regime—in certain very broad limits—acquires an 
independent role.239  
Similarly, in an article dated May 31, 1930 Trotsky emphasized the role played by the “self-
sufficient” bureaucracy in the “systematic deterioration of the regime” over the previous eight 
years: 
 
In addition to the pressure from hostile class forces from without, . 
. . the regime is under direct and heavy pressure from an internal 
factor of immense and continually growing strength: namely the 
party and state bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has been 
transformed into a “self-sufficient” force . . . . Making use of the 
means and methods with which the [proletarian] dictatorship has 
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 armed it, the bureaucracy more and more subordinates the party 
regime, . . . to its own interests.240 
In contrast, it should be noted that in this period there were Left Oppositionists who still 
believed that all deviations from proletarian democracy were a direct reflection of bourgeois 
influence. From this premise they logically concluded that the left turn, by undercutting that 
influence, should give rise to a healthier party regime. In April 1930, Trotsky responded to M. 
Okudzhava and other such “unsteady elements of the Opposition,” who were arguing that “a 
more healthy regime should ‘hatch’ by itself from the present ‘left’ Stalinist policy.” Trotsky 
characterized this view as “optimistic fatalism” and the “worst caricature of Marxism.” Again 
emphasizing the autonomy of the leadership, he observed, “The present leadership is not a blank 
sheet of paper. It has its own history, intimately bound up with its ‘general line’ from which it 
cannot be separated.”241 
At various times during this period Trotsky attempted to explain more specifically the 
origins of the threat that the leadership was attempting to crush. For example, in early 1930 he 
suggested that the leadership was exerting pressure to destroy resistance within the party to its 
economic zigzags. In April 1930 he wrote, 
The “left” turn in the present leadership is entirely a function of 
yesterday’s right course. The sharper the turn was, the more 
pitiless was the bureaucratic pressure so as not to give the party 
time to get its bearings in the contradictions between yesterday and 
today.242  
By 1932 Trotsky concluded that the bureaucracy had escalated its repression in response 
to growing proletarian dissatisfaction, which had risen as the self-confidence of the working 
class was bolstered by the successes of the plan. Thus, in January 1932 he asserted, 
The general state of mind of the proletariat now is no 
longer what it was in 1922-1923. The proletariat has grown 
numerically and culturally. Having accomplished the gigantic labor 
of restoring and uplifting the national economy, the workers are 
now experiencing the restoration and uplift of their self-
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 confidence. This growing inner confidence is beginning to change 
into dissatisfaction with the bureaucratic regime.243 
In fighting for its positions, he continued, the apparatus “is forced to turn the screws still tighter 
and to forbid all forms of ‘self-criticism’ other than the Byzantine flattery addressed to its 
leaders.”244 
As the economic situation deteriorated, in late 1932 and early 1933 Trotsky explained the 
growth of opposition within the party as a reflection of the unrest among workers and peasants 
over the decline in their standard of living. Thus, in October 1932 he stated, “The growth of 
economic disproportions, the worsening of the conditions of the masses, the growth of 
dissatisfaction among the workers and peasants, the confusion in the apparatus itself—these are 
the prerequisites for the revival of each and every kind of opposition.” Against this revival, “The 
bureaucracy, caught in a blind alley, immediately replies with repression, in a large measure as a 
preventative.”245 
According to Trotsky, Stalin and the bureaucracy had begun to see all potential 
opposition as a threat.246 However, Trotsky believed that the bureaucracy had singled out the 
Bolshevik-Leninists for the most severe repression because the Left Opposition represented the 
greatest threat to the bureaucracy’s power and interests. In January 1932 Trotsky explained that 
the Opposition was especially hated because it “talks openly about the bureaucracy, . . . thus 
revealing the secret that the general line is inseparable from the flesh and blood of the new 
national ruling stratum, which is not at all identical with the proletariat.”247 More specifically, he 
believed that the bureaucracy feared the Left Opposition could become a pole of attraction for 
dissatisfied workers. In a May 1930 letter to Soviet Oppositionists Trotsky explained that the 
apparatus had been “forced to start ‘working over Trotskyism’ again . . . to try to prevent a link-
up between the criticism and dissatisfaction in the party and the slogans of the Opposition.”248 
By early 1933 he was convinced that this “link-up” had begun to occur. In an article dated March 
3, Trotsky observed that the chief blows were “directed against the Bolshevik-Leninists, the only 
faction whose authority has grown immeasurably and continues to grow.”249   
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 As far as the further constriction of power within the apparatus and the threat or use of 
repression against previously loyal Stalinists was concerned, Trotsky explained both 
developments in terms of the growth of dissatisfaction within the apparatus itself. In November 
1930 Trotsky attributed this dissatisfaction to the fact that the “majority of the real Stalinist 
bureaucracy feels it has been doublecrossed by its leader.”250 More frequently, however, he 
argued that the dissatisfaction within the apparatus was a reflection of mounting unrest within the 
population at large. For example, in April 1930 he explained, “Under the pressure from below, 
the alarm in the apparatus is growing, the doubts in the leadership are growing, and the voices 
condemning the latest zigzag are growing.”251 And in early 1932 he observed, “As the workers 
become more impatient with the orders of the bureaucracy, the apparatus becomes more 
distrustful of the leadership of Stalin; the two processes are interconnected.”252  
Faced with these deepening divisions within its own ranks, Trotsky argued, the apparatus 
itself had responded by ceding power to a referee. In an article of April 22, 1930 he explained, 
that “an apparatus that sees itself forced to find within itself sanctions against itself cannot help 
being dominated by one person. The bureaucracy needs a superarbiter and for this it nominates 
the one who best meets its instinct for survival.”253 A year later in his “Draft Theses” on the 
Russian question, Trotsky elaborated upon this idea, explaining that the apparatus had appointed 
an arbiter to stand over it in order to avoid having to resolve its internal differences by turning to 
the masses below: 
  
Having conquered and strangled the party, the bureaucracy 
cannot permit itself the luxury of differences of opinion within its 
own ranks, so as not to be compelled to appeal to the masses to 
settle the disputed questions. It needs a standing arbitrator, a 
political superior.254 
Meanwhile, Trotsky argued, Stalin had begun to exercise his growing autonomy by 
conspiring against members of his own apparatus who challenged, or even threatened to 
challenge, his policies and power. For example, in November 1930 Trotsky argued that Stalin’s 
“open and cynical establishment of the plebiscitary-personal regime” in the party had been in 
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 response to the resistance within the apparatus to the left turn. At the same time, he predicted that 
Stalin’s imminent shift back to the right would be accompanied by blows against those within 
the apparatus “who took the ultraleft zigzag seriously” and who resisted “the approaching 
turn.”255 Furthermore, in March 1932, after noting that the apparatus was becoming “increasingly 
distrustful of Stalin,” Trotsky warned the presidium of the Central Executive Committee, “the 
conspiracy against the apparatus is pushed full speed ahead, while the apparatus is still in 
conspiracy against the party.”256  
7.7 MODIFYING THE THEORY 
According to the theory of bureaucracy developed by Trotsky in 1926-1927, the basic 
policy orientations of the Soviet leadership in the post-Lenin period were determined largely by 
the pressure exerted upon Soviet state and party apparatuses by bourgeois elements. However, as 
we have seen, during the period from late 1929 to early 1933 Trotsky often found it necessary to 
analyze the left turns in economic and international policy in terms of the actions of a highly 
autonomous bureaucracy. Similarly, in order to explain the continuing deterioration of the party 
regime in the new economic context, Trotsky found it necessary to emphasize the autonomy of 
the bureaucracy—and within the bureaucracy, the autonomy of Stalin and his closest supporters. 
Taken together, these analyses in themselves constituted significant, if implicit, ad hoc 
modifications of Trotsky’s traditional theory. 
In turn, this new emphasis in his analysis of policy compelled Trotsky to introduce 
explicit revisions into other aspects of his theory. In each of these, while continuing to 
characterize the bureaucracy as responsive to bourgeois pressure, Trotsky increasingly 
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 emphasized the bureaucracy’s autonomy in relation to all social classes. Responsive yet 
autonomous—the appearance of these two apparently contradictory evaluations in nearly every 
aspect of Trotsky’s thinking regarding the bureaucracy created a conceptual tension that ran 
throughout his theory during this period. 
7.7.1 Trotsky’s Conception of Bureaucracy 
During the years 1926-1927 Trotsky had portrayed bureaucratism primarily as a disease 
affecting the apparatuses of the state, party, etc., and characterized by the growing separation of 
those apparatuses from popular control and by the steady drift of policy to the right. For Trotsky, 
both features were related to the responsiveness of those apparatuses to bourgeois pressure and 
influence. In 1928-1929, as Trotsky increasingly emphasized the autonomy of the state and party 
apparatuses in relation to social classes, he began to refer more and more frequently to the 
bureaucracy in each of those institutions. Beyond that, he increasingly portrayed the problem of 
concern in terms of the usurpation of power in all Soviet institutions by a single, distinct, social 
layer—the bureaucracy. In the early 1930s Trotsky described the problem similarly, while 
continuing to insist that the bureaucracy remained responsive to bourgeois pressure and 
influence. At the same time, under the impact of the deepening turns in economic and Comintern 
policy, Trotsky emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy even more than previously. 
 As he had since 1928, during the years 1929-1933 Trotsky described the problem under 
consideration primarily in terms of a single social formation, the bureaucracy. There were still 
occasions when Trotsky employed the term bureaucratism. However, he now utilized this term 
fairly infrequently, and when he did so he employed it in reference to the repressive or 
excessively centralist organizational practices of the bureaucracy, viewed as a social formation. 
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 Thus, for example, in an article published in February 1930 Trotsky asserted that “bureaucratism 
[biurokratizm] is not without a material base. Its vehicle is the large solidified bureaucracy 
[biurokratiia] with a whole world of self-serving interests.”257 Also, in this period and later 
Trotsky continued to use the term bureaucracy when speaking of one or another specific 
apparatus—especially that of the Communist Party. At the same time, however, Trotsky 
commonly employed the term bureaucracy to identify the single social layer, composed of 
members of the combined apparatuses, which he believed had usurped power from the Soviet 
proletariat. For example, in May 1930 Trotsky wrote of “an internal factor of immense and 
continually growing strength: namely the party and state bureaucracy”; and in the fall of that 
year, he described how the “Soviet and party bureaucracy” lifted Stalin on a wave of reaction.258 
As in 1928-29, Trotsky’s references to the combined bureaucracy of the party and state may be 
related at least in part to his perception that the party apparatus had come to share important 
similarities in function, outlook, behavior, personnel, etc. with the state apparatus. Thus, as we 
have seen, in a letter written in October 1930 Trotsky described the party as “an apparatus 
merged in one system with the state,” and he explained that the “essential functions of the party: 
collective elaboration of views and decisions, free election of functionaries and control over 
them—all these have definitely been liquidated.”259  
Regardless of the exact referent of the term, for Trotsky an essential aspect of the 
problem was still the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to bourgeois pressure. This was evident, 
for example, in an article of April 25, 1930 where Trotsky asserted that the “workers’ 
bureaucracy” in both the West and the Soviet Union, “besides constituting an instrument for the 
proletariat to influence other classes, constitutes equally an instrument through which other 
classes influence the proletariat.”260 In support of this idea, Trotsky repeatedly pointed to new 
431 
 evidence that, he believed, showed that both the state and party apparatuses were infested with 
pro-capitalist elements. As we have seen, in 1930 and 1931 he proclaimed that the confessions of 
the “specialist-saboteurs” demonstrated this.261 Similarly, during this period Trotsky frequently 
cited the defections of three Soviet diplomats—Bessedovskii, Agabekov, and Dmitrievskii—as 
further proof of bourgeois influence in the state and party apparatuses. For example, in 
September 1931 Trotsky observed, 
To what extent is not only the state but also the party apparatus 
riddled with Bessedovskys, Dmitrievskys, Agabekovs—in general, 
class enemies—who stifle the Rakovskys and expel the 
Ryazanovs? To what extent will this apparatus prove to be a 
weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat at the decisive 
moment? . . . . But this means that the state apparatus of the 
proletarian dictatorship has assumed a contradictory character, that 
is, is riddled with elements of dual power.262 
 However, during these years Trotsky also increasingly emphasized the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy in many of his statements about the bureaucracy’s essential nature. As we have 
seen, Trotsky often spoke of the “self-sufficient” character of the bureaucracy—no doubt largely 
in reaction to the deepening turns in economic and Comintern policy. Again, in his open letter to 
the party on March 23, 1930 Trotsky observed, “The bureaucratic apparatus . . . is acquiring ever 
more self-sufficiency.”263 In an article two months later he asserted that “the party and state 
bureaucracy. . . . has been transformed into a ‘self-sufficient’ force; it has its own material 
interests, and develops its outlook, corresponding to its own privileged position.”264 Along the 
same lines, in his April 1931 theses on the Russian question Trotsky asserted that the 
bureaucracy was so independent that it was even capable of shaping the development of social 
classes: 
 
The bureaucracy . . . is not a passive organ which only refracts the 
inspirations of the class. Without having absolute independence, . . 
. the ruling apparatus nevertheless enjoys a great relative 
independence. The bureaucracy is in direct possession of state 
power; it raises itself above the classes and puts a powerful stamp 
upon their development.265 
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 7.7.2 Causes of Bureaucratic Power 
An even clearer emphasis upon autonomy was evident in Trotsky’s statements regarding 
the origins of the problem of bureaucracy. Since the mid-1920s Trotsky had explained the 
alienation of the state and party apparatuses from the Soviet proletariat primarily in terms of 
pressure exerted upon the apparatuses by bourgeois (or petty bourgeois) elements. In this 
process, bourgeois elements played the active role, while the party and state apparatuses 
passively responded to bourgeois pressure. However, this argument must have begun to seem 
less and less plausible after the leadership launched its all-out assault upon these same bourgeois 
elements. Consequently, in his explanation of the origins of bureaucratic power Trotsky now 
demoted the significance of bourgeois pressure while emphasizing the autonomous efforts of the 
bureaucracy itself. Although in a number of statements during this period Trotsky continued to 
assert that bourgeois pressure had played a major role in the process of bureaucratization, he now 
attributed less importance to it. In these accounts the ultimate significance of bourgeois pressure 
was that the bureaucracy had been able to utilize it as a battering ram against the Soviet 
proletariat. 
One variant of this explanation appeared in Trotsky’s April 1931 theses on the Russian 
question, where Trotsky depicted bureaucratization as having occurred in two phases. In his 
description of the first phase, petty-bourgeois and bourgeois elements within the country and 
within the state bureaucracy were strengthened by the weariness and disillusionment of the 
proletariat combined with the revival of capitalism under NEP: 
After the heroic straining of forces in the years of 
revolution and civil war, a period of great hopes and inevitable 
illusions, the proletariat could not but go through a lengthy period 
of weariness, decline in energy, and in part direct disillusionment 
in the results of the revolution. By virtue of the laws of the class 
struggle, the reaction in the proletariat resulted in a tremendous 
flow of new hope and confidence in the petty-bourgeois strata of 
the city and village and in the bourgeois elements of the state 
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 bureaucracy who gained considerable strength on the basis of 
NEP.266 
Here, Trotsky’s analysis closely resembled his 1926-1927 explanation of the origins of 
bureaucratism. However, in his discussion of the second phase of bureaucratization Trotsky 
downgraded bourgeois pressure to a secondary role, arguing that the party apparatus had simply 
utilized the “petty bourgeois and bourgeois bureaucracy” of the state for its own ends. He 
explained that in the context of a series of international defeats the “centrist [party] apparatus” 
forged a “bloc” with the “forces of Thermidor.” Then, “supporting itself on the strengthened and 
emboldened petty-bourgeois and bourgeois bureaucracy, exploiting the passivity of the weary 
and disoriented proletariat, and the defeats of the revolution the world over, the centrist apparatus 
crushed the left revolutionary wing of the party in a few years.”267  
Trotsky presented a more condensed version of this same argument in a document he 
wrote for the preconference of the International Left Opposition in January 1933. Here again, the 
autonomous bureaucracy was depicted as simply using petty-bourgeois pressure to defeat the 
Opposition: 
 
The bearer of the reaction against October was the petty 
bourgeoisie, particularly the better-off elements of the peasantry. 
The bureaucracy, which is closely connected with the petty 
bourgeoisie, put itself forward as the spokesman of this reaction. 
Supported by the pressure of the petty bourgeois masses, the 
bureaucracy won a large measure of independence from the 
proletariat. . . . The left wing of the proletariat fell under the blows 
of the Soviet bureaucracy in alliance with the petty-bourgeois, 
predominantly peasant, masses and the backward strata of the 
workers themselves.268 
In other accounts during this period Trotsky emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy 
even more by dropping explicit mention of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois influence altogether. In 
these statements Trotsky asserted simply that the bureaucracy had usurped power in the political 
vacuum created by the decline of proletarian activity and enthusiasm after the revolution. For 
example, a letter Trotsky wrote on September 17, 1930 to a conference of the German Left 
Opposition provided this analysis of the party bureaucracy’s rise: 
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The years of capitalist stabilization were the years of consolidation 
for the Stalinist apparatus. And that is by no means accidental. 
Only the decline in mass activity and the change from a 
revolutionary mood to one of apathy permitted the enormous 
growth of the party bureaucracy, which supported itself on the 
state apparatus for material means and for means of repression.269 
Similarly, in January 1932 Trotsky argued that the bureaucracy had been able to take 
power because of the passivity of the masses: 
The years of the revolutionary earthquake and the civil war left the 
masses in desperate need of rest. . . . . The workers were ready to 
give the bureaucracy the broadest powers, if only it would restore 
order, offer an opportunity to revive the factories, and furnish 
provisions and raw materials from the country. In this reaction of 
weariness, quite inevitable after every great revolutionary tension, 
lies the chief cause of the consolidation of the bureaucratic regime 
and the growth of the personal power of Stalin, in whom the new 
bureaucracy has found its personification.270 
7.7.3 Characteristics  
Trotsky’s comments during this period about some of the bureaucracy’s more significant 
characteristics reveal a similar tension between his traditional emphasis upon responsiveness to 
bourgeois pressure and his new emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy. On one hand, his 
statements about the bureaucracy’s conservatism and his continuing characterization of its 
economic and international policies as “centrist” were clearly derived from his traditional 
understanding of the influence of bourgeois elements upon the bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
Trotsky’s subtle revisions of his understanding of “centrism,” his statements regarding the size of 
the bureaucracy and its preoccupation with privilege, and some of his general descriptions of the 
party regime seem more closely related to his view of the bureaucracy as autonomous. 
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 Throughout these years Trotsky frequently referred to bureaucratic characteristics that 
revealed the influence of bourgeois elements upon the state and party apparatuses. Such was the 
case in his continued references to the “conservatism” or “conservative habits of thinking” of the 
bureaucracy. For example, in January 1932 Trotsky defined Stalinism as “the policy of a 
conservative bureaucracy,” and then further ridiculed the bureaucracy as a “moderate stratum, 
reflecting the demand for ‘law and order.’”271 The following January he derided the 
bureaucracy’s “conservative habits of thinking.”272 The incongruity of such statements in the 
context of the early 1930s has been noted by Alec Nove, who has asked, “Is it the typical action 
of . . . conservative bureaucrats to undertake a vast revolution from above?”273 However, the 
obvious basis for these observations is evident in Trotsky’s longer description of the 
bureaucracy’s conservatism in January 1932: “In the course of a number of years the Stalinist 
faction demonstrated that the interests and psychology of the prosperous peasant, engineer, 
administrator, Chinese bourgeois intellectual, and British trade-union functionary were closer 
and more comprehensible to it than the psychology of the unskilled laborer, the peasant poor, the 
Chinese national masses in revolt, the British strikers, etc.”274 All of these examples referred to 
Soviet economic policies or Comintern policies in the middle to late 1920s. Trotsky’s perception 
of the bureaucracy’s conservatism was clearly based upon his continuing commitment to the 
belief, forged during that earlier period, that the bureaucracy was greatly influenced by bourgeois 
elements. 
Also related to this view was Trotsky’s general characterization of Soviet economic and 
international policies in the early 1930s. Even more than before, Trotsky insisted upon labeling 
these policies as “centrist” or, beginning in 1932, as “bureaucratic centrist.”275 As in previous 
years, Trotsky often defined this centrism as a political orientation to the right of communism or 
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 Marxism. For example, at various times he explained that centrism was “intermediate,” or 
“transitional,” or that it “vacillated,” between “reformism and communism,” between 
“reformism and Marxism,” or between a “proletarian revolutionary line and a national reformist 
petty-bourgeois line.”276 Again, statements such as these were clearly based upon Trotsky’s view 
of bureaucracy developed in the late 1920s, and they represented a reasonable assessment of 
Soviet policies in that period. However, they made little sense by the early 1930s when Soviet 
economic and international policies had moved far to the left of those advocated by the 
Opposition. 
However, there were times when Trotsky seemed to recognize this. In each of these 
cases, he ended up elaborating upon his analysis in ways that emphasized the independence of 
the bureaucracy. For example, in the pamphlet What Next?, written in January 1932, Trotsky 
addressed the question of how a “centrist” bureaucracy could swing so far to the left. He 
explained that, in contrast with Western centrist groupings, Soviet centrism was “equipped with 
a much more solid and organized base in the shape of a multimillioned bureaucracy”; and he 
concluded, “The oscillations of this bureaucratic centrism, in conformity with its power, its 
resources, and the acute contradictions in its position have attained an altogether unheard-of 
sweep” ranging from “ultraleft adventurism” to out and out opportunism.277  
Of course, this argument still did not explain how a prolonged ultraleft policy could be 
characterized as “centrist.” In a series of statements in late 1932 Trotsky dealt with this problem 
by simply repositioning the leftmost limit of centrist vacillation. For example, October 1932 in 
the preface to a Polish edition of Lenin’s Left-Wing Communism, Trotsky described 
“bureaucratic centrism” as alternating “ultraleft mistakes with opportunist practice,” or 
“radicalism and opportunism.”278 Similarly, in a letter written the same month to the editors of a 
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 German left communist paper Trotsky asserted, “In actual fact, the Stalinists are zigzagging 
between ultraleftism and opportunism”; and he explained, “it is precisely in this that is expressed 
the centrist character of the Stalinist faction.”279 Finally, in a speech delivered in Copenhagen in 
November 1932 Trotsky defined the centrism of the AUCP and Comintern as follows: 
The less the functionary is controlled by the masses, the less 
consistent he is, the more subject to outside influences he becomes, 
and the more inevitably his political oscillations resemble the 
graph of a delirious fever. That is centrism. The destruction of 
democracy clears an area for the development of petty bourgeois, 
opportunist, or ultraleft influences.280 
Trotsky’s comments regarding the size of the bureaucracy during this period were 
perhaps also related to his new emphasis upon the bureaucracy’s autonomy. In 1927 the Platform 
of the Opposition had complained that the “‘layer of administrators’—in the party, the trade 
unions, the industrial agencies, the cooperatives and the state apparatus—now numbers in the 
tens of thousands.”281 By late 1930 Trotsky was describing the “Stalinist apparatus” as 
“numbering millions of people.”282 In January 1932 he estimated the number of “functionaries” 
as “a few million,” and referred to “this ruling stratum of many millions,” and the 
“multimillioned bureaucracy.”283 Finally, in October 1932 he spoke of the “millions of 
bureaucrats” that supported the “Stalinist tendency.” 284 One possible basis for these new 
estimates of the bureaucracy’s size was the rapid growth of the apparatuses of the state and party 
during the First Five-Year Plan. However, it is also possible that as Trotsky came to perceive the 
bureaucracy as a highly autonomous social formation, he began to emphasize its size and to 
redefine large numbers of officials as its members. 
Another characteristic noted by Trotsky during this period that seems related to his 
emphasis upon the bureaucracy’s autonomy was the bureaucracy’s preoccupation with its own 
material privileges. In January 1932 Trotsky graphically described the typical Soviet functionary 
as bearing “the least resemblance to an incorporeal spirit. He eats and guzzles and procreates and 
grows himself a respectable potbelly.”285 As suggested in the previous chapter, when Trotsky 
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 first introduced this theme in 1928-1929, it was apparently related to his growing perception of 
the bureaucracy as an autonomous social formation with its own interests. A similar connection 
is suggested by various passages in 1932 where Trotsky spoke of the “ruling stratum with its 
own interests and pretensions,” and where he referred to the “separate caste interests of the 
bureaucracy,” and to the “privileged position of the bureaucracy.”286 
Trotsky’s new emphasis on autonomy was also evident in his general characterization of 
the leadership’s organizational practices during this period. On the basis of both the general 
deterioration of the regime and the growing concentration of power in Stalin’s hands, in early 
1930 Trotsky began to compare the party regime to the highly autonomous states of Napoleon 
and Louis Bonaparte. Thus, in February 1930 he asserted that the methods used against the party 
right represented “a new stage in the process of the Bonapartist degeneration of the party 
regime.”287 In May of the same year when former Oppositionist Piatakov asserted “it is 
impossible to be loyal to the party without being loyal to the Central Committee: it is impossible 
to be loyal to the Central Committee without being loyal to Stalin,” Trotsky described this as a 
“general formula for the new stage,” the “dogma of the Bonapartist party.”288 Again, in his draft 
theses on the Russian question in April 1931, Trotsky denounced the “Bonapartist system of 
administering the party.”289 Finally, in an implicit reference to Louis Bonaparte’s practice of 
legitimizing his own dictatorial rule by plebiscite, during these years he also frequently described 
the regime as “plebiscitary.”290 Periodically, Trotsky explained he did not mean to imply by such 
statements that the Stalinist regime was literally Bonapartist, for that would imply it was 
capitalist. Rather, as he observed in an article in July 1930, he meant to indicate only that the 
degeneration of organizational norms had completed “the preparatory work within the party for 
Bonapartism.”291 
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 7.7.4 Consequences  
Throughout these years Trotsky continued to fear that the ultimate consequence of 
bureaucratization would be the restoration of capitalism. In the late 1920s Trotsky had based this 
prognosis upon his perception of a steady, rightward drift in economic policy. However, the 
unexpected policy shift of 1930 raised serious questions. Was the turn a retreat from the brink of 
restoration, or had it made restoration more likely? Beyond that, what were the implications of 
the turn for the most likely form a restoration would take? Trotsky’s answers to these questions 
were confused, alternately drawing upon his images of the bureaucracy as highly responsive to 
bourgeois pressure and highly autonomous. However, of one thing Trotsky remained certain: the 
counterrevolution he feared had not yet occurred. 
Through much of this period Trotsky seems to have been uncertain whether the net effect 
of recent events had been to increase or decrease the probability of capitalist restoration. On one 
hand, as he admitted in his April 1931 theses on the Russian question, the left turn had 
significantly weakened the forces of capitalism within the country: 
 
Through the combined effect of economic successes and 
administrative measures, the specific gravity of the capitalist 
elements in the economy has been greatly reduced in recent years, 
especially in industry and trade. The collectivization and the de-
kulakization have strongly diminished the exploitative role of the 
rural upper strata. The relationship of forces between the socialist 
and capitalist elements of the economy has undoubtedly shifted to 
the benefit of the former.292  
On the other hand, as he insisted in the same theses, there were various reasons for 
believing that the threat of restoration remained strong. First, although capitalist elements within 
the country had been liquidated, this had “coincided with the accelerated appearance of the 
USSR on the world market” where it was forced to compete with imperialism. Second, though 
the “Nepman, middleman, and kulak” had been weakened, the trials of the “specialist-saboteurs” 
and Mensheviks had demonstrated that the bureaucracy still contained within itself a “mighty 
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 agency of world capital.” Third, in Trotsky’s view the “elements of dual power” in the country 
had become even “stronger as the plebiscitary degeneration of the apparatus . . . progressed.”293 
Thus, it was unclear whether restoration was now more or less likely.  
Trotsky expressed a similar ambivalence in an interview with the New York Times in 
February 1932 where he noted that “active and passive Thermidorean tendencies” within the 
Soviet Union were “very strong,” but their victory was still “far off.”294 However, as the Soviet 
economic crisis deepened in the following months, Trotsky’s concern about the danger of 
restoration continued to mount until early 1933 when he warned that “catastrophe looms over the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”295 
Throughout these years Trotsky continued to describe two main paths by which 
capitalism might be restored. On one hand, as he noted in his draft theses on the Russian 
question, there was the possibility of a “Thermidorean overthrow” that would involve “a decisive 
shift of power from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie, but accomplished formally within the 
framework of the Soviet system under the banner of one faction of the official party against the 
other.”296 In general, this variant suggested that the bureaucracy was highly responsive to 
bourgeois pressure. On the other hand, there was the danger of a “Bonapartist overthrow,” that 
is, a “more open, ‘riper’ form of the bourgeois counterrevolution, carried out against the Soviet 
system and the Bolshevik Party as a whole, in the form of the naked sword raised in the name of 
bourgeois property.”297 Broadly speaking, insofar as this form of restoration implied a coup 
against a significant portion of the bureaucracy as well as against the Soviet system, it suggested 
a high degree of bureaucratic independence from bourgeois influence. Finally, Trotsky 
frequently repeated that a counterrevolution might combine these two variants.298   
Trotsky seems to have been uncertain about which of these forms of restoration was most 
likely. Just in the year 1930 he reversed his position on this question several times. At the 
beginning of the year, he still believed that a counterrevolution would probably follow the 
Thermidorian route. As we have seen, in that period he frequently warned that the leadership was 
about to reverse economic policy and implement a thoroughly rightist course. However, by late 
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 October he had concluded that the centrists were “waist-deep in trouble with the five-year plan,” 
and he was predicting that the “Kalinins and Voroshilovs” might try “to get free of the trap by 
chewing off the paw that goes by the name of ‘general secretary.’” That is, he anticipated a 
Bonapartist coup, though assisted by conscious “Thermidoreans” such as Bessedovskii, 
Agabekov, and Dmitrievskii.299 The following month Trotsky changed his mind again, warning 
that Stalin was about to implement the “inevitable turn to the right,” and in the process, perhaps 
unwittingly unleash the “Thermidorean-Bonapartist” danger—that is, a Thermidor followed 
closely by the introduction of Bonapartism.300  
By 1931 Trotsky seems to have decided that a Bonapartist coup was most likely. As we 
have seen, during these years Trotsky argued that the use of “plebiscitary” or “Bonapartist” 
methods was helping to prepare the way for a truly “Bonapartist” regime.301 In mid-1931 he 
explicitly asserted that, while the left turn had significantly reduced the likelihood of a 
Thermidor, the deterioration of the regime had greatly increased the chances of a Bonapartist 
overthrow of the workers’ state: 
 
The crushing of the right wing of the party and its renunciation of 
its platform diminish the chances of the first, step-by-step, veiled, 
that is Thermidorean form of the overthrow. The plebiscitary 
degeneration of the party apparatus undoubtedly increases the 
chances of the Bonapartist form.302 
However, by late 1932 and early 1933 Trotsky had changed his assessment once again, 
concluding that the danger of Thermidor was quite near. In October 1932 at the time of the 
discovery of the “Riutin conspiracy,” Trotsky described Riutin and Uglanov as having 
represented up until then “the most thoroughgoing Thermidorean wing in the camp of the Right”; 
and he complained that the growing economic crisis resulting from ultraleftist economic policies 
had given rise to a “new upsurge of the Right-Thermidorean tendencies.”303 In this same period 
Trotsky also expressed concern that the slogan “Down with Stalin!” might strengthen Stalin’s 
Thermidorean enemies.304 Early in the following year Trotsky continued to warn that the 
mounting crisis might propel the Soviet Union down the Thermidorean road. Thus, in an article 
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 of January 11, 1933 Trotsky counted three groupings that might support a Thermidor: the 
peasantry, a section of the proletariat, and a section of the Stalinist apparatus.305 
Of course, all of this presupposed that the Soviet Union remained a “workers’ state.” 
During this period Trotsky addressed no major new challenges to his position on the class 
character of the Soviet Union.306 Nevertheless, on a number of occasions he returned to this issue 
when considering the degree of degeneration that had occurred to that point. In doing so, he 
continued to argue that the USSR remained a workers’ state, basing his position on the three 
criteria he had put forward in previous years: (1) that the Soviet state still defended the property 
forms established by the October Revolution and embodied in the nationalization of the means of 
production and the state monopoly of foreign trade; (2) that a counterrevolutionary civil war had 
not yet occurred; and (3) that the party and state could still be reformed by the proletariat.   
In a letter to his Bulgarian supporters in October 1930, Trotsky included all three criteria 
in condensed form:  
 
Does the proletarian dictatorship still exist in the USSR? 
Yes, despite everything, it still exists. In spite of all the disastrous 
policies, in spite of all the turns in the economy toward the right 
and toward the left, the government continues to defend the 
nationalization of the means of production and the foreign-trade 
monopoly. The transition of power into the hands of the 
bourgeoisie can take place only by means of a 
counterrevolutionary insurrection. In the meantime, the 
regeneration of the proletarian dictatorship is still possible by 
peaceful means.307 
  
 Trotsky also restated these same points in his “Draft Theses” in April 1931. In the first 
paragraph of this document, Trotsky included both the “property forms” and the “absence of 
civil war” criteria: 
The character of the social regime [in the USSR] is determined 
first of all by the property relations. The nationalization of land, of 
the means of industrial production and exchange, with the 
monopoly of foreign trade in the hands of the state, constitute the 
bases of the social order in the USSR. The classes expropriated by 
the October Revolution, as well as the elements of the bourgeoisie 
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 and the bourgeois section of the bureaucracy being newly formed, 
could reestablish private ownership of land, banks, factories, mills, 
railroads, etc., only by means of a counterrevolutionary overthrow. 
These property relations, lying at the base of class relations, 
determine for us the nature of the Soviet Union as a proletarian 
state.308  
Later in the same theses he inserted his “reformability” criterion, asserting that “the recognition 
of the present Soviet state as a workers’ state not only signifies that the bourgeoisie can conquer 
power only by means of an armed uprising but that the proletariat of the USSR has not forfeited 
the possibility of subordinating the party to it, of reviving the party again, and of regenerating the 
regime of the dictatorship—without a new revolution, with the methods and on the road of 
reform.”309 
At least as far as his third criterion was concerned, Trotsky’s conviction that the Soviet 
Union remained a workers’ state actually was reinforced during these years by the turn. Since 
Trotsky partially attributed the turn to proletarian pressure, he believed that the turn confirmed 
his view that the party and state remained reformable. Reiterating the argument he had made 
against the German left communist Hugo Urbahns in September 1929, Trotsky asserted in an 
article of April 1930, “Nowhere is it written and nobody has shown that the present party, . . . 
capable . . . of silently turning the leadership through 180 degrees, could not, given the necessary 
initiative, regenerate itself internally.”310 Similarly, in his Problems of the Development of the 
USSR in April 1931, Trotsky stated, 
 
The experience of the whole post-Lenin period bears witness to the 
incontestable influence of the Left Opposition upon the course of 
the development of the USSR. All that was creative in the official 
course—and has remained creative—was a belated echo of the 
ideas and slogans of the Left Opposition.311 
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 7.7.5 Cure  
One area of Trotsky’s theory that remained relatively unaffected by the turn was his 
fundamental strategy for resolving the problem of bureaucracy. Trotsky had developed his 
approach to this question on the basis of his basic understanding of the problem. Against the 
growing responsiveness of the state and party apparatuses to bourgeois pressure and the growing 
independence of these apparatuses from proletarian control, in 1926-1927 Trotsky had advocated 
the exertion of countervailing proletarian pressure to push the apparatuses back to the left and to 
subordinate them again to the working class. He saw this reform strategy as the only appropriate 
orientation as long as capitalism had not been restored in the USSR. In the early 1930s Trotsky 
continued to insist upon essentially the same approach, both within the USSR and the Comintern.  
Throughout this period Trotsky explicitly defined his position regarding the Soviet Union 
as reformist. As we have seen, since 1928 this orientation had been challenged by the 
Democratic Centralists within the Soviet Union, and by Hugo Urbahns and his supporters in 
Germany. However, as we have seen, a reform strategy was already implicit in Trotsky’s 
continuing characterization of the Soviet Union as a “workers state,” for this label indicated to 
Trotsky not only that the Soviet Union still could be reformed, but also that there was still was 
still something worth preserving in the Soviet Union. In a letter to Soviet Oppositionists on 
October 31, 1930 Trotsky asserted, 
 
There is absolutely no question . . . that in light of the approaching 
upheavals the Bolshevik-Leninists stand for preserving and 
maintaining the October Revolution, i.e., above all, the elements of 
the proletarian dictatorship and the leading role of the party. In this 
fundamental sense we remain on the road of reform.312 
As we have seen, during these years Trotsky’s reformism regarding the Soviet Union was 
reinforced by the turn. In fact, there was only one implicit difference between this general reform 
orientation and Trotsky’s earlier perspective, though it was a major one. Previously, for Trotsky 
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 reform had involved pushing the bureaucracy to the left; now it involved pressing the 
bureaucracy back to the right. 
As in the past Trotsky insisted that the only force capable of bringing about reform was 
the Soviet proletariat. More precisely, it was the proletarian core within the party, leading 
broader layers of non-party workers to reform the party and then the state. Thus, Trotsky stated 
in February, 1930, only “the proletarian nucleus of the party, relying on the working class” could 
“take from the usurpers’ apparatus the power that has been usurped from the party.”313 As in the 
past, Trotsky viewed the Left Opposition, “vanguard of the vanguard,” as the natural leader of 
this nucleus.314 
How was the Opposition to conduct this struggle? Again in contrast to Urbahns, and 
despite the fact that virtually all Bolshevik-Leninists had been expelled from the party, Trotsky 
insisted that the Opposition continue to define itself as a faction of the AUCP. In part, he saw 
this approach as flowing logically from his reformist orientation, since he believed any attempt 
to found a new party would necessarily push the Opposition down the path of revolution. As he 
explained in a draft document for the ILO in January 1933, “The policy of a second party there 
[in the USSR] would mean a policy of armed insurrection and a new revolution. The policy of 
the faction means steering a course toward internal reform of the party and the workers’ state.”315 
Beyond that, Trotsky also feared that a new party orientation would alienate the masses 
of revolutionary workers within the Soviet Union who remained loyal to the AUCP. In an article 
of November 1931 he explained, 
 
To these masses we say today and will say tomorrow: “The centrist 
bureaucracy conquered the apparatus of the party, thanks to certain 
historical conditions. But you, worker-communists, cling to the 
party, not in the name of the bureaucrats, but in the name of its 
great revolutionary past and its possible revolutionary future. We 
understand you fully. Revolutionary workers do not leap blithely 
from organization to organization like individual students. We 
Bolshevik-Leninists are fully ready to help you worker-
communists regenerate the party.”316 
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 Trotsky remained convinced, as he had been since 1928, that the reform of the party and 
state were no longer possible without a “profound internal crisis” and “a deep internal 
struggle.”317 He seems to have believed that such a movement for reform would most likely 
develop in the course of a struggle against capitalist restoration. In his 1931 draft theses Trotsky 
explained that the task of the Opposition in such a crisis would be “to assemble and push ahead 
the proletarian wing promptly, without letting the class enemy gain time.”318 To prepare itself for 
this moment, it was necessary that the Opposition “develop as a firm faction, that it analyze all 
the changes in the situation, formulate clearly the perspectives of development, raise fighting 
slogans at the right time, and strengthen its connections with the advanced elements of the 
working class.”319  
In the meantime, Trotsky hoped to strengthen the position of the Opposition in part 
through alliances with other party groupings. In this respect, too, he continued to follow his 
traditional approach, advocating a “bloc” with the party center against forces further to its right. 
Thus, in November 1930 Trotsky argued that, just as the Bolsheviks had forged a bloc with 
Kerenskii against Kornilov, likewise, “In the face of a direct counterrevolutionary threat, a 
common struggle [by the Opposition] with the part of the Stalinist apparatus that will not stand 
on the other side of the barricades is self-evident.”320  
As the economic crisis in the Soviet Union worsened, Trotsky appealed to dissident 
Stalinists in increasingly conciliatory tones for just such an alliance.321 In fact, it was partially for 
the sake of an alliance that in late 1932 Trotsky even renounced the slogan “Down with Stalin!” 
As we have seen, earlier that year Trotsky had called upon the Soviet leadership to “carry out 
Lenin’s final and insistent advice: remove Stalin!”322 However, when he received reports that 
“Down with Stalin!” was gaining popularity within party circles, Trotsky repudiated this 
demand. In part, he was concerned that, in the midst of the deepening crisis, “Down with Stalin” 
might strengthen Thermidorian forces for whom it signified “Down with the Bolsheviks.”323 
Beyond that, he feared that the slogan might become an obstacle to the formation of a left-center 
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 alliance since it would be interpreted by Stalinists “as a call to smash the Stalinist faction, expel 
its members from the party, etc.”324 
As in the past Trotsky’s attitude to the party right remained hostile. However, one 
important difference was that, because of the turn, it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
explain exactly what issues separated the right from the left. At this point both equally 
denounced the ultraleftism of Stalinist economic and international policy and the 
authoritarianism of the party regime. Somewhat awkwardly, in October 1932 Trotsky dismissed 
this coincidence as temporary and limited, explaining that, in contrast with the left, the right 
wing was a “faction for permanent retreat,” and that, despite its “limited, temporary, and 
conjunctural ‘correctness,’” its position remained fundamentally false.325 Consequently, Trotsky 
continued to reject the idea of a “bloc”—that is, an alliance around a broad, common program—
with the right against the center.326 
Still, the defeat of the Right Opposition in the party struggle had increased Trotsky’s 
willingness to consider limited alliances with the right for the purpose of restoring party 
democracy. He first suggested such a possibility in his 1928 letter to Shatunovskii in which he 
proposed a “common effort” to restore the party “to a condition of legality.”327 In the same spirit 
in October 1930 Trotsky endorsed Rakovskii’s appeal for a coalition central committee that 
would include the left, center, and right. Trotsky observed that since the right was still in the 
Central Committee with the center, implementing this slogan would actually just mean including 
the left. Of course, he noted, the Stalinists were unlikely to agree to such a combination except in 
a crisis.328 In such a situation, he asserted the following September, a coalition CC “would be in 
essence an organizational commission for the reconstruction of the party.”329 
Beyond this, in 1932 Trotsky participated in a more realistic attempt to construct an 
alliance with party rightists, among others. In October 1932 Sedov wrote to his father from 
Germany announcing that a “bloc” had been formed with the Zinovievists, with Trotskyist 
capitulators around I. N. Smirnov, and with a grouping of former Stalinists led by Lominadze 
and Sten. Sedov also reported that negotiations were proceeding with Safarov’s dissident 
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 Zinovievists, and even with a group of rightists led by Riutin and Slepkov. In his response 
Trotsky approved of the plan in general, emphasizing that it was to be “a bloc and not a 
unification,” and insisting that all participants retained the right to criticize each other freely. 
Although Trotsky explicitly used the term “bloc,” this clearly was not to be an alliance around a 
broad, common platform. At least for the time being, Trotsky insisted, the purpose of the alliance 
was simply to provide “mutual information” to the participating groups. In light of the limited 
goals, Trotsky did not reject the participation of the right—even of a “thoroughgoing 
Thermidorean” such as Riutin. However, he urged the participants not to wait for the right to join 
since waiting would “mean leaving the ground to the Rightists.”330 
During these same years Trotsky’s position also remained reformist with regard to the 
Comintern. That is, he continued to reject the formation of a new international socialist 
organization, insisting instead that his supporters in the ILO confine their efforts to reforming the 
Comintern and its sections.331As in his position regarding the USSR, Trotsky’s reform strategy 
for the Comintern was based largely upon his understanding of the consciousness of the typical 
communist worker. He insisted that revolutionary workers would not yet understand or support 
the formation of a new International. As he explained in an interview in August 1932, 
 
The worker thinks slowly, he must mull everything over in his 
mind, I would say. He knows that the party has enlightened him 
and trained him as a conscious worker, and therefore he does not 
change as easily as the intellectual. He learns not from discussions 
but from historical events.332 
For this reason, Trotsky remained convinced that, under existing circumstances, a new 
International would inevitably degenerate into a sterile sect. Thus, in 1930 he warned that 
adopting Urbahns’ perspective of a new International would raise “the danger of becoming 
isolated from the communist masses.”333 In June 1932 he even speculated that the Stalinists 
actually wanted to push the Opposition into founding a new International since “a fatal error of 
this type on the part of the Opposition would slow up its growth for years, if not nullify all its 
successes altogether.”334 
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 Nevertheless, during these years Trotsky conceded that, in the face of some “great 
historic event” comparable to the betrayal of social democracy in 1914, the revolutionary 
proletariat would abandon all hope for the Comintern. In that case, it would be necessary for the 
Opposition to prepare for the construction of a new International.335 For Trotsky, two possible 
events of such magnitude included the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, and the victory of 
fascism in Germany. In January 1933 in a draft document on the tasks of the ILO Trotsky 
asserted, 
 
Such a historical catastrophe as the collapse of the Soviet state 
would, of course, sweep away with it the Third International too. 
Similarly, the victory of fascism in Germany and the smashing of 
the German proletariat would hardly allow the Comintern to 
survive the consequences of its disastrous policies.336 
However, in Trotsky’s mind these two possibilities were not entirely distinct. In fact, Trotsky 
was so convinced that a Nazi victory would entail the inevitable collapse of the USSR that he 
repeatedly linked the events together. Thus, in a letter published in January 1932 he asserted, 
 
Should the German proletariat be defeated by the fascists, then all 
will be lost for the Comintern and possibly also for the Soviet 
Union. For the world proletariat, that would be a setback for many 
years to come. Under such tragic conditions, the Left Opposition 
will take over the task of continuing to develop the Marxist 
program, but certainly no longer within the formal framework of 
the Third International.337 
Similarly, in a discussion in August 1932 about developments that might require the founding of 
a new International, Trotsky specified, 
 
Such an event would be the victory of fascism in Germany. But the 
victory of fascism in Germany does not only mean in all 
probability the collapse of the Comintern, but also includes the 
defeat of the Soviet Union. Only if that takes place . . . will we 
have the right to talk about a new party, about a fourth 
international.338 
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 7.8 CONCLUSION 
Over the course of the period from late 1929 to early 1933 the gulf between Trotsky’s 
expectations and developments in Soviet policy continued to widen. In previous years Trotsky 
had asserted repeatedly that, without a proletarian upsurge and/or an increase in Oppositional 
pressure, the leadership would revert inevitably to its previous rightist course. However, in late 
1929—with no evident increase in pressure from the Opposition or the proletariat—the 
leadership dramatically revised its economic and international orientation, inaugurating policies 
that clearly were far more radical than even those advocated by the Left Opposition. 
Furthermore, in previous years Trotsky had insisted that there was a direct relationship between 
the leadership’s rightist orientation and the repressive and undemocratic character of the 
party/state regime. However, from Trotsky’s perspective, between 1929 and 1933 the regime 
continued to worsen, despite the leadership’s radical shifts to the left in economic and 
international policy. 
As reality increasingly diverged from Trotsky’s expectations, the crisis in his theory 
deepened. For the first time Trotsky found himself denouncing Soviet economic policy and 
Comintern policy as “ultraleft.” Even as he did so, he continued to attempt to analyze these 
policies and developments in the party/state regime in terms of his traditional theory of 
bureaucracy. The result was an analysis that was increasingly implausible. In the same period, 
Trotsky also attempted to reconcile his theory with reality by means of a series of ad hoc 
modifications that greatly emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy. But in the process, his 
theoretical perspective grew more and more incoherent.  
In the following period, Trotsky finally was able to break free of the constraints of the 
theory he had developed in 1926-1927. The event that initiated that change was the dramatic 
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failure of Comintern policy in Germany. In response to that failure, Trotsky revised one after 
another of his traditional positions. Subsequently, new developments in Soviet policy led to even 
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 8.0  THEORETICAL REVOLUTION  
Although Trotsky’s theory of Soviet bureaucracy was badly shaken by the left turns of 1928-32, 
it was not overturned. Throughout those years Trotsky dealt with the contradictions between his 
theory and reality by various strained interpretations of reality, and by a series of ad hoc 
revisions that emphasized the ability of the bureaucracy to behave autonomously. Despite those 
revisions, Trotsky continued to see the bureaucracy as a social formation that was highly and 
immediately responsive to external class pressures. However, that was about to change. In The 
Image, sociologist Kenneth Boulding has explained that sometimes a new piece of information 
or “message” strikes “some sort of nucleus or supporting structure” in a worldview or image, and 
then “the whole thing changes in quite a radical way.” The result is “revolutionary change,” that 
is, the “sudden and dramatic” reorganization of the image.1 Similarly, Thomas Kuhn has 
described a scientific revolution as “a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals” in 
which “an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” in a 
process that is “non-cumulative,” and “relatively sudden.”2 Something like that happened with 
Trotsky’s theory during the years 1933-36.3  
The event that sparked the revolution in Trotsky’s thinking was not some new left turn. 
Rather, it was Hitler’s consolidation of political power in Germany in early 1933—a 
development that, for Trotsky, signaled the ultimate failure of Comintern policy. In response, 
Trotsky immediately abandoned his attempt to reform the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), 
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 then called for a break with the Comintern and then with the AUCP(b). Thus began a chain 
reaction that within months toppled a whole series of Trotsky’s major theoretical positions. 
There were probably various reasons why developments in Germany had this effect upon 
Trotsky’s theory when the turns in Soviet economic and Comintern policy did not. In part, it may 
have been because in 1933 Trotsky’s theory had been severely weakened by the experiences of 
the previous five years. Perhaps more importantly, the implications of the German debacle struck 
directly at central “nuclei” or “supporting structures” of Trotsky’s theory that had been 
unaffected by the policy shifts to the left: Trotsky’s reform orientation for the USSR and his 
criteria for a workers’ state. Trotsky’s change of position on these issues quickly led to a 
reassessment of the extent of the bureaucracy’s autonomy, and from that to a revision of his 
views on such issues as the relevance of the concepts of Thermidor and Bonapartism, and the 
origins of the problem of Soviet bureaucracy.  
Over the course of the following two and a half years, Trotsky’s new theoretical insights 
informed his analysis of events, while his analysis of unfolding developments led in turn to 
further theoretical revisions. As far as Trotsky’s interpretation of events was concerned, he 
increasingly explained the previous turn to the left as well as new shifts to the right in terms of 
the highly autonomous and self-interested behavior of the bureaucracy. At the same time, he 
applied his recent explanation of the origins of bureaucratic power to the continued worsening of 
the party regime. In turn, Trotsky’s analysis of current events evoked reinterpretations of the 
concepts of Thermidor and Bonapartism, an enhancement of the significance of bureaucratic 
caste and labor aristocracy, a dropping of centrism, another revision of Trotsky’s criteria for a 
workers’ state, a redefinition of Soviet foreign and Comintern policy as opportunist, and a call 
for a political revolution. By the middle of 1936 Trotsky had created the elements of a new 
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 theory that, far more than his previous ad hoc revisions, emphasized the autonomy of the Soviet 
bureaucracy. 
8.1 BREAKING WITH THE PAST 
In early 1933, from the Turkish island of Prinkipo Trotsky followed the deepening 
economic crisis in the Soviet Union and the darkening political situation in Germany with 
growing alarm. When the Nazis consolidated power in Germany in February and early March, 
Trotsky immediately called upon his German supporters to abandon their efforts to reform the 
KPD, which he blamed directly for the Nazi victory. Largely because of the constraints imposed 
by his traditional theory of the Soviet bureaucracy, he hesitated before taking the next logical 
step. Shortly afterwards, however, following the logic of his break with the KPD, he called upon 
his supporters to break similarly with the Comintern, and then with the AUCP. 
8.1.1 Breaking with the KPD 
In early 1933 Trotsky concluded that the crisis in the Soviet economy had become so 
severe that the very survival of the USSR was endangered. In an article of January 11, 
responding to Stalin’s recent economic report to the Central Committee, Trotsky drew his own 
balance sheet of the First Five-Year Plan. Despite some real economic successes, he observed, 
hungry workers were dissatisfied with the party’s economic policy; the party was unhappy with 
the leadership; the peasants were discontented with industrialization and collectivization; and a 
section of the peasantry was hostile to the regime. In fact, Trotsky asserted, the economic 
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 policies of the leadership had “enormously strengthened the danger of Thermidor.”4 In the 
following weeks Trotsky’s concern over the Soviet economic condition continued to mount. In a 
private letter written on February 15, he described the situation as “tragic” and expressed the 
conviction that “the months to come will be decisive.”5 Then, in a March 3 article entitled 
“Alarm Signal!” Trotsky declared that “catastrophe looms over the Communist party of the 
Soviet Union.” The bureaucratic leadership had “brought the national economy to the brink of 
absolute chaos” by its extreme tempos of industrialization and collectivization. “An acute feeling 
of disillusionment” now possessed the masses. Even the leadership’s recent shift to the right in 
economic policy was “absolutely incapable of leading to a way out of the great wreckage.”6 
In this same period Trotsky was growing increasingly concerned about events in 
Germany. On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor of a coalition cabinet. 
Although Trotsky viewed this as “a fearful blow for the working class,” he did not yet see the 
defeat as irrevocable since the opposing sides in Germany had not yet tested their forces in 
battle.7 Anticipating a new phase of struggle, he turned first to the KPD, pleading once more in 
an article of February 5 for a defensive alliance.8 Then, in a pamphlet of February 23 he appealed 
again to Social Democratic workers to take up the cause of the united front.9 Finally, in the 
article “Alarm Signal!” on March 3 Trotsky advised the Comintern that it could be saved from 
“further degeneration and complete collapse only by a radical change of all its policies, first of 
all in Germany.”10 Still, both the SPD and KPD resisted collaboration. While the SPD leaders 
now formally advocated a united front, as a precondition for such an alliance they demanded a 
“non-aggression pact” between the two parties and refused to participate in any actions that 
might provoke civil war. At the same time, the KPD leadership continued to direct its sharpest 
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 attacks at the socialists, while directing appeals for a united front only to local organizations of 
the SPD. 11  
Meanwhile, the National Socialists proceeded with their offensive, banning Social 
Democratic and Communist Party newspapers; dispersing socialist, communist, and trade union 
meetings; and replacing masses of government officials and police. When the Dutch anarchist 
Marinus van der Lubbe set fire to the Reichstag building on the evening of February 27, the 
Nazis blamed communists for the arson. At that point the Communist Party was outlawed; the 
entire Social Democratic press was shut down; thousands of socialist and communist officials 
and candidates were arrested; and constitutional guarantees of individual and civil liberties were 
suspended. In the subsequent March 5 elections the Nazis won a plurality with 43.9 percent of 
the vote. Then, on March 23 the new Reichstag granted Hitler dictatorial powers.12  
Recognizing the completeness of the Nazi victory, Trotsky abruptly shifted strategy in 
Germany. In previous years he had insisted upon a reform perspective for the entire Communist 
International and its sections, basing this view on the belief that the vast majority of 
revolutionary workers remained loyal to the Comintern. However, Trotsky also had asserted that 
if KPD policy permitted the Nazis to come to power, it would be necessary to form a new 
communist party in Germany. Furthermore, he had predicted repeatedly that a “great historic 
event, such as the victory of fascism in Germany,” would shake the confidence of workers in the 
Comintern and necessitate the founding of a new International. Thus, in his February 5 article, 
Trotsky warned the KPD, 
The party’s renunciation of the united front and of the creation of 
local defense committees, i.e. future soviets, signifies the 
capitulation of the party before fascism, an historic crime which is 
tantamount to the liquidation of the party and the Communist 
International. In the event of such a disaster, the proletariat, 
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 through mounds of corpses, through years of unbearable sufferings 
and calamities, will come to the Fourth International.13  
 
Consistent with this, in a letter to the International Secretariat of the ILO on March 12 
Trotsky asserted, “The KPD today represents a corpse.” Writing under the name “G. Gurov,” he 
explained that now the slogan of reform would seem ridiculous to German workers who had 
been betrayed by the KPD bureaucracy. Comparing the debacle to the collapse of Social 
Democracy on August 4, 1914 when the German, French and Belgian socialist parties all 
endorsed their own nations’ war efforts, Trotsky declared, “The Fourth of August is an 
accomplished fact.” Finally, he called for preparations for constructing a new communist party in 
Germany.14  
8.1.2 Breaking with the Comintern and the AUCP 
Although Trotsky also held the leadership of the Communist International responsible for 
the disaster in Germany, he hesitated until mid-July before abandoning the Comintern and its 
leading section. Subsequently, he admitted that the break with the Comintern should have come 
on April 5, when the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution declaring that 
the policies of the KPD “before and at the time of the Hitler coup” had been “quite correct.”15 
However, Trotsky explained that it had been important “to bring about a decisive turn without 
leading to a split” with comrades in the ILO who disagreed with the call for a new party in 
Germany. Besides that, it “was also necessary to see what the influence of the German 
catastrophe would be on other sections of the Comintern.”16 
Other explanations also have been advanced for the delay in Trotsky’s break with the 
Comintern. One account, offered by the contemporary historian J. Arch Getty, has dismissed 
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 Trotsky’s explanations for the delay as “self-justifying,” and has argued instead that the decision 
to abandon the Comintern and the timing of that decision were related to Trotsky’s maneuverings 
to regain personal power. An alternative account, previously sketched by this author in response 
to Getty, combines Trotsky’s own stated reasons for the delay with an additional explanation that 
stresses the importance of theory for Trotsky as a guide to his political behavior.17 
According to J. Arch Getty, Trotsky’s break with the Comintern and its timing can best 
be explained by reference to two “secret strategies” of Trotsky’s to return to the leadership of the 
AUCP. The first of these involved a secret letter to the Politburo on March 15, 1933 in which 
Trotsky allegedly promised that the Opposition would hold agitation for its program “in 
abeyance for an indefinite period” or even “refrain from criticism” altogether if the leadership 
would only recall him to power. According to Getty, Trotsky never published this letter because 
it contradicted his previous conditions and demands. Furthermore, Getty claims that Trotsky 
wrote his March 12 letter breaking with the KPD as a ploy to pressure the leadership of the 
AUCP into taking him back, and that he signed it with a pseudonym so that he could disavow it 
later if he was recalled to power. After waiting more than a month and a half for an answer, 
Getty argues, Trotsky gave up on this strategy and informed the Politburo on May 10 that he 
intended to begin to agitate among lower levels of the bureaucracy.18 Still, Trotsky hesitated over 
the break with the Comintern. According to Getty this was because Trotsky continued to have 
hopes for his second secret strategy, the opposition bloc of 1932. However, the capitulations of 
Zinoviev and Kamenev shortly afterwards “decapitated the 1932 bloc.” With all his hopes for a 
return to power dashed, Trotsky finally issued the call for a break with the Comintern.19  
Although Getty’s construction is imaginative, nearly every aspect of it is contradicted by 
the available evidence. Of course, there is no doubt that Trotsky wanted to return to power. In 
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 fact, in previous public statements, Trotsky repeatedly had called for the creation of a “coalition 
central committee” that would contain representatives of the Left Opposition—including, 
presumably, himself. If the Politburo had responded to his March 15 letter, it is likely that 
Trotsky would have raised this issue in negotiations. However, Trotsky’s March 15 letter to the 
Politburo mentioned nothing about leadership positions, and in fact asserted, “There is a far, far 
greater issue at stake than that of power for your faction or for the Left Opposition.” Rather, the 
letter requested only “the opportunity for normal work within the party”—a position completely 
consistent with Trotsky’s public demands.20  
Nor did Trotsky propose delaying a discussion indefinitely, or promise to abstain from 
criticism altogether. In his March 15 letter Trotsky offered only to negotiate the details of a 
party-wide discussion in the context of a highly explosive situation: “Concerning the manner of 
presenting and defending this [the Opposition’s] program before the Central Committee and the 
party, not to mention the manner of putting it into effect, there can and must be achieved a 
preliminary agreement with the goal of preventing shocks and splits.”21 Trotsky never published 
the Politburo letter, probably because its approach soon was superseded by his decision to break 
with the AUCP. However, on March 30, while still waiting for a reply from the Politburo, 
Trotsky wrote an article for his Biulleten’ in which he publicly called for an “inner-party 
agreement” with the leadership and “an honorable agreement before the eyes of the party and of 
the international proletariat” regarding preparations for a discussion and the organizational 
framework within which such a discussion would occur: 
Of course we cannot refuse to criticize centrism . . . . But 
mutual criticism, in itself unavoidable and fruitful, may have a 
different character depending on the extent to which it is 
consciously prepared by both sides and in what organizational 
framework it takes place. In this field . . . the Left Opposition is 
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 prepared to come to an agreement in which it will ask for itself 
only the restoration of its right to fight in the common ranks.22 
 
Furthermore, on May 13, 1933, three days after forwarding the Politburo letter to responsible 
party and government personnel, Trotsky wrote a brief note for the Biulleten’ confirming the 
existence of his March 15 letter and accurately describing its offer “to carry out any work in its 
interests on the condition that we retain our right to defend our point of view within the limits of 
the party statutes and the Soviet constitution.”23  
An additional problem with Getty’s first “secret strategy” is that Trotsky could not 
possibly have imagined that a threatened “split” in the Comintern would have pressured the 
leadership of the AUCP into taking him back. He clearly understood that the vast majority of his 
supporters were already outside of the Comintern, having been expelled from their respective 
parties in previous years.24 Beyond that, Trotsky did not retain the option of disavowing his 
break with the KPD by signing his March 12 letter with a pseudonym, for between March 12 and 
May 10 he wrote and published under his own name at least two statements proclaiming the 
death of the KPD and the need for a new party in Germany.25 It should also be noted that there 
was nothing unusual about Trotsky’s use of a pseudonym in his March 12 letter. From 1929 
through 1934 Trotsky employed “G. Gourov” or variations of that pseudonym at least twenty-
four times, especially in his contributions to the internal discussion of the ILO.26 Finally, if 
Getty’s account were correct, Trotsky should have dropped the pseudonym after the failure of 
this strategy. In fact, he signed the first two of his articles calling for a break with the Comintern 
“G. Gurov.”27 
Getty’s discussion of the second “secret strategy” is no more successful than his account 
of the first. Trotsky may have hoped that the opposition bloc eventually would develop into a 
political force that could help to pressure the leadership into readmitting the expelled 
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 oppositionists. However, there is no reason to believe that he entered the bloc out of “personal 
motives,” as opposed to the goal of reforming the AUCP. Since 1927, Trotsky and the entire Left 
Opposition had demanded their own readmission as a necessary part of the process of reform. As 
Trotsky publicly explained in his article “Alarm Signal!” on March 3, 1933, “It is impossible to 
revive the party without the return of the Opposition to its ranks.”28 Beyond that, it is not clear 
that Trotsky abandoned hopes for the bloc only after hearing of the capitulations.29 However, 
perhaps the biggest problem for Getty’s “second strategy” is related to timing. The whole 
purpose of Getty’s discussion of the bloc is to fill the delay between Trotsky’s final May 10 
communication with the Politburo and his decision to break with the Comintern. Even if Trotsky 
abandoned hopes for the bloc when he first heard of the capitulations, this accounts for just 
thirteen days, leaving more than seven weeks still unexplained.30  
In fact, there were probably several reasons for the delay in Trotsky’s break with the 
Comintern, including the two offered by Trotsky. Supporting his first explanation, there is 
abundant evidence that Trotsky was quite serious about convincing his comrades of the need for 
a break with the KPD. Even in his March 12 letter Trotsky warned, “This sharp turn in our 
policy, . . . will not be absorbed all at once by all our comrades. That is why it is necessary to 
analyze the question in our own ranks and, above all, among the German comrades.”31 
Subsequently, he urged the International Secretariat of the ILO to open an international 
discussion on the question; and in the following months he submitted no less than five 
contributions attempting to persuade members of the ILO, and especially the Germans, of the 
need for a change in orientation.32  
Trotsky also explained the delay in terms of the need to see if outrage over the 
consequences of the Comintern’s policies in Germany would elicit a rebellion within any of the 
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 parties of the International. Even in his letter of March 12 to the International Secretariat, 
Trotsky suggested that “the catastrophe itself could provoke a healthy reaction in some of the 
sections” of the Comintern.33 Similarly, in a statement of March 29 he observed, “We cannot 
know in advance what the reaction inside the other sections of the Comintern will be to the 
victory of fascism. To this belongs the test of events—with our active assistance.”34 Of course, at 
this point Trotsky was quite pessimistic about the Comintern reversing its position. Even while 
calling for a break with the KPD he declared, “The collapse of the KPD diminishes the chances 
for the regeneration of the Comintern.” And reviewing the experiences of the previous months in 
July, Trotsky wrote, 
The Left Opposition was guided by this theoretical possibility [of 
reform] when, after advancing the slogan of a new party for 
Germany, it still left open the question of the fate of the 
Comintern. It was clear, however, that the next few weeks would 
bring an answer and there was far too little hope that the answer 
would be a favorable one.35 
Still, in the spring of 1933 a “theoretical” possibility remained, and until that was exhausted, 
Trotsky viewed a break with the Comintern as impermissible.36  
 Nevertheless, Trotsky’s stated explanations were not the only reasons for his hesitation. 
Perhaps even more important was his recognition that a break with the Comintern would have far 
reaching implications for his political approach to, and theoretical understanding of, the USSR. 
Ultimately, it would call into question his entire understanding of the bureaucracy as highly 
responsive to external class pressure. More immediately, it would challenge three crucial 
positions derived from that understanding: his reform orientation toward the AUCP, his reform 
strategy for the Soviet state, and one of his central criteria for a workers’ state.  
 In previous years Trotsky had based his reform orientation for the Comintern on the view 
that it continued to command the loyalty of revolutionary workers. However, his reform strategy 
for the AUCP was grounded additionally upon the recognition that a policy of a “second party” 
inevitably “would mean a policy of armed insurrection and a new revolution” in the USSR. In 
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 turn, Trotsky’s commitment to a reform orientation for the Soviet Union was tied directly to his 
perception of it of it as a worker’s state.37 This presented a potential dilemma: what course should 
the Opposition take if a “great historic event” demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Comintern, but 
its leading section remained the ruling party in the USSR? Until March 1933 the question was not 
sharply posed. Since early 1932 Trotsky had suggested that either a decisive victory of fascism in 
Germany or the collapse of the Soviet workers’ state would require the formation of a new 
International. However, since he also believed that a Nazi victory would greatly increase the 
chances of capitalist restoration in the USSR, this prospect did not necessarily present a 
theoretical difficulty.38 
Once Trotsky concluded that fascism had conquered power in Germany, he found 
himself directly confronted with the dilemma. He immediately called for a break with the KPD, 
which he saw as most directly responsible for the debacle. Yet, he balked at the prospect of 
abandoning the entire Comintern. One of Trotsky’s secretaries at that time, Jean van Heijenoort, 
later recalled, “The problem of the USSR was the greatest obstacle in Trotsky’s mind before 
reaching the conclusion that there remained no other alternative than to form a Fourth 
International.” Heijenoort explained, 
 
The problem was: how to discard the policy of reform of the 
Bolshevik Party and at the same time retain the perspective of 
reforming the workers’ state? How to proclaim the Fourth 
International before the Stalinist bureaucracy has led the USSR to 
its collapse?39 
That this was a central concern of Trotsky’s is also suggested by his writings. Even in his initial 
call for a break with the KPD Trotsky rejected a similar rupture with the Comintern in part 
because “the question has not been settled for the USSR where proclamation of the slogan of 
the second party would be incorrect.”40  
For a time, Trotsky attempted to avoid a decision regarding the Comintern, given the 
possibility that the dilemma would be resolved by reality. Most optimistically, he still hoped the 
USSR and/or the Comintern might be transformed under the impact of the crises. As he wrote on 
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 March 29, “We do not give up our efforts to save the Soviet power from the ruin to which it is 
being driven by the Stalinists. We cannot know in advance what the reaction inside the other 
sections will be to the victory of fascism.”41 More pessimistically, he feared that the economic 
crisis might result in the collapse of the USSR. In line with this, on April 9, in response to the 
question of whether the break with the KPD meant a break with the Comintern, Trotsky asserted, 
“If the Stalinist bureaucracy will bring the USSR to ruin . . . it will be necessary to build a Fourth 
International.”42 
By the early summer it was clear that neither Trotsky’s most optimistic hopes nor his 
worst fears were about to materialize. With no publicly dissenting voices, on April 1 the 
Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) endorsed the 
policies of the KPD as “completely correct.”43 Meanwhile, Trotsky’s appeals to the Soviet 
leadership and bureaucracy elicited no response, and the Soviet economy appeared to be 
emerging from the worst of the economic crisis.44 In discussions with supporters Trotsky now 
proposed abandoning the Comintern; but, restrained by his position on the class nature of the 
USSR, he still rejected a rupture with the AUCP. Again, Jean van Heijenoort recalled Trotsky’s 
formulation in private discussions at this time: 
 
“Since April we have been for reform in every country except 
Germany, where we have been for a new party. We can now take a 
symmetrical position, that is, to be for a new party in every country 
except the U.S.S.R., where we shall be for the reform of the 
Bolshevik party.”45 
However, in light Trotsky’s perception that the AUCP controlled the Comintern, this 
position was clearly untenable and, as Heijenoort notes, Trotsky quickly abandoned it.46 On July 
15, 1933, in an article entitled “It Is Necessary to Build Communist Parties and an International 
Anew,” he concluded, “In all our subsequent work it is necessary to take as our point of 
departure the historical collapse of the official Communist International.”47 Five days later, in his 
article “It is Impossible to Remain in the Same International with the Stalins, Manuilskys, 
Lozovskys & Co. (A Conversation)” he admitted that it was impossible simply “to ‘proclaim’ a 
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 new International.” However, he insisted that from that point on it was necessary “to proclaim 
the necessity of creating a new International.”48 
As far as the Soviet section of the Comintern was concerned, Trotsky now reiterated with 
added significance his previous observation that it no longer existed as a party. Thus, on July 15 
he asserted, “The present CPSU is not a party but an apparatus of domination in the hands of an 
uncontrolled bureaucracy.”49 Then, on July 20 he removed all doubts about his position 
regarding the AUCP: “To speak now of the ‘reform’ of the CPSU would mean to look backward 
and not forward, to sooth one’s mind with empty formulas. In the USSR it is necessary to build a 
Bolshevik party again.”50 On August 19, the International Secretariat of the ILO endorsed 
Trotsky’s new position, voting for the creation of a new International.51 
8.2 REVISING THE THEORY 
For Trotsky, the change of position regarding the Comintern and the AUCP coincided 
with a major geographical relocation. After four and a half years in Turkey, he was finally 
granted a visa to live in France. On July 24 Trotsky arrived at Marseilles, accompanied by his 
wife, two secretaries, a typist, and an American supporter. Initially, he settled near the small 
town of Saint-Palais, a few miles north of Royan—the first of many residences he would have 
in France. There, he held frequent meetings with his own supporters and with representatives of 
various left socialist organizations from Britain, Holland, and Germany in preparation for 
founding a Fourth International. He also participated in organizing a conference of groups 
interested in a new International held in Paris on August 27-28. For the conference he also 
drafted “The Declaration of the Four on the Necessity and Principles of a New International,” 
signed by four of the fourteen participating parties and organizations.52 
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  Soon afterwards, Trotsky’s shift in position on reform of the AUCP led him to revise his 
political strategy and his theoretical understanding of the USSR in a number of other important 
ways. First, it compelled him to modify his position on the peaceful reform of the Soviet state. 
In turn, this forced Trotsky to redefine of his position on the class nature of the Soviet Union. In 
the process of responding to opponents who held divergent positions on that question, he 
expanded upon the notion of bureaucratic “parasitism.” At the same time, Trotsky’s new 
appreciation for the extent of the bureaucracy’s autonomy suggested to him a revised 
understanding of Bonapartism; it prompted him to reconsider the relevance of his traditional 
understanding of Thermidor; and it induced him to develop a new explanation for the origins of 
the bureaucratic power. Finally, the apparent divergence between Trotsky’s new evaluation of 
the Soviet leadership’s international and domestic policies compelled him to account for this 
discrepancy. 
 When Trotsky finally decided to break with the AUCP, he immediately confronted the 
problem he had sought for months to avoid. If abandoning the AUCP necessarily implied the 
need for revolution, how could this be reconciled with his understanding of the Soviet Union as 
a workers’ state? Even while first calling for a break with the AUCP, Trotsky attempted to 
reduce this dilemma by implicitly revising his position on the implications of that step for his 
reform perspective regarding the USSR. Thus, in his article of July 20 Trotsky wrote, “We 
abandon the slogan of reform of the CPSU, and we build up the new party as the instrument for 
the reform of the Soviet Union.”53 Trotsky explained that the Bolshevik-Leninists, organized as 
a separate party, could reform the state while fighting alongside a section of the bureaucracy in 
the civil war that was already in progress and that “would only become more acute.” The 
opponents in this battle were “the counterrevolution on the offensive and the Stalinist 
bureaucracy on the defensive.” At the decisive moment, Trotsky predicted, the bureaucracy 
would disintegrate and its fragments would “meet again in the two opposing camps.” Then the 
Bolshevik-Leninists would forge a united front with a section of the Stalinists against the forces 
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 of reaction.54 Thus, there was no need for force against the bureaucracy. Rather, the new party 
was to direct its force against the counterrevolution.55  
 Of course, this position, too, was untenable. As Trotsky had recognized previously, it 
was plainly inconsistent to call for the creation of a new, illegal party but to limit the party’s 
methods to peaceful reform. Consequently, on October 1, 1933 in one of his most important 
theoretical works, the pamphlet The Class Nature of the Soviet State, Trotsky concluded: “No 
normal ‘constitutional’ ways remain to remove the ruling clique. The bureaucracy can be 
compelled to yield power into the hands of the proletarian vanguard only by force.”56 
Still, Trotsky did not call for a new revolution in the USSR. In The Class Nature of the 
Soviet State Trotsky again insisted that “a real civil war” could only occur between the 
proletariat and supporters of capitalist counterrevolution.57 Instead, against the bureaucracy only 
“measures of a police character” would be necessary: 
 
When the proletariat springs into action, the Stalinist apparatus will 
remain suspended in midair. Should it still attempt to resist, it will 
then be necessary to apply against it not the measures of civil war 
but rather the measures of a police character. In any case, what will 
be involved is not an armed insurrection against the dictatorship of 
the proletariat but the removal of a malignant growth upon it.58  
 
Alternatively, Trotsky described the task as the “rock-bottom [or radical] reform [korennaia 
reforma]” of the Soviet state.59  
However, Trotsky’s call for a break with the AUCP and for the use of force against the 
bureaucracy immediately necessitated a revision of his position on the class nature of the Soviet 
Union. Since 1928, Trotsky had insisted that three criteria demonstrated that the USSR remained 
a workers’ state: 1) the Soviet state still defended the property forms established by the October 
Revolution; 2) a counterrevolutionary civil war had not yet occurred; and 3) the Soviet 
proletariat remained capable of peacefully reforming the state through the reform of the AUCP. 
Even though Trotsky attempted to minimize the amount of force that would be necessary, his 
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 new recognition that force would be required to remove the bureaucracy from power, as well as 
his call for a break with the AUCP, clearly contradicted his third criterion. Whether he chose to 
retain or abandon his characterization of the Soviet Union as a workers’ state, he clearly needed 
to redefine that term. 
Although concerns related to his perception of the Soviet Union as a workers’ state 
delayed his break with the Comintern and AUCP, once Trotsky had made that leap it does not 
appear to have been difficult for him to decide how to address the question of the class nature of 
the USSR. In the first place, two of his traditional criteria for a workers’ state remained intact. 
Besides that, abandoning his workers’ state position would have necessitated even greater 
theoretical and political adjustments than the partial modification of a definition. Thus, even in 
his first appeals for a new International and a new party, Trotsky reaffirmed the proletarian 
character of the Soviet Union.60 Then, on October 1 in The Class Nature of the Soviet State 
Trotsky provided an extended defense of the workers’ state position, while implicitly redefining 
the meaning of that term.61  
Again, Trotsky insisted upon the traditional “methodological position” of Marxism that 
the class nature of a state could not be changed, except through civil war: 
The class theory of society and historical experience equally testify 
to the impossibility of the victory of the proletariat through 
peaceful methods, that is, without grandiose class battles, weapons 
in hand. How, in that case, is the imperceptible, “gradual,” 
bourgeois counterrevolution conceivable?62 
For Trotsky, those who argued otherwise, asserting that capitalism had been restored in the 
USSR, were just “running backwards the film of reformism.”63 At the same time, Trotsky 
reaffirmed that the class nature of the Soviet state was still defined by the economic relations 
established by the revolution: “The anatomy of society is determined by its economic relations. 
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 So long as the forms of property that have been created by the October Revolution are not 
overthrown, the proletariat remains the ruling class.”64  
However, missing entirely from Trotsky’s argument was any mention of the ability of the 
proletariat to reform the state peacefully through the reform of the party. In light of the change in 
his position on party and state reform, Trotsky simply omitted this criterion without comment, 
apparently hoping to avoid drawing attention to this theoretical shift.65 Nevertheless, the 
significance of the omission was enormous. As the former Trotskyist leader Max Shachtman 
observed some years later, Trotsky “found himself obliged to alter his criterion radically from 
what it had previous been, not only for him but without exception for the entire revolutionary 
Marxian movement.”66 
Having reaffirmed a redefined workers’ state position, Trotsky proceeded in the same 
work to criticize the positions advanced by political opponents who previously had argued that a 
new revolution was necessary. Clearly, Trotsky wanted to prevent his critics from deriving 
political benefit from his own change of position on reform.  
One view examined by Trotsky was that of Lucien Laurat, an Austrian socialist 
theoretician and member of the French SFIO.67 In recent years Laurat had developed a theory 
that the Soviet Union represented an entirely new form of class society in which the bureaucracy 
not only ruled the politically, but also exploited the proletariat economically.68  
Trotsky, who frequently had spoken of the bureaucracy’s enormous privileges himself, 
readily agreed with Laurat that the bureaucracy devoured “no small portion of surplus value.” 
Nevertheless, he argued that it was technically incorrect to describe the bureaucracy as 
“exploiting” the proletariat, since the bureaucracy derived its privileges “not from special 
property relations peculiar to it as a ‘class,’ but from those property relations created by the 
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 October Revolution and that are fundamentally adequate for the dictatorship of the proletariat.”69 
To the extent that the bureaucracy robbed the people, Trotsky insisted, what was involved was 
not “class exploitation, in the scientific sense of the word, but . . . social parasitism, although on 
a very large scale.”70 
On a few previous occasions Trotsky, no doubt intentionally echoing Marx’s 
characterizations of the French state bureaucracy under the absolute monarchy and Second 
Empire, had referred in passing to the “parasitism” of the Soviet bureaucracy.71 However, in The 
Class Nature of the Soviet State, Trotsky offered a more extensive discussion of bureaucratic 
parasitism, utilizing that notion to suggest the transience and dispensability of bureaucratic rule. 
According to Trotsky, the bureaucracy was concerned, by virtue of its function and for the sake 
of its privileges, with the cultural growth of the USSR. However, development ultimately tended 
to undermine “the very base of bureaucratic domination” by strengthening the position of the 
Soviet proletariat. At the same time, the leadership’s wasteful and economically disruptive 
policies retarded growth, raising the prospect of economic and social collapse, capitalist 
restoration, and again, the downfall of the bureaucracy. Thus, from whatever angle the question 
was considered, it appeared that bureaucratic rule was ephemeral and that the bureaucracy was 
“not an independent class, but an excrescence [narost] upon the proletariat.” Trotsky concluded 
that, while a tumor might “grow to tremendous size and even strangle the living organism,” a 
tumor could “never become an independent organism.”72 
In the same article Trotsky also took up the current views of his old adversary Hugo 
Urbahns. Recently, Urbahns had begun to characterize the economic systems of Stalin’s USSR, 
Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, and Roosevelt’s United States as “state capitalist”—
allegedly a necessary and progressive stage in the development of society. As far as the USSR 
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 was concerned, Urbahns claimed to have taken this position from Lenin. In his response Trotsky 
pointed out that, since the World War, the forms of state economic intervention in the West that 
Marxists had characterized as “state capitalist” were not progressive, but “reactionary through 
and through.” Furthermore, he observed that Lenin had applied the term “state capitalism” within 
the Soviet Union to the concessions and mixed companies of NEP, not to the state-owned trusts 
that had developed into the gigantic Soviet industries of the 1930s. Thus, he concluded, not one 
of the traditional Marxist understandings of “state capitalism” could be applied “from any side to 
the present Soviet economy.”73  
In contrast, however, Trotsky now saw something of value in the earlier writings of 
Urbahns. Before developing his most recent “state capitalist” position, Urbahns had described 
the Soviet regime as a Bonapartist government, standing between classes. Again, Trotsky made 
short work of this theoretical confusion, observing that it was nonsense to speak of a “supraclass, 
or an interclass” state, and insisting that historically Bonapartism was “only one of the varieties 
of capitalist hegemony.”74 Although Trotsky himself had described the AUCP as “plebiscitary,” 
or even “Bonapartist,” he had done so to indicate broad parallels between the norms of the 
Stalinist party and those of a Bonapartist state, as well as to suggest that these norms were 
facilitating the installation of a truly Bonapartist (capitalist) regime in the USSR.75 He had not 
meant to suggest that the Soviet state was literally Bonapartist. Now, however, Trotsky abruptly 
announced that, as long as the class nature of the Soviet state was clearly and accurately defined, 
he was prepared to embrace the label completely: 
If Urbahns wants to extend the concept of Bonapartism to 
include the present Soviet regime, then we are ready to accept such 
a widened interpretation—under one condition: if the social 
content of the Soviet “Bonapartism” will be defined with requisite 
clarity. It is absolutely correct that the self-rule of the Soviet 
bureaucracy was built on the soil of veering between class forces 
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 both internal as well as international. Insofar as the bureaucratic 
veering has been crowned by the personal plebiscitary regime of 
Stalin, it is possible to speak of Soviet Bonapartism.76  
  
Of course, Trotsky was not suggesting this change because he was only now becoming 
aware of the bureaucracy’s “self-rule,” or of its “veering between class forces,” or of Stalin’s 
“personal plebiscitary regime.” He had commented upon each of these features frequently in the 
past. Rather, it is likely that Trotsky’s provisional redefinition of Soviet Bonapartism was due to 
his new appreciation, derived from his conclusion that force would be required to remove the 
bureaucracy from power, of the extent of the bureaucracy’s autonomy. Again, however, Trotsky 
hesitated in the face of a theoretical leap. It would be more than a year before he would begin to 
apply the Bonapartist label consistently to the Soviet regime.77 
Meanwhile, Trotsky’s thinking was also changing regarding the relevance of 
Bonapartism’s twin concept, Thermidor. As David Law has pointed out, in late 1933 the term 
virtually disappeared from Trotsky’s writings. Law explains that the concept “ceased, in its old 
form, to be useful to Trotsky” because “although the restoration of capitalism might still be an 
ultimate destination it was no longer thought of as immediately proximate.” In one work Law 
attributes this shift to Trotsky’s recognition of the transformation of the peasantry under 
collectivization.78 However, the extent of collectivization had not changed significantly since the 
spring of 1933 when Trotsky frequently spoke of Thermidor.79 Rather, to the extent that Trotsky 
was influenced on this question by economic developments, his concern about imminent 
restoration may have diminished as the economic situation began to improve in 1933. Perhaps 
even more significantly, as Law observes in another work, Trotsky’s October 1933 change of 
position regarding the use of force implied a rejection of the view that restoration was the 
“greatest immediate danger” in favor of “a concentration upon, and greater respect for, the 
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 current political regime.”80 In other words, Trotsky’s previous concerns about Thermidor made 
far less sense in light of his new emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy.  
A further consequence of Trotsky’s change of position on reform of the Soviet state was 
to prompt him to rethink his explanation of the origins of the problem of bureaucracy. In the late 
1920s Trotsky attributed the growth of bureaucratism primarily to the effects of bourgeois 
pressure on the state and party apparatuses. In the early 1930s, he partially amended this 
explanation to emphasize the role of the party apparatus in promoting its own autonomy. 
However, nowhere did he attempt to answer the more basic question of how the bureaucracy had 
come into being as a distinct social formation. Nor did he attempt to identify the objective factors 
that continued to enhance its autonomy. This second absence became even more glaring with 
Trotsky’s shift of position on reform of the Soviet state. At the same time, the tentative revision 
of Trotsky’s thinking on the question of Soviet Bonapartism may have suggested a new answer 
to these questions. 
 On December 4, 1933 in the International Bulletin of Trotsky’s recently renamed 
international organization, the International Communist League (ICL), Trotsky responded to a 
sympathizer who had asserted that Russian national backwardness was irrelevant to the issue of 
the construction of socialism in one country. In part, Trotsky rejected the sympathizer’s position 
on the grounds that Soviet backwardness had fostered social contradictions that threatened the 
very survival of the USSR. In his explanation of why this was the case, Trotsky offered a 
functional account of the origins of the bureaucracy and of the continuing growth of its 
autonomy: 
The bureaucracy in the USSR is neither a moral nor a 
technological factor but a social one, i.e., a class factor. The 
struggle between the socialist and capitalist tendencies assumed 
primarily the character of a struggle between the social interests 
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 represented by the state and the personal interests of the 
consumers, the peasants, the civil employees and the workers 
themselves. In the given situation, the overcoming of class 
antagonisms means the harmonizing of the social interests of 
production with the personal interest of the consumers, while 
during the present stage of development personal interest still 
remains the prime mover of the economy. Has this harmonizing 
been accomplished? No! The growth of bureaucratism reflects the 
growth of the contradiction between the private and social 
interests. Representing the “social” interests, the bureaucracy 
identifies them to a large measure with its own private interests. It 
draws the distinction between the social and the private in 
accordance with its own private interests. This creates a still 
greater tension between the contradictions and consequently leads 
to a further growth of bureaucratism. At the bottom of these 
processes lie the backwardness of the USSR and its isolation in its 
capitalist environment.81  
As he had since the 1920s, Trotsky insisted here that the problem of bureaucracy had 
fundamental social or even class bases. However, in this passage Trotsky did not identify the 
contending class forces with the social formations usually specified: the proletariat, various 
layers of the peasantry, etc. Rather, he spoke more abstractly of the competing “socialist and 
capitalist tendencies,” including, most importantly, the “social interests” represented by the state, 
and the “personal” or “private interests” of the “consumers,” including the workers. Furthermore, 
although he blamed contending class forces for the emergence of the bureaucracy, he no longer 
attributed the problem of bureaucracy to the external pressures exerted by alien classes. Rather, 
he explained the origin of the bureaucracy in terms of the functions of a post-capitalist state in a 
backward and isolated society. In doing so, Trotsky for the first time gave specific content to his 
agreement with Khristian Rakovskii in 1929 that the “differentiation of the bureaucracy from the 
working class milieu “was at first functional, then later became social.”82 
Drawing heavily upon the Marxist classics, Trotsky characterized the essential function 
of the Soviet bureaucracy as the mediation of social conflict. In their 1846 work The German 
Ideology Marx and Engels described how the early state had arisen as the representative of the 
“common interest” as opposed to “particular” interests.83 Years later in The Origins of the 
Family, Private Property and the State, Engels explained how, “in order that these antagonisms, 
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 classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile 
struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for moderating the 
conflict.”84 Along the same lines Trotsky now identified the basic function of the Soviet state as 
the “overcoming of class antagonisms” and the “harmonizing” competing social interests. More 
specifically, he explained this function in terms of the role of the state in production and 
distribution. In The State and Revolution Lenin had defined the essential functions of the state 
during the first phase of communist society as “safeguarding the common ownership of the 
means of production” while protecting the “bourgeois” norms of “equality in labor and in the 
distribution of products.”85 Similarly, Trotsky now asserted, “In the given situation, the 
overcoming of class antagonisms means the harmonizing of the social interests of production 
with the personal interest of the consumers.” 
Having come into being to represent the “social” interests, Trotsky argued, the Soviet 
bureaucracy began to identify these with its own private interests, and then to interpret the 
distinction between social and private in this light. Again, Trotsky’s debt to the Marxist classics 
is evident. In his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx noted a tendency for the modern 
state to identify its own interests with those of society: “The bureaucracy holds the state, the 
spiritual essence of society, in thrall, as its private property.”86 Likewise, in The German 
Ideology Marx and Engels argued that “because individuals seek only their particular interest, 
which for them does not coincide with their common interest, the latter is asserted as an interest 
‘alien’ [‘fremd’] to them, and ‘independent’ of them, as in its turn a particular and distinctive 
‘general’ interest.”87 Engels described this same process even more clearly in a letter in 1890: 
 
Society gives rise to certain common functions which it cannot 
dispense with. The persons appointed for this purpose form a new 
branch of the division of labour within society. This gives them 
particular interests, distinct, too, from the interests of those who 
empowered them; they make themselves independent of the latter 
and—the state is in being.88 
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 According to Trotsky, the ultimate effect of this identification of social interests with the 
bureaucracy’s private interests had been to create even “greater tension between the 
contradictions.” In turn, this had necessitated even more mediation, fostering further growth of 
“bureaucratism.”  
Here, it is likely that Trotsky had in mind the mediating role of the state in periods of 
extreme class tension, which the Marxist classics had described as characteristic of Bonapartism. 
Thus, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, Engels observed, 
By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring 
classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as 
ostensible mediator, acquires, for the moment, a certain degree of 
independence of both. Such was the . . . Bonapartism of the First, 
and still more of the Second French Empire, which played off the 
proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the 
proletariat.89 
Now Trotsky was able to explain the continuing expansion of the autonomy of the bureaucracy 
in terms of the same functional imperatives that had called it into existence in the first place.  
A final consequence of Trotsky’s change of position on reform was the emergence of an 
apparent inconsistency between his new evaluation of the international policies and the domestic 
policies of Stalinism. In The Class Nature of the Soviet State Trotsky explained that the 
bureaucracy had “completely squandered” the meaning of the Comintern as an “international 
revolutionary factor.” Yet, as far as domestic policy was concerned, the bureaucracy continued to 
“preserve a part of its progressive meaning as the gatekeeper of the social conquests of the 
proletarian revolution.”90 Trotsky was especially concerned with resolving this apparent 
discrepancy because for years he had castigated the German “Brandlerites” for supporting the 
domestic policies of the USSR while denouncing its international policies. In contrast, he 
asserted in his October 1 article, “We Marxists were never patrons of the double bookkeeping 
system.” 91  
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 In fact, Trotsky contended, there really was no fundamental difference between the 
bureaucracy’s domestic and international policies. In a declaration of the ICL written on August 
17, 1933 Trotsky characterized both as being of the “same principled nature.”92 Similarly, in The 
Class Nature of the Soviet State, he spoke of the bureaucracy’s “identical methods in USSR and 
in the international arena.”93 The difference, Trotsky explained, was in the objective results of 
the policies, which were determined in each case by the “external conditions, or to use the 
language, of mechanics, the resistivity of the material.” On one hand, the Comintern was “an 
instrument for overthrowing capitalism,” and its sections in the West lacked any “inherited 
capital.” In contrast, the Soviet government represented “an instrument for the preservation of an 
already accomplished overturn,” and “nine-tenths of the strength of the Stalinist apparatus” was 
concentrated “not in itself but in the social changes wrought by the victorious revolution.”94 
8.3 NEW POLICY SHIFTS 
The period from the fall of 1933 through the end of 1934 witnessed major changes and 
initiatives in all areas of Soviet policy. In the economic sphere the leadership retreated from the 
extreme tempos and excesses that characterized the First Five-Year Plan and began to initiate 
market reforms. Internationally, it began to seek alliances against growing threats to the East and 
West, and to promote a shift in the Comintern toward active collaboration with other parties 
against fascism. Within the party it initiated a new chistka, or cleansing operation, while 
welcoming the return of repentant former oppositionists to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 
1934.  
Meanwhile, as Ian Thatcher has observed, “For several years following the return to 
Europe, Trotsky wrote less on the USSR than at any other time in his career.”95 To a large extent 
this was probably because, when he gave up on peacefully reforming the Soviet state, Trotsky 
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 concluded that the “revolutionary center of gravity” had shifted to the West, and he redirected his 
political attention elsewhere.96 Besides that, living now in France, Trotsky spent more time 
consulting with his international comrades. Additionally, he began writing a major biography of 
Lenin. Finally, in this period he found his work frequently interrupted by a series of forced 
changes of residence until mid-July 1934 when he settled in the town of Domène at the foothills 
of the Alps.97 
However, in various statements during this period Trotsky expressed deep concerns about 
the new direction of Soviet policy in all areas. For the first time in years he found himself 
warning of the potentially disastrous consequences of the rightist course of the Soviet leadership 
in the economy and in international affairs. At the same time, he condemned the leadership’s 
continuing assaults upon critics of the bureaucracy and of Stalin. In each case, Trotsky’s growing 
theoretical emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy significantly influenced his analysis of these 
policy developments. 
8.3.1 Economic Retreat and Recovery  
Following the crisis of 1932-early 1933, the Soviet economy entered a period of 
moderation, recovery, economic progress, and market reforms that would continue through the 
end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1937. In his few statements on Soviet economic policy 
between late 1933 and early 1935 Trotsky noted this overall economic improvement, while 
expressing new concerns about the new rightward drift of policy. He explained the new policies, 
as he had explained previous shifts to the right, in terms of external class pressure. However, 
both his silences regarding Thermidor and his retrospective explanations of the left turn of 
previous years revealed a new emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy. 
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 In early 1933 the Soviet leadership called for a retreat from the excesses of the first 
piatiletka. At the Central Committee plenum in January 1933 Stalin abruptly modified the high 
targets for the Second Five-Year Plan adopted in 1932 by the Seventeenth Party Conference. 
Stalin now called for “less speedy rates” of industrialization and proposed as a minimum a “13-
14 per cent average annual increase in industrial output” in place of the 22 percent annual 
increase allegedly achieved in the first plan.98 This moderating trend continued in January 1934 
when the Seventeenth Party Congress adopted relatively modest goals in a redrafted five-year 
plan. Regarding industry, it approved Stalin’s proposals to overcome the lag in iron and steel 
production, to expand production of consumer goods, to increase labor productivity, and to 
improve quality. As far as agriculture was concerned, the Congress endorsed Stalin’s 
recommendations to improve the maintenance of farm machinery; to introduce proper crop 
rotation; to pay greater attention to livestock farming; and to regionalize the production of 
vegetables, dairy products, grain, and meat. Gone was the previous rhetoric about overcoming 
the market, eradicating money, and eliminating differences between town and country.99 
Meanwhile, the economic crisis of 1932-33 was beginning to recede. The recovery 
started with an improved harvest in 1933. That, combined with the impressive overall figures for 
industrial construction in the First Five-Year Plan contributed to a sense of relief and optimism 
among the delegates to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Sergei Kirov, secretary of the Leningrad 
organization, perhaps best captured this spirit when he joyously proclaimed, “Our successes are 
really tremendous. Damn it all, to put it humanly, you just want to live and live—really, just look 
what’s going on. It’s a fact!”100 
From 1934 to 1936 the industrial outlook grew steadily brighter. To a large degree the 
great expansion of industrial production during this period was due to the completion of the 
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 construction of plants begun during the first piatiletka. Machinery and metalworking industries 
experienced remarkable growth; coal production increased substantially; after 1934 the situation 
in rail transport improved significantly; and the production of consumer goods increased, though 
not as rapidly as projected in the plan.101  
At the same time the situation in agriculture also continued its upward turn. Although 
crop yields remained low and even continued to fall, the total output of grain slowly increased, 
and the supply of potatoes and vegetables as well as the population of livestock climbed 
steadily.102 Much of the credit for the recovery in agriculture belonged to a series of trade and 
agricultural reforms. In the spring of 1932 the government legalized markets where kolkhozy 
could sell their surplus products at free prices. Subsequently, a decree of January 1934 
reaffirmed this right, while specifically forbidding the application of administrative pressure to 
influence collective farmers and peasants to sell their grain. The kolkhoz markets were such a 
success that the state itself soon introduced sale of its own surpluses at high prices in commercial 
stores without rations. Furthermore, in November 1934 the government announced it was 
eliminating rationing of bread and all cereal foods, a measure that took effect on January 1, 
1935.103 An additional reform was the abolition in late 1934 of the political departments in the 
machine tractor stations (MTSs), and the assumption of their duties by local party committees 
and by newly created deputy MTS directors for political affairs.104 
Trotsky wrote little during this period about Soviet economic developments. In addition 
to the reasons already suggested, it is likely that some of his earlier concern about Soviet 
economic policy diminished when he realized the situation was beginning to improve. His 
awareness of this improvement was evident by at least December 12, 1933 when he referred to 
the “good harvest in the Ukraine,” as well as on March 31, 1934 when he remarked regarding 
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 Kirov’s speech at the Seventeenth Party Congress: “That Kirov rejoices over technical successes 
and the mitigation of the food scarcity is understandable. There is not an honest worker in the 
whole world who does not rejoice over this.”105  
However, in scattered comments on the Soviet economy during these years Trotsky 
expressed serious concern about the shift to the right he perceived in the recent policy changes. 
In an article of January 11, 1933 he noted Stalin’s reduction of the goals of the Second Five-Year 
Plan at the Seventeenth Party Conference, characterizing this as “a turn to the right,” and a “new 
bureaucratic zigzag.”106 Two weeks later he described this “reversal” as a “new emergency 
zigzag.”107 Although in the context of the economic crisis Trotsky welcomed the shift, he had no 
hope that it signified the adoption of a correct, long-term course. This was because, as he 
asserted on January 26, “the bureaucracy arrived at this moderation of tempos not by Marxist 
foresight but belatedly, after its head had collided against the disastrous consequences of its own 
economic adventurism.”108 Or, as he similarly observed in an article of March 3, “Under the 
blows of the crisis, which it did not foresee and which it does not openly admit even now after it 
has broken out, the leadership has been forced to retreat in the sphere of industrialization even as 
it had begun to retreat earlier in the sphere of collectivization.”109 Trotsky concluded, “The new 
zigzag in Stalinist policies is unmistakable proof of the profound dislocation of the Soviet 
economy, but it is absolutely incapable of leading to a way out of the great wreckage.”110 
Two years later, Trotsky complained about the further shift to the right embodied in the 
recent market reforms and the de-rationing of bread. In the article “Where is the Stalin 
Bureaucracy Leading the USSR?” on January 30, 1935 he described “the general direction” of 
both the economic and international turns during the previous year and a half as “to the right, 
more to the right and still further to the right.”111 Just a few years before, he recalled, Stalin had 
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 declared his intention to send the NEP “to the devil” and had ridiculed insistence upon currency 
stability as a “bourgeois superstition.” In contrast, now the bureaucracy found “itself compelled 
to apply to ‘the devil’” for a return of the market, and forced to eliminate ration cards in an effort 
to stabilize the chervonetz. In 1933 Stalin had instituted political sections “to exercise ruthless 
control over the collective farms.” Now even this “ripest product of the ‘Leader’s genius mind’” 
had been liquidated, almost without announcement.112  
Trotsky did not object to the leadership’s attempt to stabilize the currency. On the 
contrary, he saw at least this aspect of the turn as another vindication of the Opposition’s 
foresight. However, he expressed deep concerns about the methods employed in this “Neo-
NEP,” about their likely consequences, and about their implications for future policy. First, 
Trotsky objected that it was the Soviet working class—and especially its poorest sections—that 
was being forced to pay for the previous mistakes of the bureaucracy through the abolition of 
rationing. Beyond that, he predicted that the regeneration of market relations would lead to “the 
strengthening of individualistic and centrifugal tendencies in rural economy and the growth of 
differentiation between the collective farms, as well as inside the collectives.” Finally, Trotsky 
was apprehensive about the significance of the shifts for the future. The unplanned reforms had 
been introduced “to a large measure under pressure of the peasantry.” Where the retreat would 
stop, he warned, could not yet be known.113 Although in this last passage Trotsky hinted that 
Soviet economic policy might shift even more disastrously to the right, it is noteworthy that he 
did not use the term “Thermidor.” Again, largely because of his increased perception of the 
bureaucracy’s autonomy, Trotsky seems to have concluded that the danger of Thermidor was not 
imminent. 
Trotsky’s explanation for this latest turn to the right in economic policy was similar to the 
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 explanation he had offered for the conservative economic policies of the late 1920s: external 
class pressure. Thus, in his January 30, 1935 article he asserted that the reforms were adopted 
“under pressure of the peasantry” and that the bureaucracy was “retreating before the moujik.”114 
The tendency to explain policies of the bureaucracy in terms of class pressure would never 
disappear from Trotsky’s writings. However, in explaining major policy developments, from this 
point onwards Trotsky increasingly emphasized the role of conscious decisions made by the 
bureaucracy in the pursuit of its own interests.  
 The latter approach was evident in Trotsky’s attempts during this period to explain the 
previous left turn in Soviet economic policy. In the past, Trotsky usually had attributed that turn 
to pressure from the Opposition, supplemented by “panic” and/or “excitement” on the part of the 
bureaucracy. Trotsky still continued to view the Opposition’s pressure as an important source of 
that policy shift. In an article of March 31, 1934 he wrote that the Left Opposition won the fight 
for industrialization and collectivization “in a certain sense, namely in that, beginning with 1928 
the whole policy of the Soviet government represents a bureaucratically distorted application of 
the principles of the Left Opposition.”115 Now, however, Trotsky was inclined to stress the role of 
self-interest on the part of the bureaucracy. Thus, in his article “The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the 
Assassination” on December 28, 1934, he explained that in the previous “heroic” epoch of the 
bureaucracy, “with no initiative, with no horizons, with no understanding of the historical 
dynamic forces, the bureaucracy, after a stubborn resistance, found itself compelled by the logic 
of its own interests to adopt the program of industrialization and collectivization.”116 Similarly, on 
February 1, 1935 in “The Workers’ State, Thermidor, and Bonapartism” Trotsky wrote that “in 
the struggle for its own positions,” the bureaucracy “found itself compelled to take from the 
program of the Left Opposition all those measures that alone  
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 made it possible to save the social basis of the Soviet state.”117 
8.3.2 The New Turn in France 
During the same period, the Communist International also initiated a major reorientation 
in policy. Following the disastrous defeat in Germany, the focus of Comintern activity shifted to 
France, where an increasingly active right-wing movement had appeared. In the face of this 
growing threat, the Communist Party of France rejected its earlier “third period” line, and began 
pursuing a broad antifascist alliance. Although Trotsky welcomed a retreat from the Comintern’s 
previous policies, he soon began to criticize the new orientation in France from the left. 
Consonant with his increasing emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy, he attributed the right turn, 
and the centrism of Comintern policy in general, to the emotional reactions and inherent political 
characteristics of the Soviet bureaucracy. 
In early 1934 aggressive actions by organizations on the extreme right in France shocked 
the left, impelling it to seek unity. On the evening of February 6, 1934 fascist and royalist groups 
converged in a demonstration in the Place de la Concorde in Paris, and marched upon the 
Chamber of Deputies, meeting in the Palais Bourbon. In the ensuing battle with police, 
approximately 19 demonstrators were killed and hundreds of police and demonstrators were 
injured. Although the riot did not overthrow the Republic, as some rightist leaders apparently 
hoped, it succeeded in bringing down the government of Eduard Daladier, leader of the left wing 
of the moderate left Radical-Socialist Party, and in bringing to power Gaston Doumergue of the 
Radical-Socialist right. The day after the riot the Executive of the French Section of the Labor 
International (SFIO) appealed to the central committee of the Communist Party of France (PCF) 
for joint action against the fascist threat; and organizations of the PCF and SFIO on the local level 
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 began to discuss collaboration. On February 12, with the belated endorsement of the PCF, 
communists participated with socialists in a one-day general strike and a mass demonstration in 
Paris.118  
Still, for a time the PCF leadership continued to reiterate its “third period” line. In this, it 
was supported by the ECCI, which declared in a statement issued on March 3 that the only way to 
form the united front was by fighting ruthlessly to destroy the “treacherous Second International.” 
However, sentiment within the French left for a united front remained high. In May 1934 the 
congress of the SFIO voted to ask the Bureau of the Second International to approach the 
Comintern again for discussions concerning a united front.119  
At this point, the position of the Communist Party began to shift. In late May the PCF 
called for a national party conference on the question of a united front; and it appealed to the 
SFIO for collaboration on behalf of the victims of Nazi persecution. The leadership of the 
Socialists responded positively to this proposal, but demanded a “non-aggression pact” in 
exchange. When verbal attacks by the Communist Party continued, the executive committee of 
the SFIO terminated negotiations on June 20.120 However, shortly afterwards, acting upon 
telegraphic instructions from the Comintern, the united front conference of the PCF accepted the 
Socialists’ demand. The Communists pledged to “refrain mutually from all attacks, insults and 
criticisms against each other’s organizations and party members.”121 A pact between the PCF and 
the SFIO, providing for joint actions in defense of democracy, against war preparations, and 
against fascist terror in Germany and Austria was signed on July 27, 1934.122 
Within a few months, the PCF proposed an even broader alliance against fascism. In a 
speech of October 10, 1934, Maurice Thorez, general secretary of the PCF, called for an electoral 
alliance that would include not only the SFIO, but also the Radical-Socialist Party.123 In the 
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 following weeks the PCF leadership insistently appealed to the Radicals to join in “a popular front 
of freedom, labor, and peace”; and on November 25 it presented to the National Council of the 
SFIO a “Popular Front Program” of limited social reforms judged to be acceptable to the 
Radicals.124 The SFIO leadership immediately complained that this program did not include “a 
single measure of a socialist nature,” and proposed the addition of measures for the “socialization 
of the main means of production and exchange.” In turn the PCF, concerned that explicitly 
socialist demands would frighten the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie away from an anti-fascist 
front, rejected these proposals. Negotiations between the two parties then terminated in January 
1935.125  
Immediately following the rightist riot of February 6, 1934, Trotsky concluded that France 
was beginning to replay the recent history of Germany. As in Germany, the capitalist class, 
incapable of providing the people with either bread or peace, was using fascist bands to smash 
democracy and the organizations of the working class. Again, the fascists were drawing their 
popular support from the middle classes ruined by capitalism, whose anger and frustration had 
been redirected against the proletariat.126 At the moment, the sharpening conflict between classes 
had raised Doumergue to power as a Bonapartist “savior” and “arbiter.” Most immediately, 
according to Trotsky, the situation demanded “active proletarian self-defense,” organized by a 
united front of working class organizations. Beyond that, it required an audacious struggle for 
workers’ and peasants’ power.127 
By late 1934 and early 1935 Trotsky began to criticize the new orientation of the PCF 
from the left. Although he welcomed the fact that the Comintern finally had abandoned its 
ultraleft line, he now condemned it for adopting a policy that could prove to be equally ruinous.128 
Both SFIO and the PCF had rejected proposals to organize workers’ militias, calling instead upon 
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 the French government to disarm the fascist leagues. In Trotsky’s view this was an approach that 
strengthened the hand of the state while leaving organizations of the working class defenseless 
against the fascists who would only be rearmed by the police.129 Beyond that, he criticized the 
PCF’s courting of the Radical Socialists, the party employed by the big bourgeoisie to preserve 
petty bourgeois hopes for “a progressive and peaceful improvement of its situation.” In the 
current situation, he insisted, the Radicals were no longer able to play this role, as the petty 
bourgeoisie were looking for extreme solutions from either the left or the right. Consequently, by 
tying itself to the Radicals, the Communist Party was driving the peasants and small shopkeepers 
into the arms of the fascist Leagues.130 Finally, Trotsky denounced the PCF’s agreement to refrain 
from mutual criticism of the SFIO. By this agreement, he asserted, the communists had “thrown 
overboard the revolutionary program.”131 
To Trotsky, the new line—which he saw as originating in Moscow—revealed a complete 
lack of confidence in the working class by the Comintern leadership. Thus, in a letter of August 
10, 1934 he explained to a leader of a French teachers’ union that, having blamed its failures on 
the Western proletariat, the Comintern leadership had concluded, “‘For the security of the USSR, 
we have to look elsewhere for help. Since the conservative proletariat is attached to democracy, 
nothing remains but for us to attach ourselves to it, to support and preserve democracy.’”132 
However, Trotsky explained, since French “democracy” was embodied in the Radical Party, since 
the Radicals needed Socialist support to rule, and since the SFIO could only support the Radicals 
if the PCF stopped criticizing it, the “overriding plan of the Soviet bureaucracy” was to 
reestablish the regime of the Radical Herriot, by freeing the SFIO from the criticism of the 
PCF.133 
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 Beyond that, Trotsky attributed the policy change in France to fear on the part of the 
Soviet bureaucracy. In the past, Trotsky had explained right turns in Comintern policy in terms of 
external class pressure. Now, consistent with his growing emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy, 
he asserted that the right turn—like the left turn of 1929-33—represented an overreaction to 
defeats. As he stated in an “Open Letter to the Bolshevik-Leninists in the USSR,” in August 1934, 
“When the waters of fascism rose up to the Comintern’s neck in France, frightened, it 
accomplished in several days, if not in several hours, a turn unprecedented in political history.”134  
8.3.3 Shifts in Foreign Policy 
During these years the Soviet leadership also began pursuing military alliances against 
the growing threat from both Japan and Germany. These efforts culminated in the U.S. 
recognition of the Soviet Union and the signing of a mutual assistance pact with France. 
Although Trotsky viewed the attempt to forge pacts with imperialist powers as necessary in the 
existing context, he simultaneously denounced as “anti-Marxist” many of the statements made 
by Soviet leaders in order to obtain these alliances. In line with his current emphasis upon the 
bureaucracy’s independence, he attributed these developments to the conservatism of the 
bureaucracy fostered by its own material self interests. 
Since the occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, the Soviet Union had watched 
Japan with growing concern. Lacking resources to deter Japanese expansion, the Soviets initially 
opted for a policy of appeasement. Thus, in December 1931 the USSR offered Tokyo a non-
aggression pact—a proposal that was rejected. The following year the Soviets offered to sell 
Japan the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), already partially occupied by the Japanese. Although 
Japan responded favorably, the Soviets broke off negotiations in September 1933 after 
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 authorities of Manchukuo arrested six Soviet employees of the CER in an attempt to pressure the 
USSR into dropping the price.135 
While strengthening its military forces in the Far East, the Soviet Union also began 
actively seeking international alliances to counterbalance Japan. The Japanese threat apparently 
inspired Soviet participation in the conference of the League of Nations’ preparatory commission 
on disarmament that convened in Geneva in February 1932. At the conference Maxim Litvinov, 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, repeated earlier Soviet statements of support for general and 
complete disarmament, but also indicated Soviet willingness to endorse the proposal of U.S. 
President Hoover for a one-third reduction of all armaments by all nations. An additional Soviet 
statement of some significance at the Conference was Litvinov’s attempt to provide an exact 
definition of aggression.136 In the fall of 1933 the Soviet Union also seized upon the invitation 
from Franklin Roosevelt, newly elected President of the United States, to discuss recognition. On 
November 16 the two countries exchanged notes in which the United States recognized the 
Soviet Union and the Soviets pledged to settle its outstanding debts and to prevent activity on its 
territory by any organization attempting to overthrow the U.S. government.137  
In the same period the Soviet Union began to revise its foreign policy in Europe in light 
of the German threat. Despite Hitler’s self-proclaimed hostility to the USSR, the Soviet 
leadership initially hoped that German policy toward the Soviet Union would not change 
substantially under the Nazis. When on May 5, 1933 Germany ratified the Berlin protocol 
extending the 1926 Treaty of Berlin with the USSR, it seemed that this wish would be granted. 
However, during 1933 the Soviets grew increasingly concerned about attacks on Soviet 
institutions and citizens within Germany, about Hitler’s efforts to revise Versailles, and about an 
Italian proposal for a pact that would exclude the USSR. Consequently, by late 1933 the Soviet 
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 leadership had begun to pursue new alliances in Europe. In December 1933, the Politburo 
endorsed a French proposal for a mutual assistance pact against Germany and a suggestion that 
the USSR join the League of Nations. Beyond that, the Politburo expanded the prospective 
alliance to include Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland. At the 
subsequent meeting of the Central Executive Committee, Litvinov justified the pact by 
distinguishing between the “deeply pacifist” and the more militaristic imperialist powers. 
Negotiations over this expanded alliance continued through the following year. Then, in 
September 1934 the USSR joined the League; and on December 5, 1934 it concluded a protocol 
with France expressing the intention of both countries to pursue an eastern pact.138 
By June 1934 Trotsky concluded that Soviet foreign policy, as well as Soviet economic 
policy and Comintern policy, was undergoing a “sharp turn to the right,” a “decidedly anti-
Leninist turn.” 139 Aspects of this shift included Litvinov’s “purely formalistic presentation of the 
problems of war and peace” and the projected Soviet entry into the League of Nations.140 Again, 
Trotsky did not perceive either action as inherently wrong. In fact, he suggested that both were 
perhaps at least partially necessitated by the weakened position of the USSR.141 Nevertheless, he 
insisted that the Soviet leadership had gone far beyond what was permissible in its statements 
about disarmament and the League of Nations. He observed that for Marxists, disarmament was 
ineffective in preventing war, and issues of “defense” and “aggression” were just “questions of 
practical expediency.” To say otherwise, as the Soviet leadership had done repeatedly, was “to 
mislead the workers for the sake of a common front with petty-bourgeois pacifists,” while 
providing cover for Social Democratic leaders who had a stake in the status quo.142 Furthermore, 
Trotsky argued that, although it might be necessary for the USSR to enter the League, to acclaim 
this “bloc of allies and vassals of French imperialism” as a center for peace, and then to present 
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 the Soviet entry as a victory, had “nothing in common with the policy of the international 
proletarian party.”143 
Along the same lines, Trotsky noted, the Stalinists had begun portraying one group of 
imperialist powers as defenders of peace. In recent statements Soviet leaders had declared that 
Roosevelt represented “peaceful American capitalism.”144 More generally, they had begun 
distinguishing between the “peaceful, democratic and pacifist” capitalist states, and “warlike, 
fascist and aggressive” countries. Although Trotsky recognized that the purpose of such 
statements was to win allies against a possible attack from Germany and Japan, he believed they 
represented an “anti-Marxist political philosophy.” Instead of relying upon world revolution, 
Stalinism was counting upon military alliances with capitalist countries and “the insane theory of 
socialism in one country.” One certain consequence would be to further demoralize the German 
masses who were already being told that the Soviet Union had concluded an alliance with France 
against them.145 
Again, in previous years Trotsky had explained major policy shifts to the right by the 
Soviet Union as responses by the leadership to bourgeois pressure. Now, given his growing 
emphasis upon bureaucratic autonomy, he began to attribute the recent shifts to the right he 
perceived in Soviet foreign policy primarily to the conservative nature of the bureaucracy itself. 
For example, in an interview with a dissident member of the PCF in June 1934, Trotsky 
described the right turn as a reaction to the defeat in Germany, and then further explained, “A 
policy hostile to unity of action [with the Socialists] and a policy that presents the entry of the 
USSR into the League of Nations as a victory is one and the same policy, that of the ruling 
bureaucracy of the USSR, whose horizon is limited to the Soviet Union and that neglects and 
even fears the revolutionary struggle in other countries.”146 Similarly, in an interview with 
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 Louise Bryant in late 1934 or early 1935, Trotsky asserted that the Soviet bureaucracy had 
become a “national and conservative force” and that Soviet diplomacy, in particular, “defends 
the status quo.” Trotsky explained that the conditions of the Soviet bureaucrats’ existence, “as an 
uncontrolled privileged layer, accustomed only to giving orders, inevitably cause them to grow 
conservative.”147  
8.3.4 Developments in the Party Regime 
 Two of the most important political events within the USSR during this period were the 
new chistka of 1933-34 and the convening of the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934. For 
Trotsky, both events—as well as other regime-related developments during this period—were 
significant as attempts to reinforce two basic features he perceived in the Soviet regime: the self-
rule of the bureaucracy, and the personal plebiscitary regime of Stalin. Trotsky explained the 
persistence of both characteristics in terms of his new account of the origins of bureaucratic 
autonomy. 
In early 1933 the party leadership initiated a new mass chistka, or cleansing, of the party 
organization. A resolution adopted the April 1933 plenum of the CC explained that the mass 
admissions of 1931-32 had led to an influx of “alien” elements and “double dealers” into the 
party, while inadequacies of political education had resulted in the fact that large numbers of 
members were “insufficiently unstable” or “politically almost illiterate.” Individuals to be purged 
included 1) class alien and hostile elements; 2) “double dealers” who concealed their true 
aspirations while striving to undermine party policy; 3) violators of discipline who failed to carry 
out decisions of the party and state, and who chattered about their “lack of realism”; 4) 
degenerates, including those who did not want to struggle against the kulaks; 5) careerists, self-
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 seekers and bureaucratic elements; and 6) morally corrupt elements.148 As various authors have 
noted, there was a clear political thrust to several of these categories. In particular, they seem to 
have been directed at critics of the leadership’s policies regarding collectivization, dekulakization, 
and industrialization.149 However, as J. Arch Getty has emphasized, of the 18 percent of party 
members ultimately expelled in the chistka, a majority were removed for such relatively 
nonpolitical reasons as passivity and corruption.150 
 A second development with important implications for the party regime was the 
convening in late January and early February 1934 of the Seventeenth Party Congress, the 
“Congress of Victors.” Again, this first party congress to be held since the launching of the great 
offensive in industry and agriculture, celebrated the party’s weathering of the tumultuous storms 
of the previous four years. Climaxing a year-long intensification of the Stalin cult, speaker after 
speaker rose to credit one man for the party’s victory.151 Newly repentant oppositionists 
delivered some of the most hyperbolic eulogies. Zinoviev acclaimed Stalin for implementing the 
socialist construction that Lenin had only imagined, while Kamenev described the “Stalin epoch” 
as historically equal to the era of Lenin. Bukharin asserted, “It is the duty of every party member 
to rally round Comrade Stalin as the personal embodiment of the mind and will of the party, as 
its leader, its theoretical and practical leader.”152 
 If the Seventeenth Congress was a Congress of Victors, as Robert Tucker has observed it 
also seems to have been designed to be a “congress of reconciliation.”153 The fact that former 
oppositionists were allowed to speak and were treated respectfully suggested that the years of 
party struggle were finally at an end. Stalin himself seemed to encourage this view in his address 
to the Congress. Noting that at the Fifteenth Congress it had been necessary to struggle against 
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 the Trotskyites and at the Sixteenth, against the “Right deviators,” he observed, “At this congress 
. . ., there is nothing to prove and, it seems, no one to fight.”154 
 However, there were also more ominous themes in the General Secretary’s long address 
to the Congress. Although the opportunists and deviators had been smashed, Stalin warned that 
“remnants of their ideology” lived on in the minds of some party members.155 For example, some 
comrades, influenced by Right deviators, believed that the advancement of the Soviet Union 
toward a classless society indicated that the dictatorship of the proletariat was about to wither 
away. Against this view, Stalin declared that a classless society could only be built “by 
strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by intensifying the class struggle, 
by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants of the capitalist classes, and in battles with 
enemies, both internal and external.”156   
For Trotsky, there was never any doubt that the primary intent of the chistka of 1933 was 
political—to shore up the “self-rule of the bureaucracy” and “the personal plebiscitary regime of 
Stalin.” This is not to say that Trotsky believed that no purge was necessary. In fact on March 
30, 1933 he observed that there was no reason for the party to have two million members, and he 
offered the Opposition’s assistance in purging “the raw material, the ballast” to make the party a 
more effective instrument for combating Thermidor.157 However, he had no confidence in any 
chistka initiated and conducted by Stalinists. Thus, on March 3, 1933 he declared, “We do not 
trust the selections of Stalin-Menzhinsky-Yagoda; they have as their criteria not the interests of 
the proletarian revolution but the interests of the clique.”158  
Despite the variety of purge criteria, Trotsky viewed the chistka mainly as an attempt to 
prevent the revival of genuine party discussion. As he wrote on July 20, 1933, “The purges and 
expulsions were at first intended to disorganize the party, to terrorize it, to deprive it of the 
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 possibility of thinking and acting; now the repressions are aimed at preventing the reorganization 
of the party.”159 With the announcement of the forthcoming party congress, Trotsky concluded 
that the purpose of the chistka was to prevent the surfacing of dissent at that gathering. On 
December 12 he wrote, “The chief aim of the chistka was to terrorize the party prior to the 
congress. . . . This time, everybody was to be kicked out who had ever evinced the slightest 
inclination toward party discussion.”160 
More specifically, Trotsky saw the cleansing operation as aimed at party members who 
shared at least some of the Opposition’s views. On January 4, 1933 when the chistka was first 
announced he observed, “This cleansing begins and ends . . . with the repression of the comrades 
who share our views and with the destruction of all criticism and all Marxist thinking within the 
party.”161 Later in the year he pointed out that press reports emphasized the role of the chistka in 
rooting out Trotskyists. Thus, on December 12 he noted, “Through all the articles and notices on 
the chistka, there runs the red thread of ‘Trotskyism.’”162  
For Trotsky this did not mean that many, if any, of those being expelled in the chistka 
were actually Bolshevik-Leninists. He thought some were compromised bureaucrats, hated by 
the populace, but labeled “Trotskyists” to load upon Trotskyism “the guilt for the crimes of the 
Stalinists.” At the same time, he argued that the Stalinists were branding as “Trotskyist” all 
“criticism of bureaucratism in general.” Their intent was to “remind those who have a tendency 
to reflect and to be critical and who are courageous” that if they let themselves be carried away, 
they would be treated in a manner befitting Trotskyists.163 
However, during this period Trotsky also perceived indications that Stalin was preparing 
a new wave of persecution against true Bolshevik-Leninists. In 1933 Soviet delegates to a 
conference of teachers held in Rheims announced that a trial in the USSR would soon 
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 demonstrate that Trotskyists had participated in counterrevolutionary activities. Soon afterwards, 
Western newspapers reported that a few dozen “Trotskyists” arrested in Ukraine had been 
charged with sabotage and state treason. Trotsky vigorously denied the charges, insisting, “If real 
saboteurs have been arrested in the Ukraine, they cannot and do not have any relation to the Left 
Opposition; if adherents of the Left Opposition are arrested in the Ukraine, they cannot and do 
not have any relation to sabotage.” In part, he believed Stalin’s motive was to justify the 
incarceration and exile of Left Oppositionists since 1928. Beyond that, the Stalinists were 
growing increasingly alarmed over the popular sympathy for the Bolshevik-Leninists in the 
Soviet Union and over the gains of the Opposition internationally.164 
Although the Seventeenth Party Congress was the scene of reconciliation with newly 
repentant oppositionists, Trotsky did not expect that it would mark any improvement of party 
regime. Rather, in an article entitled “On the Eve of the Congress,” written on January 20, 1934 
six days before the congress convened, Trotsky anticipated that the congress would once again 
confirm that the party was dead as a revolutionary organization. For Trotsky, this had been 
indicated already by the delay, in violation of the party statutes, of nearly four years in convening 
the congress.165 He believed it would further be demonstrated by the lack of any serious 
discussion at the congress, as ensured by the chistka. Trotsky concluded that the congress was 
not being called to determine policies, but simply to endorse the leadership, the economic plan, 
and the work of the Comintern.166 Taken together, the arbitrary convening of congresses, the 
violation of statutes, the elimination of criticism, the arbitrary purges, and the deification of the 
leader, all signified, again, “the liquidation of the party as an active political whole that checks, 
elects, and renews its apparatus.”167 
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 For Trotsky the real question confronting the congress was “where and why did the 
Bolshevik Party disappear?” In this connection Trotsky noted again the discrepancy between the 
claims that the construction of socialism in the USSR was nearing completion, and the fact that 
state coercion actually was intensifying. To explain this contradiction, he reviewed and expanded 
upon his recent account of the origins of bureaucratic autonomy. Again, Trotsky insisted, the 
USSR was still far from socialism. In 1932, his former friend and collaborator Karl Radek had 
attempted to dispute this in a response to Trotsky published in the German newspaper Das 
Berliner Tageblatt. Radek had argued that socialism meant only the nationalization of production 
and distribution, and that shortages of milk were due to the absence of cows, not of socialism. 
Trotsky now replied that, on the contrary, socialism requires the ability to meet all human needs: 
“If the cows are nationalized, but their number is insufficient or their udders dry, this is still not 
socialism, because for lack of milk conflicts arise: between the city and village, between the 
kolkhozes, sovkhozes and individual peasants, between all the toilers and the bureaucracy.” 
Amplifying upon his December 1933 remarks, Trotsky spoke here not only of the struggle 
between the state and consumers, but also of the conflicts among the various groupings of 
consumers. These conflicts, which inevitably took on a “social and in their tendencies, a class 
character,” in turn required “the powerful intervention from above, that is, state coercion.” Once 
again, Trotsky concluded, “The real key to bureaucratic omnipotence lies in these simple 
facts.”168  
Meanwhile, according to Trotsky, power at the national summit, as well as within each 
geographic territory of the USSR, continued to concentrate in the hands of one leader who was 
increasingly deified in the press. In the same article Trotsky restated his functional explanation 
for this process as well, connecting it with the emergence of “bureaucratic omnipotence”: 
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 Since the workers are denied the possibility of reelecting and 
directing their apparatus, some other instance is necessary to solve 
state problems. Disagreements within the uncontrolled bureaucracy 
must be settled from above, by the ‘leader,’ who is but the 
personification of the apparatus.169  
8.4 THE KIROV ASSASSINATION 
On December 1, 1934 an event occurred that would have enormous impact upon the 
Soviet political regime in the coming years—the assassination of Sergei Kirov. What is known 
for certain is that at approximately 4:30 PM a young, unemployed, former Communist named 
Leonid Nikolaev fatally shot Kirov in the Leningrad party headquarters. A debate still rages 
among historians about other aspects of the case, including especially the question of Stalin’s 
complicity.170 However, the consequences are clear. Immediately, the murder was used as a 
pretext for the arrest of Stalin’s critics within the party; and in subsequent years it would become 
the pivotal event in a series of trials that would culminate in the execution of tens or hundreds of 
thousands, and the arrest of at least hundreds of thousands more.171 Nine days after Kirov’s death 
Trotsky put forward a preliminary analysis, distributed to sections of the ICL as a confidential 
circular. Subsequently, in response to queries from American friends, he returned repeatedly to 
the case, ultimately reexamining the assassination and its aftermath in five more articles and a 
press statement.172 Through all of these writings, to a large degree Trotsky’s interpretation of 
events was shaped by his perception of the political context within the USSR, and more 
specifically by the current version of his theory of Soviet bureaucracy. 
Shortly after the arrest of Nikolaev and his family and acquaintances, the Soviet 
leadership responded to the assassination by striking at enemies on the “right.” From December 
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 5 to 18 the Military Collegium of the Supreme Soviet sentenced 102 “White Guardists” in 
Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Minsk to death on charges of preparing terrorist acts against 
Soviet officials. Allegedly, the accused were sent into the Soviet Union from abroad to carry out 
acts of terrorism.173 
By the end of the month the focus of the investigation and reprisals shifted to the left. An 
indictment published on December 26 charged that Nikolaev had participated with thirteen 
others, including members of the Leningrad Komsomol, in an underground Zinovievist terrorist 
organization that had planned the murders of Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich, as well as Kirov. 
It was also alleged that Nikolaev had received 5,000 rubles from an unnamed foreign consul, 
later identified as Latvian, who had offered to put the conspirators in touch with Trotsky. All 
fourteen were found guilty and were shot on December 29.174  
In mid-December Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other former leaders of the Leningrad 
Opposition were also arrested. Due to lack of evidence, a special board of the NKVD took 
charge of the cases of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and seven others to consider sentences of summary 
exile. However, on January 17 Pravda announced that a secret tribunal in Moscow had found the 
Zinovievists guilty of organizing a “Moscow Center” that had inspired terrorist sentiments within 
the Leningrad group directly responsible for the assassination. Zinoviev reportedly confessed, 
“The former activity of the former opposition could not, by the force of objective circumstances, 
but stimulate the degeneration of those criminals.” All of the defendants in this trial received 
sentences of 5-10 years.175  
Subsequently, on January 23, 1935, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court tried 
twelve members of the leadership of the Leningrad NKVD, including its head, Filipp Medved, 
for criminal negligence in the Kirov affair. It was alleged that, even though they “had at their 
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 disposal information about the preparations for the assassination of Comrade Kirov,” they “had 
shown not merely carelessness, but criminal negligence in regard to the basic requirements of the 
defense of state security and had not taken the necessary measures.”176 Eleven received fairly 
light sentences of two to three years in labor camps; only one received the heavier sentence of 
ten years.177  
Meanwhile, the leadership was launching a broader campaign against the left. A press 
campaign against Trotskyism and the “rotten liberalism” that tolerated it gained in intensity, and 
libraries were again purged of works by Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and other oppositionist 
leaders. Party organizations throughout the Soviet Union exposed and expelled “Trotskyists” and 
“Zinovievists,” many of whom were then arrested. Former members of the Trotskyist 
Oppositionist, recently released, were rearrested and incarcerated or sent to remote regions; 
while family members and individuals more remotely connected to the Opposition were arrested 
and deported. At the same time, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of former supporters of the 
Leningrad Opposition were arrested.178  
In his first letter devoted to the issue Trotsky examined and rejected a variety of 
hypotheses regarding the motives for the murder, and concluded that this was a political 
assassination directed against “the party in power, its policies, and its leaders.”179 Although he 
argued that the leadership’s response confirmed this interpretation, it is clear that he accepted it 
primarily because it coincided with his own perception of the current political context. 
Speculating on Nikolaev’s intent, he observed that “the Stalinist regime at times drives honest 
people into the blind alley of despair”; and he blamed “Stalinist policies and the regime” for the 
counterrevolutionary tendencies that were appearing “even among elements that are not hostile 
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 to the regime.” The very existence of these terrorist tendencies, he concluded, reflected “the 
profound political crisis” of the Russian Revolution.180  
Furthermore, as David Law has observed, Trotsky’s perspective on the general situation 
within the USSR initially predisposed him to accept the leadership’s allegations regarding a 
Komsomol conspiracy.181 In “The Stalinist Bureaucracy and the Assassination” on December 28 
Trotsky commented that there was no apparent reason to dispute this charge because the 
bureaucracy had “not confessed it with an easy heart.” However, he then noted the “great 
symptomatic significance” of the conspiracy, for it simply confirmed the extent of popular 
discontent within the Soviet Union: “The hostility to the leaders in power must have been 
widespread and must have assumed the sharpest forms for the terrorist group to crystalize . . . 
within the ranks of the party youth.”182 
Of course, Trotsky was not willing to believe all of the leadership’s accusations. In the 
same article he repudiated the charges that leading Zinovievists were involved, ridiculing the 
notion that Old Bolshevik leaders could have embraced either the alleged goal of capitalist 
restoration or its terrorist means.183 In Trotsky’s estimation these accusations represented just 
another “juridical ‘amalgam’” of the type the leadership had employed repeatedly against the 
Opposition since 1927. The obvious goal was “to terrorize completely all critics and 
oppositionists, and this time . . . by the firing squad.”184 
To explain why this was occurring, Trotsky drew upon his recent analysis of the origins 
of bureaucratic autonomy. Once more, he located the ultimate source of this autonomy in the 
struggle “of each against all” for the satisfaction of “essential elementary needs.” To regulate the 
contradictions, the bureaucracy assumed the necessary role of “controller, judge, and 
executioner,” but then proceeded to exploit this role to enhance its own power and material 
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 welfare. Ultimately, the bureaucracy’s “national conservatism, appropriative instincts and its 
spirit of caste privilege” began to paralyze its progressive work. Unrestricted bureaucratic 
domination generated perpetual economic crises, which in turn created a permanent political 
crisis. In defense of the “dictatorship of the bureaucracy,” the ruling Stalinist faction found it 
necessary to resort to “ever more violent methods” and to circulate “ever more envenomed” 
amalgams.185  
Although Trotsky saw this amalgam as directed at all critics, two targets in particular 
stood out. First, the charges against the Zinovievists suggested that the amalgam was aimed, at 
least in part, at disaffected elements within the middle and lower levels of the bureaucracy now 
inhabited by the former opposition leaders.186 As in previous years, Trotsky believed that these 
strata were experiencing mounting levels of demoralization. Linking this observation with his 
recent theoretical insights, he observed, “When the bureaucracy comes into contradiction with 
the necessities of development and the consciousness of the class that has raised it to power, it 
begins to decompose and to lose faith in itself.” Bureaucrats who found themselves outside of the 
constricting circle of power were beginning to grumble and to harbor liberal thoughts. Trotsky 
speculated that Zinoviev and Kamenev, infected by the mood of their environment, had ridiculed 
Stalin in private. When word of this reached Stalin, he decided to make examples of them in 
order to teach the “vacillating and decomposing bureaucracy a lesson.”187 
Beyond that, Trotsky also saw the amalgam as aimed at the Bolshevik-Leninists. Even in 
his circular letter of December 10 Trotsky suggested that Stalin might attempt to implicate the 
ICL—though at that point he still considered this “not very probable.”188 Nevertheless, after Le 
Temps reported rumors of Trotsky’s involvement and after the arrest of the Zinovievist leaders, 
Trotsky asserted, “Using the Zinovievist group as a footstool, Stalin is aiming to strike a blow at 
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 Trotskyism.”189 Perhaps because there was no evidence that the Bolshevik-Leninists were 
growing within the Soviet Union, he saw the blow as directed specifically at international 
Trotskyism. At any rate, Trotsky related this conclusion as well to his current views on the 
bureaucracy. He reiterated that internationally “the Stalinist bureaucracy plays a demoralizing 
and fatal role from beginning to end.” In fact, the Stalinist leadership had long since given up on 
the Comintern, swapping dreams of revolution for hopes in the League of Nations. However, 
Stalin now feared that the lies supporting the bureaucracy domestically would crumble once 
Soviet workers learned of the growing international influence of Trotskyism. Consequently, the 
amalgam suggested to Trotsky that Stalin was preparing to launch a campaign against the 
“terrorist” threat posed by international Trotskyism to the security of Europe.190  
Shortly afterwards, Nikolaev’s confession validated these concerns, while providing 
Trotsky with new insights into the assassination itself. To Trotsky, the story that a foreign consul 
gave Nikolaev 5,000 rubles and offered to deliver a letter to Trotsky suggested a frame up. In an 
article of December 30 he deduced that the Soviet secret police were “financing Nikolaev and 
attempting to link him up” with Trotsky “through the medium of an actual or fake consul.” He 
saw this as subsequently confirmed by the dismissal of all the leading representatives of the 
NKVD in Leningrad, and by their conviction for criminal negligence.191 “Can one admit for a 
single moment,” asked Trotsky on January 26, “that such pillars of the GPU as Medved could 
show negligence when dealing with the preparation, known to them beforehand, of the 
assassination of Kirov?”192  
Furthermore, NKVD complicity immediately suggested an even more sensational 
conclusion: Stalin, too, was directly involved. On January 26 Trotsky asserted, “Without the 
direct agreement of Stalin—more precisely, without his initiative—neither Yagoda nor Medved 
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 would have decided to mount such a risky enterprise.”193 This was not to say that either Stalin or 
the NKVD intended to kill Kirov. “We have no facts for such a supposition,” Trotsky 
observed.194 Besides that, he apparently saw no motive for such a murder since, in his view, 
Kirov had “played no independent role.”195 Rather, he concluded that the entire objective of the 
conspiracy was to establish a link between the terrorists and Trotsky. For this purpose the NKVD 
hoped to get an incriminating note from Zinoviev and a letter to Trotsky from Nikolaev. 
However, Nikolaev acted too quickly. Detaching himself from the NKVD and his own terrorist 
group before the amalgam could be established, he shot Kirov—contrary to Stalin’s plans.196 
A few days later, Trotsky modified his explanation of the post-assassination amalgam 
once more in light of reports from the Soviet Union. In an article of January 30, 1935 he noted 
that an increasingly virulent and bizarre campaign in the Soviet press had begun denouncing 
“Trotskyism”; new “Trotskyists” were being discovered in “schools, universities, periodicals and 
commissariats”; and arrests and exiles had again “assumed a mass character.” Furthermore, he 
asserted in an apparent reference to the recent chistka, that “about 300,000 individuals, 15 to 20 
percent” had been removed from “the many-times-purged party.” For Trotsky all of these 
developments, combined with the arrest and conviction of the leading Zinovievists, constituted a 
“rabid attack against the left wing of the party and the working class.”197 
8.5 REVISING BONAPARTISM AND THERMIDOR 
On February 1 1935, in his major theoretical article “The Workers’ State, Thermidor, and 
Bonapartism,” Trotsky announced a dramatic revision in his thinking regarding the important 
theoretical concepts of Thermidor and Bonapartism—redefining both terms and embracing both 
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 as applicable to the Soviet Union.198 He seems to have made these changes largely in response to 
regime developments and to the recent rightward shifts in economic and international policy that 
again suggested the relevance of the concept of Bonapartism to the Soviet situation. The 
redefined terms would become key elements in his newly emerging theory of a highly 
autonomous Soviet bureaucracy. At the same time, Trotsky’s change of position on Thermidor 
and Bonapartism immediately resulted in other important theoretical changes: it led Trotsky to 
drop centrism as a characterization of Stalinism; it enhanced the significance of other theoretical 
concepts Trotsky previously had employed; and it compelled Trotsky once again to redefine 
workers’ state. 
As far as past debates over the issue of Thermidor were concerned, in his February 1 
article Trotsky remained convinced that the position of the Left Opposition had been essentially 
correct. He recalled that in 1926-27 the Democratic Centralists had asserted, “Thermidor is 
already accomplished!” which meant that a “regenerating bourgeois regime” had already come to 
power in the USSR. Against this, Trotsky argued that the Left Opposition had insisted rightly 
that, although “elements of dual power” had appeared, the USSR remained a workers’ state.  
However, Trotsky now admitted that in making this point the Opposition had been 
mistaken in accepting the term Thermidor for capitalist restoration. In this regard, he observed, 
the Thermidor analogy “served to becloud rather than to clarify the question.” Since the 
revolution of 1789-1793 was bourgeois in character, Trotsky explained, a “corresponding” social 
counterrevolution would have restored feudal property relations. In fact, “Thermidor did not 
even make an attempt in this direction.” Rather, the significance of Thermidor in France was to 
transfer “power into the hands of the more moderate and conservative Jacobins, the better-to-do 
elements of bourgeois society”—doing so entirely “on the basis of the new bourgeois society and 
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 state.”199 Trotsky further argued that Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup of the Eighteenth of Brumaire 
had comparable significance. After Thermidor, the rise of Napoleon represented “the next 
important stage on the road of reaction.” Again, however, there had been no attempt to restore 
old property forms. Rather, Napoleon guarded bourgeois property “against both the ‘rabble’ and 
the claims of the expropriated proprietors.”200  
In light of these reinterpretations, Trotsky now saw both terms as highly relevant for 
describing the Soviet experience. Regarding Thermidor, he observed, “Today it is impossible to 
overlook that in the Soviet revolution also a shift to the right took place a long time ago, a shift 
entirely analogous to Thermidor, although much slower in tempo and more masked in form.”201 
Specifically, he now dated the beginning of the Soviet Thermidor approximately back to 1924 
when the Left Opposition was first defeated.202 As far as Bonapartism was concerned, Trotsky 
noted that, just as Napoleon struggled against both the feudal word and the “rabble” on behalf of 
a new bourgeois aristocracy, Stalin now guarded “the conquests of the October Revolution not 
only against the feudal-bourgeois counterrevolution but also against the claims of the toilers, 
their impatience and their dissatisfaction.” To reinforce his point about the dual nature of 
Stalinist policy, Trotsky emphasized that he was comparing Stalin’s regime to the youthful 
Bonapartism of Napoleon I, “that was not only the gravedigger of the political principles of the 
bourgeois revolution but also the defender of its social conquests,” not to the completely 
reactionary “Bonapartism of decay” typified by the regimes of Napoleon III, or Schleicher, or 
Doumergue.203  
Although Trotsky first explained his new positions on both Thermidor and Bonapartism 
in the same article, there are reasons to believe that the decision to revise his understanding of 
Bonapartism came first. Statements by Trotsky over the preceding year and a half—in particular, 
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origins of bureaucratic autonomy—already had made his redefinition of the term Bonapartism a 
much shorter theoretical leap than his reinterpretation of Thermidor. Beyond that, in the weeks 
preceding the February 1 article Trotsky applied the term Bonapartism to the Soviet Union 
earlier and more frequently than the term Thermidor, suggesting that he viewed the Bonapartist 
analogy to be more significant.204 Furthermore, to the extent that his understanding of recent 
events evoked the revisions, these more clearly suggested Bonapartist rather than Thermidorian 
characteristics. Finally, it appears that, to a large degree, Trotsky arrived at his new position on 
Thermidor by deriving it logically from his revised understanding of Bonapartism.205  
Of course, Trotsky did not redefine either term because he had just learned that neither 
Thermidor nor the reign of Napoleon I had restored feudalism in France. Rather, he did so 
because recent events suggested that these revisions would promote a better understanding of the 
current Soviet situation. As Trotsky explained in his February 1 article, “The disclosure of the 
error was greatly facilitated by the fact that the very processes of the political degeneration, 
which are under discussion, have in the meantime assumed much more distinct shape.”206 In 
particular, policy developments since the fall of 1935 helped Trotsky overcome his hesitation 
about applying the Bonapartist label to the Soviet system.  
Most important in this regard were events related to the state and party regime, and 
especially those related to the Kirov assassination, that suggested similarities between Stalinism 
and Bonapartism. As we have seen, in October 1933 Trotsky listed “the self rule of the 
bureaucracy” and the “personal plebiscitary regime of Stalin” as two of the defining 
characteristics of Stalinism.207 During the following months he perceived that these 
characteristics were reinforced by the chistka, by the new arrests of “Trotskyists,” and by the 
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 growing “deification of the leader” prior to the Seventeenth Party Congress. Furthermore, he saw 
both characteristics as strengthened even more dramatically in December and January by the 
post-assassination amalgams and by the repression of the Zinovievists, representing dissident 
elements within the bureaucracy, and of the Trotskyists, representing the proletarian vanguard. 
Thus, in his February 1 article Trotsky observed that the Bonapartist features of the party regime 
were more apparent than ever before: “The domination of the bureaucracy over the country, as 
well as Stalin’s domination over the bureaucracy have well-nigh attained their absolute 
consummation.”208  
Beyond that, it is also likely that aspects of the Kirov assassination and subsequent 
amalgams reminded Trotsky of specific historical parallels in Napoleon Bonaparte’s rise to 
power. As he noted on February 1, “One is literally hit between the eyes by the resemblance 
between the present Soviet regime and the regime of the First Consul, particularly at the end of 
the Consulate when the period of the empire was nigh.”209 Or, as he wrote a month later, “The 
Stalin regime, which is the translation of Bonapartism in the language of the Soviet state, reveals, 
. . . a certain number of supplementary features resembling the regime of the Consulate (or of the 
empire, but still without a crown).”210  
One event that played a key role in Napoleon Bonaparte’s transition from First Consul to 
Emperor was an assassination conspiracy in early 1804. As described by Alphonse Aulard, 
prominent historian of the French Revolution whose work was known to Trotsky, the plot was 
organized by a group of royalist exiles in Britain headed by Georges Cadoudal, but secretly 
encouraged by Bonaparte’s agents. According to Aulard, the Consular police hoped to “tarnish 
the glory” of Bonaparte’s “sole rival in point of military honor,” Moreau, by putting the 
conspirators in touch with him. The conspirators were arrested in February 1804, before the 
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 attempt could be carried out. Bonaparate then used the incident to justify the elimination of his 
enemies on both the right and the left. Subsequently, to discourage further assassination attempts, 
his supporters proposed the conversion of Bonaparte’s life consulate into a hereditary empire—a 
proposal that was confirmed by a national plebiscite in the wave of Bonapartist adulation that 
swept France following the exposure of the conspiracy.211 Trotsky may have had this episode in 
mind in a discussion with his secretary Jean van Heijenoort shortly after the Kirov murder: 
In a conversation with me at the time, Trotsky sketched his theory 
of what he called “crowned socialism.” You will see, Stalin will 
get himself crowned.” He thought that, after the Kirov 
assassination, Stalin would assume some majestic title, like 
Bonaparte adopting the name of Napoleon.212 
 
 Aside from developments in the party regime, recent shifts in Soviet international and 
domestic policy also may have contributed to Trotsky’s change of position on Bonapartism. In 
October 1933 Trotsky had listed the bureaucracy’s “veering between class forces,” as the third 
characteristic of Soviet Bonapartism.213 In the following months, Trotsky saw further evidence of 
this “veering” in the introduction of the economic “NeoNEP” and the new line in international 
policy—turns Trotsky viewed as the sharpest and most significant since 1928-29. Thus, on 
January 30, 1935 he included the “diplomatic retreat before the world bourgeoisie and before 
reformism” and “the economic retreat before the petty-bourgeois tendencies within the country” 
as two elements (along with the “political offensive against the vanguard of the proletariat”) in 
the “tripartite formula of the new chapter in the development of Stalinist Bonapartism.”214   
Of course, since the late 1920s Trotsky had characterized the leadership’s zigzags as an 
indication, not of Bonapartism, but of bureaucratic centrism. Through 1934 Trotsky continued to 
apply the term bureaucratic centrism frequently, especially to Comintern policy.215 In fact, on a 
left-right continuum this designation seemed to fit the policies of 1934-1935 far better than it fit 
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 the “ultraleftist” polices of previous years. As Trotsky expressed in late January and early 
February 1935, the Comintern had returned to the “old organic course” practiced in China in its 
alliance with the Guomindang.216 However, despite Trotsky’s stretching of the concept of 
centrism in recent years, that term still suggested that the bureaucracy stood between classes, 
passively responding to their external pressures. In contrast, Trotsky now viewed the 
bureaucracy as an independent entity, standing above classes and mediating their conflicts. 
Although classes could sometimes pressure the bureaucracy into changing course, the 
bureaucracy also was capable of actively choosing policies in its own self-interest—an 
understanding better captured by Bonapartism than by centrism. Consequently, in his February 1 
article Trotsky announced that he was dropping centrism, explaining that the centrist phase of 
Stalinism had been superseded by the “hypertrophy of bureaucratic centrism into 
Bonapartism.”217  
Similar reasoning suggested the need for a revision of Thermidor. If the bureaucracy was 
autonomous enough to choose its own policies, then it seemed less likely it could be pushed into 
a covert restoration of capitalism. Largely because of his new emphasis on bureaucratic 
autonomy, Trotsky had stopped using the term for more than a year. Now, the accumulating 
policy shifts to the right demanded that Trotsky address the question directly: 
Where does this course lead? The word “Thermidor” is heard again 
on many lips. Unfortunately this word has become worn from use; 
it has lost its concrete content and is obviously inadequate for the 
task of characterizing either that stage through which the 
bureaucracy is passing or the catastrophe that it is preparing.218  
 
At this point Trotsky might have been tempted to discard the term altogether. However, 
his revised understanding Bonapartism suggested the relevance of a redefined Thermidor. From 
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 the conclusion that the Soviet Union was Bonapartist, Trotsky deduced that it already had gone 
through a Thermidorian phase: 
Enough to mention that we ourselves often speak—and with ample 
cause—of the plebiscitary or Bonapartist regime of Stalin. But 
Bonapartism, in France, came after Thermidor. If we are to remain 
within the framework of the historical analogy, we must 
necessarily ask the question: Since there has been no Soviet 
“Thermidor” as yet, whence could Bonapartism have arisen? 
Without making any changes in essence in our former 
evaluations—there is no reason whatever to do so—we must 
radically revise the historical analogy.219 
 
Explaining how Thermidor had occurred in the USSR, Trotsky noted further similarities 
between the French and Soviet experiences in terms of the processes involved, the economic 
preconditions of stabilization, and the political types of the individuals who rose to power. In 
both France and the USSR, he observed, power shifted to a bureaucracy through a political 
process involving repression, attrition, cooptation, and careerism.220 In both countries the new 
phase of political stabilization was based upon an upsurge of productive forces that benefited a 
privileged stratum linked to the bureaucracy, while the masses fell into prostration and apathy.221 
Finally, in both countries the phase of reaction brought to power functionaries who in “their 
manner of living, their interests, and psychology” differed dramatically from the revolutionaries 
who had first struggled for power. In this regard, Trotsky noted the prominent role of former 
Mensheviks and right-wing Social Revolutionaries in the Stalinist AUCP, and even more in the 
Soviet diplomatic service.222 
In order to explain of how the regime became Bonapartist, Trotsky returned once more to 
his recent functional account of the origins of bureaucratic autonomy and one-man rule. Trotsky 
portrayed the initial phase of this process as overlapping historically with the process of 
Thermidor. Initially, he repeated, the bureaucracy raised itself above the masses to carry out the 
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 necessary task of regulating the contradictions between “the city and the village, between the 
proletariat and the peasantry,” etc. At the same time, it used this regulatory function “to 
strengthen its own domination.” Trotsky noted that during this phase the bureaucracy’s 
regulation of conflicts had constituted the “social base of bureaucratic centrism, of its zigzags, 
its power, its weakness and its influence on the world proletarian movement that has been so 
fatal.” When the bureaucracy’s uncontrolled rule then generated new social contradictions, it 
exploited these to create “a regime of bureaucratic absolutism.” Meanwhile, contradictions 
within the bureaucracy itself “led to a system of handpicking the main commanding staff; the 
need for discipline within the select order that has led to the rule of a single person and to the cult 
of the infallible leader.” Now, this process was nearing completion: “As the bureaucracy 
becomes more independent, as more and more power is concentrated in the hands of a single 
person, the more does bureaucratic centrism turn into Bonapartism.”223 
At the end of his February 1 article, fearing that opponents on the left would attempt to 
capitalize upon his theoretical changes, Trotsky added a postscript in which he minimized the 
significance of his revisions: 
It is in no case a question of changing our principled position as it 
has been formulated in a number of official documents, but only a 
question of rendering it more precise. Our “self-criticism” extends 
not to the analysis of the class character of the USSR or to the 
causes and conditions for its degeneration but only to the historical 
clarification of these processes by means of establishing analogies 
with well-known stages of the Great French Revolution.224  
 
However, the implications of Trotsky’s revisions were far more important than he 
admitted. Most generally, they codified and reinforced Trotsky’s view of the bureaucracy as a 
highly autonomous social formation. In line with this, Trotsky’s revision of position on 
Bonapartism immediately resulted in his dropping of bureaucratic centrism—a development that 
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 would have important implications for his analysis of Soviet policy. Beyond that, Trotsky’s 
revisions of his understanding of Thermidor and Bonapartism enhanced the significance of two 
other concepts he had used in the past— 
bureaucratic caste and labor aristocracy—while requiring yet another redefinition of workers’ 
state. 
Once concept affected by Trotsky’s redefinition of Thermidor and Bonapartism was the 
notion of a bureaucratic caste. By 1935 Trotsky had been using this term in reference to the 
Soviet bureaucracy for several years, but actually the concept was much older. Hal Draper has 
noted that, due to a “vogue for things Indian,” the term caste was already popular in Germany in 
the early nineteenth century as “a swear-word directed especially against Old Regime strata seen 
as fossilized, such as the old nobility, officer élite, and so on, as well as the bureaucracy.”225 As 
we have seen, in 1821 the Prussian statesman Freiherr vom Stein characterized the Prussian 
Bureaulisten as “a class for themselves—the clerical caste.”226 Furthermore, the expression was 
in use in Russia by the late nineteenth century. There, in 1891 the Brockhaus-Efron 
Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ argued that, under bureaucracy, officialdom formed “a special caste 
outside of the people,” and it asserted that “caste exclusiveness” was one of the distinctive 
features of bureaucracy.227  
By the 1930s, the concept of a bureaucratic caste also was a familiar one within the 
Marxist movement. Marx and Engels frequently had employed the term caste in their 
descriptions of relatively autonomous state apparatuses of Bonapartist regimes. For example, in 
his 1852 work The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx commented that Louis Bonaparte had “been 
forced to create, alongside the real classes of society, an artificial caste for which the 
maintenance of his regime is a question of self-preservation.”228 Similarly, in his first draft of 
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 The Civil War in France written in 1871, Marx described how, in the state of Louis Bonaparte, 
administration and governing were treated as “mysteries, transcendent functions only to be trust 
to the hands of a trained caste—stateparasites.” Against this, the Paris Commune had made 
public functions into “real workmen’s functions, instead of the hidden attributes of a trained 
caste.”229 As Hal Draper has observed, in such passages Marx and Engels utilized caste as “a 
loose term for a social stratum which does not play the role of a separate class.”230 The 
Bolsheviks also used bureaucratic caste in this broad sense. For example, in an important work 
written during the First World War, Zinoviev denounced the “caste of labor bureaucrats”—that 
is, the officials of the Social Democratic parties and trade unions of the West—as a major source 
of the opportunism and social chauvinism of the Second International.231 
No doubt Trotsky was thinking especially of these examples from the Marxist classics 
when he first applied the term to the Soviet bureaucracy.232 It seems that Trotsky’s first 
references to a bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union appeared in early 1929 in statements where 
he was beginning to stress the autonomy of the party-state bureaucracy.233 At that time Trotsky 
asserted that the bureaucrats who had exiled him were “people who have got the power into their 
hands and converted themselves into a bureaucratic caste,” and he characterized the party 
apparatus as “a definitely constituted caste.”234 In the following five years, Trotsky referred to 
the bureaucratic caste in the USSR on just a few more occasions.235  
However, at the end of December 1934 and in early 1935, the importance of the notion of 
a bureaucratic caste was underlined by Trotsky’s emerging understanding of Thermidor and 
Bonapartism. By redefining the rise of the bureaucracy as a fundamental transfer of power, 
Trotsky’s new position on Thermidor and Bonapartism called into question of the precise nature 
of the dominant social formation. Trotsky’s answer was this was not a class, but a bureaucratic 
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 caste. Thus, at this time Trotsky suddenly began using the term caste more frequently and 
insistently, and in ways that more clearly suggested a class-like degree of autonomy.236 For 
example, in his January 12, 1935 article on the investigation into the Kirov assassination, 
Trotsky described the “vile amalgam” of the consul as a typical measure used by the Stalinist 
bureaucracy “in the struggle for its caste positions.”237 In his January 26, 1935 article on the 
investigation into the assassination he observed, “The need for amalgams emerges when a 
bureaucracy rises above the revolutionary class as a ruling caste, with its special interests, 
secrets, and machinations.”238 And in his February 1, 1935 article on Thermidor and 
Bonapartism Trotsky asserted, “The Stalinist bureaucracy smashed the Left Opposition in order 
to safeguard and entrench itself as a privilege caste.”239 From this point on, the concept of 
bureaucratic caste occupied a more significant place in Trotsky’s theory. 
 Another term that received enhanced significance from Trotsky’s redefinition of 
Thermidor and Bonapartism was labor aristocracy. Again, the Bolsheviks used this term 
frequently during the war, referring to a stratum within the working class in the imperialist 
countries that, with the labor bureaucracy, had been transformed by privileges into an 
opportunist tool of the bourgeoisie.240 It seems that Trotsky first employed the term in writings 
on the Soviet bureaucracy in July 1931 when he condemned the increasing use of piecework as 
an attempt to create a stratum of more prosperous workers: “The program of the Stalinist 
bureaucracy leads it inexorably to the necessity of supporting itself upon the ever more 
privileged labor aristocracy.”241  
 Trotsky’s reconsideration of Rakovskii’s 1928 letter on the “professional dangers of 
power” in light of his own revised understanding of Thermidor may have contributed to his 
renewed interest in the concept. Rakovskii had observed that the reaction following the French 
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 Revolution had transferred power from the bourgeois class as a whole to a bureaucracy and to 
the upper strata of the highly differentiated bourgeoisie. As far as the USSR was concerned, 
Rakovskii noted that in 1928 “workers and employees” were divided into eighteen different 
categories, including a layer described by “semi-vagabonds,” as the “‘new nobility’.”242 Along 
the lines of Rakovskii’s analysis, Trotsky now asserted that after a proletarian revolution, a 
“bureaucracy and a workers’ aristocracy connected with it begins to take form.” Furthermore, he 
argued that the smashing of the Opposition in 1924 transferred power to “the more conservative 
elements among the bureaucracy and the upper crust of the working class.”243 
At the same time, Trotsky’s reading of French history also suggested the utility of the 
concept of labor aristocracy for understanding Soviet Bonapartism. Recalling Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s creation of the Legion of Honor, the imperial court, and a new titled nobility, 
Trotsky observed that Napoleon had “concentrated the fruits of the regime” in the hands of a new 
bourgeois aristocracy.”244 Similarly, he observed, Stalin was now creating a “new aristocracy by 
means of an extreme differentiation in wages, privileges, ranks, etc.”245 (Here, Trotsky was 
speaking of the growing layer of privileged Soviet shock workers, increasingly differentiated by 
titles such as “best of the shock workers” and “best of the best,” and by medals such as the Order 
of the Red Banner of Labor and the Order of Lenin.246) Like Napoleon, Stalin was relying upon 
his new aristocracy for political support: “Leaning for support upon the topmost layer . . . against 
the lowest—sometimes vice versa—Stalin has attained the complete concentration of power in 
his hands.”247 
 Despite Trotsky’s claim that his “self-criticism” regarding Thermidor and Bonapartism 
did not extend “to the analysis of the class character of the USSR,” in fact it immediately 
involved a revision in this area as well. Although Trotsky now explicitly rejected the view that 
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 either the French or the Soviet Thermidor involved a social counterrevolution, he still viewed 
Thermidor as a counterrevolution of sorts. Thus, he observed: “Was Thermidor 
counterrevolutionary? The answer to this question depends upon how wide a significance we 
attach, in a given case, to the concept of ‘counterrevolution.’”248 As a form of counterrevolution, 
a Thermidor necessarily required a civil war. For this reason—and perhaps thinking of 
comparisons to the waves of repression and White terror that followed the French Thermidor—
Trotsky now described the violence and repression employed against the Opposition as a 
“number of minor civil wars waged by the bureaucracy against the proletarian vanguard.”249 
Even though Trotsky qualified this assessment with the observation that, in comparison with the 
French edition, the Soviet Thermidor had maintained “a comparatively ‘dry’ character” at least 
initially, he could no longer use the absence of a civil war to demonstrate that the Soviet Union 
remained a workers’ state.250 Consequently, in the section of “The Workers’ State, Thermidor, 
and Bonapartism,” in which he again defended his worker’s state position, this criterion too was 
now absent. Trotsky’s sole remaining argument for his workers’ state position was that “the 
social content of the dictatorship of the bureaucracy is determined by those productive relations 
that were created by the proletarian revolution.”251  
8.6 DEEPER SHIFTS, REPRESSION, AND A CONSTITUTION 
From February 1935 into the summer of 1936 the Soviet leadership deepened its latest 
turns in economic and international policy, while combining elements of repression and 
conciliation in its internal political policy. In the economy, it offered new economic incentives to 
the peasantry. Internationally, it persisted in its efforts to establish military alliances with 
533 
 imperialist powers, while promoting “antifascist” alliances of Communist parties with Socialist 
and/or liberal parties within the capitalist world. Regarding internal political policy, the 
leadership continued the post-assassination repression of its critics. At the same time, it initiated 
two new membership accounting operations that included elements of repression. However, in 
late 1935 and early 1936 the leadership also promised liberalizing reforms in a new constitution. 
 Meanwhile, until mid-June 1935 Trotsky remained in the French town of Domène. At 
that point, under threat of expulsion from France, Trotsky obtained a visa for Norway. Trotsky 
arrived in Oslo with his wife and two secretaries on June 18, 1935.252 In this period Trotsky 
continued his relative silence on Soviet affairs, especially in the economic sphere. However, in 
various statements on Soviet policy he applied his new insights, especially in depicting the 
motivation for Soviet policy initiatives in terms of the self-interests of a highly autonomous 
bureaucracy, or of the Stalinist leadership within the bureaucracy. New developments in his 
thinking, which would become important aspects of his theory of bureaucracy, included his 
characterizations of Soviet international policy as essentially opportunist in nature, and his 
conclusion that a political revolution was necessary to remove the bureaucracy from power. 
8.6.1 New Initiatives in Economic Policy 
 While the overall economic situation continued to improve, during this period the Soviet 
leadership introduced important policy initiatives to enhance productivity in both agriculture and 
industry. In agriculture, the leadership adopted a new kolkhoz statute that permitted peasants on 
collective farms to own and farm small plots and to own livestock. In industry, it promoted the 
Stakhanovite movement, calling upon workers to make heroic efforts in production. In his few 
remarks on economic questions during this period Trotsky noted the general improvement in the 
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 situation, while continuing to express apprehensions about the right turn in agricultural policy. 
Trotsky’s new analysis of the bureaucracy was evident in his silence concerning “Thermidorian” 
restoration, in his explanation of the right turn, and in his ongoing interest in the “labor 
aristocracy.”  
The economic upturn of 1933-34 persisted into the first half of 1936. In particular, this 
period saw an expansion of consumer industries—although, at least partially because of 
unanticipated increases in defense spending, this was not nearly as great as projected in the plan. 
Meanwhile, living standards, while still low, continued to improve in the city and, even more, in 
the countryside.253  
In February 1935, in an effort to enhance agricultural productivity, the Central 
Committee convened the Second All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Activists to adopt a “model” 
statute to be used, with local adaptations, by collective farms throughout the Soviet Union. One 
of the compulsory provisions of the statute recognized the right of each kolkhoz household to a 
private plot of land of ¼ to ½ hectares. Once obligatory deliveries to the state were met, kolkhoz 
members were free to consume or sell the remaining produce from these plots. Additionally, to 
promote the recovery of Soviet livestock decimated by the mass slaughters that accompanied 
collectivization, individual households were permitted to have a limited number of animals, 
excluding horses, for personal use.254  
Regarding industry, a major new development in this period was the rise of the 
Stakhanovite movement. On the night of August 30-31, 1935 Alexei Stakhanov, a pick operator 
in the Central Irmino mine in the Donbas region of Ukraine, managed to produce more than 
fourteen times the average shift output of coal. Stakhanov’s feat was accomplished by a 
combination of a division of labor, special advance preparations, and hard work. With the 
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 encouragement of Pravda, the Stakhanovite movement quickly spread to other mines and 
industries, turning into a mass campaign to increase labor productivity. In December the plenum 
of the Central Committee endorsed the movement, using it to justify an upward revision of 
technological and labor norms.255 
Again, during these years Trotsky devoted relatively little attention to Soviet economic 
matters.256 As before, this was probably at least partially due to his belief that the economic 
upturn was diminishing both the dangers of restoration and the opportunities for “forcible 
reform.” Trotsky explicitly noted the economic improvement and the effect it was having on 
workers and peasants in a conversation with a Canadian supporter, Earle Birney, in November 
1935: 
In the last two years a very important economic improvement has 
taken place, both in agriculture and industry. As a result, not only 
have the privileged sections secured more privileges and the 
bureaucracy added new top layers, but also the lower strata are 
better off than before. Moreover, the situation of the poor peasants 
and workers had been so bad that a slight improvement 
(comparatively) made for a large improvement in their minds.257 
 
 However, Trotsky’s few remarks on Soviet economic matters in 1935 and early 1936 
revealed two major concerns. One was the continuing shift of policy to the right. In particular, 
Trotsky was troubled about the market reforms embodied in the model statutes adopted by the 
Second Kolkhoz Conference, fearing that these were part of a deeper retreat. As he wrote in his 
diary on February 14, 1935, 
Le Temps has published a very sympathetic report from its 
Moscow correspondent about the new privileges granted to the 
kolkhozniks . . . , especially in regard to their acquiring ownership 
of horses, cattle, and other livestock. Certain further concessions to 
the petty bourgeois tendencies of the peasant seem to be in 
preparation. At this stage it is hard to predict the point at which 
they will manage to hold the line against the present retreat . . . . At 
the present time the retreat is proceeding at full speed. 258  
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In another diary entry on April 27 he noted that the recently announced May Day slogans “spoke 
only of the struggle against the Trotskyists and the Zinovievists and did not mention the right 
opposition at all.” From this, Trotsky concluded, “This time the turn to the right will go farther 
than ever before, much farther than Stalin foresees.”259 Still, in light of his recent theoretical 
revisions, Trotsky did not predict that a Thermidorian restoration of capitalism was imminent. 
Although Trotsky’s remarks in his February 15 diary entry about “concessions to the petty 
bourgeois tendencies of the peasant” and managing to “hold the line” suggest that he saw the 
right turn in agricultural policy as, to some degree, dictated by external class pressures, his 
characterization of the retreat as a reaction “brought on by the extremely crude bureaucratic 
illusions of the preceding period” clearly implied a greater degree of autonomy on the part of the 
bureaucracy.260  
Trotsky’s second concern, consistent with his recent remarks about the fostering of a new 
Soviet aristocracy, was with the growing economic inequality in the USSR. Again, in his 
November conversation with Birney, he noted that, with the recent improvement in the economic 
situation, “the privileged sections secured more privileges and the bureaucracy added new top 
layers.”261 This concern was also suggested by Trotsky’s wholehearted endorsement on 
December 31 in a note to the sections of the ICL of a recent article by Leon Sedov on the 
Stakhanovite movement: 
The article is based on very important documentation and, in my 
opinion, gives a totally correct picture of the character and the role 
of this movement which is glorified by the Stalinists not only 
uncritically, but also in a totally dishonest fashion. I would like to 
call the attention of all comrades to this article.262 
 
Although Trotsky did not elaborate, a main conclusion of Sedov’s article was that the Stalinist 
leadership was “putting the Stakhanovists in a very privileged position” to promote “the 
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 differentiation of the working class,” with the aim of creating a more stable base of support in the 
“labor aristocracy.”263  
8.6.2 Further Shifts in International Policy 
Important developments in Soviet foreign policy and Comintern policy in 1935 and 1936 
included the communiqué signed by Stalin and French foreign minister Pierre Laval in May 
1935, the formation of the Popular Front in France, the endorsement of the popular front strategy 
by the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, and the implementation of the Popular Front in the 
French elections and the working-class upsurge of 1936. Trotsky denounced all of these, as well 
as Stalin’s comments in an interview in 1936, as evidence of the counterrevolutionary character 
of Soviet international policy. To a degree, this evaluation coincided with his belief since 1933 
that the Soviet Union had “completely squandered” its significance as an “international 
revolutionary factor.” However, Trotsky now went far beyond his earlier analysis, characterizing 
Stalinist policy as social patriotic, Menshevik, and worse than traditional opportunism; and 
describing the Comintern as essentially social democratic. This shift in Trotsky’s evaluation of 
Soviet international policy was facilitated by the fact that in February 1935 Trotsky began to 
describe Soviet policy as Bonapartist, rather than bureaucratic centrist. The Bonapartist 
characterization left open the question of where Soviet policy fell on a left-right continuum. For 
Trotsky, that question was answered by the similarities he perceived during this period between 
Soviet and traditional social democratic policy. However, throughout this period he explained the 
counterrevolutionary character of Soviet policy largely in terms of the self-interested motivations 
of the Soviet bureaucratic caste, rather than simply in terms of external class pressure. 
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 Continuing Soviet efforts to obtain a defensive alliance against Germany, on May 2, 1935 
V. P. Potemkin, Soviet ambassador to France, signed a treaty of Material Aid with Laval 
obliging each nation to come to the assistance of the other in the event of an attack by a third 
party.264 Two weeks later Stalin explicitly approved French rearmament for national defense in a 
communiqué issued jointly with Laval: 
It is precisely for the sake of maintaining peace that these 
States are obliged, above all, not to weaken in any way their means 
of national defense. On this point, in particular, Comrade Stalin 
expressed complete understanding and approval of the national 
defense policy pursued by France with the object of maintaining its 
armed forces at a level consistent with its security requirements.265 
The statement from Moscow immediately elicited mixed reactions from the French left. 
The PCF endorsed both the alliance and the Stalin-Laval communiqué. Communist posters 
appeared across France proclaiming, “Stalin is right.” and in a speech of May 17 Thorez 
explained that if an imperialist state sided with the USSR in war, “the war would not be a war 
between two imperialist camps.” 266 The SFIO, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic. Leon 
Blum argued that the communiqué was “a slap in the face” of all who had campaigned against 
French militarism, and asserted, “We socialists refuse to make common cause with the ideas and 
the military planning of the bourgeoisie.”267  
Despite these disagreements, the PCF persisted through the spring of 1935 in its attempt 
to establish an electoral alliance that would include both Socialists and Radicals. Though the 
PCF’s new support for a strong national defense repelled the Socialists, it impressed the Radicals 
positively.268 At the same time, the benefits derived by all three parties from an informal bloc in 
the municipal elections of May 1935 generated new support for the alliance.269 Ultimately, the 
efforts of the PCF paid off with the formation of the Popular Front on July 14, 1935 at a mass 
demonstration on the anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. Forty-eight national 
organizations and an estimated crowd of 570,000, with Daladier, Blum, and Thorez at their head, 
participated in the procession from the Place de la Bastille to the Place de la Republique. The 
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 assembled throng sang both the Marseillaise and the Internationale and pledged “to defend the 
democratic liberties won by the people of France, to give bread to the workers, work to the 
young, and to the world the great peace of mankind.”270 
Still, tensions between the PCF and the SFIO continued during the subsequent fall and 
winter. In contrast to the SFIO, the PCF opposed the inclusion of demands for nationalization in 
the draft program of the front, and it proposed to invite conservative parties such as the 
“Democratic Alliance” to join.271 At the same time, the PCF indignantly rejected socialist 
proposals for a Popular Front government, and it condemned the SFIO for its participation in the 
Radical government of Sarraut formed in June 1936.272  
However, in January 1936 the PCF, the SFIO, and the Radical Socialists negotiated an 
agreement for the mutual support of each other’s candidates in the second round of balloting in 
the upcoming parliamentary elections. The outcome of the election in late April and early May 
was an enormous success for the Popular Front parties, which won an absolute majority in the 
Chamber with 334 out of 618 seats. On June 4, 1936 Blum assumed the office of Prime Minister 
at the head of a Socialist-Radical government. To preserve their freedom to criticize, the 
Communists declined Blum’s invitation to participate.273 
The election results immediately sparked an explosion of accumulated discontent within 
the French working class. Heartened by the victory of the left, workers spontaneously struck and 
occupied factories across France. The movement progressively swelled until, by the beginning of 
June, nearly two million workers were on strike. From the beginning, the leaderships of both the 
Socialist and Communist parties attempted to moderate to resolve the crisis as quickly as 
possible. Two days after assuming office, Blum invited workers’ and employers’ representatives 
to a conference at the Hotel Matignon for negotiations. Jacques Duclos of the PCF explained his 
party’s aim: “We are concerned about two things—first, to avoid any disorder, and second, to get 
talks going as soon as may be, with a view to a quick settlement of the conflict.”274 In the face of 
the escalating class war the PCF called a meeting of its Parisian membership on June 11. At that 
gathering Thorez urged Communists to use their influence to end the strike, arguing, “While it is 
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 important to lead well a movement for economic demands, . . . it is also necessary to know how 
to end it. There is at present no question of taking power.”275 In reply to Marceau Pivert of the 
SFIO left who had just declared, “Now everything is possible for those who are bold enough,” 
Thorez responded, “No, everything is not possible at the present.”276 The following day, a 
meeting of the Communist-influenced metal workers voted to return to work. The majority of 
strikes were settled within a few days; and together, the Socialist and Communist parties were 
able to end most strikes by the beginning of August.277  
Meanwhile, the Comintern as a whole was embracing the French Popular Front strategy. 
At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which convened in Moscow on July 25, 1935, Georgi 
Dimitrov delivered the main report.278 In essence the report represented an endorsement and 
extension of the French Popular Front tactic to all countries of the world. Dimitrov called first 
for a “proletarian united front” with Social Democratic parties and reformist trade unions against 
the class enemies of the proletariat, promising for the sake of unity that Communists would not 
attack any allies in the united front. Furthermore, Dimitrov advocated an “anti-fascist People’s 
Front” that would include parties and organizations controlled by the “agents of big capital.” 
Going beyond the position of the PCF, he declared that Communists were prepared even to share 
responsibility for forming a Popular Front government. Finally, he proposed the ultimate 
unification of Social Democratic and Communist parties, and pledged that Communists would 
take the initiative in achieving this.279  
Aside from the question of the Popular Front against fascism, the Seventh Congress also 
addressed the struggle against war. In his report on this question Palmiro Togliatti called for a 
vigorous struggle against the chief sources of the threat to peace—German fascism and Japanese 
militarism. The method of fighting for peace was to be through a united front of “all those who 
want to defend and preserve peace.” In particular, Togliatti urged that Communists unite with the 
“pacifist masses,” while continuing to expose their “pacifist illusions.”280 
Although in early 1935 Trotsky noted signs that the PCF was beginning to back away 
from its traditional “revolutionary defeatism,” he was shocked by the Stalin-Laval communiqué. 
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 On the day after it was issued, he confessed in his diary that he could not believe his eyes when 
he first read it. To Trotsky, this was “an act of treason in the fullest sense, signed and 
notarized.”281 Trotsky explained his reaction in an open letter to the world proletariat on May 25, 
and an open letter to the workers of France on June 10. While he had serious reservations about 
the value of the treaty for the Soviet Union, he did not criticize Stalin for that agreement. 
Practical agreements with the class enemy, he asserted, “may be correct or wrong, but they 
cannot be rejected on principle.”282 Rather, Stalin’s crime was in signing the communiqué. For 
the first time, Stalin had “openly said what is.” That is, he had openly “repudiated revolutionary 
internationalism and passed over to the platform of social patriotism.”283  
Beyond that, Trotsky argued that the Comintern, by endorsing the communiqué, had 
become “the diplomatic agent of Stalinism” which had just taken “the decisive step on the road 
to civil peace.”284 He explained that when a working class party announces its readiness to 
support national militarism, it transforms itself into the “domestic beast of capital.” By approving 
the communiqué the Comintern had demonstrated it was “the principal obstacle on the historic 
road of the working class.” In fact, Trotsky asserted, the Stalinists now stood at the extreme right 
wing of the working-class movement” and were “immeasurably more harmful than the old, 
traditional opportunists” because they covered themselves with the authority of the October 
Revolution.285 
Trotsky offered differing explanations for the treaty and the communiqué. He viewed the 
treaty as a legitimate adaptation “to the imperialist factor,” forced upon the Soviet leadership by 
a series of international defeats.286 In contrast, he attributed the communiqué to the 
bureaucracy’s lack of confidence in, and actual hostility to, the world revolution—attitudes 
derived from the material interests of the bureaucracy. In his open letter of June 10, Trotsky 
asserted: 
 
The betrayal of Stalin and of the leadership of the 
Communist International is explained by the character of the 
present ruling stratum in the USSR; it is a privileged and an 
uncontrolled bureaucracy, which has raised itself above the people 
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 and which oppresses the people. Marxism teaches us that existence 
determines consciousness. The Soviet bureaucracy, above all, fears 
criticism, movement and risk; it is conservative; it greedily defends 
its own privileges. Having strangled the working class in the 
USSR, it has long since lost faith in the world revolution. It 
promises to build “socialism in one country,” if the toilers shut up, 
endure and obey.287 
Instead of relying upon the revolutionary proletariat, the bureaucracy was putting its hopes in 
diplomacy and alliances. Beyond that, fearing that the workers might frighten its new allies, the 
bureaucracy had decided “to put a brake upon the class struggle of the proletariat in the ‘allied’ 
countries.” Thus, for Trotsky the source of Stalin’s betrayal was “the national conservatism of 
the Soviet bureaucracy, its outright hostility to the proletarian revolution.”288 The communiqué, 
so closely resembling the Social Democratic betrayal of August 4, 1914, once again 
demonstrated that the Comintern was dead as a political organization.289 
At the time of the formation of the Popular Front, Trotsky also sharply condemned the 
PCF’s alliance with the Radicals, reiterating and amplifying upon his previous arguments. 
Against claims in Pravda that the Radicals were a “bloc between the middle and petty 
bourgeoisie,” Trotsky quipped on March 28, 1936 that “a horseman is not a bloc between a rider 
and a horse.” In fact, he insisted, “The Radicals are the democratic party of French 
imperialism—any other definition is a lie.”290 While the masses were abandoning the Radical 
Party, the Socialist and Communist leaders were trying to save it, forcing their parties in the 
process to limit their activities to the program of the Radicals. Thus, Trotsky characterized the 
People’s Front as a “society for insuring Radical bankrupts at the expense of the capital of 
working class organizations.” Its purpose was to put “a brake upon the mass movement, 
directing it into the channels of class collaboration.”291 
Trotsky perceived both domestic and international inspirations for the PCF’s efforts to 
construct the front. On August 23, 1935 he observed that after the riot of February 1934, PCF 
leaders who had denounced Radicals as fascists and Social Democrats as social fascists, 
“completely lost faith in themselves and their banner” and decided to seek an alliance with both 
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 parties. However, he also parenthetically noted that the decision was made “at the direct bidding 
of Moscow.”292 On March 28, 1936 he explained Soviet motivations as follows: 
 
Under pressure of the danger threatening from Hitler’s 
Germany, the policy of the Kremlin turned towards France. Status 
quo—in international relations! Status quo—in the internal 
relations of the French regime! Hopes for the social revolution? 
Chimeras! 
 
Again he concluded, “The policy of Stalin, determined by the interests of the privileged 
bureaucracy, has become conservative through and through.293  
For Trotsky, the events of the spring of 1936 further demonstrated the 
counterrevolutionary role of the PCF and of the Comintern as a whole. In an article of June 5, 
1936 he saw this as evident first of all in the 1936 French election results. Far from 
demonstrating the popular mandate for the Popular Front as claimed by both the SFIO and the 
PCF, the outcome represented a vote against it. The Communists had drawn dramatic gains from 
the SFIO; the Socialists had increased their vote at the expense of the Radicals; the Neo-
Socialists, outspoken advocates of a bourgeois-proletarian alliance, had been rejected; and 
despite hopes of the SFIO and the PCF for a Radical government, the masses had imposed a 
Blum ministry. A class polarization was taking place in France, yet the PCF and the SFIO 
persisted in frustrating the popular will by imposing a Popular Front from above. Even worse 
than the SFIO’s governmental collaboration with the Radicals was the PCF’s post-election 
pledge to support the Blum government from without—as Trotsky explained, “in order the better 
to subject the working masses to the People’s Front, i.e., to the discipline of capitalism.”294 
As the upsurge of June 1936 unfolded, Trotsky excitedly followed events in France by 
radio from a Norwegian village. On June 9 he proclaimed, “The French revolution has 
begun!”295 To coordinate the offensive, he called for the election of representatives from the 
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 factories and industries—or in other words, for the creation of “soviets of workers’ deputies.” In 
this regard, he even took up the recently discarded slogan of the Comintern, “Soviets 
everywhere!”296 For Trotsky, the difference between this perspective and that of the PCF was a 
measure of how far Stalinism had fallen from revolutionary politics. He viewed the leaders of the 
PCF, together with those of the SFIO, as actively hostile to the revolutionary movement, afraid 
that the strike might “spoil all their blueprints for a Popular Front.” Especially revealing in this 
regard was PCF leader Marcel Cachin’s comment that “We are all of us . . . confronted by the 
fact of the strike.” As interpreted by Trotsky, Cachin was saying that “the strike is our common 
misfortune.”297 Reviewing the record of the strike in July, Trotsky asserted that if the 
“Communist” party had been genuinely communist, it would have broken with the Radicals on 
the first day of the strike, called for the creation of factory committees and soviets, and would 
have proceeded to establish dual power in the country. Then, in his sharpest criticism of French 
Stalinism to date, Trotsky denounced the PCF as “merely one of the tools of French 
imperialism.”298 Regarding the international role of Stalinism as a whole, he observed, 
The Stalinist bureaucracy is a far more threatening and treacherous 
obstacle on the road of the world revolution than the autocratic 
czar once was. The Comintern covers a policy of social patriotism 
and Menshevism with the authority of the October Revolution and 
the banner of Leninism.299  
 
For Trotsky the principal significance of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern was its 
extension of the “opportunist turn” of the PCF to the rest of the world.300 In “The Comintern’s 
Liquidation Congress” written on August 23, 1935, Trotsky asserted that the congress, while 
endorsing and generalizing the French experience on both the Popular Front and the question of 
war, “liquidated Lenin’s teaching, making an abrupt about-face to opportunism and 
patriotism.”301 In particular, the congress had rejected Lenin’s views that the proletariat could not 
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 take power within the framework of bourgeois democracy or with its methods, that even the most 
“left” bourgeois parties ultimately served finance capital, that the real culprit in imperialist war 
was imperialism itself, and that “revolutionary defeatism” was the appropriate policy within all 
imperialist countries.302 According to Trotsky, nothing now distinguished the Communists from 
the Social Democrats “except the traditional phraseology.”303 
One final development in this period that again demonstrated to Trotsky the enormous 
gulf separating Stalinism and Leninism was Stalin’s interview with Roy Howard of the Scripps-
Howard newspaper chain on March 1, 1936. From a practical point of view, Trotsky observed in 
an article of March 18, the most important aspect of the interview was Stalin’s warning that the 
Soviet Union immediately would respond militarily to a Japanese invasion of Outer Mongolia. 
Because of the strategic significance Mongolia in a war between Japan and the USSR, Trotsky 
approved of this reply “in the main.”304  
However, Trotsky was far more critical of Stalin’s answers to questions about the cause 
of war. Although Stalin had placed the blame for war on capitalism, Trotsky noted that as soon 
as Stalin passed “from dim theoretical recollections to real politics,” he began talking about 
“individual evil-minded cliques” that could not grasp the benefits of peace, and arguing that the 
“friends of peace,” using instruments such as the League of Nations, were growing stronger 
against the “enemies of peace.”305 Trotsky asserted that in describing imperialist countries, it 
would be more appropriate to speak of the friends and enemies of the status quo, which was 
characterized by the oppression of the overwhelming majority of mankind by a minority. 
Furthermore, as the Bolshevik Party program of 1919 had observed, the League was merely one 
of the tools used by capitalists “for the systematic exploitation of all the peoples on earth.” By 
embellishing its imperialist allies and the League, and by duping workers with slogans about 
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 disarmament and collective security, both the Soviet government and the Comintern in effect had 
been “transformed into the political agency of imperialism in relation to the working masses.”306 
Finally, Trotsky focused on the best-known aspect of the interview: Stalin’s remarks on 
the Soviet position regarding world revolution. When Howard asked if the USSR had abandoned 
its plans for world revolution, Stalin responded that the Soviet Union “never had such plans and 
intentions,” and characterized the contrary view as the product of a “tragicomic” 
misunderstanding. For Trotsky, Stalin’s answer was “inappropriate and indecent.” He observed 
that the Bolsheviks had organized the Comintern to promote revolution, and had proclaimed 
repeatedly the duty of the victorious proletariat in one country to provide assistance—even with 
armed force—to other “rising peoples.” In contrast, Stalin was now advocating a theory of 
“revolution in one country,” in the process transforming the Comintern “into a comedian.” 
According to Trotsky, Stalin had “compromised himself so cruelly” because of his need to break 
with the past. In fact, he suggested that Stalin would have been more convincing to both Howard 
and the world bourgeoisie if he had admitted, “Your comical misunderstanding . . . consists in 
the fact that you take us for the continuators of Bolshevism, whereas we are its gravediggers.” 
However, Stalin could not yet speak so frankly, because “The past binds him, the tradition 
hampers him, the phantom of the Opposition frightens him.”307  
8.6.3 Repression, Party Purges, and a New Constitution 
As far as situation regarding the state and party regime was concerned, the period from 
1935 to the middle of 1936 was characterized by a combination of harsh political reprisals, 
further organizational operations within the party, and signs of growing liberalization. The 
repression initiated after the Kirov assassination continued and expanded in the early months of 
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 1935. That year and the next the party leadership initiated two new membership-accounting 
operations, involving large numbers of new expulsions. At the same time, news regarding the 
drafting of a new constitution raised widespread hopes of liberal reform. During these years 
Trotsky analyzed these and other regime developments in terms of his theory, arguing that the 
acts of repression, the party expulsions, and the liberal reforms all were designed to shore up the 
domination of the bureaucratic caste and/or the personal rule of Stalin. One further important 
development in Trotsky’s thinking, reinforced by news about the planned Soviet constitution, 
was his decision to call for a new political revolution in the USSR. 
In early 1935 the leadership continued the repression against the left initiated after the 
Kirov assassination, while extending it to broader strata of Soviet society. In March, large 
numbers of former aristocrats, civil servants, officers, and business people, together with 
thousands of Leningrad workers and their families, were sent into exile or to prison camps in 
Siberia, while smaller numbers were deported from Moscow.308 Then in the early summer of 
1935 Zinoviev and Kamenev were brought back to Moscow to stand trial with more than 100 
others for an alleged Kremlin plot against Stalin. Two of the defendants were shot and others 
received prison of camp sentences of five to ten years. Kamenev, who denied everything, 
received a sentence of an additional five years.309 At this point only one member of the political 
elite was affected by the reprisals. Avel’ Enukidze, the secretary of the Central Executive 
Committee of the Soviets and a long-time friend of Stalin’s, was accused of providing assistance 
to the terrorists of the Kremlin plot. On June 7, the Central Committee voted to expel him from 
both the Central Committee and the party.310  
Meanwhile, in October 1934, the party leadership decided to conduct a general 
registration of party membership, the Verification (proverka) of Party Documents. The original 
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 impulse for the campaign was the extreme disorganization and chaos in party membership 
records, especially in the local party organizations, revealed by the 1933 chistka. However, in the 
wake of the Kirov assassination the leadership also began to perceive the administrative 
confusion as a security threat. A May 13, 1935 letter from the Central Committee to local party 
organizations alleged that party cards had fallen into the hands of adventures, enemies of the 
party, and foreign spies. The letter also outlined procedures for verifying party documents, and 
for expelling members with invalid or unsupported credentials.311 In his final report on the 
proverka in December 1935 N. Ezhov announced that 177,000 members, or 9.1 percent of the 
party membership, had been expelled. Again, it seems the majority were dropped for nonpolitical 
reasons, such as lying to the party, having false membership documents, or personal 
corruption.312 As of December 1935, 2.9 percent of those expelled in the proverka—or a little 
over 5,000 members—were removed as Trotskyists or Zinovievists. However, from the emphasis 
given to these groups in reports, it is clear that the “Trotskyists” and “Zinovievists” were 
viewed—at least by Ezhov, the NKVD, and the Soviet press—as far more significant than their 
numbers warranted.313 
Immediately after the proverka, the party leadership undertook yet another administrative 
campaign, the 1936 Exchange of Party Documents (obmen partdokumentov). In the proverka it 
had been discovered that party documents were badly worn and in need of replacement. 
Additionally, the obmen was initiated to reconsider questionable cases of party membership that 
had arisen in the proverka. In particular, the Central Committee urged party organizations to 
redirect their attention from “penetrations of the party by enemies,” etc., to the elimination of 
individuals who did not actively participate.314 Thus, the announced goals of the exchange were 
even less political than those of the proverka. Nevertheless, by the end of 1936 the portion of 
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 those expelled as “Trotskyists” or “Zinovievists” in 1935-36 rose to 5.5 percent.315 Furthermore, 
in a reversal of the previous instructions from the Central Committee, a March 15, 1936 editorial 
in Pravda asserted that the purge should be directed less against passive elements, and mainly 
against “enemy and alien elements.”316 
Meanwhile, news reports of preparations for a new constitution were raising hopes, even 
among higher party circles, that a genuine political liberalization was about to begin. On Stalin’s 
motion, the Central Committee session of February 1935 established a constitutional commission 
headed by Stalin with the goal of “further democratizing” the Soviet system—a step justified on 
the grounds of the society’s advance toward socialism. A draft of the new constitution was 
approved by the Politburo on May 15, 1936 and by the Central Committee in early June, and was 
published on June 12 for national discussion. In his interview with Roy Howard in March 1936 
Stalin outlined some of the most important provisions that would appear in the constitution: 
suffrage was to be universal, in contrast with the earlier disenfranchisement of employers and 
clergy; it was to be equal, replacing the differential representation of workers and peasants; it 
was to be direct, instead of the previous tiered election of higher soviets by lower; and it was to 
be secret, as opposed to the former open system of voting. Stalin explained that, since there were 
“no classes,” and “a party is part of a class,” no parties aside from the AUCP were to be 
permitted. However, “all sorts of public, non-Party organizations” would be able to nominate 
candidates.317 
Reiterating his analysis in January, in various statements during early 1935 Trotsky 
continued to characterize the ongoing post-assassination repression as directed by the 
bureaucracy against the left in order to implement the right turn. Thus, on February 15, referring 
to the decision of the kolkhoz conference to grant kolkhoz households the right to own livestock, 
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 he wrote in his diary, “At the present time, the retreat in is proceeding at full speed. For this very 
reason Stalin is once again forced to cut down everyone and everything that stands to the left of 
him.”318 Similarly, upon reading of a statement by Litvinov announcing the termination of aid for 
propaganda to Communist parties in Britain and its dominions, Trotsky asserted in a diary entry 
of April 4, 1935, “The turn to the right in the sphere of both foreign and domestic policies forces 
Stalin to strike out at the left with all his might: this is his insurance against an opposition.”319 
More specifically, Trotsky saw the Bolshevik-Leninists as the primary target of the 
repression. During these months Trotsky repeatedly warned that the Soviet leadership would 
attempt a new amalgam against the Bolshevik-Leninists to compensate for the failure of its 
previous attempt.320 Indications along these lines soon appeared in the Soviet press. On March 20 
Pravda reported that the 1,074 former aristocrats, high tsarist officials, etc. apprehended in 
Leningrad were being prosecuted for “activity against the state in the interest of foreign 
nations.”321 Five days later the paper amended its description of the arrested in a denunciation of 
the “foul dregs of the Trotskyists, the Zinovievists, the old princes, counts, gendarmes, all this 
refuse” working “according to the instructions of foreign information bureaus.”322 In an article of 
March 31 Trotsky concluded that the leadership had resolved “to prepare new bloody repressions 
against the Oppositionists.” Since no terrorist act was available, Pravda was instructed to link 
these repressions to the arrests of the old proprietors, etc.323  
However, in light of what he judged to be the provocative, implausible, and frankly 
“stupid” character of the charges involved, on March 29 Trotsky speculated in his diary that 
perhaps the amalgam was really directed against “some third element, not belonging to either the 
princes or the Trotskyists.” Consistent with his theory and previous analysis, he identified the 
likely targets as Stalin’s opponents within the bureaucracy: “liberal tendencies” within the 
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 bureaucracy, that is, “some closer and more intimate enemies of Stalin’s Bonapartism.” In this 
connection Trotsky wondered again what form a Bonapartist coup might take, rejecting both the 
crown and the title of leader for life as presenting too many “technical” difficulties. Regardless 
of the form, he concluded darkly, “Some new stage is being prepared, by comparison with which 
Kirov’s murder was only an ominous portent.”324 Trotsky clearly had a similar analysis in mind 
in a diary entry of June 20 where he asserted that the recent expulsion of Enukidze really was 
directed at Kalinin. On the basis of that and the continuing propaganda campaign against the 
Trotskyists and Zinovievists he concluded, “Stalin’s dictatorship is approaching a new 
frontier.”325 
In late 1935 and early 1936 Trotsky analyzed recent accounts of the imprisonment and 
exile of Bolshevik-Leninists similarly. One of these accounts was by “A. Tarov,” pseudonym of 
the mechanic Arven Davtian, who had escaped after serving more than three years in exile and 
nearly four in prison. Another was by Ante Ciliga, a former leader of the Yugoslavian party, who 
had served more three years in Soviet prisons and two years in Siberian exile before his release 
in December 1935. A third was by the Belgian writer and Opposition leader Victor Serge, who 
was arrested in 1933 and who served eighty days in solitary confinement and three years in 
deportation before an international campaign secured his release in April 1936.326 Upon their 
arrival in the West, all told similar stories of the horrible conditions experienced by 
Oppositionists in prisons, labor camps, and exile.327  
For Trotsky, the accounts confirmed that the main target of the repression was the 
“proletarian vanguard” represented by the Bolshevik-Leninists, and also that the twofold purpose 
of the repression was to defend the interests of the bureaucratic caste and the personal rule of 
Stalin. Thus, in an article of September 6, 1935 Trotsky observed that the traditional Bolshevik 
552 
 revolutionary terror against the oppressors had been “completely supplanted by the cold-blooded 
and venomous terror of the bureaucracy, which fights like a mad beast for its posts and sinecures, 
for its uncontrolled and autocratic rule—against the proletarian vanguard.” The Stalinist terror 
was “an instrument for crushing the party, the trade unions, and the soviets, and for establishing 
a personal dictatorship which lacks only . . . an imperial crown.” 328  
 At the same time Trotsky also perceived the verification and exchange campaigns within 
the party of 1935 and 1936 as directed against the Bolshevik-Leninists. In an article of January 
11, 1936 he noted the diversity, indicative of another “Thermidorean amalgam,” of the categories 
of members expelled in the Verification of Documents campaign: “Trotskyists, Zinovievists, 
opportunists, double-dealers, alien elements, swindlers, adventurers, . . . [and] spies of the 
foreign agencies.” He explained that part of the reason the Trotskyists were listed first was that 
the “Bolshevik-Leninists were and remain the most irreconcilable enemies of the bureaucracy, 
which seeks to perpetuate its position as a ruling case.”329 Beyond that, he mistakenly believed 
that the prominence of “Trotskyists” in the list was due to the fact that they were the largest 
group numerically. From local figures reported in Pravda, he estimated that at least 5 percent —
and probably between 5 and 20 percent, or 10,000-25,000 individuals—of those purged were 
expelled as “Trotskyists” or “Zinovievists.”330 Shortly afterwards, on the basis of the prominent 
place accorded to Trotskyists and Zinovievists in reports of the more than 17,000 expulsions in 
Moscow and Leningrad, he amended this estimate, asserting that “not less than 10,000” from 
these two categories “were expelled in the two capital cities alone.”331  
From these estimates Trotsky concluded that the Bolshevik-Leninists were experiencing 
remarkable growth within the USSR. Guessing that no more than “tens” or “hundreds” of those 
purged had participated in the Opposition during the years 1923-28, on January 11 he judged that 
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 these must be “new recruits,” especially from the youth. Consequently, he concluded, “If not as a 
doctrine, then as a mood, as a tradition, a banner, our tendency has a mass character in the 
USSR, and today it is obviously drawing to itself new and fresh forces.” Despite all of the 
persecutions and capitulations, the Fourth International still had “its strongest, numerically 
largest, and most tempered section in the USSR.”332 Viewed from the standpoint of his theory, 
this was not an unexpected development. As Trotsky explained in an article written a few months 
later, there was no doubt that opposition groupings in the working class were “revived precisely 
by the new pressure upon the workers, accompanied with new and monstrous privileges for the 
bureaucracy and the ‘best people.’” Furthermore, he asserted, in contrast with groups like the 
Workers’ Opposition and Democratic Centralists, the Bolshevik-Leninists were growing rapidly 
because the “advanced workers” supported their position on the class nature of the Soviet 
Union.333 
Trotsky anticipated that the 1936 Exchange of Party Documents also would be aimed at 
Bolshevik-Leninists. Noting on January 11, 1936 the “rigid proviso” that new cards were only to 
be issued to those who had earned “confidence,” he commented, “Perhaps six months later we 
shall learn how many new Bolshevik-Leninists will thereby be promoted from the party to the 
concentration camps.”334 Two months later, he saw evidence that the leadership was using the 
exchange to target Bolshevik-Leninists while preparing new reprisals against them. On March 25 
he commented upon the recent statement in Pravda, which he presumed was authored by Stalin, 
that the party was continuing to rid itself of “Trotskyists, Zinovievists, White Guards, and other 
filth.” Noting again that the “Trotskyists” occupied first place, he explained, “This means that 
the heaviest blows are directed against them.” Beyond that, he perceived a threat in the article’s 
condemnation of the practice of depriving everyone expelled, even a man who was not an 
554 
 “enemy,” of the right to work. In fact, Trotsky concluded, Stalin’s order had condemned tens of 
thousands of Oppositionists to unemployment and homelessness, even in exile.335  
In early 1936 Trotsky utilized his theory of bureaucracy, and especially his recent 
understanding of Soviet Bonapartism, to analyze the new Soviet constitution. Although the draft 
text was not yet available, he responded to statements about the constitution that had appeared in 
Pravda, in Stalin’s interview with Roy Howard, and in an interview with Molotov published in 
Le Temps. In an article of April 15, 1936 Trotsky asserted that the justification for the new 
constitution in terms of the “socialist” character of the Soviet Union was contradicted by the fact 
that there was still no mention of the withering of repression, of the bureaucracy, or of the secret 
police.336  
Still, Trotsky believed the bureaucracy had important reasons for introducing 
constitutional reforms at this time. One, he suggested, was to combat corruption within the state 
apparatus itself. In his interview with Howard, Stalin explained that secret suffrage would “be a 
whip in the hand of the population against the organs of government which work badly.” For 
Trotsky, this was an admission that “Stalin’s autocratic rule” had created an entire system of 
corruption that even threatened the existence of the Soviet state as a source of the power and 
privileges of the bureaucracy. “Taking fright at their own handiwork,” he concluded, “the chiefs 
of the Kremlin turn to the population with a plea to help it cleanse and straighten out the 
apparatus of administration.”337 Or as he had asserted in “The Workers’ State, Thermidor, and 
Bonapartism,” Stalin, as a Bonapartist, sometimes found it necessary to lean on the lowest layers 
of the new social hierarchy against the “topmost layer.”338 
However, a significant limit on participation noted by Trotsky was the continuing ban on 
opposition parties, justified by Stalin in terms of the “classless” character of Soviet society. By 
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 this line of reasoning, Trotsky observed, there was no need for even a single party. Nor was 
Trotsky impressed by Stalin’s promise that “all sorts of public, nonparty organizations” would 
participate in nominating candidates, for he noted that the “active role” in organizations such as 
trade unions was “played exclusively by the representatives of the privileged summits,” and on 
every important question the final decision was made by the AUCP, “the political organization 
of the ruling stratum.” Consequently, he concluded, the electoral participation of nonparty 
organizations would lead to nothing but rivalry between different bureaucratic cliques within 
limits set by the top leadership. In fact, Trotsky asserted, that was a second reason for the 
constitutional reforms: “to learn in this manner some secrets hidden from it and to refurbish its 
regime, without at the same time permitting a political struggle which must inevitably be 
directed against itself.” 339 
 However, in Trotsky’s estimation an even more important purpose behind the new 
constitution was to prevent the soviets from becoming again militant institutions of proletarian 
power. Although Trotsky believed that the soviets had lost their political significance long 
before, he now suggested that in time they might have revived with the growth of new social 
antagonisms. To prevent this from occurring, he asserted, “The new constitution abolishes the 
soviets, dissolving the workers into the general mass of the population.”340 While the basic state 
institutions were still to be called “soviets,” these were to be transformed into something entirely 
different. The equalization of worker and peasant representation was intended to smother 
working-class protest against inequality with the weight of the more backward peasantry. In this 
regard, Trotsky noted that “Bonapartism, . . . always leans upon the village against the city.”341 
The elimination of factory representation in the urban soviets was to reduce workers to atomized 
citizens, voting “each one for himself.”342 Finally, the introduction of direct election of state 
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 officials and higher soviets was to create Bonapartist plebiscites in which citizens were given a 
chance periodically to vote “For or against the Leader.”343 By these measures, Trotsky 
concluded, the new constitution would establish the legal sanction for Bonapartism that he had 
been anticipating since the Kirov assassination: “The new constitution is thus intended to 
liquidate juridically the outworn Soviet system, replacing it by Bonapartism on a plebiscitary 
basis.”344  
In July 1936 Trotsky’s understanding of the new constitutional provisions reinforced his 
recent conclusion that a political revolution would be required to overthrow the bureaucracy. 
Although in October 1933 Trotsky first recognized that force would be necessary to remove the 
bureaucracy from power, he avoided the term revolution and continued to minimize the violence 
that would be needed. In fact, as we have seen, at that time he insisted that a “real civil war” 
could only occur between the proletariat and the supporters of capitalist counterrevolution, and 
that against the bureaucracy, only measures of a “police character” would be necessary.345 
However, Trotsky’s revision of position on Thermidor and Bonapartism in February 1935 
provided new reasons for changing his position on revolution. In part, it constituted a new 
milestone in his recognition of the extreme autonomy of the bureaucracy. At the same time, 
Trotsky’s argument that Thermidor, though not a social counterrevolution, was a 
counterrevolution of sorts suggested the possibility of a new revolution that was not a social 
revolution.  
Trotsky first outlined his new position on this question on January 1, 1936 in a letter to 
comrades who had asked about the direction of development of the USSR. In his response, 
Trotsky utilized the old Marxist distinction between a social and a political revolution, explicitly 
suggesting that a new political revolution would be necessary in USSR: 
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  What perspective opens before us? Very probably a new 
revolution. This will not be a social evolution, but a political 
revolution. In its evolution the bourgeoisie too has known of 
“great” revolutions, i.e., social revolutions, and purely political 
revolutions which took place on the basis of already established 
property. The theoretical prognoses of Marx and Lenin did not 
foresee, in any case, the possibility of political revolutions on the 
basis of property nationalized by the proletariat. But they did not 
foresee the Bonapartist degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship, 
either.346  
 
 For Trotsky, the new Soviet constitution of 1936 provided additional justification for this 
position. On July 8, 1936, in a resolution on the Soviet Union for the first International 
Conference for the Fourth International, Trotsky argued that the new constitution liquidated “de 
jure” the ruling position of the proletariat that had been liquidated “de facto” years before. By 
sealing “the dictatorship of the privileged strata . . . over the producing masses,” the constitution 
eliminated the possibility of the peaceful withering of the state and had opened legal roads for 
capitalist restoration. With the “last possibility of a legal reformation of the state” gone, Trotsky 
asserted, the struggle against the bureaucracy necessarily became revolutionary: 
If a social counterrevolution . . . is necessary for the return of the 
USSR to capitalism, then for the further development of socialism 
a political revolution has become inevitable, i.e., the violent 
overthrow of the political rule of the degenerated bureaucracy 
while maintaining the property relations established by the October 
Revolution. The proletarian vanguard of the USSR, basing itself 
upon the toiling masses of the whole country and upon the 
revolutionary movement of the whole world, will have to batter 
down the bureaucracy by force, restore Soviet democracy, 
eliminate the enormous privileges, and assure a genuine advance to 
socialist equality.347 
8.7 “SMALL OR LARGE INTELLECTUAL CATASTROPHES” 
In September 1914, shortly after concluding that the Second International was dead as a 
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 revolutionary organization, Lenin began taking intensive notes on Hegel’s Science of Logic. 
Michael Löwy, among others, has suggested that in light of the unexpected betrayal by the 
Socialist International, Lenin had either “a simple desire to return to the sources of Marxist 
thought,” or an intuition that the methodological weakness of the Second International was its 
“noncomprehension of the dialectic.” Whatever the reason, Löwy argues, Lenin’s vision of the 
Marxist dialectic and his positions on a number of important political questions were profoundly 
altered by the experience.348  
In the fall of 1933, shortly after calling for a break with the Comintern, Trotsky similarly 
began taking notes on Hegel’s Science of Logic.349 One passage from Trotsky’s notes, written in 
June 1934, stands out for its relevance to the development of his theory during the years covered 
in this chapter:  
Historically humanity forms its “conceptions”—the basic elements 
of its thinking—on the foundation of experience, which is always 
incomplete, partial, one-sided. It includes in “the concept” those 
features of a living, forever changing process, which are important 
and significant for it at a given moment. Its future experience at 
first is enriched (quantitatively) and then outgrows the closed 
concept, that is, in practice negates it, by virtue of this 
necessitating a theoretical negation. But the negation does not 
signify a turning back to tabula rasa. Reason already posses: a) the 
concept and b) the recognition of its unsoundness. This recognition 
is tantamount to the necessity to construct a new concept, and then 
it is inevitably revealed that the negation was not absolute, that it 
affected only certain features of the first concept. . . . 
 
Thus, in the domain of thinking (cognition) as well, the 
quantitative changes lead to qualitative ones, and then those 
transformations haven’t a [steady] evolutionary character but are 
accompanied by breaks in gradualness, that is, by small or large 
intellectual catastrophes. In sum, this also means that the 
development of cognition has a dialectical character.350 
 
 As we have seen, the concept of bureaucracy formed in 1926-27, incorporating features 
“important and significant” for Trotsky at that moment, at first appeared to enrich his 
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understanding of Soviet reality. However, with the experience of the left turn and then the 
deepening of the turn, reality increasingly seemed to outgrow Trotsky’s “closed concept” of 
bureaucracy from that earlier period. Finally, after years of ad hoc adjustments, in 1933 Trotsky 
was compelled to recognize that the disastrous failure of Comintern policy in Germany negated 
his reform perspective in practice. In turn, this necessitated a “theoretical negation” through the 
ultimate construction of a “new concept” that emphasized the autonomy of the bureaucracy. 
Although he retained some features of the old theory, in one “large intellectual catastrophe” 
Trotsky broke with the KPD, then with the Comintern, and then with the AUCP; revised his 
position on peaceful reform; modified his criteria for a workers’ state; tentatively suggested a 
revision of position on the concept of Bonapartism; amplified upon the notion of bureaucratic 
parasitism; developed a new, functional explanation for the origins of bureaucratic autonomy; 
and attempted to account for the discrepancy between his evaluations of Soviet international and 
domestic policy. During the following year and a half, Trotsky’s interpretation of policy 
developments provoked a series of somewhat smaller theoretical “catastrophes.” In this period he 
completely revised his understanding of Thermidor and Bonapartism; dropped the term 
bureaucratic centrism; emphasized the notions of caste and labor aristocracy; again modified his 
criteria for a workers’ state; redefined Soviet international policy as fully opportunist; and called 
for a new revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy. By the summer of 1936 the combined 
theoretical catastrophes of 1933-35 had replaced Trotsky’s old theory with elements of a new 
one. In August Trotsky assembled these elements into a coherent whole in his masterwork on 
Soviet bureaucracy, The Revolution Betrayed. 
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for the Comintern and possibly also for the Soviet Union. For the world 
proletariat, that would be a setback for many years to come. Under such tragic 
conditions, the Left Opposition will take over the task of continuing to develop 
the Marxist program, but certainly no longer within the formal framework of the 
Third International. [Trotsky, Writings [1932], 23.] 
 
However, in a discussion in August 1932 Trotsky seems to suggest that only the collapse the USSR would lead to a 
break with the Comintern: 
 
You must not forget that a new fourth international is only possible after a great 
historic event. . . . Such an event would be the victory of fascism in Germany. 
But the victory of fascism in Germany does not only mean in all probability the 
collapse of the Comintern, but also includes the defeat of the Soviet Union. Only 
if that takes place—it need not necessarily take place, . . . only then will we have 
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 9.0  THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED1  
In the summer of 1935, Trotsky’s American publisher Simon and Schuster suggested to Trotsky, 
living in exile in Norway, that he write a new preface for a projected one-volume edition of his 
History of the Russian Revolution. Under pressure of financial considerations and at the urging 
of his American translator Max Eastman, Trotsky reluctantly agreed. His initial plan was to 
spend two to three months at most on the project, using it to summarize his recent writings on 
USSR. However, in early 1936 he found himself consumed by the project. As he recalled in a 
letter to his former secretary Sara Weber, “I became the prisoner of the subject. I could not 
produce a superficial work on the USSR. I became more and more engrossed in the theme—with 
frenzy and desperation.”2 By the time Trotsky completed the work in early August 1936, it had 
grown into a book-length manuscript entitled Chto takoe S.S.S.R. i kuda on idet? [What Is the 
USSR and Where Is It Going?]. At that point Simon and Schuster rejected it, but Doubleday, 
Doran and Co. picked it up for publication in the United States. At the suggestion of Trotsky’s 
French publisher, Trotsky adopted The Revolution Betrayed as the final title, demoting the 
original name to a subtitle.3 
In terms of its influence as an analysis of Soviet history and politics, the significance of 
The Revolution Betrayed can hardly be exaggerated. In 1963 Trotsky’s biographer Isaac 
Deutscher eulogized the book as a “profound political treatise and a tract for the time,” as “one 
of the seminal books of the century,” and as a “classic of Marxist literature.”4 In 1977 historian 
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 Robert McNeal characterized it as “a pioneer work in describing the emergence of a new elite in 
Stalin’s Russia.”5 The same year David Katz depicted it as “a seminal study which influenced a 
whole generation of Sovietologists.”6 In 1984 Marxist scholar Perry Anderson asserted that it 
“remains a topical masterpiece to this day.”7 Three years later, on the fiftieth anniversary of its 
publication, political economist Richard Day argued that the work continued “to be an 
indispensable starting point for any attempt to address the question posed by its subtitle: What Is 
the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?”8 Furthermore, even since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and into the twenty-first century it remains a popular title in libraries, and it continues to 
be cited frequently in academic literature.9  
However, as far as the development of Trotsky’s thinking on the problem of Soviet 
bureaucracy is concerned, the significance of The Revolution Betrayed is more ambiguous. In 
this respect as well, writers as diverse as John Plamenatz, C. L. R. James, Baruch Knei-Paz, John 
Molyneaux, Robert Wistrich, David Lovell, and Ian Thatcher have emphasized its importance, 
describing it as Trotsky’s “best,” “most complete,” “most comprehensive,” “most sustained,” 
and “fullest” analysis of the Soviet Union under Stalinism.10 On the other hand, scholars such as 
Siegfried Bahne, David Law, and Ian Thatcher have noted that much of the content of The 
Revolution Betrayed was not new, and that for the most part that work merely summarized his 
observations from recent years.11  
In fact, both sets of evaluations are correct. It is true that much of The Revolution 
Betrayed restated for a general audience views Trotsky had expressed in the international 
Trotskyist press since 1933. These included a description of the bureaucracy as a caste, a 
functional account of the origins of the problem of bureaucracy, a recognition of the relevance of 
the concepts of Thermidor and Bonapartism to the Soviet experience, a description of the 
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 bureaucracy’s privileges as parasitic, an application of the term labor aristocracy to broader 
privileged strata in the USSR, a characterization of Soviet international policy as 
counterrevolutionary, a revised explanation of why the USSR could still be considered a 
workers’ state, the conclusion that a new political revolution was necessary to remove the 
bureaucracy from power, and Trotsky’s recognition that a new revolutionary party was required 
to organize and lead such a revolution. 
However, The Revolution Betrayed was also a highly important work in the development 
of Trotsky’s thinking. Most significantly, it was Trotsky’s first systematic and comprehensive 
presentation of his views on Soviet bureaucracy since the late 1920s, codifying his recent 
insights that portrayed the bureaucracy as a highly autonomous social formation. Beyond that, 
The Revolution Betrayed contained a number of new ideas and emphases. More clearly than ever 
before Trotsky defined and stressed the socio-economic context of Soviet bureaucratization. In 
turn, this provided Trotsky with a framework for redefining the functional origins of bureaucratic 
power, for evaluating Soviet policy in all areas, and for starkly identifying the alternative 
potential futures confronting the USSR. Other elements introduced at this time included a 
recognition of the corrupting effects of the ban on party factions adopted under Lenin, a greater 
attempt to sketch the fundamental features of the bureaucratic caste, a characterization of the 
Soviet regime as totalitarian, and the outlining of a program for the political revolution that 
included support for the freedom of competing Soviet parties. With these additions, The 
Revolution Betrayed brought to a conclusion the revolution in Trotsky’s theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy that had begun in 1933.  
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 9.1 THE CONTEXT AND CONCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
Perhaps the most important innovation in The Revolution Betrayed was Trotsky’s clear 
definition and emphasis upon the socio-economic context of Soviet bureaucratization. The Soviet 
Union, Trotsky explained, was a backward society in transition from capitalism to socialism. Of 
course, he had commented frequently in the past upon both the backwardness of the USSR and 
upon the transitional character of Soviet society and/or of the epoch through which it was 
passing.12 However, he never focused so sharply upon this context or placed it so squarely in the 
center of his analysis as he did now. It seems that Trotsky arrived at this new approach through 
reflection upon the broad dynamics of the Russian Revolution and a consideration of recent 
descriptions of Soviet society by the Stalinist leadership. 
It is likely that Trotsky’s enhanced emphasis upon Soviet backwardness was inspired by 
his original plan to write a new preface to The History of the Russian Revolution. The central 
theme of that work was how a socialist revolution could first occur in a backward country.13 
Trotsky recapitulated that explanation in the first chapter of The Revolution Betrayed, describing 
the triumph of the Russian proletariat in terms of the laws of “uneven and combined 
development.” He explained that the uneven development had created a Russian bourgeoisie too 
weak to resolve “the democratic tasks of backward Russia.” Consequently, in accordance with 
the law of combined development, “Socialization of the means of production had become a 
necessary condition for bringing the country out of barbarism.” However, unevenness ultimately 
had exacted its revenge: “Entering upon the socialist revolution as ‘the weakest link in the 
capitalist chain,’” the Soviet Union was still attempting, nearly two decades later, “to solve those 
problems of technique and productivity which were long ago solved by capitalism in the 
advanced countries.”14  
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 This was not to say that the Soviet Union had failed to make substantial gains since 1917. 
To the contrary, Trotsky noted the monumental achievements of the first two Five-Year Plans. 
The centralized, planned economy created by the revolution had made it possible for Soviet 
economic growth dramatically to outstrip that of Germany, Britain, France, the United States, 
and Japan. However, Trotsky insisted that a balanced view required comparing the level of 
productivity of the Soviet Union with that of the West. Doing so revealed that the average output 
of Soviet workers lagged far behind that of their Western counterparts. Trotsky concluded that 
the preparatory stage of borrowing technology and culture from the West was “far from 
finished,” and would “occupy a whole historic period.”15 
If the gap between Soviet and Western productivity was great, the contrast between the 
level of development in the USSR and that required for a communist society was even greater. In 
this regard, Trotsky reaffirmed the traditional Marxist view that the “material premise of 
communism should be so high a development of the economic powers of man that productive 
labor, having ceased to be a burden, will not require any goad, and the distribution of life’s 
goods, existing in continual abundance, will not demand . . . any control except that of education, 
habit and social opinion.”16 It was true that Marx had discussed a lower stage of communism—
called “socialism” by Lenin—that would precede the elimination of all material inequality and 
want. This was the stage that the Soviet leadership now claimed that the USSR had attained, as 
evidenced by “the dominance of the state trusts in industry, the collective farms in agriculture, 
the state and co-operative enterprises in commerce.” However, Trotsky insisted that for Marx 
even the lowest stage of communism was “a society which stands higher in its economic 
development than the most advanced capitalism.” Thus, it was more accurate to characterize the 
584 
 Soviet Union, as Bolsheviks traditionally had described it, as a “preparatory regime transitional 
from capitalism to socialism.”17  
Later in The Revolution Betrayed, Trotsky spelled out the implications of this observation 
in his explanation of the origins of the extreme autonomy of the bureaucracy. As in all his recent 
writings, in this work Trotsky depicted the problem of Soviet bureaucracy in terms of the 
extraordinary degree of independence from Soviet society as a whole and from all of its social 
classes that had been attained by the bureaucracy. By way of comparison, Trotsky again recalled 
how Lenin had anticipated in The State and Revolution that the proletarian revolution would 
resolve the age-old problem of bureaucracy by abolishing “the necessity of a bureaucratic 
apparatus raised above society—and above all, a police and standing army.” Following Marx and 
Engels, Lenin had asserted that the need for a bureaucracy arises when social antagonisms need 
to be “softened” and “regulated,” in the interests of the privileged. Upon seizing power, the 
proletariat would “shatter the old bureaucratic machine and create its own apparatus out of 
employees and workers.” To prevent these workers from turning into bureaucrats, the proletarian 
state would institute the variety of practical measures outlined by Marx and Engels: election and 
recall of all officials; reduction of the salaries of officials to the level of workmen’s wages; and 
the participation of all in control and supervision so that “all may for a time become 
‘bureaucrats’, and therefore nobody can become a bureaucrat.” Thus, from its inception the 
dictatorship of the proletariat was to cease being a “state” in the old sense—“a special apparatus, 
. . . for holding in subjugation the majority of the people.” Rather, power was to be exercised by 
“workers’ organizations such as soviets”; and the bureaucratic apparatus of the state was to begin 
“to die away on the first day of the proletarian dictatorship.”18  
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 For Trotsky, the contrast between this vision and the actual state headed by Stalin could 
not be more striking. Not only had the Soviet state not even “begun to ‘die away’” after nearly 
two decades of Soviet power, it had “grown into a hitherto unheard of apparatus of compulsion.” 
Instead of dissolving in a system of mass participation, the bureaucracy had “turned into an 
uncontrolled force dominating the masses.”19 In Trotsky’s estimation, the degree of political 
alienation even exceeded that in exceptional state forms such as Bonapartism, as described by 
Marx and Engels. Trotsky noted that never before had “a bureaucracy achieved such a degree of 
independence from the dominating class,” even in fascist Italy or Germany.20 “In this sense,” 
Trotsky admitted, it was actually “something more than a bureaucracy.” It was “in the full sense 
of the word the sole privileged and commanding stratum in the Soviet society.”21 
9.2 CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM 
In recent years Trotsky had offered two types of explanations for the extreme divergence 
between the vision of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and the realities of Soviet power. On several 
occasions he had put forward a functional account of the origins of the bureaucracy and of the 
continuing growth of its power and autonomy. At the same time he had listed various factors that 
had contributed to the weakening of the Soviet working class in its struggle with the bureaucracy 
for political hegemony. In The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky expanded upon both themes, 
redefining his functional explanation in light of the backward and transitional character of Soviet 
society, and also noting the negative impact of political norms introduced in the first years of the 
revolution. 
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 In at least five different articles during the previous four years Trotsky had explained the 
origins of the problem of Soviet bureaucracy in functional terms, arguing that bureaucratic power 
had arisen out of the struggle of “each against all” over basic necessities and articles of 
consumption. Although, according to Trotsky, this struggle had taken various forms, including 
conflicts between different groups of consumers, between the city and the village, etc., it was in 
essence a class struggle. Representing social interests, the bureaucracy had been called upon to 
harmonize and control these conflicts. However, the bureaucracy had then utilized this function 
to enhance its own power and privileges. In doing so it had further exacerbated social tensions, 
creating even greater need for regulatory intervention.22 Along the same lines in the Revolution 
Betrayed Trotsky now argued, “The social demand for a bureaucracy arises in all those situations 
where sharp antagonisms require to be ‘softened,’ ‘adjudicated,’ ‘regulated,’ (always in the 
interests of the privileged, the possessors, and always to the disadvantage of the bureaucracy 
itself.”23 Now, however, he amplified upon this explanation, explicitly relating it to the functions 
of a proletarian dictatorship in a backward, transitional society that had been suggested by Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin.  
Trotsky explained that the basic tasks of any proletarian dictatorship included its 
“fundamental mission” to construct a society “without classes and without material 
contradictions” and the “‘incidental’ task” of preparing for its own dissolution. Both goals had 
been implied by Frederick Engels in his 1878 work, Anti-Dühring: “‘When, together with class 
domination and the struggle for individual existence created by the present anarchy in 
production, those conflicts and excesses which result from this struggle disappear, from that time 
on there will be nothing to suppress, and there will be no need for a special instrument of 
suppression, the state.’”24 The problem, Trotsky observed, was that even the “socialization of the 
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 means of production” does not automatically eliminate “the struggle for individual existence.” In 
this regard he noted that even a socialist state in America, basing itself upon the most advanced 
capitalism, “could not immediately provide everyone with as much as he needs,” and would 
initially “be compelled to spur everyone to produce as much as possible” by resorting to the 
inequities of the capitalist system of wage labor. That was why Marx had recognized in his 
Critique of the Gotha Program that “‘bourgeois law’” would be “‘inevitable in the first phase of 
the communist society, in that form in which it issues after long labor pains from capitalist 
society.’”25 That was also why Lenin, in The State and Revolution, had argued that “‘under 
Communism not only will bourgeois law survive for a certain time, but also even a bourgeois 
state without the bourgeoisie!’”26  
From these premises Trotsky reasoned that any proletarian dictatorship would have a dual 
character from its inception, “socialistic” in its defense of social ownership of production, and 
“bourgeois” in its distribution of goods “with a capitalistic measure of value and all the 
consequences ensuing therefrom.”27 Furthermore, experience had shown that this dual function 
inevitably affects the structure of the state. Since “the majority cannot concern itself with the 
privileges of the minority,” in order to defend bourgeois law, the workers’ state must create “a 
‘bourgeois’ type of instrument—that is, the same old gendarme, although in a new uniform.” In 
fact, Trotsky concluded, when a post-revolutionary state grows increasingly despotic, and when 
the “bureaucracy rises above the new society” instead of withering, this is because of the “iron 
necessity to give birth to and support a privileged minority as long as it is impossible to 
guarantee genuine equality.”28   
If the “tendencies towards bureaucratism” would be present anywhere after a proletarian 
revolution, Trotsky argued that they were especially strong in a backward country such as 
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 Russia. Again, he found an anticipation of this insight in the classics. In The German Ideology 
Marx had asserted, “‘A development of the productive forces is the absolutely necessary 
practical premise [of Communism], because without it want is generalized, and with want the 
struggle for necessities begins again, and that means that all the old crap must revive.’”29 
According to Trotsky, Marx failed to develop this idea because he did not foresee the possibility 
of a socialist revolution in a backward county. However, Trotsky also observed that even Lenin 
was not able to draw all the necessary conclusions regarding a backward and isolated proletarian 
state because he and all the Bolsheviks had assumed the Russian Revolution would soon receive 
material assistance from socialist Europe.30 It was only in light of experience that Trotsky was 
able to elaborate the implications of Marx’s warning for a backward, transitional society: 
The basis of bureaucratic rule is the poverty of society in 
objects of consumption, with the resulting struggle of each against 
all. When there is enough goods in a store, the purchasers can 
come whenever they want to. When there is little goods, the 
purchasers are compelled to stand in line. When the lines are very 
long, it is necessary to appoint a policeman to keep order. Such is 
the starting point of the power of the Soviet bureaucracy. It 
“knows” who is to get something and who has to wait.31 
 
In this important passage Trotsky offered a “distributive” variant of his previous functional 
account of the origins of Soviet bureaucratization.32  
Acknowledging that this explanation seemed to suggest that rising material and cultural 
levels should have undermined both privilege and bureaucracy within the USSR, Trotsky 
suggested two reasons for why the reverse had occurred. First, although the early Soviet regime 
was far less bureaucratic and far more egalitarian than that of 1936, this had been an “equality of 
general poverty.” Only later economic growth made it possible to provide significant privileges 
for a minority. Second, there had been “the parallel political factor in the person of the 
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 bureaucracy itself.” That is, the bureaucracy consistently had sought to enhance its own 
privileges: 
In its very essence it is the planter and protector of inequality. It 
arose in the beginning as the bourgeois organ of a workers’ state. 
In establishing and defending the advantages of a minority, it of 
course draws off the cream for its own use. Nobody who has 
wealth to distribute ever omits himself. Thus out of a social 
necessity there has developed an organ which has far outgrown its 
socially necessary function, and become an independent factor and 
therewith the source of great danger for the whole social 
organism.33 
 
Beyond that, the bureaucracy actively had promoted inequality by fostering the development of a 
labor and peasant aristocracy to strengthen its own rule.34 
In conjunction with this functional explanation, Trotsky once more offered a political and 
historical account of the Thermidorean process. Reviewing the history of debates over Soviet 
economic policy, Trotsky noted the apparent contradiction between the political success of the 
Stalinists and the defeat of “the more penetrating group,” the Left Opposition. Trotsky’s 
explanation for this discrepancy was that a “political struggle is in its essence a struggle of 
interests and forces, not of arguments.” Underlying the political contest at the Soviet summit had 
been shifts “in the relations between classes,” and in the “psychology of the recently 
revolutionary masses.”35  
Again, Trotsky observed that every revolution in history had been followed “by a 
reaction, or even a counterrevolution,” due to the effect of prolonged revolutionary upheaval 
upon the consciousness of the insurgent class: 
A revolution is a mighty devourer of human energy, both 
individual and collective. The nerves give way. Consciousness is 
shaken and characters are worn out. Events unfold too swiftly for 
the flow of fresh forces to replace the loss. Hunger, 
unemployment, the death of the revolutionary cadres, the removal 
of the masses from administration, all this led [in the French 
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 Revolution] to such a physical and moral impoverishment of the 
Parisian suburbs that they required three decades before they were 
ready for a new insurrection.36 
 
According to Trotsky, the effects of combined and uneven development had enhanced this 
phenomenon in the Soviet Union. He explained that the Soviet proletariat, though “still 
backward in many respects,” accomplished in a few months “an unprecedented leap from a 
semifeudal monarchy to a socialist dictatorship.” Thus, when the revolution ran into obstacles, 
the backwardness reasserted itself in an “inevitable” reaction within the proletariat.37  
Trotsky explained that the reaction began as early as the civil war. In those years the 
isolated revolution experienced intervention after intervention, together with the disappointment 
of prolonged destitution instead of the anticipated reign of prosperity. Leading representatives of 
the proletariat either died in the war or were lifted up into the bureaucracy. The period of 
extreme tension, and of hopes and illusions, gave way to “weariness, decline and sheer 
disappointment in the results of the revolution.” A “flood of pusillanimity and careerism” 
replaced the ebbing mood of “‘plebeian pride.’” Upon this wave, Trotsky asserted, “the new 
commanding caste rose to its place.”38 
The reaction continued after the war with the introduction of military methods into the 
local Soviets by demobilized Red Army commanders. Subsequently, the sickness and death of 
Lenin removed a powerful opponent of the bureaucracy from the scene. Meanwhile, the 
introduction of NEP infused new confidence into the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, 
permitting the bureaucracy to perceive itself as a “court of arbitration” between the classes. Also, 
through the 1920s the world revolution experienced a whole series of defeats—most significantly 
in Germany in 1923 and in China in 1926-1927—for which the bureaucracy was largely to 
blame. As a result, the masses experienced another “cold wave of disappointment” upon which 
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 the bureaucracy was able to capitalize in its struggle against the Opposition. Eventually, Trotsky 
argued—again emphasizing the autonomy of the bureaucracy in relation to other classes—the 
bureaucracy was able to utilize its petty bourgeois ally, together with more backward strata of the 
proletariat, to defeat the Opposition.39 
Meanwhile, according to Trotsky, the reaction was facilitated by the “degeneration” of 
the Bolshevik Party. Returning to a theme he had raised first in 1923, Trotsky spoke of the 
closeness, and “and at times actual merging” of the party and the state apparatus which had 
transferred state methods of administration into the party. Another contributory factor, which 
Trotsky had touched upon briefly in an article in August 1934, had been the banning of 
oppositional parties.40 Initially, Trotsky now asserted, the Bolsheviks had hoped to preserve 
“freedom of political struggle within the framework of the Soviets.” However, during the civil 
war alternative parties were outlawed, one after another, in “an episodic act of self defense.” 
Trotsky now admitted that this was “obviously in conflict with the spirit of Soviet democracy.” 
As a consequence, “underground oppositional currents” in the country began to exert pressure 
upon the only legal party.41 Then in 1921, at the time of the Kronstadt revolt, the Tenth Party 
Congress responded in turn by banning opposition factions within the party. Trotsky described 
this measure too as “an exceptional measure to be abandoned at the first serious improvement in 
the situation,” and observed that initially the Central Committee applied this rule very cautiously. 
However, for the first time he publicly conceded that this measure also “proved to be perfectly 
suited to the taste of the bureaucracy.”42 Finally, in 1924 the “Leninist levy” threw the doors of 
the party wide open to masses of new recruits, effectively freeing the bureaucracy from the 
control of the proletarian vanguard. At that point the bureaucracy was able to replace democratic 
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 centralism with “bureaucratic centralism,” and to reshuffle personnel “from top to bottom” based 
on the “Bolshevik” criterion of obedience.43 
Near the end of The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky returned to a discussion of the 
mediating role of the bureaucracy, employing it to explain both the extreme hypertrophy of 
bureaucratic autonomy in recent years, and the growth of Stalin’s individual power. Again, 
Trotsky observed, “Caesarism, or its bourgeois form, Bonapartism, enters the scene in the 
moments of history when the sharp struggle of two camps raises the state power, so to speak, 
above the nation, and guarantees it, in appearance, a complete independence of classes—in 
reality, only the freedom necessary for a defense of the privileged.” Stalinism, he argued, was “a 
variety of the same system” in a workers’ state, based upon the “antagonism between an 
organized and armed soviet aristocracy and the unarmed toiling masses.”44 Meanwhile, a similar 
dynamic had led to the concentration of political power in Stalin’s hands. Just as the various 
consumer groups and classes of Soviet society found it necessary to grant the bureaucracy 
regulatory powers, the bureaucracy itself, torn by internal contradictions, had discovered a need 
for its own mediator. Thus, Trotsky explained, 
The increasingly insistent deification of Stalin is, with all 
its elements of caricature, a necessary element of the regime. The 
bureaucracy has need of an inviolable super-arbiter, a first consul 
if not an emperor, and it raises upon its shoulders him who best 
responds to its claim for lordship. That “strength of character” of 
the leader which so enraptures the literary dilettantes of the West, 
is in reality the sum total of the collective pressure of a caste which 
will stop at nothing in defense of its position. Each one of them at 
his post is thinking: l’etat—c’est moi. In Stalin each one easily 
finds himself. But Stalin also finds in each one a small part of his 
own spirit. Stalin is the personification of the bureaucracy. That is 
the substance of his political personality.45  
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 9.3 CHARACTERISTICS: SIZE, PRIVILEGES, CONSCIOUSNESS 
In The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky devoted special attention to internal characteristics of 
the bureaucracy that he only had touched upon in the past. These included the size of the 
bureaucracy and the extent of its privileges. Additionally, Trotsky remarked again upon aspects 
of the consciousness of the caste as a whole, as well as of its various layers. 
Although for many years Trotsky had denounced the enormous size and privileges of the 
Soviet bureaucracy, he never attempted to estimate either with any precision. Now, he attempted 
to fill this gap with an analysis of “the social physiognomy of the ruling stratum.”46 In doing so, 
he began with the caveat that it was impossible to find accurate numbers to describe the Soviet 
bureaucracy. In part, this was because of the difficulties in delineating the “administrative 
apparatus” in a country where the state is almost the sole employer. In part, it was because Soviet 
statisticians etc., as well as “foreign friends” of the USSR were maintaining “an especially 
concentrated silence” on the question.47  
As far as the size of the bureaucracy was concerned, Trotsky’s previous estimates were 
quite vague. As we have seen, in the 1927 The Platform of the Opposition described the “layer of 
‘administrators’—in the party, the trade unions, the industrial agencies, the cooperatives and the 
state apparatus” as numbering “in the tens of thousands.”48 By the early 1930s Trotsky’s 
estimates for the entire bureaucracy were much higher, but no less hazy. Thus, he spoke of the 
“millions of people” in the Stalinist apparatus, of the “few million” functionaries, of the “many 
millions” in the “ruling stratum,” of the “multimillioned bureaucracy,” and of the “millions of 
bureaucrats” who supported the Stalinist tendency.49 
Now Trotsky attempted a more precise estimate, beginning with the summit of the 
bureaucracy. He noted that, as of November 1, 1933, there were 55,000 directing personnel in 
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 the central state apparatus. However, that figure had grown considerably in recent years, and it 
excluded some departments, the co-operative centers, various “social organizations,” the 
governmental apparatuses of the republics, as well as the “general staffs” of the trade unions, 
party, etc. Including these in his calculations, Trotsky concluded, “We will hardly be 
exaggerating if we number the commanding upper circles of the Soviet Union and the individual 
republics at 400,000 people”— or maybe as large as half a million. These were not the 
“‘functionaries,’” but the “‘dignitaries’” or “‘leaders’” of the bureaucracy—“a ruling caste in the 
proper sense of the word,” perhaps approximately the same group described in the 1927 Platform 
as “a layer of ‘administrators.’”50  
Below the top level was a “heavy administrative pyramid with a broad and many faceted 
foundation.” This group included the executive committees of provincial town and district 
soviets, and parallel organs in the party, the trade unions, the Communist Youth, local organs of 
transport, commanding staffs of the army and fleet, agents of the secret police, and the presidents 
of the town and village soviets. It also included the administrative and technical personnel of 
industrial enterprises, the presidents and party organizers of 250,000 collective farms, and the 
elders of trade departments and cooperatives. By Trotsky’s calculation, “This whole stratum 
which does not engage directly in productive labor, but administers, orders, commands, pardons 
and punishes . . . must be numbered at five or six million.”51 This was the bureaucracy in its 
entirety.  Related to the bureaucracy was another social stratum Trotsky recently had begun 
to focus upon—the “labor and collectivized peasant aristocracy.” Together, Trotsky guessed, this 
stratum totaled perhaps another five to six million.52 Finally, to arrive at an estimate of the 
portion of the Soviet population truly represented by the top leadership, Trotsky added the 
figures for the bureaucracy and the aristocracy and then, treating this group as analogous to a 
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 social class, also included estimates for their families. From this, Trotsky concluded that twenty 
to twenty-five million people, or twelve to fifteen percent of the Soviet population, constituted 
“the authentic social basis of the autocratic ruling circles.”53 
Regarding income, Trotsky observed, “There is no possibility of estimating what share of 
the national income is appropriated by the bureaucracy.” Again, in part this was because 
information on the incomes of the bureaucracy was carefully hidden. Also, the problem of 
estimating was complicated by the fact that an accurate figure would have to include the 
“immense gifts” exchanged among the bureaucracy, as well as the significant embezzlement of 
state funds at all levels. Beyond that, it was necessary to include the bureaucracy’s “almost 
monopolistic enjoyment of the . . . conquests of civilization,” such as theaters, rest palaces, 
hospitals, resorts, etc. However, as rough approximation Trotsky guessed that, including salaries, 
semi-legal incomes, and privileges, perhaps 15-20 percent of the Soviet population enjoyed “not 
much less of the wealth than is enjoyed by the remaining 80 to 85 percent.”54  
Related to the material position of the bureaucracy, according to Trotsky, was its 
consciousness—that is, its attitudes or its psychological makeup. This was a theme Trotsky had 
commented upon frequently in the past. Here, he only touched upon it briefly. In the context of 
Soviet poverty, Trotsky suggested, the opportunities for self-enrichment available to the 
bureaucracy had created a common set of attitudes. These attitudes included acquisitiveness, 
caste solidarity, fear of the masses, and subservience to Stalin: 
Where a separate room and sufficient food and neat 
clothing are accessible only to a small minority, millions of 
bureaucrats, great and small, try to use the power primarily in 
order to guarantee their own well-being. Hence the enormous 
egoism of this stratum, its firm inner solidarity, its fear of the 
discontent of the masses, its rabid insistence upon strangling all 
criticism, and finally its hypocritically religious kowtowing to “the 
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 Leader”, who embodies and defends the power and privileges of 
these new lords.55  
 
At another point in The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky spoke of the “moral decay of the 
uncontrolled apparatus.” Citing articles by Oppositionists Rakovskii and Sosnovskii, he observed 
that the bureaucracy had acquired distinctly non-proletarian tastes for luxury and for young 
women with bourgeois backgrounds. Also, Soviet authorities had become used to treating the 
masses with a “lordly ungraciousness.”56 
Additionally, Trotsky noted variations in the consciousness of diverse layers and 
divisions of the bureaucracy. For example, he asserted that the contrast between life-styles of 
bureaucrats at the bottom of the pyramid and those at the top, analogous to differences between 
“the petty bourgeoisie of the backwoods” and “the big bourgeoisie of the capitals” in capitalist 
countries, had produced corresponding differences in “habits, interests and circles of ideas.”57 
Furthermore, he noted the similarities between the outlooks of various bureaucratic occupational 
groupings and their counterparts in the West. Thus, Soviet trade union leaders had “the same 
scornfully patronizing relation to the masses, the same conscienceless astuteness in second-rate 
maneuvers, the same conservatism, the same narrowness of horizon, “ etc. as Western trade-
union bureaucrats. Similarly, Soviet diplomats had taken from diplomats in the West not only 
their tailcoats, but their modes of thought.” 58 
9.4 CHARACTERISTICS: POLICIES 
Considering an even broader range of issues than he had in previous years, in The 
Revolution Betrayed Trotsky again attempted to demonstrate the divergence of contemporary 
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 Soviet behavior from ideal socialist policy and/or previous Bolshevik practice. In each area 
Trotsky’s discussion was framed by his discussion of the socio-economic context. Thus, in 
policy after policy Trotsky conceded that part of the deviation had been necessitated by the 
backwardness and transitional character of Soviet society. However, in each case he also 
attributed a major portion of the reaction to efforts by the bureaucratic caste to maintain and 
enhance its own power and privileges.  
9.4.1 Economic Policy 
In his discussion of economic policy, Trotsky devoted special attention to the issue of 
inequality. In light of the low level of social productivity and the transitional character of the 
society, he explained that at least some degree of inequality was unavoidable. In 1935 the 
Stalinists had been forced to retreat from planned distribution to trade, just as the Bolsheviks had 
been compelled to retreat from “socialist distribution” to the market of NEP. Inevitably, Trotsky 
admitted, this “raising of the productivity of labor on the basis of commodity circulation,” had 
entailed “a growth of inequality.”59 However, reviewing the extremes of inequality promoted by 
the bureaucracy, Trotsky concluded that much of it was unnecessary from an economic 
standpoint, and was introduced only to feed the privileges and reinforce the power of the 
bureaucracy.  
The most profound economic differentiation noted by Trotsky was between the 
“privileged minority,” including the bureaucracy and the labor and peasant aristocracies, and 
“the majority getting along on want.”60 Workers and collective farmers lived in crowded housing 
or huts, while bureaucrats complained of the lack of domestic servants. The average Soviet 
citizen competed for vacant seats on filthy passenger trains, while the bureaucracy reserved for 
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 itself parlor cars, special trains and steamers, and the best automobiles and airplanes. Even while 
recognizing “the historic necessity of inequality for a prolonged period,” Trotsky observed, 
“questions remain open about its admissible limits and its social expediency in each concrete 
case.” He predicted that the question of whether or not the existing structure was socialist would 
be decided “by the attitude toward it of the masses themselves,” and not by “the sophisms of the 
bureaucracy.”61 
At the same time, Trotsky noted the growing income disparities within the proletariat. At 
one extreme were the unskilled workers who lived in a “regime of destitution,” earning 1200 to 
1500 rubles per year or less, and living in rundown, common dwellings. At the other extreme 
were the Stakhanovites who received incomes and privileges twenty to thirty times the earnings 
of lower categories of workers. “In scope of inequality in the payment of labor,” Trotsky 
observed, “the Soviet Union has not only caught up to, but far surpassed the capitalist 
countries!”62  
At least part of the inequality associated with Stakhanovism, according to Trotsky, was 
necessary to spur production. Against the claims of the Stalinist leadership, Trotsky asserted that 
there was nothing “socialist” about Stakhanovism; rather, it was just a variant of the hated 
system of piecework payment described by Marx as “‘the most suitable to capitalistic methods of 
production.’” Nevertheless, in light of the low degree of Soviet economic development, the 
adoption of a piecework system was completely appropriate; it was a question of “abandoning 
crude illusions.”63  
However, the degree of inequality associated with Stakhanovism, which had provoked 
furious resistance among workers, was another matter entirely. Trotsky argued that the “flagrant 
differences in wages, doubled by arbitrary privileges,” were not designed to promote 
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 productivity. Rather, they were employed by the bureaucracy to introduce “sharp antagonisms” 
into the proletariat in accordance with the maxim “Divide and rule!” Furthermore, many of the 
more extreme examples of privilege represented attempts by local bureaucrats “to escape from 
their isolation” by allowing an upper stratum of workers to share in their benefits.64 
Trotsky noted even more pronounced disparities within agriculture. On the surface it 
seemed that “collective tendencies” had triumphed over “individualistic” or bourgeois tendencies 
in the civil war over collectivization. In fact, he observed, the struggle continued within the 
collectives themselves. Bourgeois tendencies were evident in the recent state transfer land to the 
kolkhozy for their “eternal” use; in the restoration of small private plots, viewed by the peasant as 
“no less significant than the collectives”; and in the increasingly common, though illegal, 
practice of renting land. According to Trotsky these were all contributing to a growing 
differentiation within the village. Other factors included differences in climate, soil, crop 
produced, and proximity to industrial centers. The end result had been the growth of “a species 
of bourgeois collectives, or ‘millionaire collectives.’”65  
Again, Trotsky expressed mixed feelings about the disparities. On one hand, some degree 
of differentiation was necessary in light of the backwardness of Soviet agriculture: “To attack the 
kulak collectives and members of collectives would be to open up a new social conflict with the 
more powerful ‘progressive’ layers of the peasantry, who are only now, after a painful 
interruption, beginning to feel an exceptionally greedy thirst for a ‘happy life.’”66 At the same 
time, however, Trotsky perceived that a significant part of the differentiation was designed 
simply to buttress the rule of the bureaucracy. In agriculture as in industry, the bureaucracy 




Thus in agriculture immeasurably more than in industry, 
the low level of production comes into continual conflict with the 
socialist and even co-operative (collective farm) forms of property. 
The bureaucracy, which in the last analysis grew out of this 
contradiction, deepens it in turn.67  
9.4.2 Social Policy 
Trotsky employed a similar approach in his discussion of “family, youth and culture,” 
themes he had last focused upon in 1923 and 1924.68 In the early years of the revolution, Trotsky 
recalled, the Bolsheviks had attempted heroically to liberate women through a variety of 
measures. In particular, the traditional housekeeping and child-rearing functions of the family 
were to be socialized through the introduction of maternity houses, crèches, kindergartens, 
schools, social dining rooms, social laundries, etc. Again, the Bolsheviks had run up against the 
constraints of poverty. Now, nearly twenty years after the revolution the number and quality of 
institutions providing these services remained shockingly inadequate. At the same time, 
widespread poverty, together with the growth of a privileged layer, had fostered the growth of 
prostitution.69  
However, in Trotsky’s view the reaction in policy regarding women and the family had 
gone much further than necessity required. Lacking the resources to provide safe and sanitary 
abortions, the state recently had reversed traditional Bolshevik policy and had banned them 
altogether. Then, making a virtue of necessity, a leading representative of the bureaucracy had 
justified the new policy by extolling the “joys of motherhood.” Beyond that, the bureaucracy had 
begun to glorify the family as the “sacred nucleus of triumphant socialism,” and in the process 
had initiated a campaign against frequent and easy divorces. Trotsky argued that these extreme 
forms of reaction were dictated not by necessity, but by bureaucratic interest: “The most 
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 compelling motive of the present cult of the family is undoubtedly the need of the bureaucracy 
for a stable hierarchy of relations, and for the disciplining of youth by means of 40,000,000 
points of support for authority and power.”70 
As far as Soviet national policy was concerned, Trotsky recognized that contradictions 
inevitably arose between the cultural demands of the non-Russian nationalities and the 
requirements of Soviet economic construction during the transition period: 
The cultural demands of the nations aroused by the 
revolution require the widest possible autonomy. At the same time, 
industry can successfully develop only by subjecting all parts of 
the Union to a general centralized plan. But economy and culture 
are not separated by impermeable partitions. The tendencies of 
cultural autonomy and economic centralism come naturally from 
time to time into conflict.71 
 
Still, he believed it was possible to reconcile these contradictions with the “actual participation” 
of the various nationalities by drawing “the necessary lines between the legitimate demands of 
economic centralism and the living gravitations of national culture.”72  
However, for Trotsky, this was precisely where the problem arose as far as the 
bureaucracy’s national policy was concerned. Instead of collaborating with the various national 
groupings to establish policy, the bureaucracy approached “both economy and culture from the 
specific interests of the ruling stratum.”73 The extreme centralization of bureaucratic control 
meant that Soviet national policy was Great Russian policy in fact, if not in intent: “Since the 
Kremlin is the residence of the authorities, and the outlying territories are compelled to keep step 
with the center, bureaucratism inevitably takes the color of an autocratic Russification, leaving to 
the other nationalities the sold indubitable cultural right of celebrating the arbiter in their own 
language.”74 
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 Likewise, Trotsky insisted that bureaucratic control of culture had greatly exceeded what 
was needed. While reaffirming that science and art under socialism would be free of “even any 
shadow of compulsion,” Trotsky asserted that a transitional regime necessarily establishes 
“severe limitations upon all forms of activity, including spiritual creation.” According to 
Trotsky, in the early years the Bolshevik Party always viewed such restrictions as a temporary 
evil, and even in the civil war had never presumed to pass judgment on artistic and scientific 
questions.75 However, since that time, the bureaucracy had vastly outstripped the requirements of 
political necessity in its control over culture: 
The present ruling stratum considers itself called not only to 
control spiritual creation politically, but also to prescribe its roads 
of development. The method of command-without-appeal extends 
in like measure to the concentration camps, to scientific agriculture 
and to music. The central organ of the party prints anonymous 
directive editorials, having the character of military orders, in 
architecture, literature, dramatic art, the ballet, to say nothing of 
philosophy, natural science, and history.76 
 
As the powers of the bureaucracy increased, natural and social sciences and the arts were all 
conscripted to glorify the regime, Stalin, and the latest zigzags in policy. According to Trotsky, 
the central concern of the bureaucracy regarding art was to make sure that it incorporated the 
bureaucracy’s interests, and to present these in a manner that would “make the bureaucracy 
attractive to the popular masses.”77 Predictably, Trotsky concluded, the end product was less than 
impressive: “In reality, in spite of individual exceptions, the epoch of the Thermidor will go into 
the history of artistic creation pre-eminently as an epoch of mediocrities, laureates and 
toadies.”78 
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 9.4.3 Military and International Policy  
Regarding international affairs, Trotsky argued that the dangerous situation in which the 
USSR now found itself had been created by a combination of objective factors, including its 
backwardness and isolation, and subjective factors, including the confusion and demoralization 
of the world proletariat. Of the two, Trotsky viewed the subjective as more important:  
The danger of a combined attack on the Soviet Union takes 
palpable form in our eyes only because the country of the soviets is 
still isolated, because to a considerable extent this “one sixth of the 
earth’s surface” is a realm of primitive backwardness, because the 
productivity of labor in spite of the nationalization of the means of 
production is still far lower than in capitalist countries, and 
finally—what is at present most important—because the chief 
detachments of the world proletariat are shattered, distrustful of 
themselves and deprived of reliable leadership.79 
 
Furthermore, according to Trotsky, the primary blame for the weakened state of the subjective 
factors fell on the bureaucracy. “The fact is,” he asserted, “that in its capacity as leader of the 
Communist International, the nationally limited and conservative, ignorant and irresponsible 
Soviet bureaucracy has brought nothing but misfortunes to the workers’ movement of the 
world.” In this regard, he pointed in particular to the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1925-27, 
and “the shattering of the German proletariat.”80 
In his discussion of recent Soviet international policy Trotsky drew a sharp line between 
legitimate compromises dictated by necessity, and the unprincipled concessions of the Soviet 
leadership. According to Trotsky, “no serious revolutionary statesman would deny the right of 
the Soviet state to seek supplementary supports for its inviolability in temporary agreements with 
this or that imperialism.”81 In fact, he recalled that in the first years after the revolution the 
Soviet government had concluded a whole series of treaties with bourgeois governments, 
604 
 including the Brest-Litovsk peace of 1918, a treaty with Estonia in 1920, the Riga peace with 
Poland in 1920, and the Rapallo agreement with Germany in 1922.82  
However, at the same time he observed, “It could never have entered the mind of the 
Soviet government as a whole, nor any member of it, to represent its bourgeois counteragents as 
‘friends of peace,’ and still less to invite the communist parties of Germany, Poland, or Esthonia 
to support with their votes the bourgeois governments which had signed these treaties.”83 Yet 
that was exactly what the Soviet government, and even the Communist International, had done in 
connection with the Soviet entry into the League of Nations and the Franco-Soviet pact. By 
painting up the episodic allies of the USSR, Trotsky observed, the Comintern had become “a 
political agent of the imperialists among the working classes.”84 He explained this shift in 
perspective in terms of the evolving mentality of the Soviet bureaucracy: 
Having betrayed the world revolution, but still feeling loyal 
to it, the Thermidorean bureaucracy has directed its chief efforts to 
“neutralizing” the bourgeoisie. For this it was necessary to seem a 
moderate, respectable, authentic bulwark of order. But in order to 
seem something for a long time, you have to be it. The organic 
evolution of the ruling stratum has taken care of that.85  
 
Recent developments in the Red Army afforded Trotsky further examples of the 
Thermidorian reaction. One of these involved policy related to the militia system. Trotsky 
recalled that the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 had set a long-range goal of transforming the 
army into a militia system organized on a territorial basis. However, according to Trotsky, even 
though a militia system is cheaper than a regular army, it requires a “high economic basis” in the 
form of established railroads, highways, etc. Consequently, in the early years of Soviet power the 
emphasis was always upon the more expensive regular army. In this regard Trotsky remarked, 
“There is nothing here to wonder at. It is exactly because of its poverty that the Soviet society 
has hung around its neck the very costly bureaucracy.”86 
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 Trotsky noted that policy regarding the militia system changed rapidly when his 
opponents took over the War Commissariat in 1925. Hoping to avoid wars by “neutralizing” the 
world bourgeoisie, and thus relatively unconcerned about defense, they quickly reorganized 74 
percent of the Red Army on a militia basis. However, with the rise to power of Hitler and the 
rearmament of Germany, the Soviet government was forced to take the needs of defense more 
seriously. Again it reversed course, rapidly shifting the balance to 77 percent regular and 23 
percent territorial divisions. Although Trotsky agreed that, within limits, the “productive 
foundations of society” had necessitated a shift, he regarded the rapid slide from 74 to 23 percent 
as “excessive.” In part, he suggested, this had been done under pressure from the French general 
staff; beyond that, it was motivated by “political” considerations—specifically, the “undesirable 
closeness of the army to the people” as indicated by the “keen discontent” in the army during the 
First Five-Year Plan.87  
Further manifestations of Thermidor in military policy noted by Trotsky included the 
restoration of the hated cossack troops and the reinstitution of the officers’ corps abolished by 
the revolution. Of the former, Trotsky asked, “Is it possible to doubt that these riders of the 
steppes are again on the side of the privileged against the oppressed?”88 Regarding the latter, 
Trotsky asserted that the “purely political aim” of this measure was “to give a new social weight 
to the officers.”89 
9.4.4 Regime   
In his discussion of the Soviet regime Trotsky again denounced various aspects of 
repression, including the “continual purgations” of the party and Soviet organization to prevent 
“the discontent of the masses from finding a coherent political expression,” the spread of “spying 
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 and tale bearing,” the judicial conviction in court of the bureaucracy’s political enemies by 
means forgeries, and the exacting of confessions by threat of the firing squad. He charged that 
the “the sword of the dictatorship,” which had been used against those who would restore 
privilege, was now directed against those who revolted against privilege. In particular, the 
Thermidorians directed the repression against the Oppositionists who reminded them of the past, 
and made them “dread the future.” The Oppositionists had been expelled and arrested by the 
“tens of thousands” and sent to exile or prisons and concentration camps, where hundreds had 
been shot or had died of hunger strikes or suicide.90 
However, the largest part of Trotsky’s discussion of regime developments was devoted to 
the new draft constitution of the USSR. Much of this simply repeated remarks Trotsky had made 
in recent months. As in previous articles, he derided the undemocratic way this “most 
democratic” of constitutions was being introduced and dismissed many of the democratic 
guarantees as mere window dressing. Again he exposed the sophistry of Stalin’s justification of 
one-party rule. Again he suggested that the constitution was being introduced in part to provide, 
through the secret ballot, a “whip” to be used for the reform of the bureaucracy. And again he 
argued that in part it was being introduced to forestall a revival of militant worker and Red Army 
soviets by liquidating them juridically.91 
An important new aspect of Trotsky’s analysis was his explicit examination of the 
constitution in the context of the backwardness and transitional character of Soviet society. For 
Trotsky, this context was relevant for deciphering the true significance of the opening chapter of 
the constitution, which declared, “The principle [of work] applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of 
socialism: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.’”92 For Trotsky, 
this slogan made a mockery of Marx’s assertion that labor and remuneration in the more 
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 advanced phase of communist society would be characterized by the formula: “From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!”93 By this, Trotsky explained, Marx had 
meant that work under communism would cease to be an obligation, and would become instead 
an individual need, rewarded generously and without “humiliating control.” In fact, the Soviet 
Union, still lacked the means of fulfilling either half of the formula. Consistent with the level 
attained by Soviet society, payment was really nothing but the old capitalist system of wage 
labor. But instead of “frankly acknowledging that bourgeois norms of labor and distribution” still 
prevailed, the authors of the constitution had completely distorted Marx’s principle, “and upon 
this falsification erected the structure of their constitution!”94  
Another aspect of the Soviet constitution that became clear in light of the backward and 
transitional nature of Soviet society was Article 10, which guaranteed the “personal property 
right of citizens.”95 Of all the provisions of the constitution, Trotsky regarded this article as 
undoubtedly “of greatest practical significance in the economic sphere.” He explained that, in 
part, its purpose was to defend the property of peasants and workers from frequent and arbitrary 
seizures by members of the bureaucracy—a measure necessary for stimulating labor 
productivity. Beyond that, however, it was designed to protect the more substantial 
accumulations of members of the bureaucracy: “The bureaucrat’s automobile will certainly be 
protected by the new fundamental law more effectively than the peasant’s wagon.”96 
Trotsky also examined the new methods of electing soviets from the perspective of the 
transitional character of Soviet society. Besides eliminating the legal possibilities of reviving the 
soviets, he now suggested, these measures also facilitated a restoration of capitalism. He 
described these reforms as “an immense step back from socialist to bourgeois principles,” which 
paralleled “the same historic course” embodied in the rightward shifts in foreign policy, in the 
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 family, and in social inequality. “By juridically reinforcing the absolutism of an ‘extra-class’ 
bureaucracy,” Trotsky warned, “the new constitution creates the political premises for the birth 
of a new possessing class”—that is, for capitalist restoration.97 
One final development in Trotsky’s analysis of the regime that is worth noting was his 
characterization of the regime as totalitarian. This term had been in use for some time, having 
been coined in the early 1920s by the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile, and then adopted by 
Italian fascists themselves. In the late 1920s and early 1930s both the popular press and social 
scientists began to employ it in reference to both fascist and socialist parties and regimes.98 
Apparently the first description of the USSR as totalitarian by a partisan of the far left appeared 
in a letter by the Oppositionist Victor Serge, written shortly before his arrest on February 1, 1933 
and published soon afterwards in the French paper La Révolution prolétarienne.99 Trotsky may 
have picked up the term either from the popular press or from a reconsideration of Serge’s 
article.100  
 On a few occasions previously Trotsky had compared aspects of the Soviet regime to 
those in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Thus, on January 20, 1934 in an article devoted to the 
upcoming Seventeenth Party Congress, Trotsky remarked that “in the last period the Soviet 
bureaucracy has familiarized itself with many traits of victorious fascism, first of all by getting 
rid of the control of the party and establishing the cult of the leader.”101 Similarly, in an article of 
May 22, 1936 written in light of the recent revelations of Tarov, Ciliga, and Serge, Trotsky 
observed, “The concentration camps are now spread over the whole periphery of the country and 
are imitations of the camps in Hitler Germany.”102 However, until now Trotsky had not applied 
one label to the political systems of Italy, Germany, and the USSR. 
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 Now, besides noting again the “deadly similarity” in the features of Stalinism and 
fascism,103 in The Revolution Betrayed Trotsky employed the term totalitarian five times in 
reference to the Soviet regime. Describing the “unlimited hierarchy of party secretaries” that 
reigned in the party, the state, the trade unions, the cooperatives, etc., he asserted that the 
“regime had become ‘totalitarian’ in character several years before this word arrived from 
Germany.”104 He observed that, instead of withering, the Soviet state had “acquired a totalitarian-
bureaucratic character.”105 He commented upon the ruinous “effect of the ‘totalitarian’ regime 
upon artistic literature.”106 He insisted that in a nationalized economy the production of quality 
goods required democracy and freedom to criticize—“conditions incompatible with a totalitarian 
regime of fear, lies and flattery.”107 Finally, after asserting that Stalin’s faction had eliminated 
the party’s traditional struggle against bureaucracy and had subjected the party to its own 
apparatus while merging the latter with the apparatus of the state, he observed, “Thus was 
created the present totalitarian regime.”108  
Although Trotsky did not explicitly define totalitarian here, these passages suggest a few 
of the general features he had in mind. These included the concentration of enormous powers in 
the hands of a single “deified” leader, the elimination of popular control over the leadership, the 
use of extreme repression, and the elimination of contending loci of power. One additional 
similarity, according to Trotsky, was that both could be described as having the same ultimate, 
general cause: “the dilatoriness of the world proletariat in solving the problems set for it by 
history.”109  
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 9.5 CONSEQUENCES 
Since the early 1920s, the fear that had haunted Trotsky was that bureaucratization could 
result in capitalist restoration. Trotsky returned to this concern in The Revolution Betrayed. Once 
more he asserted that, for the time being, the Soviet Union remained a workers’ state. 
Nevertheless, he insisted that the transitional character of the Soviet regime did not mean that a 
transition to socialism was assured. “In reality, he concluded, “a backslide to capitalism is 
wholly possible.”110 Specifically, Trotsky now suggested that restoration might occur either 
through a Soviet defeat in the coming war, or through the efforts of a section of the bureaucracy. 
As in the past, Trotsky continued to insist that the Soviet Union remained a workers’ 
state. After repeated modifications of his position on this question over the previous three years, 
he was left now with one central criterion for this: the property relations as codified by Soviet 
law remained those established by the Bolshevik Revolution. Trotsky explained,  
Classes are characterized by their position in the social system of 
economy, and primarily by their relation to the means of 
production. In civilized societies, property relations are validated 
by laws. The nationalization of the land, the means of industrial 
production, transport and exchange, together with the monopoly of 
foreign trade, constitute the basis of the Soviet structure. Through 
these relations, established by the proletarian revolution, the nature 
of the Soviet Union as a proletarian state is for us basically 
defined.111 
 
Even though he admitted that the Soviet bureaucracy was extraordinarily autonomous, he 
insisted that it was not yet a new ruling class for it had “not yet created social supports for its 
domination in the form of special types of property.”112 
At the same time, Trotsky again challenged the position most commonly held by critics 
to his left—that the Soviet Union was state capitalist. He conceded that it was theoretically 
possible to conceive of a state capitalist system in which the entire bourgeoisie of a country 
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 would constitute itself a stock company that would own and administer the national economy of 
a country through the state. However, he argued that such a system could never exist in the real 
world because of the “profound contradictions among the proprietors themselves,” and because 
such a state would be “too tempting an object for social revolution.” Furthermore, for Trotsky 
the state capitalist designation clearly did not apply to the Soviet Union where the bureaucracy 
owned neither stocks nor bonds, where its members were recruited in the manner of an 
“administrative hierarchy,” where sons and daughters of bureaucrats could not inherit rights to 
exploit the state apparatus, and where the bureaucracy was forced to conceal its income and its 
very existence as a group. Again, Trotsky concluded that the bureaucracy’s “appropriation of a 
vast share of the national income has the character of social parasitism,” rather than of 
exploitation.113 
Still, for Trotsky it was all too possible that capitalism in its traditional form might be 
restored in the Soviet Union. One way this could occur would be would be through foreign 
intervention in the coming world war. In light of the overwhelming technical, economic, and 
military superiority of imperialism, Trotsky predicted, “If the war should remained only a war, 
the defeat of the Soviet Union would be inevitable.” Furthermore, because Soviet property forms 
were “sharply out of accord with the economic basis of the country,” the inevitable result of such 
a defeat by imperialism would be a change in property relations. Still, Trotsky professed 
optimism about Soviet chances of surviving a world conflict, given “the probability, and even the 
inevitability of revolution” in the event of a war.114 
Trotsky also perceived domestic forces that were working toward restoration. In the late 
1920s and early 1930s he had seen the domestic restorationist threat as emanating from alien 
class elements that were exerting pressure upon the state and party apparatuses. In contrast, he 
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 now saw this danger as arising directly out of the dynamics of the Soviet regime. “To the extent 
that, . . . it develops the productive forces,” he observed, the regime “is preparing the economic 
basis of socialism.” However, “To the extent that, for the benefit of an upper stratum, it carries to 
more and more extreme expression bourgeois norms of distribution, it is preparing a capitalist 
restoration.” Ultimately, Trotsky asserted, “Either the bourgeois norms must in one form or 
another spread to the means of production, or the norms of distribution must be brought into 
correspondence with the socialist property system.”115  
Although Trotsky asserted that limited economic progress had awakened “petty 
bourgeois appetites” within all social groupings of Soviet society, he identified the bureaucracy 
as the primary source of the threat of restoration. At least for the time being, he argued, the 
bureaucracy was compelled to defend state property both “as the source of its power and its 
income” and out of fear of the proletariat. However, in the absence of legally sanctioned property 
rights, the privileges of the bureaucracy were unstable and unable to be transferred by 
inheritance. Thus, Trotsky predicted that the bureaucracy inevitably would “seek supports for 
itself in property relations.” If it was successful, he warned, it would mean the conversion of the 
bureaucracy “into a new possessing class,” that is, a new capitalist class.116 
Trotsky further sketched how the process of restoration might appear both from the 
summit of power and from the level of the individual enterprise. Upon coming to power, he 
predicted, a bourgeois party—whether formed by foreign capitalists, by a section of the 
bureaucracy, or by other indigenous pro-capitalist elements, “would probably have to clean out 
fewer people [within the present bureaucracy] than a revolutionary party.” Immediately, it would 
proceed to promote capitalist relations in agriculture and to denationalize industry: 
First of all, it would be necessary to create conditions for the 
development of strong farmers from the weak collective farms, and 
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 for converting the strong collectives into producers’ cooperatives 
of the bourgeois type—into agricultural stock companies. In the 
sphere of industry, denationalization would begin with the light 
industries and those producing food. The planning principle would 
be converted for the transitional period into a series of 
compromises between state power and individual “corporations”—
potential proprietors, that is, among the Soviet captains of industry, 
the émigré former proprietors and foreign capitalists. 
Notwithstanding that the Soviet bureaucracy has gone far toward 
preparing a bourgeois restoration, the new regime would have to 
introduce in the matter of forms of property and methods of 
industry not a reform, but a social revolution.117 
 
At the same time, Trotsky reiterated a description he had offered several times previously of how 
a restoration would appear from below in the event of a disintegration of the regime: 
A collapse of the Soviet regime would lead to the collapse 
of the planned economy, and thus to the abolition of state property. 
The bond of compulsion between the trusts and the factories within 
them would fall away. The more successful enterprises would 
succeed in coming out on the road of independence. They might 
convert themselves into stock companies, or they might find some 
other transitional form of property—one, for example, in which the 
workers should participate in the profits. The collective farms 
would disintegrate at the same time, and far more easily. The fall 
of the present bureaucratic dictatorship, if it were not replaced by a 
new socialist power, would thus mean a return to capitalist 
relations with a catastrophic decline of industry and culture.118 
9.6 CURE 
Nevertheless, Trotsky believed that the dynamics of the regime, even while fostering 
restorationist tendencies, were strengthening forces that supported the transition to socialism. 
According to Trotsky, one consequence of Soviet bureaucratization had been the growth of 
discontent among the Soviet masses. He explained, “The bureaucracy is not only a machine of 
compulsion but also a constant source of provocation. The very existence of a greedy, lying and 
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 cynical caste of rulers inevitably creates a hidden indignation.”119 Furthermore, the improvement 
of the economic situation of the workers, by “increasing their self-respect and freeing their 
thought for general problems of politics,” actually had promoted this antagonism. Thus, the “vast 
majority of the Soviet workers” was already “hostile to the bureaucracy”; while the peasants 
hated the bureaucrats “with their healthy plebeian hatred.”120 
For the time being, Trotsky conceded, the proletarian struggle against the bureaucracy 
was muted. He explained that the Soviet working class feared that an attempt to remove the 
bureaucracy might open the door to restoration. However, he confidently predicted that, as soon 
as they were able to see an alternative, Soviet workers would rise to throw out the bureaucracy. 
For that to occur, it was “necessary that in the West or the East another revolutionary dawn 
arise.”121  
Again, Trotsky suggested that the struggle within the USSR might begin as a legal battle, 
made possible by the liberal reforms contained in the constitution, against “badly working organs 
of power.” However, Trotsky insisted that in order to succeed the struggle would have to become 
revolutionary in nature: “No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his own claws. The Soviet 
bureaucracy will not give up its position without a fight. The development leads obviously to the 
road of revolution.”122 To prepare the assault and to lead the masses in this political revolution, 
required the efforts of a revolutionary vanguard organization—the Soviet section of the Fourth 
International. Trotsky admitted that for the moment this section was weak and driven 
underground. However, he asserted that violence against a revolutionary vanguard could never 
save a caste that had outlived its usefulness.123 
Trotsky would not predict the precise program of the new revolution, for he argued that 
this would depend upon various factors, including the timing of the revolution, the level of 
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 Soviet economic development, and the international situation. However, he provided a general 
outline that included democratic, economic, and cultural aspects: 
It is not a question of substituting one ruling clique for 
another, but of changing the very methods of administering the 
economy and guiding the culture of the country. Bureaucratic 
autocracy must give place to Soviet democracy. A restoration of 
the right of criticism, and a genuine freedom of elections, are 
necessary conditions for the further development of the country. 
This assumes a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning 
with the party of Bolsheviks, and a resurrection of the trade unions. 
The bringing of democracy into industry means a radical revision 
of plans in the interests of the toilers. Free discussion of economic 
problems will decrease the overhead expense of bureaucratic 
mistakes and zigzags. Expensive playthings—palaces of the 
Soviets, new theaters, show-off subways—will be crowded out in 
favor of workers’ dwellings. “Bourgeois norms of distribution” 
will be confined within the limits of strict necessity, and in step 
with the growth of social wealth, will give way to social equality. 
Ranks [in the military] will be immediately abolished. The tinsel of 
decorations will go into the melting pot. The youth will receive the 
opportunity to breathe freely, criticize, make mistakes, and grow 
up. Science and art will be freed of their chains. And finally, 
foreign policy will return to the traditions of revolutionary 
internationalism.124 
 
Most significant here, and consistent with Trotsky’s recent admission of the corrosive effects of 
the ban on opposition parties, was his new demand for “a revival of freedom for Soviet parties.” 
Trotsky did not define here precisely which parties he had in mind, or suggest a method by 
which these would be selected. However, in his “Transitional Program” in 1938 Trotsky 
amplified a bit on this point, explaining, “The workers and peasants themselves by their own free 
vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties.”125  
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 9.7 LATER DEVELOPMENTS 
Of course, The Revolution Betrayed was not Trotsky’s final word on the Soviet 
bureaucracy. Until his assassination in 1940 Trotsky continued to comment upon developments 
in Soviet policy and within the USSR, to propose demands for the coming political revolution, to 
revise previous political assessments, to defend aspects of his theory against critics, and to 
introduce modifications into his theory.126 As far as his analysis of events is concerned, most 
important were his writings on the Moscow trials of 1936-1938,127 on Comintern policy in Spain 
in 1936-38,128 on the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939,129 on the Soviet invasion of 
eastern Poland in September 1939 and the subsequent transformation of property relations there, 
and on the Soviet invasion of Finland at the end of November 1939.130 Major new demands 
proposed by Trotsky during these years included his 1938 call for the removal of all bureaucrats 
from the soviets,131 and his 1939 proposal for an independent, Soviet Ukraine.132 One reversal of 
position, consistent with his enhanced emphasis upon the autonomy of the bureaucracy, included 
Trotsky’s admission in 1936 that he had been mistaken in believing the charges in the trials of 
the “Industrial Party” in 1930 and the Menshevik specialists in 1931.133 Even more significant 
was his conclusion in 1938 that, from the point of view of the bureaucracy, the Right Opposition 
had represented a “left danger.”134 The most important of Trotsky’s writings in defense of his 
theory of bureaucracy were his contributions in 1937 and in 1939-40 to debates within the 
international Trotskyist movement on the class nature of the Soviet Union.135 One significant 
terminological development during these years was Trotsky’s characterization in 1938 of the 
USSR as a “degenerated workers’ state.”136 A theoretical modification worth noting was 
Trotsky’s concession in 1938 that in “completely exceptional circumstances” Stalinist parties 
could break with their own capitalists to form a “workers’ and farmers’ government.”137 Other 
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important revisions in 1939 included Trotsky’s admission of the theoretical possibility that the 
Stalinist bureaucracy could become a new exploiting class if the war did not result in revolution, 
and his suggestion that events could compel the redefinition of the bureaucracy as a new class if 
a victorious Western proletariat ceded power to a bureaucracy.138 Nevertheless, despite these 
various applications, innovations, and adjustments, in all of his writings on the USSR after 
August 1936 Trotsky based his analysis in a fundamental sense upon the theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy codified in The Revolution Betrayed.  
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 10.0  CONCLUSION 
The story of the development of Leon Trotsky’s views on Soviet bureaucracy is a complex one. 
In his various writings on the subject Trotsky expressed three main understandings of the nature 
of that problem: Shortly after the revolution he denounced inefficiency in the distribution of 
supplies to the Red Army and scarce resources throughout the economy as a whole. By 1923 he 
had become concerned about the growing independence of the state and party apparatuses from 
popular control and their increasing responsiveness to alien class pressures. Then in later years 
Trotsky depicted the bureaucracy as a distinct social formation, motivated by its own narrow 
interests, which had attained a high degree of autonomy from all social classes. Throughout the 
course of this evolution, Trotsky’s thinking was influenced by a combination of factors that 
included his own major concerns at the time, preexisting images and analyses of bureaucracy, 
and his perception and analysis of unfolding events. In turn, at each point Trotsky’s 
understanding of the general nature of the problem directed and shaped his political activities and 
his analyses of new developments. From all of this, the image of Trotsky that emerges is of an 
individual for whom ideas and theories were supremely important, both as means of 
understanding the world, and as a guide to his own attempts at changing it. 
Soon after the revolution, many Bolsheviks derived their understanding of bureaucracy 
from the primary popular understanding of that term, as well as from the traditional Marxist 
analysis of political alienation. Thus, they perceived the problem of Soviet bureaucracy in terms 
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 of the excessive centralization of political power, and as related in various ways to the presence 
of bourgeois influence in the state apparatus. However, in this period Trotsky viewed the 
problem quite differently. Largely concerned about the effective operation of the war machine 
and of the economy as a whole, and drawing upon popular secondary meanings of bureaucracy, 
Trotsky defined the problem of Soviet bureaucracy almost exclusively in terms of inefficiency. 
Thus, during the civil war Trotsky began to focus especially on the phenomenon of 
glavkokratiia—an inefficient system he described as characterized by both the excessive 
concentration of economic power in the industrial glavki and tsentry and by the inadequate 
degree of central coordination between them. This understanding influenced Trotsky’s policy 
choices and his political behavior in a number of important ways. Most immediately, it led him 
to advocate a greater emphasis upon economic planning—a concern that would become a 
lifelong preoccupation. At the same time, it impelled him to dismiss the value of Lenin’s favorite 
institutional solution for the problem of bureaucracy: the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate. 
Then, in late 1922 Trotsky’s understanding of bureaucratic inefficiency helped bring him into an 
anti-bureaucratic alliance with Lenin. 
Beyond that, however, Trotsky’s focus upon the need for economic planning to address 
glavkokratiia also contributed greatly to his development of a new understanding of the problem 
of Soviet bureaucracy in 1923. Facing continued opposition by the leadership majority to a 
strengthened emphasis upon planning—even after it had been endorsed by the Twelfth Party 
Congress—Trotsky attempted to account for this resistance in terms of the classical Marxist 
analysis of political alienation. The problem, he argued, was that market forces and alien class 
pressures, as well as the specialization of officials, had pushed the state and party leadership to 
the right. This process had been facilitated by the bureaucratization of the party, understood in 
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terms of the widening separation of the party apparatus from the control of the ranks. Ultimately, 
Trotsky warned, such bureaucratism could lead to the opportunist degeneration of the party 
leadership, and even to the restoration of capitalism within the USSR. Again, Trotsky’s analysis 
of the problem of Soviet bureaucracy played a major role in guiding his political behavior, 
leading him in late 1923 into oppositional activity on behalf of party democracy, largely as a 
means of bringing about the changes in economic policy he sought.
Though defeated in the party struggle of 1923, Trotsky returned to the political and 
theoretical offensive in 1926-1927 with the formation of the United Opposition. At that point, 
Trotsky’s perception of a further deterioration of the party regime and a continuing drift to the 
right in economic and international policy convinced him even more that there was a direct 
relationship between the phenomenon of bureaucratism and the growth of alien class pressures. 
Consequently, in 1926-1927 Trotsky advanced a comprehensive and coherent theory of Soviet 
bureaucracy grounded entirely in that understanding. Even more sharply than before, he argued 
that a general shift in the balance of class forces had pressured the leadership into implementing 
rightist policies while repressing workers’ democracy. On the basis of that theory Trotsky 
warned again that the consequent weakening of the proletariat threatened to culminate in a 
capitalist restoration—most likely by a gradual and phased “Thermidorian” route. His theory 
also led him to conclude that only the Opposition, representing the proletarian vanguard, could 
hope to reform the party by pushing it back to the left and compelling the restoration of workers’ 
democracy.  
Ultimately, the Opposition was beaten and thousands, including Trotsky, were sent into 
internal exile. However, this was followed, not as Trotsky had predicted, by a strengthening of 
the party right and the restoration of capitalism, but by a dramatic series of leftist initiatives in 
 economic and Comintern policy, and by the defeat of the right wing of the party by the Stalinist 
center. Continuing to insist upon the validity of his theory, Trotsky attempted to reconcile the 
contradictions between his theory and reality by means of a series of ad hoc theoretical 
modifications and strained interpretations of events. Thus, while increasingly emphasizing the 
autonomy of the apparatus, Trotsky tended to downplay the significance of the “leftist” policy 
changes, and to explain these in terms of proletarian and/or Oppositional pressure. Furthermore, 
Trotsky’s theory led him to predict that, unless the left turns were supplemented by Oppositional 
pressure, they would quickly collapse. 
Still, between late 1929 and early 1933 Trotsky perceived the leadership as veering even 
more sharply to the left, dramatically accelerating industrialization, instituting mass 
collectivization and a campaign to eliminate the kulak, and deepening the “Third Period” line of 
the Communist International. At the same time, he noted that, while repressing dissidents of all 
persuasions, the leadership had inaugurated a cult of public adulation for Stalin. Trotsky 
denounced all of these shifts and innovations at least as sharply as he had criticized the policies 
of earlier years. Even more than before, the shifts in policy impelled him to push the limits of his 
old theory by introducing ad hoc modifications that emphasized the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy. However, probably due to a variety of factors—including the apparent successes of 
Trotsky’s theory in explaining events in 1926-1927, the absence of an acceptable theoretical 
alternative, his responsibilities as leader of the Opposition, and sheer stubbornness—Trotsky 
continued to insist upon the relevance of his image of the bureaucracy as highly responsive to 
alien class pressures. The result was an analysis of current developments that, in various 
respects, seemed both increasingly divorced from reality and increasingly incoherent. 
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 Ultimately, the event that precipitated a radical revision of Trotsky’s theory of 
bureaucracy was Hitler’s conquest and consolidation of power—a development that for Trotsky 
represented a failure of Comintern policy as profound as the capitulation of the Second 
International at the outset of World War I. Trotsky’s consequent break with the KPD initiated a 
chain reaction that overturned or modified a whole series of his other positions, in each case 
reinforcing his appreciation of the autonomy of the bureaucracy. Subsequently, Trotsky utilized a 
number of these insights to analyze new shifts to the right in Soviet economic and international 
policy, new developments in the party regime, and the wave of repression unleashed by the 
leadership following the Kirov assassination. Reciprocally, in early 1935 these interpretations of 
policy developments, combined with a rethinking of the history of the French Revolution, led 
Trotsky to initiate a new round of theoretical modifications, including a redefinition of 
Thermidor and Bonapartism, that culminated in 1936 in his call for a political revolution in the 
USSR.  
Trotsky’s new theory of bureaucracy received its most complete expression in his major 
theoretical work of 1936, The Revolution Betrayed. In that book Trotsky defined the bureaucracy 
as a social entity that had attained unprecedented independence from society as a whole, as well 
as from all social classes. His most important innovation, perhaps prompted by a reconsideration 
of his argument in The History of the Russian Revolution, was a discussion of the problems of a 
backward, transitional society. That notion provided a context for his reformulated account of the 
functional origins of bureaucratic power, a framework for evaluating Soviet policies in all 
spheres, and a basis for his stark identification of the alternatives confronting the USSR as either 
political revolution or capitalist restoration. 
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 This story of the development of Trotsky’s theoretical position on the question of Soviet 
bureaucracy suggests a number of conclusions about the theorist himself. One of the most 
striking of the features that emerges is Trotsky’s enormous theoretical creativity. His passion for 
comprehending the political world was often expressed in his paraphrase of Spinoza’s 
recommendation: “It is necessary . . . , not to laugh, not to weep, but to understand!”1 The 
method Trotsky chose for achieving this understanding was through theorizing. Trotsky’s 
secretary, Jean van Heijenoort, has recalled Trotsky’s ability and tendency to construct theories 
even about personal matters at a moment’s notice and on the basis of limited evidence.2 The 
same characteristic is evident in Trotsky’s writings on Soviet bureaucracy. Over the course of 
two decades Trotsky developed three distinct conceptions of the problem of Soviet bureaucracy, 
but also a host of lesser theories on every aspect of reality related to each those conceptions.  
Nevertheless, despite this ability to construct theories quickly and easily, Trotsky could 
be quite conservative regarding theoretical change. He frequently demonstrated this trait in the 
contempt he expressed for anyone who attempt to “update” Marxism to reconcile it with current 
fashion—a practice he disparagingly characterized as “trimming Marx’s beard.”3 In this study, 
this trait was also evident in the way Trotsky clung to his own central ideas regarding Soviet 
bureaucracy. Most strikingly, this was apparent in Trotsky’s attempts to uphold key aspects of 
his 1926-1927 theory of bureaucracy as late as 1933, despite substantial evidence suggesting that 
these should be altered. Although there were various reasons for this, one certainly was that—for 
better or worse—his thinking could be inflexible when it came to his most deeply held beliefs.  
Another distinctive characteristic of Trotsky’s was the extent to which he utilized theories 
to guide his behavior. In fact, the purpose behind his theorizing was seldom simply 
understanding for its own sake. Rather, Trotsky was attempting to comprehend the world in 
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 order to be in a better position to change it. As he explained in his autobiography, “To 
understand the causal sequence of events and to find somewhere in that sequence one’s own 
place—that is the first duty of a revolutionary. And at the same time it is the greatest personal 
satisfaction possible for a man who does not limit his tasks to the present day.”4 Throughout this 
study, we have seen repeated examples from every period of how, in the “causal sequences” he 
identified, Trotsky repeatedly sought a place for himself and his supporters. 
Finally, as the previously quoted passage also indicates, this study suggests that Trotsky’s 
ultimate and consistent purpose was not focused upon narrow, personal interests, but rather upon 
the advancement of socialism and the revolution. As Trotsky explained in his “Testament” in 
February 1940,  
For forty-three years of my conscious life I have remained 
a revolutionist; for forty-two of them I have fought under the 
banner of Marxism. If I had to begin all over again I would of 
course try to avoid this or that mistake, but the main course of my 
life would remain unchanged. I shall die a proletarian revolutionist, 
a Marxist, a dialectical materialist . . . . My faith in the communist 
future of mankind is not less ardent, indeed it is firmer today, than 
it was in the days of my youth.5 
 
There were times when his own immediate concerns influenced his broader 
perspective—as when the problems he encountered in military supply shaped his general 
analysis of glavkokratiia. Furthermore, it seems there were times when interests of personal 
power may have sensitized him to larger issues—such as when his own growing isolation 
contributed to his perception of the erosion of workers’ democracy in 1923. Beyond that, there 
were times—as in the party struggle of 1926-1927 and afterwards—when Trotsky sought to 
enhance his own and the Opposition’s political power as a means of reform. However, there 
were no apparent cases in which Trotsky sought personal power in opposition to the 
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advancement of the revolution, or in which he cynically redefined the needs of the revolution to 
coincide with his own personal interests.  
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